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ABSTRACT

A transcript of a hearing on ethnic groups, immigrants, and opportunities for success is provided in this document. Included are prepared statements and supplemental materials by experts on population, ethnicity, public policy, and other issues relating to coexistence of the many ethnic and racial groups which live in the United States. Among the specific issues discussed are: who is mainly responsible for the social welfare of ethnic and racial groups; access to educational and economic opportunities; the efficacy of bilingual education and remedial programs; the labor market; changing demographics; assimilation and the melting pot concept. Minority groups discussed include Blacks, Puerto Rican, Native Americans, and Vietnamese. (KH)

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"MELTING POT—FACT OR FICTION"

ED270539

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND FAMILIES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HEARING HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, ON
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 1985

Printed for the use of the
Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families

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"MELTING POT—FACT OR FICTION"

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 1985

House of Representatives,
Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:38 a.m., in room 2257, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. George Miller (chairman of the select committee) presiding.

Members present: Representatives Miller, Lehman, Weiss, Levin, Wheat, Evans, Coats, Johnson, and Monson.

Staff present: Ann Rosewater, deputy staff director; Anthony Jackson, professional staff; Judy Weiss, professional staff; Mark Souder, minority staff director; and Joan Godley, committee clerk.

Chairman Miller. The Select Committee will come to order.

This morning's hearing is entitled "Melting Pot: Fact or Fiction." At the outset, I would like to commend our colleague, Alan Wheat, for suggesting the Select Committee hold this hearing and do it in conjunction with the Black Caucus Weekend. Having read most of the testimony, I think it is going to be a fascinating hearing for the members of the committee and for the audience.

At this point, I would like to recognize our ranking member, Mr. Coats, for any opening statement that he might have.

Mr. Coats. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This hearing, "Melting Pot: Fact or Fiction", raises some important issues. I am pleased that we are able to address these today.

Except for the native Americans, all of us here today can trace our roots back to some other origin. Regardless of the circumstances, we have all become part of that which we call America. The extent to which these groups are offered the opportunity to succeed and the extent to which the opportunity to succeed is taken will be examined today.

The problems that are faced, the barriers that must be overcome, and the characteristics that each ethnic group brings with it to the struggle for American success are all deserving of our attention. I look forward to the testimony that will be presented in that regard.

On the whole, some ethnic groups, such as the Japanese, have fared better than others. I would like to insert a U.S. family income index by ethnic group from Thomas Sowell's book, "Ethnic America, a History in the Economics and Politics of Race—An International Perspective." Dr. Sowell was unable to be with us today, but I encourage those who are further interested in this subject to include his reference books in their studies.

In addition to the raw data, we need to ask whether there are some traits, some family and cultural strengths, that some groups bring with them that help them succeed. Within the groups that have not fared as well, we need to ask how much of the difference is due to demographic variables, such as age, family size, and geographic differences. For example, Hispanics in San Antonio earn 59 percent of the income of non-Hispanic whites, but Hispanics in San Diego earn 84 percent of the income of non-Hispanic whites. After we compare statistics of equal value, I hope we can look into how to encourage the development of family strengths and attitudes of all groups, so that we can all participate in the opportunity that America offers.

Recent studies have shown us that the percentage of all children living in poverty has decreased, but that the percentage of black and Hispanic children living in poverty has increased. In our inner cities, statistics abound telling us of the alarming crime rate, school dropout rates, and rates of teenage pregnancies. It is evident that we have some serious problems that we must address. We have seen these serious problems increase steadily, even as the Federal Government has spent billions of dollars trying to bring about a solution.

We also need to look at some creative new ideas based on a factual, fair, nonidoleogical view of what is really happening in this country. That is partly why I am so looking forward to hearing the testimony of Dr. Ray Hammond about some of the work that he has been doing.

Eleanor Holmes Norton, former Chairman of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, states that—and I quote—"The ghetto is no longer a place; it's a way of life." What can we do? Where should we put our emphasis to restore hope and to encourage the opportunities for success? Hopefully some of the testimony we hear today will give us direction so that our young people won't have to feel as if they're destined to a life on a dead-end street.

Mr. Chairman, I have a number of articles, one of which I have already mentioned, that I would like to have included in the hearing record, and would ask that the hearing record be held open for 2 weeks. These articles include new and exciting ideas from Glen Loury, a black economist from Harvard, and several recent articles by William Raspberry, including one about Dr. Ray Hammond, who is with us today, and a New Republic cover story by Dr. Hammond and his partner, Jeff Howard. I would ask unanimous consent that we do keep the record open so that these could be included and used as a basis for our discussion.

I thank the Chair for holding this important hearing today.

[Opening statement of Congressman Dan Coats follows:]

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DAN COATS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF INDIANA AND RANKING MINORITY MEMBER

Mr. Chairman: This hearing, Melting Pot: Fact or Fiction? raises some very important issues. Except for the native Americans, all of us here today can trace our roots back to other countries. Regardless of the circumstances, we have all become a part of that which we call "America". The extent to which these groups are offered the opportunity to succeed, and the extent to which the opportunity to succeed is taken will be examined today. The problems that are faced, the barriers that must be overcome, and the characteristics that each ethnic group brings with it to the struggle for American success are all deserving of our attention. I look forward to the testimony that will be presented today.

On the whole, some ethnic groups such as the Japanese, have fared better than others. (I would like to insert a U.S. Family Income Index by ethnic group from Thomas Sowell's excellent article "Ethnicity in a Changing America." Dr. Sowell was unable to be with us today, but I encourage those who are further interested in this subject to include his reference books "Ethnic America: A History" and "The Economics and Politics of Race: An International Perspective" in their studies.) In addition to the raw data, we need to ask whether there are some traits, some family and cultural strengths, that some groups bring with them that helps them to succeed. Within the groups that have not fared as well, we need to ask how much of the differences is due to demographic variables such as age, family size, and geographic differences (For example, Hispanics in San Antonio earn 59% of the income of non-Hispanic whites; but in San Diego, Hispanics earn 84% of the income of non-Hispanic whites.) After we compare statistics of equal value, I hope we can look into how to encourage the development of family strengths and attitudes of all groups so that all can participate in the opportunity America offers.

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We need to look at some creative new ideas, based on a factual, fair, non-ideological view of what is really happening in this country. That's partly why I am so looking forward to hearing the testimony of Dr. Ray Hammond about some of the work he has been doing.

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Mr. Chairman, I have a number of articles that I would like to have inserted in the hearing record, including some exciting new ideas from Glen Loury, a black economist from Harvard; several recent articles by William Raspberry, including one about Dr. Ray Hammond, who is with us today; and a New Republic cover story by Dr. Hammond and his partner Jeff Howard. I would ask that the hearing record be held open for two weeks.

[Material referred to follows:]

4

THOMAS SOWELL

Ethnicity in a Changing America

[Reprinted or reproduced by permission of Daedalus, Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, "A New America", Vol. 107, Issue 1, winter, 1978—Boston, MA.]

THE RAPID AND far-reaching changes which swept across the United States in the decades since World War II had especially dramatic impact on racial and ethnic relations. For example, Jews were restricted or excluded from many university faculties before the war,[1] but in the postwar era their representation on such faculties rose far beyond their proportion of the population.[2] Sports which totally excluded black athletes before the war came to be dominated by black athletes after the war; in baseball, for example, there were seven consecutive years in which no white man won the National League's Most Valuable Player award.[3] Anti-Japanese laws, which flourished in California before the war, were resoundingly defeated in a postwar referendum.[4] Attitude surveys showed major reversals of public opinion on race and ethnicity,[5] and rising rates of intermarriage further substantiated these changes. More than 40 percent of all Japanese-American men now marry women who are not Japanese American,[6] and more than half of all Irish-American, German-American, and Polish-American married men are married to women outside their own respective ethnic groups.[7] Ironically, the once popular concept of America as a "melting pot" is now sweepingly dismissed by intellectuals at a time when it is closer to reality than before.

Ethnicity remains a major factor in such objective variables as income, education, fertility, unemployment, and crime, as well as in such subjective variables as general opinions and political preferences. However, ethnicity as an explanation is too general to explain very much. It could conceivably mean anything from genetic determinism to sweeping charges of "racism" as the reason for all intergroup differences. Moreover, American ethnic groups differ in so many demographic, geographic, and other respects that it is necessary to separate out the effects of these other differences in order to determine how much effect ethnicity, as such, has on the behavior of ethnic groups themselves or on the larger society's behavior toward them. For example, American ethnic groups differ substantially in median age—by more than a decade, in some cases[8]—and any two groups (ethnic or otherwise) with differing age distributions would tend to differ in a number of age-related phenomena, including income, fertility, unemployment, and crime, even if there were no other significant differences between the groups, and even if society made no conscious distinctions between them. In short, gross differences among ethnic groups have many sources, some ethnic, and some not; and these various sources of differences have to be considered and weighed individually.

Before attempting to account for the socioeconomic differences among American ethnic groups, it will be necessary to consider the magnitude of such differences, and the trends over time. Then it will be possible to consider such factors as age, discrimination, urbanization, and public policy.

1. *Ethnic Characteristics*

There is no single, comprehensive source of data on major American ethnic groups, nor any easy or certain way of making the data from various sources completely comparable. However, data for a number of ethnic groups can be obtained from the same sources, so that there is comparability among groups covered by a given source, even if not among groups whose data are derived from different sources. Data for seven of the ethnic groups covered here are from the decennial Census and data for five more ethnic groups are from the occasional *Current Population Reports* of the Bureau of the Census. These data are supplemented by private surveys. Each source will be identified as we consider, in order, income, occupation, fertility, and attitudes.

INCOME

Despite a tendency to think of "minorities" as poorer than the general U.S. population, some ethnic groups are above the national average in income, and some are below it. Those ethnic groups whose incomes are available from the 1970 Census are shown in Table 1. It is noteworthy that both Chinese Americans and Japanese Americans had higher incomes than the U.S. population as a whole, though both groups are visibly, persistently, and genetically different

TABLE 1.
MEAN INCOME (1969) OF EMPLOYED PERSONS

	Personal Income	Family Income
Total U.S. Population[1]	$ 5,817	$ 10,678
American Indians[2]	3,715	6,621
Black Americans[3]	3,680	6,821
Chinese Americans[2]	5,955	12,176
Filipino Americans[2]	5,149	10,395
Japanese Americans[2]	6,330	13,377
Puerto Ricans[2]	4,417	6,728
West Indians[4]	5,057	9,821

Source: 1970 U.S. Census

[1] Data from published 1970 U.S. Census.

[2] Data from 1970 U.S. Census, Public Use Sample.

[3] Data from 1970 U.S. Census, Public Use Sample, excluding black Americans of West Indian ancestry as defined in footnote 4.

[4] Data from 1970 U.S. Census, Public Use Sample; "West Indians" are defined here as black residents of the United States who were either born in the West Indies or whose parent(s) came from the West Indies.

from the general population. It is also noteworthy that black West Indians had higher incomes than Puerto Ricans, most of whom are white. A closer examination of color as an explanatory variable will be made in Section 2.

Some ethnic groups are not directly identifiable from the 1970 Census categories, nor would the decennial Census' "nativity and parentage" data cover them, because these groups immigrated so long ago that many (or most) would now be native born of native-born parents. The data in Table 2 are from special surveys conducted by the Bureau of the Census, but carried out with procedures differing from those of the decennial Census. Because these surveys do not cover 1969, the year whose income is reported in the 1970 Census, data from two surveys for the years 1968 and 1970 are shown in Table 2.

The data in Table 2 are less reliable than those in Table 7, for a number of reasons, but they probably are the best that is available on the groups in question. It is noteworthy that the older European immigrant groups' incomes are not above those of the two Oriental groups, nor dramatically above those of black West Indians.

Finally, there is an important group—Jewish Americans—who are not included in the government's data because of constitutional limitations on religious inquiries by the Bureau of the Census. A private survey by the National Jewish Population Study found a median family income of $19,259 among Jewish Americans in 1969. Even though the exact figure may be questioned (there was a nonresponse rate of about one-third on this question in the survey), the general position of the Jews as first in income among American ethnic groups agrees with the findings of other surveys.[9]

OCCUPATION

Because income and occupation are closely related, it is not surprising to find that those ethnic groups with higher incomes tend also to have higher occupational status. Rather than attempt to enumerate the whole range of occupations, three categories are selected for Table 3. The corresponding data for the descendants of European immigrants in 1969 are shown in Table 4. Because the data for the latter do not include "unemployed," there is some upward bias in the percentages for other occupational groups.

Mexican Americans are missing from Table 4 because their occupational distribution in 1969 was not covered by the *Current Population Reports*. How-

TABLE 2.
MEDIAN FAMILY INCOME

	1968	1970
German Americans	$ 8,607	$10,402
Irish Americans	8,127	9,964
Italian Americans	8,808	11,089
Mexican Americans	5,488	8,946
Polish Americans	8,849	11,619

Source: Current Population Reports of the U.S. Bureau of the Census (Series P-20, nos. 213, 221, 224, 249) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office).

TABLE 3.
OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION, 1969

	Professional, Technical, and Kindred	Operatives	Unemployed
Total U.S. Population[1]	14.0%	17.0%	3.9%
American Indians[2]	9.6	19.5	10.0
Black Americans[2]	7.6	22.4	6.3
Chinese Americans[2]	25.3	14.4	2.7
Filipino Americans[2]	23.1	12.8	4.4
Japanese Americans[2]	18.2	11.9	2.1
Puerto Ricans[2]	5.0	34.4	6.3
West Indians[2]	15.2	12.7	3.7

Source: 1970 U.S. Census
[1] Published Census data.
[2] 1970 Census, Public Use Sample.

ever, it is clear from a later survey (for 1971) that their occupational status has been low: only 4.5 percent were professional or technical, and 27.7 percent were operative.[10]

In occupation, as in income, there is no decisive advantage apparent for European minorities as compared to nonwhite ethnic groups as a whole—the differences within the latter being more dramatic than their overall differences from the so-called "white ethnics." The occupational data, like the income data, also demonstrate how misleading it is to compare one group with "the national average," for this average is derived from widely disparate statistical results for different groups. No group is as unusual as comparisons with a mythical "national average" might suggest. All have companion groups in comparable circumstances.

FERTILITY

In general, the respective fertility rates of American ethnic groups in Table 5 are inversely related to their income in Table 1. The lowest-income groups—American Indians and black Americans—have the largest number of children per woman, whereas the higher-income Orientals have among the lowest number of children per woman. This inverse relationship is not perfect, but it is very strong nevertheless.

Although fertility is ultimately a biological function, it has no apparent connection with race. Native black Americans and black West Indians living in the United States have sharply contrasting fertility patterns—the former with one of the highest ratios of children per woman and the latter with the very lowest among any of the ethnic groups shown (see Table 5). These two branches of the same race have greater fertility differences from each other than either has from the U.S. population as a whole. Moreover, the complete reshuffling of the rank order of fertility among American ethnic groups since 1910 also indicates a socioeconomic rather than a biological phenomenon. So too does the fact that some groups have more than halved their fertility rates in two generations—and

TABLE 4.
OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION, 1969

	Male Professional, Technical, and Kindred	Operatives	*Female* Professional, Technical, and Kindred	Operatives
German Americans	14.8%	18.2%	16.6%	13.0%
Irish Americans	14.1	17.9	14.9	13.1
Italian Americans	13.5	20.0	9.7	25.3
Polish Americans	14.5	19.6	13.1	19.2

Source: Current Population Reports, U.S. Bureau of the Census (Series P-20, no. 221) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970).

TABLE 5.
FERTILITY

	Children per Woman (1969), 15 years and older[1]	Children per Woman (1969), 15–44 years old[2]	Children per Woman (1969), 35–44 years old[3]	Children per Woman (1910), 35–44 years old[3]
Total U.S. Population	2.1	1.7	3.0	3.4
American Indians	2.8	—	—	—
Black Americans	2.4	2.0	3.6	4.2
Chinese Americans	1.9	—	—	—
Filipino Americans	1.9	—	—	—
German Americans	—	1.8	3.0	4.0
Irish Americans	—	1.9	3.1	3.3
Italian Americans	—	1.5	2.4	5.5
Japanese Americans	2.0	—	—	—
Mexican Americans	—	2.2	4.4	5.3
Polish Americans	—	1.6	2.5	5.9
Puerto Ricans	2.4	2.1	—	—
Russian Americans	—	1.4	2.4	5.3
West Indians	1.8	—	—	—

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.
[1] 1970 Census, Public Use Sample.
[2] *Current Population Reports*, P-20, no. 226, p. 14.
[3] Ibid., p. 28.

that this reduction has been most pronounced among the most rapidly rising group, the Jews (Russian Americans).

The inverse relationship between fertility and socioeconomic status is particularly striking within ethnic groups with a generally low socioeconomic level. The poorest and least educated members of such groups tend to have even more children than equally poor and equally uneducated numbers of the general population, whereas the higher income or better educated members of such ethnic groups tend to have even fewer children than equally high income or equally well-educated members of the general population. For example, Mexican Americans in general have the highest fertility rate among all the ethnic groups shown in Table 5, second column, but Mexican-American wives who have had four years of high school have fewer children than the national average among similarly educated wives, and fewer children than similarly educated wives in the other ethnic groups shown.[11] Many studies of blacks have shown a similar phenomenon: more children than their white counterparts at the low end of the socioeconomic scale and fewer children than their white counterparts at the upper end of the socioeconomic scale.[12] Indeed, upper-level blacks have long had fertility rates too low to reproduce themselves.[13]

Among the grim implications of such fertility patterns in low-income ethnic groups is that much of the hard struggle upward from poverty toward affluence has to be repeated over again from scratch in each new generation, because those who have succeeded do not reproduce themselves and those who remain trapped in poverty supply a disproportionate amount of the next generation. Looked at another way, much hard-won, and extremely valuable, "human capital" (in the form of successful experience) perishes with each generation among low-income minorities, whereas such human capital is progressively accumulated and compounded among groups whose more successful numbers supply a larger proportion of their next generation.

Another grim implication of ethnic fertility patterns is found in a study which showed that three-quarters of all black males who failed the Army mental tests came from families of four or more children, and one-half from families of six or more children.[14] The negative effect of large family size on mental test scores is a phenomenon which extends across racial or socioeconomic lines.[15] It has obvious importance in an era when educational requirements for jobs are rising. Moreover, it may indicate something about the general problems of children raised with an inadequate share of adult attention. Certainly the Army mental test findings undermine the arguments of those who claim that promoting birth control among low-income ethnic groups is a form of "subtle genocide."[16] The behavior of the more successful members of such ethnic groups suggests the opposite. So too does the historical record of sharply declining fertility rates among ethnic groups that have risen and are rising.

ATTITUDES

Although hard data are available on objective variables such as income or education, attitudes must be either inferred from behavior or judged by answers to survey questions—answers which may be biased by such factors as the wording of the question or the respondents' beliefs about the expected or acceptable answer. Nevertheless, attitudes by and about ethnic groups are too important to ignore. When there are major changes in such attitudes indicated by social behavior, survey responses, voting data—or, even more important, by all three indicating the same pattern or trend—then clearly it is a social phenomenon worth noting.

Some indicators of major changes in public opinion on race and ethnicity have already been noted: the breakdown of employment barriers against Jews and Negroes in the post-World War II period, and of intermarriage barriers as regards various ethnic groups, Oriental as well as European. Voting behavior likewise shows similar trends: not only are many more black public officials being elected, but some are being elected by overwhelmingly white constituencies—Senator Brooke in Massachusetts and Mayor Bradley in Los Angeles being the most striking examples. The first Oriental Senator and the first Catholic President were also elected during this period—and both became better known for their personal characteristics than for their ethnic designations. An ethnic slur against the Senator by a minor figure at the Watergate hearings brought instant, outraged mail and forced a public apology. Opinion surveys show similar major changes in the postwar era. As recently as 1958, just over half of the voters said that they would not vote for a "well-qualified" black candidate for President, but by 1971 less than one-fourth of the voters took that position.[17] Similar changes of opinion were apparent in surveys dealing with social contacts: white parents' acceptance of their children's bringing home black playmates grew from 40 percent in 1956 to 81 percent in 1971; a plurality in favor of state laws banning interracial marriage in 1965 changed to a majority against such laws by 1971.[18]

Although the general public's attitudes toward racial and ethnic differences are important, so too are the attitudes of the ethnic groups themselves. These attitudes often differ sharply from the media image of these groups. Almost two-thirds of black Americans found the law "too lenient" with criminals, and 78 percent declared themselves "sick and tired of hearing people attack patriotism, morality and other traditional American values."[19] Even in an era of interethnic rivalries and "white backlash" against policies to advance blacks, Governor Wallace obtained only 7 percent of the Irish votes in New York in 1968, no more than 17 percent of the Slavic vote in any state, only 10 percent of the Italian vote nationwide, and 2 percent of the Jewish vote. At the height of media discussion of "black anti-Semitism," Jewish candidates received overwhelming majorities—over 90 percent of the vote—in black districts in Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Ohio in 1968, and in New York State Arthur Goldberg "won a greater percentage of the black vote than any other similar candidate running for statewide office since Robert F. Kennedy."[20]

The post-World War II era cannot be generalized as the continuation or culmination of historic trends toward racial or ethnic toleration or acceptance, nor are all the current trends promising in that respect. Despite the view that "time" is a key variable tending to produce tolerance, there have been sustained periods of major retrogression in racial and ethnic relationships in the United States. The three decades prior to the Civil War saw ever tighter legal restrictions and ever narrowing economic opportunities for the half-million free blacks in the United States, and the period from about 1890 to World War I saw major political and social retrogression for the black population as a whole, culminating in the Woodrow Wilson administration, which was a disaster for black Americans. Anti-Semitism was stronger in the last quarter of the nineteenth century than it had been before. Mexican Americans likewise suffered growing intolerance around the turn of the twentieth century.[21] The restrictive immigration laws of the 1920s showed an increasing hostility toward ethnic Americans generally, one symptom of which was the spread of the Ku Klux Klan into northern communities on a large scale for the first time.[22] Anti-Japanese prejudice reached a new peak with the mass internment of Japanese Americans during World War II.

Once the post-World War II era is seen as a special period—not absolutely unique, but also not part of a constant or inevitable trend—then questions may be raised about its nature, its sources, and its likelihood of persistence. The racism of the Nazis and its consequences undoubtedly discredited racism in America and elsewhere. The ideals of the war effort, the international cooperation necessary for victory, and the experience of many Americans of serving together in the armed forces with people from other ethnic groups also set the stage for a reevaluation of existing racial and ethnic practices. Judicial and political decisions reinforced and extended these tendencies.

Although there is widespread evidence that American public opinion rejects restrictions based on race, religion, or nationality, there is also growing evidence of impatience with programs providing benefits based on similar ethnic criteria. Quotas or statistical "balance" have been rejected by public opinion and by elected officials, whether in "affirmative action" in employment programs or in school busing.[23] Violence has also polarized the races: after several summers of ghetto rioting, one-third of the American public said that they felt differently about Negroes—and almost all of these had changed to less respect.[24]

2. Causal Factors

Without attempting a definitive disentanglement of multiple causes, it is possible to make some general assessment of various factors in explaining some of the large—and even startling—differences that exist among American ethnic groups. Some of the factors examined here will include such well-recognized variables as discrimination and government policy, as well as the controversial and emotionally charged issue of genetic differences in intelligence. More mundane and more neglected variables, such as age and location, will also be considered. How important any given factor may prove to be in explaining ethnic group differences is ultimately an empirical question which cannot be decided by the amount of support or controversy it generates.

AGE

Age suffers the fate of being a noncontroversial variable, of no political or ideological use to anyone, and therefore it is often overlooked in explaining interethnic differences. But median age differences among American ethnic groups are substantial in themselves, and also substantial in their impact on a wide range of socioeconomic variables. Americans of Irish or Italian ancestry have median ages of about 36 years, whereas Americans of Puerto Rican or Mexican background have median ages of just one-half of that (Table 6). Russian Americans (mostly Jewish) are more than a decade older than Irish or Italian Americans, and are therefore nearly three times as old as the two Hispanic groups. Just over one-half of the Russian Americans are 45 years old or older, whereas only 12 percent of Puerto Ricans are that old. Because younger ethnic groups generally have lower incomes than older ethnic groups, the income differences may reflect age (experience) differences, rather than "ethnic" differences, as such—whether ethnic differences are conceived of in terms of the larger society's discrimination or in terms of the respective groups' "ability." As one striking example, Cuban Americans have higher incomes than Mexican Americans, but Mexican Americans earn more than Cuban Americans in the same age brackets; Americans of Cuban ancestry are simply 10 years older than Americans of Mexican ancestry.[25] Any theory which tried to explain the Cubans' "ethnic" advantage over Chicanos in income would be a theory about a nonexistent phenomenon. More broadly, theories which attempt to explain differences between any two ethnic groups, or between a given ethnic group and the "national average," run the risk of explaining too much if they do not first eliminate those differences due simply to differences in age distribution.

When the personal incomes of 30-year-old males are taken from the 1970 Census (Table 7), the differences among ethnic groups are much less than when gross comparisons are made, as in Table 1. Fertility is also an area where the age distribution of an ethnic group makes a difference (Table 8). If there is a dis-

TABLE 6.

AGE

	Median Age in 1969	% 45 and Older	% under 25
Total U.S. Population	28.0	30.2	46.4
American Indians[1]	20.4	19.5	57.7
Black Americans[2]	22.3	23.6	47.4
Chinese Americans[3]	26.8	—	—
German Americans[4]	35.5	37.0	35.7
Irish Americans[4]	36.7	39.3	35.0
Italian Americans[4]	36.1	38.3	35.3
Japanese Americans[5]	32.3	—	—
Mexican Americans[6]	17.8	15.2	62.4
Polish Americans[4]	39.8	43.4	31.1
Puerto Ricans[7]	18.3	12.1	52.2
Russian Americans[4]	45.8	51.4	26.4

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.
[1] *U.S. Census of Population, 1970; Subject Reports* PC(2)–1F, p. 2.
[2] *U.S. Census of Population, 1970; Subject Reports* PC(2)–1B, p. 2.
[3] *U.S. Census of Population, 1970; Subject Reports* PC(2)–1G, p. 61.
[4] *Current Population Reports*, P–20, no. 221, p. 4.
[5] *U.S. Census of Population; Subject Reports* PC(2)–1G, p. 2.
[6] *Current Population Reports*, P–20, no. 213, p. 6.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 6.

TABLE 7.

MEDIAN PERSONAL INCOME OF 30-YEAR-OLD MALES, 1969

American Indians	$ 5,324
Black Americans	5,838
Chinese Americans	7,638
Filipino Americans	5,795
Japanese Americans	9,528
Puerto Ricans	6,175
West Indians	6,561

Source: 1970 Census, Public Use Sample.

proportionate concentration of women in the prime child-bearing years, then the annual birth rate of a group is biased upward, even if the age-specific annual birth rate is no higher than average. If the total number of children per woman is considered, instead of the annual birth rate, then a disproportionate concentration of older women biases the fertility rate upward, because older women tend to have had more total children than younger women, even though younger women may be having more babies currently.

For example, Table 8 shows Filipino and Japanese Americans to have very similar numbers of children per woman, with the Filipinos having slightly less—1.9 versus 2.0. On an age-specific basis, however, Americans of Philippine ancestry generally have more children per woman than do Americans of Japanese ancestry. The age distributions are simply different—with about 36 percent of Japanese-American women being 45 years old or older, whereas only about 21 percent of Filipino-American women are that old. In the case of native black Americans versus black West Indians in the United States, the gross fertility rate differences understate the actual intergroup differences among women of the same age. In the central 25–44 age brackets, native black Americans of native parentage average more than one full child per woman above the fertility rate of those blacks in the United States who were born in the West Indies, or whose parents were born in the West Indies.

Age is also an important hidden factor in ethnic data in another and a very different sense. The internal age-bracket divisions of a given ethnic group represent cohorts of people whose present careers began and developed in different eras. In a society with the kind of rapidly changing racial-ethnic views and practices already noted, this means that different age cohorts are affected by very different social conditions. In turn this means that gross comparisons of one whole ethnic group and another (or one whole ethnic group versus the "national average") may give a very misleading picture as to the current effects of current conditions and policies. For example, it has been found that the economic rate of return on education is lower for blacks than for whites, but an age-cohort breakdown shows that younger blacks have a slightly higher rate of return than their white counterparts.[26] Older blacks were educated in an earlier period, with far fewer days per school year than their white contemporaries in addition to disparities in the quality of education, and they entered a labor market with far more racial barriers to employment and advancement than today. Their current careers reflect those past conditions, whereas the younger

TABLE 8.

FERTILITY BY AGE

	15–24 Years Old		25–34 Years Old	
	Children per Woman	% all Women	Children per Woman	% all Women
American Indians	0.6	29.5	3.0	20.8
Black Americans	0.7	27.1	2.7	18.7
Chinese Americans	0.2	26.3	1.6	22.5
Filipino Americans	0.4	27.2	1.5	33.5
Japanese Americans	0.2	18.1	1.5	19.1
Puerto Ricans	0.7	31.4	2.6	27.6
West Indians	0.3	18.2	1.6	20.0

	35–44 Years Old		45 and Older		TOTAL	
	Children per Woman	% all Women	Children per Woman	% all Women	Children per Woman	% all Women
A.I.	4.4	17.5	3.9	32.3	2.8	100
Black	3.7	17.0	2.9	37.2	2.4	100
Chinese	2.9	20.0	3.0	31.3	1.9	100
Filipino	3.0	18.7	3.6	20.5	1.9	100
Japanese	2.2	17.0	3.0	35.9	2.0	100
P.R.	3.5	19.1	3.5	22.0	2.4	100
W.I.	2.5	20.2	2.2	41.7	1.8	100

Source: 1970 Census, Public Use Sample.

age cohorts of blacks have income, occupational status, etc., which reflect more of the current effects of current conditions.

The magnitudes of the differences between age cohorts of the same ethnic group may be indicated by the fact that more than 20 percent of all blacks in the 55–64-year-old bracket, and more than 40 percent of all blacks 65 and over, have had less than five years of schooling, whereas less than 2 percent of blacks in the 25–29-year-old bracket had such little education. Among Mexican Americans, more than one-fourth of the 55–64-year-olds, and more than half of those 65 and older, have less than five years of education, whereas only 7 percent of the 25–29-year-old Mexican Americans suffer this much educational disadvantage. Puerto Rican data are quite similar to those for Mexican Americans.[27]

Any evaluation of present conditions or present policies on the basis of gross ethnic data without age distinction runs the risk of considering as failures approaches which have in fact proved successful. It may be decades before most or all of an ethnic group consists of people whose careers have developed completely under the more recent conditions and policies. Yet approaches whose success is visible among the younger age cohorts might be mistakenly discarded as failures during the interim, when the gross statistics are dominated by people whose life patterns were set in an earlier era.

Racial progress in economic terms is especially striking among young college-educated people, where black men have already achieved income parity with white men, and black women slightly more than parity with white women. At higher occupational levels—among doctoral scientists and engineers—blacks under 35 earned slightly more than whites under 35 with the same credentials, even though blacks over 50 earned slightly less than whites over 50 with the same credentials. Among college and university faculties, blacks with top credentials and publications generally earn slightly more than whites in the same fields with top credentials and publications.[28]

A neglect of interethnic age differences sometimes creates an unrealistically optimistic picture as well as an unrealistically pessimistic one. For example, blacks as a group have lower death rates than whites as a group. This might seem to negate the view that blacks live under more unhealthy and stressful conditions than whites. But in fact it is simply an age phenomenon. Younger people generally have lower death rates than older people. On an age-specific basis, whites have lower death rates than blacks, though the differences are narrowing.[29]

Much social pathology is associated with age. More than three-quarters of all serious crime in the United States is committed by young people between the ages of 14 and 25 years—and 90 percent of the violent crimes are committed by males.[30] The explosive rise in crime in the United States during the 1960s occurred when there was an increase in the proportion of such males in the American population, as a result of the postwar "baby boom." Obviously, those ethnic groups with unusually large proportions of their population in the crime-prone years will tend to have higher crime rates, even if there were no other factors at work. A major factor in the large black-white difference in crime rates is the difference in the youth components of the two populations. Although black crime rates are many times as high as white crime rates[31]—and the murder rate more than 10 times as high[32]—the "age-specific crime rates of blacks are only slightly higher than those of whites on the same socioeconomic level."[33] Similar factors influence the crime rates of Puerto Ricans and Mexican Americans: more than half of all Puerto Ricans are under 25 years of age, as are almost two-thirds of all Mexican Americans.

Unemployment rates are also heavily influenced by age. Over the years, young men under 20 have consistently had unemployment rates more than double those of men in the 25–34- or 35–44-year age brackets. Ethnic groups with above-average proportions of young people would therefore tend to have above-average unemployment rates, even if there were no other differences to consider. In some respects, age differences outweigh racial differences: black males in the 25–34- and 35–44-year age brackets have lower unemployment rates than white males under 20—and this has been true, consistently, for decades. The high "average" black unemployment rate reflects a very high black teen-age male unemployment rate—above 30 percent throughout the 1970s—and conceals enormous internal age disparities. By contrast, the unemployment rate among black males in the 35–44-year age bracket has gone as high as 10 percent for only one year in more than a quarter of a century.[34]

Teenage unemployment is quite different from adult unemployment, both in its causes and in its consequences. For teenagers in general, the official unemployment rate is biased upward, because it is based on the noninstitutional population, and teenagers are more often institutionalized than adults—principally in schools, colleges, and the military services. The teenage unemployed are therefore divided by a much smaller denominator than they would be if the same age cohorts were adults, so the unemployment percentage comes out correspondingly higher. This is not the sole reason for high teenage unemployment rates, but it is a statistical bias. Moreover, the nature of teenage unemployment is also different. Among black unemployed teenagers surveyed in 1972, almost half were in school, and 83 percent of those in school were looking for part-time work. Those black teenagers who were both out of work and out of school constituted less than 7 percent of black teenagers.[35] Yet this situation has been statistically—and politically—inflated into a "crisis."

LOCATION

In a vast country with substantial income differences among regions, the socioeconomic condition of any ethnic group depends in part on where its members are located. American ethnic groups are not randomly distributed, either geographically or in terms of rural and urban residence.

The distribution of those European ethnic groups that came to the United States in the era of wind-driven ships was strongly influenced—virtually predetermined—by the respective destinations of cargo vessels leaving from their particular part of Europe, predominately northern and western Europe. When steam-powered ships made mass immigration by passenger vessels economically feasible, a whole new pattern of immigration emerged—dominated now by immigration from eastern and southern Europe.[36] The destinies of immigrants were shaped by conditions in the places where they happened to land. For example, many of the Irish landed in Boston, a city shunned by American working-class groups at that time because of its lack of appropriate job opportunities. But the Irish—fleeing from a devastating famine—had little choice but to make the best of this unpromising situation, which contributed to the relative slowness of their socioeconomic rise.[37]

Those immigrants who arrived virtually penniless—the Irish, the Italians, and the Jews, for example—settled right in the ports of debarkation. Those groups who had enough money left after the voyage to exercise some locational preference—the Germans and Scandinavians, for example—typically settled elsewhere. Today's ethnic settlement patterns still reflect those initial conditions. The subsequent economic history of the United States also affected the location of different ethnic groups differently. Those who arrived during the era of massive railroad building, and who were sufficiently poor to take on this hard and dangerous work, often settled in geographic patterns reflecting the routes of those railroads.[38] Similarly, those groups who arrived during the development of coalmining, steelmaking, etc., also had their geographic distributions influenced by the location of those industries.

Black Americans had their initial locations chosen for them by others during the era of slavery, but again it was not a random choice. They were concentrated in the region whose climate and soil were suited to the kinds of crops that could flourish under the restricted work patterns necessitated by slavery.[39] With the invention of the cotton gin in 1793, slavery in America became overwhelmingly cotton-producing slavery,[40] and the distribution of the black population accordingly moved toward the kinds of land best suited for cotton growing. Beginning with the Census of 1790, the center of distribution of the black population moved southwestward, at an average rate of 49 miles per decade, for most of the nineteenth century. For those blacks who were free before the Civil War—about half a million "free persons of color" in 1850[41]—the movement was in the opposite direction, toward the Northeast and, within both North and South, toward urban areas. The "free persons of color" were more urbanized than the white population,[42] and more urbanized than the general black population would be until almost the middle of the twentieth century.

Oriental ethnic groups have tended to settle in those parts of the United States most geographically accessible to Asia—the West Coast; and Mexican and Cuban Americans have likewise tended to settle in those parts of the United States closest to their countries of origin—the Southwest and Florida, respectively. American Indians are distributed geographically in a pattern reflecting the various tribes' territories in pre-Columbian times and the subsequent locations of reservations chosen for them by white conquerors. The concentration of Puerto Ricans and West Indians in and around New York City reflects the accessibility of air and shipping routes in the twentieth century.

How much difference does location make? Plenty—and it affects not only income but also such variables as education and even fertility. The 1970 Census found the average family income of blacks in New York State to be more than double the average family income of blacks in Mississippi.[43] The average income of American Indians in Chicago, Detroit, or New York City is more than double what it is on most major reservations, and at least $2,000 more than it is on any major reservation.[44] Mexican Americans in the Detroit metropolitan area average more than double the income of Mexican Americans in the Laredo or Brownsville metropolitan areas in Texas.[45]

Location alone is not wholly responsible for all geographic and rural-urban differences, for many other group characteristics vary with location. For example, American Indians living in the urban Northeast are almost a decade older than the American Indians living in the rural Midwest, and the urban northeastern Indians average about three children per married woman (age 35–44), whereas the rural midwestern Indians average about five.[46] Innumerable studies have consistently shown blacks living outside the South to have higher IQs than blacks living in the South,[47] and the IQs of black migrants from the South rise after they leave.[48]

Location in a more narrow sense—within a given metropolitan area—is also associated with significant and even profound intraethnic social differences. In urban ethnic enclaves there has been a tendency for the site of initial ethnic settlements to expand outward, with the more prosperous, more educated, more acculturated portion of the ethnic group leading the expansion into surrounding areas, and away from those members of the group less fortunate in these respects. Such patterns have been common among American ethnic groups, whether black, Jewish, Mexican, or Italian in origin.[49] These simple facts have far-reaching implications for the interpretation of ethnic communities by scholars or journalists at a given time. Life may change very little for people on a given tract of land, even during periods of widespread and rapid upward socioeconomic mobility, because that mobility may take the form of successful individuals' movement outward toward more comfortable neighborhoods, and their replacement by new people struggling through an earlier social-evolutionary phase. In short, the people on a given block may be suffering from the same problems that people on that block suffered from twenty or fifty years ago, even though the particular families who suffered there in an earlier era are now living more prosperous lives elsewhere. Scholarly studies, journalistic news stories, or governmental surveys which focus on the fate of a particular neighborhood (or community or other tract of land) may find a picture of hopeless stagnation even when progress is pervasive.

DISCRIMINATION

Virtually every ethnic group has encountered discrimination in employment, in housing, in the provision of public services, or in all three ways at once. The moral offensiveness of discrimination has distracted attention away from the question of its causal impact on socioeconomic variables—or else has led to the sweeping assumption that interethnic differences can be explained in terms of the degree of discrimination encountered by the various groups.[50] But to test this hypothesis requires considering the results achieved by comparable individuals from different ethnic backgrounds. It has already been apparent that whole ethnic groups are not necessarily comparable—in age distribution, geographic distribution, or in other respects that influence socioeconomic outcomes. It is not even clear that all relative differences in attributes can be objectively specified and controlled, so that any remaining differences in results could be confidently ascribed to ethnic or racial discrimination. One way to deal with this problem would be to break a given ethnic group down into subgroups who "all look alike" to employers, testers, and other outsiders, even though they may differ for various historical or other reasons. For example, American employers are unlikely to differentiate between those Italian Americans whose ancestors originated in the north of Italy from those whose ancestors originated in the south of Italy. Therefore, if there have been substantial socioeconomic differences between the descendants of northern and southern Italians in the United States—as there have been[31]—then those differences can hardly be ascribed to employer discrimination rather than to attributes of the people themselves. There are problems with both the "comparable individuals" approach and the "internal differences" approach, so that neither can be relied on exclusively.

When age and education are simultaneously held constant, the gross ethnic differences in income narrow but do not disappear. For example, whereas American Indians as a group earned only 57 percent as much income as Japanese Americans, that figure climbs to 85 percent when college-educated members of both groups are compared, and to 89 percent when the comparison is between college-educated males in the 35–44-year age bracket.[32] Because age, sex, and education do not exhaust all sources of income differences, it is clear that even the 11 percent differential remaining in this example cannot all be due to discrimination. Moreover, because Japanese Americans average higher incomes than the U.S. population in general, their incomes can hardly be accounted for by discrimination. Similar comparisons could be made among other ethnic groups, or between given ethnic groups and the "national average."

Successive corrections for age, education, location, etc. sharply reduce income differences among American ethnic groups and between individual ethnic groups and the "national average." Young black married couples located outside the South earned 93 percent of the income of young white married couples located outside the South in 1971—and when both spouses worked in both races, the black couples earned slightly more.[33]

None of this means that prejudice or discrimination have disappeared. It does indicate that the demonstrable magnitude of interethnic income differences among comparable individuals is far less than gross ethnic income differences or popular impressions might suggest. This seriously undermines current employer discrimination as an explanatory variable, though there are other kinds of discrimination—including past employer discrimination and discrimination in schooling—which may still have a major influence on income, especially among older members of various ethnic groups.

Sometimes discrimination is thought to apply particularly to nonwhite ethnic minorities, whose visible and perpetual physical differences make discrimination more easy as well as more likely. The above average incomes of Orientals undermines this hypothesis, though the still substantial black-white income differentials lend some credence to it. However, a very different picture emerges when the incomes and occupations of native black Americans are compared with those of black West Indians living in the United States. It has already been shown (see Tables 1 and 3) that income and occupational differences have been very large as between these two black groups living in the same country. Part of this reflects locational differences, for West Indians are far more concentrated in and around New York City. But even among American Negroes and West Indians living in the New York City standard metropolitan statistical area, the differences do not disappear. Even though the two groups' average years of schooling are the same in New York City SMSA, their median family incomes still differ: $6,881 vs. $8,830 in 1969.

The success of West Indians in the United States has sometimes been attributed to a superior education under the British system in the Islands or to different treatment by white American employers. One way to test these hypotheses would be to isolate second-generation West Indians—those blacks born in the United States of West Indian-born parents, and therefore likely to have been educated in the United States and unlikely to have an accent that would enable a white employer to distinguish them from native blacks.[54] A compilation of 1970 Census data for second-generation West Indians in the New York City area showed them to exceed the socioeconomic status of other West Indians, as well as of native blacks—and of the U.S. population as a whole—in family income ($10,900), education (11.9 years), and proportions in the professions (18.3 percent).

Color alone clearly is not decisive in socioeconomic outcomes, even when that color is black. But from this, it cannot be concluded that "racism" in general is dead or dying. It has already been noted that American racial or ethnic attitudes differ greatly according to the activity involved and the physical or status proximity. In the economic sphere, discrimination can impose onerous costs on the discriminator as well as on those discriminated against.[55] Moreover, the emergence of antidiscrimination laws and changed public opinion in the 1960s added to the costs of discrimination. A sharp rise of black incomes as a percentage of white incomes was one result.[56]

Antidiscrimination laws which prescribe employment, pay, and promotion without regard to race or ethnicity must be distinguished from affirmative-action programs which prescribe employment, pay, and promotion with regard to race or ethnicity in the numerical goals and timetables required of employers. The effects of the two kinds of programs can be separated with respect to time, because affirmative-action mandatory numerical "goals and timetables" are a recent development, since 1971. It is significant that black income as a percentage of white income reached its peak the year before affirmative-action quotas and has declined since. Despite tremendous public controversy, affirmative action in general has produced negligible socioeconomic results for minorities or women. One reason for this may be that although market processes impose certain costs on discriminating employers, affirmative action imposes procedural costs on all employers, whether discriminatory or not, and therefore provides little incentive to reduce discrimination.[57] It may even provide some incentive to intensify discrimination, once employers realize that hiring minority members does not end their legal troubles but only opens up more opportunities for legal penalties and/or costly administrative processes if their pay and promotion patterns do not match the government agencies' conceptions, whether or not there is any actual discrimination. Moreover, a government-approved affirmative-action plan in no way insulates an employer from lawsuits charging "reverse discrimination." In short, affirmative-action programs create no clear incentive to change employment practices in a specified way. This is yet another contrast between such programs and antidiscrimination laws.

Just as substantial interethnic differences in income do not prove discrimination, neither does the absence of substantial differences prove an absence of discrimination. For example, Oriental faculty members earn about the same income as white or black faculty members, but are better qualified than both—in terms of degree level, quality ranking of the department granting their degrees, and individual publication records. When all these variables are held constant, Oriental faculty are typically paid thousands of dollars per year less than either black or white faculty members with the same objective qualifications.[58] In short, discrimination cannot be assessed in terms of gross interethnic differences, without regard to qualifications, for to do so risks both exaggeration and underestimation.

THE GOVERNMENT

Ethnic minorities are affected by government policy not only when these policies are specifically intended to have an ethnic dimension, but also in cases where ethnicity is not an explicit consideration. For example, government regulation of public utilities has usually not involved any concern with ethnic issues, yet by setting up "cost-plus" methods of pricing, the government regulatory agencies have in net effect made employment discrimination virtually costless to the utility, because all additional costs entailed by discrimination are passed on to the public.[59] There has been a history of higher levels of racial and ethnic discrimination in such utilities than in the general economy.[60] Government price fixing in a variety of areas (rent control, minimum wage laws, interest-rate ceilings, etc.) lead to either excess supply or excess demand, depending upon whether the artificial price is set above or below the price that would have existed otherwise. Its net effect is that excess supply allows the demanders to discriminate among suppliers at zero cost to the discriminators, whereas excess demand allows the suppliers to discriminate among the demanders at zero cost to the suppliers.[61] It is therefore not surprising that the minimum wage law, for example, has been found to increase black teenage unemployment.[62]

The direct provision of government services may also be racial or ethnic in its impact, though not explicitly so in its formulation. For example, in the first decade of "urban renewal" three-quarters of the people displaced from their homes or businesses were either black or Puerto Rican.[63] Police protection and public education likewise show a long history of differential quantity and quality, adversely affecting ethnic communities ranging from nineteenth-century immigrant neighborhoods to twentieth-century ghettos and barrios.[64] The government as an employer has a long history of discrimination in both the civilian and military sectors.

It is not that government action necessarily increases discrimination. It simply tends to operate in ways that are less constrained by economic consideration and more determined by political influences. During periods of political concern for antidiscrimination or even affirmative-action policies, those sectors most under government control or influence tend also to react in these directions more quickly and more strongly than do other sectors. The growth of new minority employment in recent years has been especially pronounced in the government itself, in government-regulated industries, and among government contractors.[65] Conversely, during periods of national political reaction, as between World War I and the Great Depression, black federal employees in higher positions declined, and opportunities in military service also retrogressed.

[redacted]

The only general and predictable effect of government control and influence is to free economic decision making from the constraints of the competitive market.

The magnitude of government influence on the fate of ethnic and racial minorities is easily exaggerated, however. It has already been noted that affirmative-action programs have produced no significant gains for blacks. The Irish obviously benefited from patronage jobs in the era of Irish-dominated municipal "machines," but such generally low-level jobs in such politically related occupations have been blamed for the relatively slow rise of the Irish during that era.[66] Certainly such unusually successful ethnic groups as the Jews and the Orientals have not taken the political route. The leadership of the Chinese-American community deliberately decided to avoid politics.[67] "Black power" in political terms was at its peak in the Reconstruction Era after the Civil War—an era of economic retrogression for blacks in many respects.[68] The sharp rise in the black economic position during the 1960s coincided with a period of declining black voter participation outside the South.[69] There is no need to argue for an inverse relationship between political and economic power, but the empirical case for such a position might be easier to make than the empirical case for the opposite view that political power is necessary (and/or sufficient) for economic advancement.

EDUCATION

It has already been noted that education affects income, occupation, and even fertility. One of the difficult problems is to define similar units of education, so as to compare the effect of education on individuals from various ethnic backgrounds. That is, however, virtually impossible, so that what can be done instead is to indicate (1) why and how a given number of years of schooling is a substantially different amount of "education" for different ethnic groups, (2) note the direction and roughly estimate the magnitude of the differences, and (3) consider the gross interethnic differences among individuals from different educational levels against the background of the known statistical biases.

The easiest educational differences to document are black-white differences, especially among older age cohorts. Most black Americans have been raised and educated in the South, even though the percentage has been declining over time, and until the decade of the 1960s most black college students were attending predominantly black colleges. In earlier times, it was not uncommon for the school year for blacks in the South to have one-third fewer days than for whites, so that a black pupil with 9 years of schooling would have been in class the same number of days as a white pupil with only 6 years of schooling. Comparisons of blacks and whites with the "same" education measured in years grossly misstates their respective education in terms of days of schooling. Qualitative differences compounded the disparity. Per-pupil expenditures also varied by race, with black pupils in many parts of the South receiving only a fraction of the expenditures on white pupils.[70] Moreover, black secondary schooling was available at all only quite late in history. The first black public high school in the state of Georgia was built in 1924, and only after bitter political struggles.[71] At the college level, even the best black institutions lag behind white institutions

[redacted]

by such objective measures as College Board scores, library resources, departmental rankings, and faculty scholarship record,[72] and evaluations of the intangibles at such schools show at least equal deficiencies.[73] Finally, and perhaps as a consequence of the educational deficiencies mentioned, the fields of specialization selected by black college students are disproportionately the easier and less well-paid fields, notably education and the social sciences.[74]

The trends over time are toward a narrowing of racial differences in education. The end of the dual (segregated) school system in the South has meant the end of differences in days of schooling per year—though not the end of the effect of such disparities on the careers of older blacks educated in an earlier era. Per-pupil expenditure differences have narrowed generally.[75] More black college students now attend predominantly white schools than attend predominantly black institutions,[76] but again the effects differ among age cohorts of blacks, and it remains true that most black college graduates today are graduates of black colleges.

At the opposite end of the spectrum are the Orientals and the Jews. Orientals not only have quantitatively more education than the national average,[77] they are statistically overrepresented in the more difficult and better-paying areas, such as the natural sciences.[78] In general, Oriental faculty members have the Ph.D. more often than either black or white faculty members, and the Orientals' degrees are more often from high-rated departments.[79] Jews are also disproportionately in such demanding fields as law, medicine, and biochemistry, and are educated in the more selective colleges.[80] For Orientals and Jews, statistics on years of schooling understate their real education.

Those ethnic groups attending Catholic colleges and universities are attending institutions which are not included among the top American colleges and universities, either in terms of objective criteria (College Board scores, endowment, library resources, Merit Scholars, faculty publications) or the evaluations of the academic profession. The best of the Catholic institutions rank above the best of the black institutions in these respects, but well below the standards of the Ivy League, of elite colleges such as Amherst and Swarthmore, or of the top state universities. Among those ethnic groups which are predominantly Catholic, only the Irish sent half or more of their college students to Catholic institutions,[81] but Italians, Poles, and Germans also send substantial proportions to such Catholic colleges and universities.

Despite great qualitative differences in schooling, all the ethnic groups for which data are available show a similar pattern of increasing income with increasing years of schooling, and in all cases a college education means an income above the American national average. Moreover, even before the destruction of various racial barriers in recent decades, black college graduates earned more than the average American,[82] despite many individual stories of blacks with degrees working at menial jobs.

3. *Summary and Implications*

The very concept of ethnic "minorities" is misleading in the United States; and attempts to generalize about minority problems, or to compare one ethnic group to some national average, are still more misleading. Minority is a meaningful designation in countries where there is an ethnic majority, but in the United States the largest specifically identifiable ethnic group—those of British ancestry—constitute only 15 percent of the population, as compared to 13 percent whose ancestry is German, 11 percent Negro, and 8 percent Irish.[83] No small part of the reason why American history has been what it has, is that no one group could achieve overwhelming dominance. Pluralism and toleration were not ideals from which Americans started, but necessities to which they were driven.[84] It was slowest coming in the racial area, where majority-minority lines could be drawn. Nazi racism and its sickening consequences brought racism in general into disrepute in the United States, and set the stage for a series of changes in public opinion and government policy in post-World War II America. The more general and enduring principle of American pluralism was not, however, the result of preachments or "leadership," but of the virtual inescapability of the need to cooperate and the virtual impossibility of achieving the religious, political, or other dominance of any one group—though many tried.[85]

The sheer size of the United States and of American ethnic groups meant that these groups were not mere representatives or appendages of some foreign country or culture. It is a commonplace that there are more people of Italian ancestry in New York than in Rome, more people of Polish ancestry in Detroit than in Cracow, more Jews than in Israel—and so on down the list of American ethnic groups. The distinctive cultures of these ethnic groups are to a large extent creations growing out of their experience on American soil, not mere transplants from other countries. Chow mein, the St. Patrick's Day parade, and the "Afro" hairdo are all American products, some exported back to the homeland from which the groups in question originated. Moreover, the assimilation process has been two-way, with the so-called mainstream American culture incorporating many culinary, vernacular, musical, and other features once specifically and exclusively ethnic. Again, the pluralistic mosaic is more descriptive of American social reality than is a simplistic majority-minority dichotomy.

Rapid changes in the American racial scene are often concealed or muted in gross statistical comparisons which fail to separate out the younger generation reared under the new conditions. The rise and spread of organizations and individuals administering or "representing" racial ethnic groups in various ways (both inside and outside the government) has also created a large constituency with a vested interest in social pathology and even an aversion to consideration of ethnic success, advancement, and development. Ethnic groups are thus constantly presented to the public in terms of "minority problems" to be "solved" by spending large sums of tax money. Whatever the political possibilities—or limitations—of this approach, it has obvious intellectual disadvantages as an approach to understanding reality. The complexities of history, economics, and cultural dynamics cannot be reduced to a simplistic morality play in which the choice is to blame either "society" or to "blame the victim." Variables which do not readily lend themselves to blame—age and geographic location, for example—are simply ignored in this moral, ideological, or political vision. Moreover, the proposed solutions of social problems—the very definitions of such social problems—are similarly constrained within the narrow limits of what is ideologically satisfying or politically palatable. Thus, for example, violent and murderous youth gangs are not dealt with directly as cancerous urgencies but are regarded as social "symptoms" which will go away after some agenda of sociopolitical reform has been carried out. Sometimes there is even a suggestion that, in the interim, "society" needs or deserves such problems as a prod to reform—ignoring the fact that the victims are not some amorphous "society" but the immediate ethnic community itself and that community's aspirations for its children, whose education is easily destroyed by a handful of hoodlums. Aside from the programmatic policy point of view, from an explanatory point of view youth gangs fade into the background as derivative social phenomena, and discussions of education, for example, proceed in terms of teaching methods, racial balance, and other variables which may make far less difference than whether or not there is such sheer turmoil in the schools as to prevent anything from working.

The point here is not simply that a particular policy approach may be wrong, but that the very framework of perception is distorted by moralistic-ideological imperatives. In such a climate of opinion, explanatory variables are acceptable only in the proper sociopolitical attire. Conversely, "explanations" become prominent and even pervasive with no factual support, on the basis of their consonance with the prevailing moral vision. A prime example here is the explanation of the high incidence of "broken homes" and female-headed households among blacks in the middle of the twentieth century as a result of the legacy of similar family instability under slavery. Even though this explanation has been accepted as a matter of course, carrying the imprimatur of such scholars as Myrdal, Frazier, Moynihan, and DuBois, it was not until 1976 that any comprehensive factual research on this point was published—and the facts devastated the vision. The overwhelming majority of black children have been raised in male-headed, two-parent households, under both slavery and freedom, until relatively recent times.[86] Again, the main point is not that a particular view was invalid but that the whole basis for its acceptance for decades was whether it fit in with the prevailing vision.

Age, location, and fertility may never replace "liberty, equality, and fraternity" or other emotionally satisfying slogans, but these neglected variables have major impact on the income, unemployment rates, and even IQs of American ethnic groups. Discrimination and government policy fit the moral-social-political vision better, but the facts are not easily reconciled with the view that these latter are the predominant influences on ethnic economic progress. Age, location, and fertility are functions of complex historical and cultural processes, whereas discrimination and government policy are the direct results of current actions by current people, so that blame, reform, and quick change seem more plausible with the latter. But if "social science" is ever to deserve its name, that cannot be a reason for preferring one set of explanations over another.

Although it is possible to make a general assessment of the relative effects of different variables, it is not necessary to assume that the same variables have the same impact on all ethnic groups. Racially different groups are in a different situation from groups whose differences are of language, nationality, and culture, all of which can be eroded by time; blacks as a group once enslaved are even more of a special case, though there is often a tendency to generalize about ethnicity from the specific history of blacks. Moreover, the relative success of black West Indians—once enslaved under even more brutal conditions than black Americans[87]—suggests that even color differences can be exaggerated in their effects.

What is most clear is that whatever may have determined the past is not inevitably determining the future. There are many objective indications that ethnicity is changing in a changing America. On the whole, and for the present, at least, it is a substantial change for the better.

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Myths about Minorities

Thomas Sowell

WILL ROGERS once said that it's not ignorance that is so bad, but all the things we know "that ain't so." Much of what we "know" about racial and ethnic minorities in America is unsubstantiated and just plain wrong.

We "know," for example, that there is in this country a majority of white Anglo-Saxon Protestants (Wasps) surrounded by a fringe of minorities, who have lower incomes, occupations, and IQ's, and higher fertility rates and crime rates. We "know" that non-whites invariably earn less than whites, and that blacks, who suffer broken homes as a legacy of slavery, are the worst off of all in economic terms. Yet none of those common beliefs is literally true, and some are very wide of the mark.

"Minorities"

THE very notion of a Wasp majority and small minorities is wrong. Census Bureau surveys show that about half of the American population cannot identify their ethnicity at all, presumably because of intermixtures over the generations. While Anglo-Saxons are the largest single identifiable group, they are only 14 per cent of the population—not much more than such "minorities" as German-Americans (13 per cent) or blacks (11 per cent). There is thus no ethnic majority to be contrasted with "minorities," but a mosaic of many groups, and a large number of people who are mixtures of various groups.

Even the racial distinction between black and white is not as sharp in reality as it is in rhetoric. Very few blacks are of unmixed African ancestry. Most have at least one white ancestor, and in addition, whole tribes of Indians have been absorbed into the black population. By the same token, a leading social historian has estimated that tens of millions of white Americans have at least one black ancestor. The old Southern racial doctrine—that "one drop of Negro blood" made you black, legally and socially—was never carried out in practice; to avoid embarrassing some of the "best" white Southern families, state laws required some specified fraction of Negro ancestry.

Americans are far from having blended into one indistinguishable mass, but we are just as far from being a majority-minority society, or a society in which racial and ethnic labels can be taken literally. Paradoxically, the melting-pot concept enjoyed its greatest popularity at a time when intermarriage was still rare across religious or ethnic lines, and rarer yet across racial lines. It is now dismissed by intellectuals at a time when it is closer to reality than ever before. Thus, most marriages of American men of Irish ancestry are to women who are not of Irish ancestry. Most men of German or Polish ancestry do not marry within their respective ethnic groups. Nor is this trend limited to whites. About 40 per cent of Japanese-American men marry women who are not Japanese-American. In short, both the acceptance and the rejection of the "melting-pot" concept by intellectuals was a matter of changing fashions rather than hard evidence.

Incomes and Occupations

ANGLO-SAXONS are not pace setters in income, occupations, or education. Americans of Jewish, Japanese, Polish, Chinese, or Italian ancestry make more money. While the image of the Wasp is one of old families in elite enclaves, the reality also includes desperately poor people scattered along hundreds of miles of the Appalachians, and others scattered throughout the whole range of American incomes and occupations.

The idea of a "national average" is as misleading as the idea of a Wasp majority. Most people are not average. Variations in income from one group to another are common, and income variations among age brackets, or among cities, are even larger than income variations among ethnic groups. The national average is nothing more than a statistical amalgamation of all these wide-ranging diversities. The idea that it is a norm or a standard—that any statistical deviation from it is both unusual and suspicious, and that we would all be the same except for the sins of "society"—is arbitrary political rhetoric.

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The incomes of so-called ethnic minorities do not line up below the mythical national norm but range on both sides of the statistical average. For example, the following American ethnic groups earned the following percentages of the national average in family income, at the time of the most recent census:

ETHNICITY	INCOME
Jewish	170 per cent
Japanese	132 per cent
Polish	115 per cent
Italian	112 per cent
Chinese	112 per cent
German	107 per cent
Anglo-Saxon	107 per cent
Irish	103 per cent
NATIONAL AVERAGE	100 per cent
Filipino	99 per cent
West Indian	94 per cent
Mexican	76 per cent
Puerto Rican	63 per cent
Black	62 per cent
Indian	60 per cent

(Source: *Essays and Data on American Ethnic Groups*, Urban Institute, 1978.)

These income patterns show more of a continuum than a majority-minority dichotomy. Moreover, two of the five highest income groups—Chinese and Japanese—are non-white. The great majority of Puerto Ricans are white, but their incomes are only about half the incomes of these two Oriental groups, and virtually the same as the incomes of blacks. West Indians are black, but their incomes differ little from the national average. The supposedly overwhelming effect of color on economic well-being is less apparent in census data than it is in media rhetoric.

Black West Indians are sometimes said to be treated preferentially by employers, who pick them out from other blacks by their accent, or by their place of birth or schooling. But if this were the reason why West Indians earn far higher incomes than other blacks, it would apply much less to second-generation West Indians who have less of an accent (or no accent) and are born and educated in the United States. This whole line of reasoning collapses like a house of cards under the weight of census data for second-generation West Indians—who have higher incomes than Anglo-Saxons, and higher representation in professional occupations.

The facts about occupation are just as far from popular (or media) beliefs as the facts about income. About 14 per cent of employed Americans are in the professions, or in comparable technical and similar fields. Despite the reiterated theme of color barriers or exclusions in the professions, at least four non-white groups have higher than average representation in these high-level occupations: black West Indians (15 per cent); Japanese (18 per cent); Filipinos (23 per cent); and Chinese (25 per cent). Black Americans have below-average representation (8 per cent), but white Puerto Ricans have even lower representation (5 per cent). There are many reasons why various groups have differing representations in the professions, but the supposedly decisive effect of color as depicted by the media is, again, simply not reflected in the census data.

Somewhere down the road, we will have to come to grips with the hard fact that color is not as all-determining as we once thought—or as civil-rights activists still insist—and that cultural factors will have to be dealt with much more seriously.

Social Pathology

THE problems that minorities have are so much a cliché that ethnic groups without special problems are often not even regarded as minorities. Some of the most commonly cited problems are broken homes, poor educational performances, high crime rates, and very large families. This preoccupation with pathology—and with the responsibility of "society" for supposedly causing it—often overlooks strengths and successes within the self-same ethnic groups. Those who have written about the economic advancement of blacks (such as Ben J. Wattenberg and Richard Scammon) have found themselves the targets of abuse. So have those (like myself) who have written about high-performance black schools.

One might think there would be great interest in what does and does not work, especially in an area where so much fails. But the hostile reception accorded to any good news about black progress suggests a large vested interest in social pathology—as a source of accusations and demands on society, and as a reason for giving money, power, and patronage to the accusers and denouncers. Although much social pathology is all too real, the question is what is its source, and what will make things better or worse. The politically preferred explanation may be the sins of others, but it is not enough just to document the existence of such sins. Nothing is easier to prove than sin among human beings. The real issue remains this: do the economic and other problems of ethnic groups actually vary with the frequency or severity of the sins against them?

Groups may be subject to very similar treatment by society at large and yet differ enormously in their economic achievements and social problems. Japanese-Americans and Mexican-Americans, for example, came to the United States in large numbers at about the same time (the early 1900's), settled in the same region (the Southwest), and faced discrimination in schools and on the job. Yet today Japanese-American incomes are almost double the incomes of Mexican-Americans, and their crime rates and broken homes are only a fraction of the figures for Mexican-Americans. As for how they were treated by "society," the Japanese suffered more—being legally denied citizenship and land ownership for many years, and being interned with great loss of property during World War II. They were also much easier targets of racism, being physically different, whereas many Mexican-Americans are physically indistinguishable from other white people. (The Japanese language is also further from English than the Spanish language is.)

Why one group does better economically than another is a complex question. But the presence of Jews and Japanese at the top of the income ladder among American ethnic groups is strong evidence that prejudice or discrimination alone is hardly a sufficient explanation.

If there is one thing that separates the high-income groups from the low-income groups, far more decisively than color or discrimination, it is family patterns. More than half of all Mexican-American children are in families of six or more children. Half of all Japanese-American children are in families of three or fewer. A relatively prosperous black group like the West Indians has fewer children per family than a relatively poor white group like the Puerto Ricans. Where there is only a mother, but no father, to take care of a large family, the problems are obviously even greater.

Those who look for sins are quick to call broken homes and female-headed families among blacks a "legacy from slavery." In reality, however, this is a relatively recent phenomenon—and one equally common among Puerto Ricans, who were not enslaved. (It was also common earlier in the century among the Irish, when they lived under conditions similar to those of blacks and Puerto Ricans today.) Historically, the great bulk of black children grew up in male-headed, two-parent households, under both slavery and freedom, well into the early decades of the 20th century. The current large and rising numbers of female-headed families among blacks is a modern phenomenon stemming from the era of the welfare state—when the government began to subsidize desertion and teenage pregnancy.

An even more emotion-laden issue is the racial difference in IQ test scores. People on both sides of the controversy proceed as if there must be something unique about blacks—either a unique genetic makeup or a unique environment. This is another example of the danger of comparing statistics from a single isolated group with the national average—even when those statistics form a continuum, with other groups close by on either side. Historically, IQ scores in the 80's have been commonplace among American ethnic groups—including some groups now scoring at or above the national average, such as Italian-Americans or Polish-Americans. Such IQ's have also been commonplace abroad, as among Catholics in Northern Ireland, canal-boat children in Britain, indigenous Israelis of non-European stock, or other groups living outside the mainstream of Western culture. Moreover, IQ scores are not fixed, but fluctuate even from one decade to the next, as in the following results from a large, nationwide study:

ETHNICITY	IQ	
	1970's	1960's
Polish	109	107
Chinese	108	107
German	105	106
Irish	105	107
Italian	100	103
Mexican	87	82
Black	82	88
Puerto Rican	80	84

(Source: *Essays and Data on American Ethnic Groups*, Urban Institute, 1978.)

High crime rates among blacks are likewise regarded as unique, and often glibly attributed to such "root causes" as racism and discrimination. Historically, however, there is nothing unique to blacks about crime and violence. Police vans are still called "Paddy wagons" today because they were so often full of Irishmen in 19th-century America. The Irish killed more people in one riot in New York in 1863 than blacks killed in all the ghetto riots across the country in the 1960's. Nor were the Irish themselves unique. In fact, they were often the *victims* of riots, as other groups invaded their neighborhoods to commit violence, arson, or murder. Nineteenth-century "race riots" were much bloodier than their present-day counterparts, even though the "races" involved were usually all white.

As for "white racism" as the root cause of black crime, it has produced no such effect on other non-whites, such as West Indians or Japanese-Americans. Studies have shown both groups to have lower crime rates than whites. This is not to deny that crime in general, and high crime rates among blacks in particular, are serious problems. They are, indeed, much too serious to be dealt with through easy assumptions and ideology.

Ignored Variables

IF IDEOLOGICAL predispositions tend to lead people toward giving explanations without evidence, they also tend to make people ignore factors that preclude an assessment of blame, or quick political solutions.

Thus, one of the most obvious reasons for differences in income among ethnic groups is routinely overlooked: some groups work more than others. About one-fifth of Chinese-American families have three or more people working. Among Puerto Ricans the proportion is less than half that. When it comes to families with no one working, it is the Puerto Ricans who are first and the Chinese who are last. Most ethnic groups fall somewhere betweern these extremes, with the four lowest income groups having the fewest people per family working regularly.

Experience is another obvious factor in income differences—and one that is just as routinely ignored. This is a country where income differences among age brackets are even greater than income differences among races and ethnic groups. For this reason, differences in age (experience) among ethnic groups will obviously affect income. These age differences are vast: the four lowest income groups are all at least a decade younger than the four highest, and at least two decades younger than the top group, the Jews.

ETHNICITY	AGE
Jewish	46
Polish	40
Irish	37
German	36
Italian	36
Anglo-Saxon	34
Japanese	32
TOTAL U.S.	28
Chinese	27
Black	22
American Indian	20
Mexican	18
Puerto Rican	18

(Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.)

Age differences of this magnitude turn gross comparisons among ethnic groups into comparisons of apples and oranges.

Educational differences compound the effect of age differences. Jews, in addition to being more than a quarter of a century older than Puerto Ricans, average 70 per cent more education. In the face of compounded differences of this magnitude, high-level occupations which typically require *both* experience and education cannot be filled on the basis of proportional representation from the various ethnic groups. Yet the government's affirmative-action policies constantly compare job percentages with population percentages—ignoring the fact that population statistics include not only the inexperienced and less educated, but also children and infants.

Something as apparently innocuous as location has a great impact on income. Regional differences in incomes are very substantial, especially as between the South and other regions. The average difference in income between California and Arkansas is greater than that between blacks and whites. Between Alaska and Mississippi, the income difference is greater still. The apparent paradox that Puerto Ricans earn a shade more than blacks nationally, while at any given location blacks tend to earn more than Puerto Ricans, is easily explained by the fact that half the black population of the United States is located in the low-income South. Even the more substantial income advantage of Mexican-Americans over blacks disappears if one considers only blacks outside the South. In Los Angeles, the two groups' incomes are virtually identical.

Virtually every American ethnic group has its own peculiar pattern of geographical distribution, reflecting historical happenstance and cultural preference. Each group's average national income reflects regional variations which may have nothing to do with ethnicity. Even an ideal society, with zero discrimination, would not produce equal incomes for its various ethnic groups as long as they were distributed geographically in different ways—this, quite apart from all the other huge differences in age, education, and other factors.

One of the more intangible—but very important—differences among groups has to do with culture, tradition, values, and work skills. Many of these differences go back to the time before the various groups ever set foot on American soil. The overrepresentation of Jews in the garment industry in America reflects a previous overrepresentation in clothing production in Eastern Europe. The overrepresentation of Germans in the American beer industry, or of Irish in politics, likewise has historical roots in their respective countries of origin.

Not only skills but attitudes were brought over from Europe or other places of origin. The Irish in Boston at the turn of the century had more education than Jews in the same city at that same time, but more Jewish children than Irish children went on to college. American society had given the Irish (who arrived earlier) more education than it had the Jews, but centuries of tradition in Europe had produced very different attitudes toward education in the two groups. "Society" in the United States is not the cause of all American social phenomena.

Some Implications

NOTHING is easier to find in American history than ethnic or racial discrimination—in jobs, schooling, housing, and many other basic areas of life. It is tempting to find here the explanation of all intergroup differences. But the presence of other large differences—in age, geographical distribution, and cultural orientation—means that discrimination cannot automatically be presumed to be the only factor, or necessarily even the major factor.

How far have we come in reducing or eliminating discriminatory pay differences among individuals with the same qualifications and different racial or ethnic backgrounds? Among the younger generation, we have come just about all the way. By the late 1960's, young blacks and whites from families with similar reading (or non-reading) habits, and with the same individual levels of education, *had the same income.* This was a milestone in the fight against discrimination, but the fact that large racial and ethnic differences in income still remain indicates that the fight against discrimination is only one of many battles that need to be fought. Reading habits, for example, vary significantly among ethnic groups, as do family size, the number of one-parent households, and many other characteristics that affect the opportunity for young people to enter the economy with equal qualifications. That many of today's racial or ethnic handicaps existed before young people ever reached the employer's door is no consolation, but only an indication of where needed efforts might be directed.

Unfortunately, many of these environmental factors are much more difficult to deal with than employer discrimination. Civil-rights organizations with years of specialization in fighting employer discrimination cannot change direction overnight, or take on a whole new range of social problems that no one knows how to cope with very effectively. Such a drastic reorientation is hardly feasible. What *is* possible is for thinking people, and especially decision-makers, to require hard evidence before advocating public policies based on time-worn clichés, especially when they are held by organizations or self-styled spokesmen doing business-as-usual.

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Glenn Loury

Blacks Must Now Fight the Enemy Within

The civil rights movement today stands at a historic juncture. The long legal struggle against racial discrimination has essentially been won. Leaders of the movement must now consider how an agenda created during the turbulent '50s and '60s should be redefined to conform to the social and political realities facing blacks in the '80s and '90s.

This redefinition should be centered on finding ways that blacks and whites can work to confront the internal difficulties now besetting poor black communities. For the great barrier to progress for blacks today is not an "enemy without" that denies opportunity to blacks because of racism, but an "enemy within" that keeps our young people from taking advantage of the opportunities available to all Americans.

In short, there is a profound need for moral leadership among blacks. The challenge now facing the movement is to find a way to provide that much needed leadership.

This is not to say that racism has disappeared; so long as there are distinct races of human beings there will be racism. Nor is it to say that government cannot or should not pursue policies aimed at helping the poor. I intend only to acknowledge that profound change has occurred in the last 30 years, reducing the ability of racist whites to act on their prejudices. Today the most hotly contested civil rights issue—affirmative action—concerns the extent to which past racism warrants special, not simply equal, treatment of blacks. For blacks the problem has always been not the existence of racism but its management. We have at our disposal now numerous legal means for managing the "enemy without."

Meanwhile, the "enemy within" goes relatively unchecked. The level of violence by blacks against other blacks is of alarming proportions. The academic performance of our young people, even in comparison to recent immigrants for whom English is a foreign language, is dismal. Each year, more black women give birth while still in high school than are graduated from college. The proportion of black children dependent on welfare has essentially doubled in the last 20 years. Young black men can be heard to brag about the children they have fathered but need not support.

This circumstance is the result, in substantial part, of the values, attitudes and behavior of black people. Recent history suggests that neither the defeat of Ronald Reagan, nor the election of more black congressmen and mayors, nor the transfer of monies from defense to domestic spending, nor the implementation of stronger affirmative action policies can be expected to reverse this situation. What we need instead is a concerted effort by black leaders and intellectuals to promote those norms and values in our communities that discourage dysfunctional behavior.

One obstacle to meeting this challenge is the fear often expressed by civil rights activists that, by focusing on internal problems in the black community, we will let racist American society "off the hook," relieving whites of their moral obligation to help the black poor. Another concern expressed about taking on the "enemy within" is that to do so would confirm whites' belief that blacks are morally and intellectually inferior.

Both of these worries are misplaced. While it may be the fault of past and ongoing racism that so many blacks find themselves mired in poverty, the responsibility for the behavior of black youngsters lies squarely on the shoulders of the black community itself. There is great danger in ignoring this responsibility, for those held legitimately at fault for the black condition may nonetheless refuse to do anything about it.

At some point, and I think that point has now been reached, it is more important to get started rebuilding one's own house than it is to spend time persuading the neighbors that they should help. Blacks cannot afford to be America's conscience if the cost is to neglect dealing with these life-threatening problems.

Moreover, nothing provides greater support for those believing in black inferiority than the continuation of the pathological behaviors to which I have alluded. Of course, blacks are inherently as capable of accomplishment as anyone else in this society. You know this, and I know this. But the only way to prove it is for black people to actually achieve up to this potential.

Thus, suppressing discussion of internal failures for fear that racial stereotypes will be confirmed is self-defeating. Blacks' problems lie not in the hearts of white people but rather in the wasted and incompletely fulfilled lives of too many black people.

The civil rights movement could experience a historic renaissance were its leaders to apply their considerable talents and resources to grappling directly with this problem. It is up to us concerned black citizens to see that they do.

The writer is professor of political economy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard and a member of the Council for a Black Economic Agenda.

WASHINGTON
POST
9/23/84

William Raspberry

Great Expectations—For Black Children

One way to understand what Jeff Howard and Ray Hammond are talking about is to think of Chinese Americans and point guards.

Howard and Hammond don't mention Oriental basketball players anywhere in their veil-lifting discussion of the academic underachievement of black students in "Rumors of Inferiority," in the Sept. 9 issue of The New Republic.

Their interest is not athletics but the black performance gap on measures ranging from the Scholastic Aptitude Test (the black median score is some 200 points below the white median on a test where the maximum score is 1,600) to the Florida test for teachers (passed by 80 percent of whites who take it; the black pass rate is 35 to 40 percent) to the New York City sergeant's exam (10.6 percent of the white applicants pass it; 4.4 percent of Hispanics, 1.6 percent of blacks).

What accounts for the gap?

Howard, a social psychologist, and Hammond, a physician, think the answer has very little to do with ability and a lot to do with self-doubt, ill-founded presumptions and powerful, internalized stereotypes.

"The performance gap is largely a behavioral problem," the authors contend. "It is the result of a remediable tendency [of blacks] to avoid intellectual engagement and competition. Avoidance is rooted in the fears and self-doubt engendered by a major legacy of American racism: the strong negative stereotypes about black intellectual capabilities."

Teachers, influenced by test data and other pervasive rumors of black inferiority, tend to expect less of black students; black students tend to accept the judgment of their intellectual inferiority and their resulting poor effort and performance fulfills everybody's expectation.

As with Chinese basketball players. Genetics and innate ability alone cannot explain the almost total absence of Chinese players from post-high school basketball. Physical size might account for the absence of centers and forwards. But surely the same physical and mental agility, the same hand-eye coordination, the same quickness and body control that produce so many outstanding gymnasts and table-tennis players would produce at least one NCAA point guard.

Might it be that Chinese youngsters, seeing no one who looks like themselves doing particularly well on the courts, saddled with constantly reinforced assumptions that their talents lie in other directions, and embarrassed by their awkwardness the first time they try basketball, simply choose not to compete?

A black youngster will rarely allow his initial awkwardness on the court to convince him that basketball is not his game. His expectation is that he will learn to play the game well. And because he fully expects to succeed, he can be persuaded to undergo endless hours of instruction, practice and drill.

Is it possible to create a similar expectancy for intellectual success? The authors believe it is. They call for a national program, black led, to change the "psychology of performance" among black children. The program they describe would have three key elements:

A deliberate attempt to control "expectancy communications," including the way we talk with one another, including (presumably) the tendency to think of intellectual engagement and competition as somehow "white."

Inculcation of an "intellectual work ethic." "We must teach our people, young and mature, the efficacy of intense, committed effort in the arena of intellectual activity and the techniques to develop discipline in study and work habits."

An effort to change the way young people think about their intellectual development, encouraging them to attribute their intellectual successes to ability and their intellectual failures to a lack of effort. Failure, rather than being allowed to destroy the children's self-confidence, "should be seen instead as feedback indicating the need for more intense effort or for a different approach to the task."

That, of course, is what every good teacher tries to accomplish, and it's reasonable to wonder how successful the Howard/Hammond prescription will be. But there's not much doubt in my mind that their diagnosis could be the foundation of a major new attack on an old, deeply disturbing problem.

WASHINGTON POST, July 1, 1985 (WILLIAM RASPBERRY)

The Cure Is in Black America

You can think of Glenn C. Loury (incorrectly) as one of the new breed of "black conservatives"—out of step with the mainstream black leadership and insufficiently critical of the Reagan administration—and dismiss him out of hand.

Or you can listen to this Harvard professor of political economy, judging his analysis of the problems confronting the black "underclass" and his prescriptions for change by the yardstick of common sense.

Perhaps because his views, in the current issue of The Public Interest, sound so much like what I have been trying to say, I prefer to listen to him when he says that much of the cure for what ails black America must be provided by black America itself.

He begins with a statement of the opposite point of view: that the problems that beset the black underclass, including family instability and crime, "are themselves manifestations of oppression—the historical and ongoing racism of the 'larger society'—and that to focus on self-help strategies aimed at the behavior of blacks is to treat the symptoms of oppression, not its causes.

"If jobs were provided for those seeking work (still making the counter-argument), and if a commitment to civil rights could be restored at top levels of government, these internal problems would surely take care of themselves."

But "I believe this argument to be profoundly mistaken, and under certain circumstances possibly quite dangerous, for it invariably ends by placing the responsibility for the maintenance of personal values and social norms among poor blacks on the shoulders of those who do not have an abiding interest in such matters."

Loury is trying, in short, to distinguish between "fault" (the link between racism and the pathology of the ghetto) and "responsibility" (the question of who must take the lead in resolving the problems).

It may be fair to assign the fault to racist whites, he argues, but the responsibility rests on blacks, because "no people can be genuinely free so long as they look to others for their deliverance."

To some degree, Loury is pummeling a horse that is, if not dead, at least on its death bed. Most of the black leadership has begun to accept the notion that the next stage in the march toward equality must be choreographed and directed by blacks themselves. The question is not so much who should do it as what to do. Loury offers a suggestion.

"The next frontier for the [civil rights] movement should be a concerted effort to grapple directly with the difficult, internal problems which lower-class blacks now face. . . . To the extent that we can foster institutions within the black community that encourage responsible male involvement in parenting, help prevent unplanned pregnancies and support young unwed mothers in their efforts to return to school and become self-supporting, important changes in the lives of the most vulnerable segment of the black population can be made."

Loury is talking, quite unabashedly, about the necessity of changing the behavior of the black underclass—something the black leadership (until quite recently) has been reluctant to discuss for fear of lending support to the claim of bigots that blacks are somehow unworthy and inferior.

But, says Loury, it is beyond debate that the "values, social norms and personal behaviors often observed among the poorest members of the black community are quite distinct from those characteristic of the black middle class." This "growing divergence," if unaddressed, will make it virtually impossible for the poorest blacks to improve their circumstances—even "with the return of economic prosperity, with the election of a liberal Democrat to the presidency, or with the doubling in size of the Congressional Black Caucus."

The fundamental requirement for change, says Loury, is a revitalized and internalized moral leadership. And that is something that only blacks themselves can provide.

> *"Glenn C. Loury is talking, quite unabashedly, about the necessity of changing the behavior of the black underclass."*



C. VANN WOODWARD
WHITES IN SERVITUDE

SEPTEMBER 9, 1985

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THE NEW REPUBLIC

RUMORS OF

Barriers to black success in America

INFERIORITY

by Jeff [illegible]

The hidden obstacles to black success.

RUMORS OF INFERIORITY

BY JEFF HOWARD AND RAY HAMMOND

TODAY'S black Americans are the beneficiaries of great historical achievements. Our ancestors managed to survive the brutality of slavery and the long history of oppression that followed emancipation. Early in this century they began dismantling the legal structure of segregation that had kept us out of the institutions of American society. In the 1960s they launched the civil rights movement, one of the most effective mass movements for social justice in history. Not all of the battles have been won, but there is no denying the magnitude of our predecessors' achievement.

Nevertheless, black Americans today face deteriorating conditions in sharp contrast to other American groups. The black poverty rate is triple that of whites, and the unemployment rate is double. Black infant mortality not only is double that of whites, but may be rising for the first time in a decade. We have reached the point where more than half of the black children born in this country are born out of wedlock—most to teenage parents. Blacks account for more than 40 percent of the inmates in federal and state prisons, and in 1982 the probability of being murdered was six times greater for blacks than for whites. The officially acknowledged high school dropout rate in many metropolitan areas is more than 30 percent. Some knowledgeable observers say it is over 50 percent in several major cities. These problems not only reflect the current depressed state of black America, but also impose obstacles to future advancement.

The racism, discrimination, and oppression that black people have suffered and continue to suffer are clearly at the root of many of today's problems. Nevertheless, our analysis takes off from a forward-looking, and we believe optimistic, note: we are convinced that black people today, because of the gains in education, economic status, and political leverage that we have won as a result of the civil rights movement, are in a position to substantially improve the conditions of our communities using the resources already at our disposal. Our thesis is simple: the progress of any group is affected not only by public policy and by the racial attitudes of society as a whole, but by that group's capacity to exploit its own strengths. Our concern is about factors that prevent black Americans from using those strengths.

It's important to distinguish between the specific circumstances a group faces and its capacity to marshal its own resources to change those circumstances. Solving the problems of black communities requires a focus on the factors that hinder black people from more effectively managing their own circumstances. What are some of these factors?

Intellectual Development. Intellectual development is the primary focus of this article because it is the key to success in American society. Black people traditionally have understood this. Previous generations decided that segregation had to go because it relegated blacks to the backwater of American society, effectively denying us the opportunities, exposure, and competition that form the basis of intellectual development. Black intellectual development was one of the major benefits expected from newly won

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Jeff Howard is a social psychologist; Ray Hammond is a physician and ordained minister.

access to American institutions. That development, in turn, was expected to be a foundation for future advancement.

YET NOW, three decades after *Brown v. Board of Education*, there is pervasive evidence of real problems in the intellectual performance of many black people. From astronomical high school dropout rates among the poor to substandard academic and professional performance among those most privileged, there is a disturbing consistency in reports of lagging development. While some black people perform at the highest levels in every field of endeavor, the percentages who do so are small. Deficiencies in the process of intellectual development are one effect of the long-term suppression of a people; they are also, we believe, one of the chief causes of continued social and economic underdevelopment. Intellectual underdevelopment is one of the most pernicious effects of racism, because it limits the people's ability to solve problems over which they are capable of exercising substantial control.

Black Americans are understandably sensitive about discussions of the data on our performance, since this kind of information has been used too often to justify attacks on affirmative action and other government efforts to improve the position of blacks and other minorities. Nevertheless, the importance of this issue demands that black people and all others interested in social justice overcome our sensitivities, analyze the problem, and search for solutions.

The Performance Gap. Measuring intellectual performance requires making a comparison. The comparison may be with the performance of others in the same situation, or with some established standard of excellence, or both. It is typically measured by grades, job performance ratings, and scores on standardized and professional tests. In recent years a flood of articles, scholarly papers, and books have documented an intellectual performance gap between blacks and the population as a whole.

- In 1982 the College Board, for the first time in its history, published data on the performance of various groups on the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT). The difference between the combined median scores of blacks and whites on the verbal and math portions of the SAT was slightly more than 200 points. Differences in family income don't explain the gap. Even at incomes over $50,000, there remained a 120-point difference. These differences persisted in the next two years.
- In 1983 the NCAA proposed a requirement that all college athletic recruits have a high school grade-point average of at least 2.0 (out of a maximum of 4.0) and a minimum combined SAT score of 700. This rule, intended to prevent the exploitation of young athletes, was strongly opposed by black college presidents and civil rights leaders. They were painfully aware that in recent years less than half of all black students have achieved a combined score of 700 on the SAT.
- Asian-Americans consistently produce a median SAT score 140 to 150 points higher than blacks with the sam family income.
- The pass rate for black police officers on New York City sergeant's exam is 1.6 percent. For Hispanics, it's 4.4 pe cent. For whites, it's 10.6 percent. These are the result after $500,000 was spent, by court order, to produce a te that was job-related and nondiscriminatory. No one, eve those alleging discrimination, could explain how the r vised test was biased.
- Florida gives a test to all candidates for teaching pos tions. The pass rate for whites is more than 80 percent. F blacks, it's 35 percent to 40 percent.

This is just a sampling. All these reports demonstrate real difference between the performance of blacks an other groups. Many of the results cannot be easily e plained by socioeconomic differences or minority stat per se.

WHAT IS the explanation? Clear thinking about th is inhibited by the tendency to equate performan with ability. Acknowledging the performance gap is, many minds, tantamount to inferring that blacks are int lectually inferior. But inferior performance and inferi ability are not the same thing. Rather, the performan gap is largely a behavioral problem. It is the result of remediable tendency to avoid intellectual engagement a competition. Avoidance is rooted in the fears and se doubt engendered by a major legacy of American racis the strong negative stereotypes about black intellectu capabilities. Avoidance of intellectual competition is ma fested most obviously in the attitudes of many bla youths toward academic work, but it is not limited children. It affects the intellectual performance of bla people of all ages and feeds public doubts about bla intellectual ability.

I. INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT

The performance gap damages the self-confidence many black people. Black students and professional pe ple cannot help but be bothered by poor showings competitive academic and professional situations. Bla leaders too often have tried to explain away these pro lems by blaming racism or cultural bias in the tests the selves. These factors haven't disappeared. But for ma middle-class black Americans who have had access to e cational and economic opportunities for nearly 20 yea the traditional protestations of cultural deprivation a educational disadvantage ring hollow. Given the cultu and educational advantages that many black people n enjoy, the claim that all blacks should be exempt from performance standards applied to others is interpreted a tacit admission of inferiority. This admission adds f ther weight to the questions, in our own minds and in minds of others, about black intelligence.

The traditional explanations—laziness or inferiority the one hand; racism, discrimination, and biased tests the other—are inaccurate and unhelpful. What is requir

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is an explanation that accounts for the subtle influences people exert over the behavior and self-confidence of other people.

Developing an explanation that might serve as a basis for corrective action is important. The record of the last 20 years suggests that waiting for grand initiatives from the outside to save the black community is futile. Blacks will have to rely on our own ingenuity and resources. We need local and national political leaders. We need skilled administrators and creative business executives. We need a broad base of well-educated volunteers and successful people in all fields as role models for black youths. In short, we need a large number of sophisticated, intellectually developed people who are confident of their ability to operate on an equal level with anyone. Chronic mediocre intellectual performance is deeply troubling because it suggests that we are not developing enough such people.

The Competitive Process. Intellectual development is not a fixed asset that you either have or don't have. Nor is it based on magic. It is a process of expending mental strength and reach. The development process is demanding. It requires time, discipline, and intense effort. It almost always involves competition as well. Successful groups place high value on intellectual performance. They encourage the drive to excel and use competition to sharpen skills and stimulate development in each succeeding generation. The developed people that result from this competitive process become the pool from which leadership of all kinds is drawn. Competition, in other words, is an essential spur to development.

Competition is clearly not the whole story. Cooperation and solitary study are valuable, too. But of the various keys to intellectual development, competition seems to fare worst in the estimation of many blacks. Black young people, in particular, seem to place a strong negative value on intellectual competition.

Black people have proved to be very competitive at some activities, particularly sports and entertainment. It is our sense, however, that many blacks consider intellectual competition to be inappropriate. It appears to inspire little interest or respect among many youthful peer groups. Often, in fact, it is labeled "grade grubbing," and gives way to sports and social activity as a basis for peer acceptance. The intellectual performance gap is one result of this retreat from competition.

II. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERFORMANCE

Rumors of Inferiority. The need to avoid intellectual competition is a psychological reaction to an image of black intellectual inferiority that has been projected by the larger society, and to a less than conscious process of internalization of that image by black people over the generations.

The rumor of black intellectual inferiority has been around for a long time. It has been based on grounds as diverse as twisted biblical citations, dubious philosophical arguments, and unscientific measurements of skull capacity. The latest emergence of this old theme has been in the controversy over race and IQ. For 15 years newsmagazines and television talk shows have enthusiastically taken up the topic of black intellectual endowment. We have watched authors and critics debate the proposition that blacks are genetically inferior to whites in intellectual capability.

Genetic explanations have a chilling finality. The ignorant can be educated, the lazy can be motivated, but what can be done for the individual thought to have been born without the basic equipment necessary to compete or develop? Of course the allegation of genetic inferiority has been hotly disputed. But the debate has touched the consciousness of most Americans. We are convinced that this spectacle has negatively affected the way both blacks and whites think about the intellectual capabilities of black people. It also has affected the way blacks behave in intellectually competitive situations. The general expectation of black intellectual inferiority, and the fear this expectation generates, cause many black people to avoid intellectual competition.

OUR HYPOTHESIS, in short, is this. (1) Black performance problems are caused in large part by a tendency to avoid intellectual competition. (2) This tendency is a psychological phenomenon that arises when the larger society projects an image of black intellectual inferiority and when that image is internalized by black people. (3) Imputing intellectual inferiority to genetic causes, especially in the face of data confirming poorer performance, intensifies the fears and doubts that surround this issue.

Clearly the image of inferiority continues to be projected. The internalization of this image by black people is harder to prove empirically. But there is abundant evidence in the expressed attitudes of many black youths toward intellectual competition; in the inability of most black communities to inspire the same commitment to intellectual excellence that is routinely accorded athletics and entertainment; and in the fact of the performance gap itself—especially when that gap persists among the children of economically and educationally privileged households.

Expectancies and Performance. The problem of black intellectual performance is rooted in human sensitivity to a particular kind of social interaction known as "expectancy communications." These are expressions of belief—verbal or nonverbal—from one person to another about the kind of performance to be expected. "Mary, you're one of the best workers we have, so I know that you won't have any trouble with this assignment." Or, "Joe, since everyone else is busy with other work, do as much as you can on this. When you run into trouble, call Mary." The first is a positive expectancy; the second, a negative expectancy.

Years of research have clearly demonstrated the powerful impact of expectancies on performance. The expectations of teachers for their students have a large effect on academic achievement. Psychological studies under a variety of circumstances demonstrate that communicated expectations induce people to believe that they will do well or poorly at a task, and that such beliefs very often trigger responses that result in performance consistent with the expectation. There is also evidence that "reference group expectancies"—directed at an entire category of people rather than a particular individual—have a similar impact on the performance of members of the group.

EXPECTANCIES do not always work. If they come from a questionable source or if they predict an outcome that is too inconsistent with previous experience, they won't have much effect. Only credible expectancies—those that come from a source considered reliable and that address a belief or doubt the performer is sensitive to—will have a self-fulfilling impact.

The widespread expectation of black intellectual inferiority—communicated constantly through the projection of stereotyped images, verbal and nonverbal exchanges in daily interaction, and the incessant debate about genetics and intelligence—represents a credible reference-group expectancy. The message of the race/IQ controversy is: "We have scientific evidence that blacks, because of genetic inadequacies, can't be expected to do well at tasks that require great intelligence." As an explanation for past black intellectual performance, the notion of genetic inferiority is absolutely incorrect. As an expectancy communication exerting control over our present intellectual strivings, it has been powerfully effective. These expectancies raise fear and self-doubt in the minds of many blacks, especially when they are young and vulnerable. This has resulted in avoidance of intellectual activity and chronic underperformance by many of our most talented people. Let us explore this process in more detail.

The Expectancy/Performance Model. The powerful effect of expectancies on performance has been proved, but the way the process works is less well understood. Expectancies affect behavior, we think, in two ways. They affect performance behavior: the capacity to marshal the sharpness and intensity required for competitive success. And they influence cognition: the mental processes by which people make sense of everyday life.

Behavior. As anyone who has experienced an "off day" knows, effort is variable; it is subject to biological cycles, emotional states, motivation. Most important for our discussion, it depends on levels of confidence going into a task. Credible expectancies influence performance behavior. They affect the intensity of effort, the level of concentration or distractibility, and the willingness to take reasonable risks—a key factor in the development of self-confidence and new skills.

Cognition. Expectations also influence the way people think about or explain their performance outcomes. These explanations are called "attributions." Research in social psychology has demonstrated that the causes to which people attribute their successes and failures have an important impact on subsequent performance.

All of us encounter failure. But a failure we have been led to expect affects us differently from an unexpected failure. When people who are confident of doing well a task are confronted with unexpected failure, they tend attribute the failure to inadequate effort. The likely sponse to another encounter with the same or a sim task is to work harder. People who come into a task pecting to fail, on the other hand, attribute their failure lack of ability. Once you admit to yourself, in effect, that don't have what it takes," you are not likely to approa that task again with great vigor.

Indeed, those who attribute their failures to inadequa effort are likely to conclude that more effort will produc better outcome. This triggers an adaptive response to fa ure. In contrast, those who have been led to expect failu will attribute their failures to lack of ability, and will find difficult to rationalize the investment of greater effo They will often hesitate to continue "banging my he against the wall." They often, in fact, feel depressed wh they attempt to work, since each attempt represents confrontation with their own feared inadequacy.

THIS COMBINED EFFECT on behavior and cogniti is what makes expectancy so powerful. The negati expectancy first tends to generate failure through its i pact on behavior, and then induces the individual blame the failure on lack of ability, rather than the act (and correctable) problem of inadequate effort. This mis tribution in turn becomes the basis for a new negati expectancy. By this process the individual, in effect, int nalizes the low estimation originally held by others. Th internalized negative expectancy powerfully affects futu competitive behavior and future results.

The process we describe is not limited to black people. goes on all the time, with individuals from all groups. helps to explain the superiority of some groups at som areas of endeavor, and the mediocrity of those san groups in other areas. What makes black people unique that they are singled out for the stigma of genetic intelle tual inferiority.

The expectation of intellectual inferiority accompanies black person into each new intellectual situation. Sinc each of us enters these tests under the cloud of predicte failure, and since each failure reinforces doubts about o capabilities, all intellectual competition raises the specte of having to admit a lack of intellectual capacity. But th particular expectancy goes beyond simply predicting an inducing failure. The expectancy message explicitly a cribes the expected failure to genes, and amounts to open suggestion to black people to understand any failu in intellectual activity as confirmation of genetic inferi ity. Each engagement in intellectual competition carri the weight of a test of one's own genetic endowment an that of black people as a whole. Facing such a terrib prospect, many black people recoil from any situatio where the rumor of inferiority might be proved true.

For many black students this avoidance manifests itse in a concentration on athletics and socializing, at the e pense of more challenging (and anxiety-provoking) aca demic work. For black professionals, it may involve a tendency to shy away from competitive situations or projects, or an inability to muster the intensity—or commit the time—necessary to excel. This sort of thinking and behavior certainly does not characterize all black people in competitive settings. But it is characteristic of enough to be a serious problem. When it happens, it should be understood as a less than conscious reaction to the psychological burden of the terrible rumor.

The Intellectual Inferiority Game. There always have been constraints on the intellectual exposure and development of black people in the United States, from laws prohibiting the education of blacks during slavery to the Jim Crow laws and "separate but equal" educational arrangements that persisted until very recently. In dismantling these legal barriers to development, the civil rights movement fundamentally transformed the possibilities for black people. Now, to realize those possibilities, we must address the mental barriers to competition and performance.

The doctrine of intellectual inferiority acts on many black Americans the way that a "con" or a "hustle" like three-card monte acts on its victim. It is a subtle psychological input that interacts with characteristics of the human cognitive apparatus—in this case, the extreme sensitivity to expectancies—to generate self-defeating behavior and thought processes. It has reduced the intellectual performance of millions of black people.

Intellectual inferiority, like segregation, is a destructive idea whose time has passed. Like segregation, it must be removed as an influence in our lives. Among its other negative effects, fear of the terrible rumor has restricted discussion by all parties, and has limited our capacity to understand and improve our situation. But the intellectual inferiority game withers in the light of discussion and analysis. We must begin now to talk about intellectual performance, work through our expectations and fears of intellectual inferiority, consciously define more adaptive attitudes toward intellectual development, and build our confidence in the capabilities of all people.

THE expectancy/performance process works both ways. Credible positive expectancies can generate self-confidence and result in success. An important part of the solution to black performance problems is converting the negative expectancies that work against black development into positive expectancies that nurture it. We must overcome our fears, encourage competition, and support the kind of performance that will dispel the notion of black intellectual inferiority.

III. THE COMMITMENT TO DEVELOPMENT

In our work with black high school and college students and with black professionals, we have shown that education in the psychology of performance can produce strong performance improvement very quickly. Black America needs a nationwide effort, now, to ensure that all black people—but especially black youths—are free to express their intellectual gifts. That effort should be built on three basic elements:

- Deliberate control of expectancy communications. We must begin with the way we talk to one another: the messages we give and the expectations we set. This includes the verbal and nonverbal messages we communicate in day-to-day social intercourse, as well as the expectancies communicated through the educational process and media images.
- Definition of an "intellectual work ethic." Black communities must develop strong positive attitudes toward intellectual competition. We must teach our people, young and mature, the efficacy of intense, committed effort in the arena of intellectual activity and the techniques to develop discipline in study and work habits.
- Influencing thought processes. Teachers, parents, and other authority figures must encourage young blacks to attribute their intellectual successes to ability (thereby boosting confidence) and their failures to lack of effort. Failures must no longer destroy black children's confidence in their intelligence or in the efficacy of hard work. Failures should be seen instead as feedback indicating the need for more intense effort or for a different approach to the task.

The task that confronts us is no less challenging than the task that faced those Americans who dismantled segregation. To realize the possibilities presented by their achievement, we must silence, once and for all, the rumors of inferiority.

Who's Responsible? Expectations of black inferiority are communicated, consciously or unconsciously, by many whites, including teachers, managers, and those responsible for the often demeaning representations of blacks in the media. These expectations have sad consequences for many blacks, and those whose actions lead to such consequences may be held accountable for them. If the people who shape policy in the United States, from the White House to the local elementary school, do not address the problems of performance and development of blacks and other minorities, all Americans will face the consequences: instability, disharmony, and a national loss of the potential productivity of more than a quarter of the population.

However, when economic necessity and the demands of social justice compel us toward social change, those who have the most to gain from change—or the most to lose from its absence—should be responsible for pointing the way.

It is time that blacks recognize our own responsibility. When we react to the rumor of inferiority by avoiding intellectual engagement, and when we allow our children to do so, black people forfeit the opportunity for intellectual development that could extinguish the debate about our capacities, and set the stage for group progress. Blacks must hold ourselves accountable for the resulting waste of talent—and valuable time. Black people have everything to gain—in stature, self-esteem, and problem-solving capability—from a more aggressive and confident approach to intellectual competition. We must assume responsibility for our own performance and development. □

Chairman MILLER. Without objection.

The Chair has an opening statement, and if there is no objection, I would like to insert it in the record at this point.

[Statement of Chairman George Miller follows:]

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE MILLER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA AND CHAIRMAN, SELECT COMMITTEE ON CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND FAMILIES

I want to begin by commending Congressman Alan Wheat for asking the Select Committee to hold this hearing, "Melting Pot: Fact Or Fiction?", in conjunction with the Congressional Black Caucus.

Issues related to race and immigration remain at the core of America's agenda. To the extent we resolve them together, we advance those ideals and dreams which we are most proud of. To the extent we fail, we fail those, here and abroad, who hold America's promise of fairness and opportunity to be their own salvation and hope.

Our obligations, therefore, go beyond occasional scrutiny by policymakers, or trendy theorizing by social scientists, or official government lassitude.

Our obligation is to be honest with ourselves about today's realities, and sensitive to the changing needs of tomorrow.

Clearly, there is much we have achieved. With improved access to prenatal care for pregnant women, and better nutrition, infant mortality and low birthweight rates for black infants have declined significantly over the past three decades. This year, minority students led the greatest single year increase in SAT scores in over two decades, with Mexican-American and Puerto Rican students posting the highest gains. Recent studies also show that significant numbers of Asian refugee children — in this country only 3 to 4 years with no prior knowledge of English — are excelling in school in math-related subjects and are holding their own in English.

But there is another side of the coin.

Infant mortality in the black community is 94% higher than it is in the white community and the gap is widening.

One out of two black children are now in poverty.

Hispanic children were the only group of children for whom poverty rose in 1984.

(over)

School dropout rates for Native American children reach as high as 85 percent in some urban areas. Hispanic and black youth also continue to face extremely high dropout rates.

Tragically, some of the strides made in overcoming economic and social problems faced by past generations of minorities and immigrants are now being reversed.

There is still all too ample evidence that the burdens of poverty, discrimination and discouragement continue to eat away at our social fabric. It is our challenge to attack them no less vigorously than the legal barriers of the past.

What we know about current conditions, and the causes of those conditions, serves as the context for considering the future.

In testimony we will hear today, we will learn that given current trends in immigration and fertility, by the year 2000, one out of three Americans will be Hispanic, Black or Asian. Right now, the minority population of Los Angeles is over 50 percent, and 22 of the nation's 26 largest school districts have predominantly minority enrollments.

In short, the makeup of our people is undergoing enormous change.

We will also learn that as the demographic makeup of our nation changes, so too will the structure of our economy.

The number of blue collar manufacturing jobs will decline, jobs which allowed past generations of minorities to climb into the economic mainstream. The opportunities available to new immigrants will increasingly be in low paying service-sector jobs that provide far fewer opportunities for upward mobility.

These changes have enormous implications not only for family economic security, but for family formation, childrearing, education and training, and health care.

We have to begin to ask: Are we ready? And, more importantly, do we have the will?

We, as a society, and as a government, must face our responsibilities. Today's hearing, by putting the spotlight on current and future barriers faced by minorities and immigrants, should help us begin that process.

U.S. House of Representatives
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND FAMILIES
385 House Office Building Annex 2
Washington, DC 20515

"MELTING POT: FACT OR FICTION?"

A FACT SHEET

POPULATION AND IMMIGRATION TRENDS

-- In 1980, the total U.S. population was 226.5 million. Of that, 188.4 million were white, 26.5 million were black, 1.4 million were American Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut, and 3.5 million were Asian and Pacific Islander. Persons of Spanish origin, who may be of any race, numbered 14.6 million. (Bureau of the Census, 1985)

-- By 2030, given current trends in fertility and immigration, the Hispanic population will more than double, from 14.5 million to 37 million, nearly equaling the black population. The Asian population will more than quadruple, from 3.5 million to 17 million. Although their numbers will have increased by 15 million in 2030, the non-Hispanic white population will have declined to 60 percent of the total population. (Bouvier, Population Reference Bureau, 1985)

-- Since 1930, more than half of all immigrants to the United States have been female, and two-thirds have been women and children. (Department of Labor, 1985)

FAMILY INCOME CHARACTERISTICS

Children

-- In 1984, the poverty rate for black children was 46.2 percent; for Hispanic children, 38.7 percent. One out of three Native American children under 18 was poor in 1980. (Bureau of the Census, 1980 and 1985)

-- Black children in two-parent families are twice as likely as white children in two-parent families to be living in poverty. (Children's Defense Fund, 1985)

-- Two-thirds of all black children in female-headed families are poor, 71 percent of all such Hispanic children live in poverty, the highest rate of poverty for any group of children. (Bureau of the Census, 1985)

Families

-- From 1974 to 1984, real median family income for black families dropped 8.5 percent; for families of Spanish origin, 6.3 percent; for whites families, 2 percent. In 1974, white median family income was 67 percent higher than for black families; by 1984, nearly 80 percent higher. (Bureau of the Census, 1985)

-- In 1982, median income for families of Cuban origin was $18,089; for families of Puerto Rican origin, $11,256. (Bureau of the Census, 1982)

-- In single-parent households, two-thirds of white parents are employed; less than 50 percent of black, Hispanic or Native American parents have jobs. (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1985)

-- Seventy-three percent of Native American married-couple households had at least one adult working in 1980. (Bureau of the Census, 1980)

(more)

-- After an average of 32 months residence in the U.S., 16 percent of 1400 Southeast Asian refugee households surveyed had incomes at or above the poverty level. Sixty-nine percent of the refugees held low-status jobs; their economic improvement resulted almost exclusively from increasing the number of household members in the workforce, not from improvements in individual jobs. (Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1985)

TRENDS IN EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT

Academic skills and language

-- Despite significant improvements in minority reading skills in the past 14 years, the gap between black and white performance remains great; only 16 percent of black children were adept at reading at age 17, compared with 45 percent of white children of the same age. (National Assessment of Educational Progress, 1985).

-- Eighty percent of Hispanic and 85 percent of black 17-year-old high school students lack the language skills needed to handle college-level work. Fifty-five percent of white 17-year-olds lack these skills. (National Assessment of Educational Progress, 1985)

-- Approximately 18 percent of Hispanic children aged 8-13, and about 25 percent of those aged 14-20, are enrolled below grade level. (National Council of La Raza, 1985)

-- In a study of 350 Southeast Asian refugee children, 27 percent scored in the 90th percentile on math achievement -- almost 3 times the national average. Twenty-seven percent also earned a general grade-point average of A or A-. Most of the children came to the U.S. with no knowledge of English. (Institute of Social Research, 1985)

-- In 1982, there were approximately 2.4 million children in the U.S. with limited English proficiency. In 1980, 21 percent of students in San Francisco; 19 percent in Los Angeles; 19 percent in Boston; and 6 percent in New York, had limited skills in English. By 1984, these figures had risen to 29 percent in San Francisco, and 23 percent in Los Angeles. (Fernandez, 1984)

Dropout rates

-- In 1984, more than 1 in 4 Hispanic 18 and 19 year olds were high school dropouts, as were 17 percent of blacks and 15 percent of whites. Some studies estimate a Hispanic dropout rate of 80 percent in New York City, 70 percent in Chicago, and 50 percent in Los Angeles. (Bureau of the Census; Hispanic Policy Development Project, 1984)

-- The national high school dropout rate for Native Americans averages 48 percent. Studies conducted in some urban high schools found dropout rates as high as 85 percent for Native American and 80 percent for Puerto Rican students. (National Coalition of Advocates for Students, 1985).

College enrollment

-- In 1977, college attendance rates were about the same for blacks and whites; by 1982, whites were about 45 percent more likely than blacks to attend college. (CDF, 1985)

-- Over half of Hispanic and Native American college students, and over 40 percent of black and Asian students, were enrolled in 2-year colleges. (American Council on Education, 1984)

-- Blacks received 6 percent, and Hispanics only 2 percent, of bachelor's degrees awarded in 1980. (ACE, 1984)

-- White children are three times more likely than black children to live in families headed by college graduates. (CDF, 1985)

(more)

Youth unemployment

- In 1984, the official unemployment rate for youth aged 16-19, was 19 percent; for black youth, 43 percent; for white youth, 16 percent; for Hispanic youth, 14 percent. (Department of Labor, 1984)
- In 1984, the real youth unemployment rate which includes discouraged job seekers, was 31 percent; for black youth, 58 percent; for white youth, 27 percent; and for Hispanic youth, 19 percent. (Roosevelt Centennial Youth Project, 1984)

Concentration of minority students in schools

- More than one-fourth of Hispanics attended schools with minority enrollments of 90-100 percent. (National Council of La Raza, 1985)
- Twenty-two out of the 26 largest school systems in the country had enrollments of more than 50 percent minority students. (Fernandez, 1984)
- A recent longitudinal study shows that black children who attended racially mixed schools were more likely to graduate from high school and complete more years of college. (Center for Social Organization, Johns Hopkins University, 1986)

HEALTH TRENDS

Infant mortality and low birthweight

- The gap in black/white infant mortality rates (IMR) was wider in 1982 than at any time since 1966. In 1982, the IMR for black infants was 19.6 for each 1000 live births, compared to 10.1 for whites. (Department of Health and Human Services, 1984)
- In 1983, the low birthweight rate for infants of all races was 6.8 percent; 5.7 percent for whites, and 12.6 percent for blacks. Black and white low birthweight rates showed the widest gap since 1970. (National Center for Health Statistics, 1985)

Other health indices

- In 1983, 10 percent of black women and 12.5 percent of Hispanic women received late or no prenatal care. (National Center for Health Statistics 1985)
- Black preschool children are six times more likely than white children to have elevated blood lead levels. (NCHS, 1982)
- Between 47 percent and 61 percent of black preschoolers are not fully immunized against one or more preventable childhood diseases, compared to between 33 percent and 43 percent of white preschoolers. (CDF, 1985)
- Native American and Hispanic children show the highest prevalence of growth stunting and obesity - 2 to 3 times that found among all children ages 2 to 4 -- suggesting that the quality of diet for these children is inadequate. (Centers for Disease Control, 1982)

Chairman MILLER. Mr. Wheat.

Mr. WHEAT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity.

First let me thank you for your leadership, not only on this particular issue but on the range of issues that we have studied as a committee since its creation over 2 years ago.

As we have looked over all of the issues on the Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families, one of the unfortunate things that we have repeatedly seen is that, no matter what the problem, the problem tends to be exaggerated among minority children, particularly among native black children within this Nation. Since the scientific community lets us know there are no physiological reasons for the exacerbation of problems within the black community, it is important to hold hearings like this one so that we can begin to examine social, economic, cultural, and psychological patterns within minority cultures, and within their families. Through our examination, perhaps we will begin to determine what are some of the causes for lesser degrees of success in black American communities. Why, for example, do immigrants achieve a higher degree of success than black Americans?

While it may not be possible today to come to conclusions as to why these disparities seem to exist, this hearing can at least begin the process of nonemotional examination into the problem. This committee has done an excellent job in focusing the attention of the Nation on a number of problems that relate to families in this country. With your leadership, I have no doubt that we can begin to focus the attention of the Nation on this problem, also.

I would also like to thank all the witnesses who have come to participate in this hearing today. I would especially like to thank Dr. Harriette McAdoo, who returned to Washington late last night in order to be able to join us.

Chairman MILLER. Congressman Monson.

Mr. MONSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate very much your holding this hearing today. I join with the others in welcoming the witnesses and look forward to their testimony.

I don't want to detract from what we are about to learn, but I think the fact that so many of the people in this country trace their roots to our neighbor to the south, Mexico, it is appropriate to express our concern and condolences for the disaster that has taken place there. I also commend President and Mrs. Reagan for the action they have taken and their commitment to assist in other ways as well, and to the Congress for its concern in the resolution that we passed.

I think the spirit of voluntarism has been evident throughout the country, both from within the Hispanic community and without, and I commend all those who have taken part in efforts to assist in Mexico. I note that while that has taken place all over the country, there have been people from within my own district that have also been a part of that, and I commend them as well.

I thank the chairman for allowing me this opportunity, and, I look forward to the hearing on the important subject that we are about to embark on.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you.

Mr. Evans.

Mr. EVANS. Mr. Chairman, I have no opening statement. I would just like to commend the Chair and the ranking member, Mr. Coats, the staff and the witnesses, for the important testimony they will give us today.

Chairman MILLER. Mr. Lehman.

Mr. LEHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think if any area of the country exhibits the problems of the so-called melting pot, it is the area that I represent in Dade County, Miami. Instead of a community, we actually have three to four ghettos without a whole lot of communication and very few bridges. We have the Cuban American, we have the blacks, we have the Anglo—and even the Anglo is subdivided between the Jewish and non-Jewish, so we almost have four ghettos in our area. We have to build bridges between these people in order to make our community survive and for the well-being of our Nation. So let's get on with the show.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you.

The first panel that the committee will hear from will be made up of Dr. Leon Bouvier, Dr. Harriette McAdoo, Dr. Ray Hammond, and Dr. David Swinton. If you will come forward, please. Welcome to the committee. We look forward to your testimony.

Your written statement will be included in the record in its entirety. Feel free to proceed in the manner in which you are most comfortable.

Dr. Bouvier, we will start with you.

STATEMENT OF LEON F. BOUVIER, PH.D., VICE PRESIDENT, POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU, INC.

Dr. BOUVIER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am Leon Bouvier, vice president of the Population Reference Bureau, which is a nonprofit demographic research organization here in Washington.

I am pleased to have this opportunity to testify this morning on how demographic changes, particularly immigration, affect our society. Let me state at the outset that the testimony is based on the results of objective, nonpartisan analysis. Of course, my views are wholly mine and do not necessarily reflect those of the Population Reference Bureau. I have submitted a more detailed report and I will just summarize it here very briefly.

I would like to talk first of all about what I call demographic behavior. All of us are population actors. Parents gave birth to us, we have children—some of us have many, some have few, some have none—and we all die at some time or other. But very often social factors intervene to determine that time. Most of us move once, twice, often. Many of us cross international borders.

The results of all these millions of population acts gives us today's population and tomorrow's population, not only in size but in composition, age, sex, ethnic, and racial makeup. So immigration is a demographic act in that sense. It has been performed by millions and millions of individuals who have decided, for one reason or another, to move to this country from elsewhere. As a result of such massive movements, the country's identity itself has been in a state of permanent flux.

Indeed, as Nathan Glazer recently remarked in "Clamor at the Gates," "the United States, it seems, remains the permanently unfinished country."

We are all familiar, I think, with the history of immigration, especially the 19th century shifts from north and west Europe to south and east Europe. As a result, the Nation changed its identity, from being overwhelmingly white, Anglo-Saxon Protestant to being much more heterogeneous within its white majority.

These dramatic shifts did not occur without trouble. The late 19th century and early 20th century witnessed increasing hostility toward the newest immigrants. The result was the restrictive and discriminatory legislation of the 1920's, later reaffirmed in 1952.

With the major changes in legislation in 1965 and subsequent years, immigration which had been falling since the twenties once again increased. Not only did the number grow, but the sources of immigration changed dramatically. The proportion coming from Latin America and Asia grew, while that coming from Europe fell.

Today, immigration levels, especially if we include illegal entries, almost equal the high levels of the turn of the century when a million or so a year would enter the country. Today, about 80 percent of all legal immigrants come from either Latin America or Asia. New shifts have been noticed within the Asian group. Very few Japanese migrate to the United States any more. Filipinos have just surpassed the Chinese as the largest Asian ethnic group in the United States.

So there are differences between the turn of the 20th century and the end of the 20th century, which is coming very soon. In 1900, the resident population of the United States was averaging four children per family. Since 1972, fertility in the United States has fallen to the point that were it to continue its current levels, the population would begin to fall within 50 years without immigration. Women average about 1.8 births.

So we can't look at immigration in a vacuum if we're interested in its effects on American society. We have to examine both demographic behaviors, migration and fertility: immigration by some 700,000 to 1 million individuals, overwhelmingly from Latin America and Asia, and the very low fertility of the resident population.

Well, what about the future? How will these changes affect this society? I prepared some projections to illustrate what would be the impact of continued net immigration of 500,000 per year and continued low fertility of the resident group. I won't bore you with the assumptions—they're in the paper. I will say I think they are quite conservative.

According to the 1980 census, non-Hispanic whites comprised just under 80 percent of the population of the United States, blacks about 11.7 percent, Hispanics 6.4 percent, and Asians, 1.5 percent. By 2000, which is just a little over 14 years from now, non-Hispanic whites will be just under three-quarters of the population, blacks will increase slightly to 13 percent, Hispanics 9 percent, and Asians, 3.5 percent. Numerically, the Hispanic population will grow from 14.5 million in 1980 to 24 million by the turn of the century; Asians from 3.5 million to 9 million.

Over the 50-year period between 1980 and 2030, changes will be dramatic. From being four out of five in 1980, non-Hispanic whites will be two out of three by 2030. The numbers will only increase from about 180 million to 195 million. The Hispanic population will more than double in size and almost equal the black population. The Asian population will more than quadruple over the same period.

Furthermore, future immigrants are likely to settle near their fellow country people. Today, nearly 70 percent of all Hispanics reside in four States: California, Texas, New York, and Florida. Three-quarters of all Asians live in seven States: California, Hawaii, New York, Illinois, Texas, New Jersey, and Washington. California's population, which is 24 million in 1980, should pass 31 million by the turn of the century, and about 42 million in 2030.

By the turn of the century, just over half of California's population will be non-Hispanic white, with that proportion falling to just under 40 percent by 2030. By then, about as many Californians will be Hispanic and another 14 percent Asian, and probably 6 or 7 percent black. Similar changes, though not as dramatic, will occur in other receiving States, especially Texas.

Well, let's look at what some of these changes mean for just a few selected sectors of society. I would like to concentrate on education very briefly. Educational institutions are facing numerous problems, many of them involving bilingual and even multilingual teaching. In Los Angeles, some 80 different languages are spoken by the children in the public schools, and debate goes on as to how to best cope with the problem of integrating these young immigrants into American society through proficiency in the English language.

Attitudes toward education also vary among people. The dropout rate for Mexican adolescents is a cause for concern. On the other hand, some Asian groups are showing enormous appetites for education. These educational differentials are reflected in the occupations and the incomes of adult immigrants. As we enter what Naisbitt has referred to as the "information society," with communications so important, I have to wonder if we are seeing the development of a two-tier economy where some Asians will be competing with the educationed whites and blacks for the new prestigious positions, while some Hispanics compete with the less educated blacks and whites for the lower level jobs.

What do these numbers really mean? The Nation is clearly facing a challenge somewhat similar to what it faced at the turn of the 20th century. This time, however, it is more interracial than interethnic within the European population. Now, I am aware that such a statement can arouse emotions. Is it racist to even mention that the percent of the non-Hispanic white population will fall in future years. Should these statistics even be mentioned, given the fact that neoracists can perhaps use them to their advantage?

We have been confronted with these questions many times in the past. I am convinced that it is important that policymakers and other opinion leaders be aware of the dramatic changes beginning to transpire in our society. It is a new challenge with many alternative solutions. It is a challenge that can be met if we act now.

Because of these demographic changes, we, as a nation, are both getting older and becoming more heterogeneous. These are all the result of changing demographic behavior. Clearly, we are an unfinished nation. Now is the time for reasonable people, in and out of government, to address this important question: What kind of a nation do we want to be? What will be the future patterns of cultural adaptation by the various groups?

There are those who prefer what I call status quo, a continuation of the present situation under an Anglo conformity unbrella. It's sort of a "salad bowl" rather than a melting pot. Integration, if not assimilation, will be encouraged, and the newest immigrants clearly would have to become competent in English to communicate with the white leadership.

Another view argues for cultural pluralism, pointing out that immigrants don't always melt into American society. Some groups prefer not to melt into American society and maintain their own ethnic identities. Others are the unmeltable ethnics, so-called—blacks, Chicanos, native Americans.

There is another mode of adaptation that is emerging, what we call the voluntary development of ethnic enclaves, where certain groups are economically successful, despite any evidence of integration or assimilation. They preserve their identity, they preserve their internal solidarity. In such milieus immigrants can move ahead economically despite little knowledge of the host culture and language. As an example, Koreans have been quite successful in Los Angeles.

Ethnic enclaves may well be part of the future of the United States. Perhaps entirely new patterns of integration and/or assimilation may occur. Whatever direction is taken, I think the ability to communicate must be given highest priority. The residents of a nation must interact comfortably if a society of ever-changing culture is to persist. The Nation's identity, I think, is at a crossroad. Decisions made now as to the kind of nation we desire, whatever it may be, decisions made now by the newest immigrants themselves as to the choice of adaptation, whatever it may be, these will have tremendous effects on the nature of American society of the future.

I would like to close with a quote from Law Prof. Peter Shuck of Yale University. He said: Immigration laws serve to answer the very first question that any society must put to itself: what are we; what do we wish to become; and most fundamentally, which individuals constitute the "we" who shall decide these questions.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Prepared statement of Leon Bouvier follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LEON F. BOUVIER, PH.D., VICE PRESIDENT, POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU, INC., WASHINGTON, DC

I am Dr. Leon F. Bouvier, Vice President of the Population Reference Bureau, a non-profit demographic research organization located in Washington, DC.

I am pleased to have the opportunity to testify this morning on how demographic changes, particularly immigration, affect every segment of our society. Let me state at the outset that this testimony is based on the results of objective, non-partisan analysis. Moreover, any views that are expressed are wholly mine and do not necessarily reflect those of the Population Reference Bureau.

I have submitted a detailed report for the record and will limit my remarks to summarizing the findings of the research and speculating on what it means for the future of our society.

INTRODUCTION

The story of immigration to the US is again being repeated. For almost two centuries, people from other lands have emigrated to America searching a better life. The early 19th century saw the first "newest immigrants." They and their families and others from their homeland who followed, became the "newest minorities." Later, still more people came from different sources and became the "newest immigrants" and "newest minorities."

Today we are witnessing still another stream of immigrants, this time from Latin America, the Caribbean, and Asia. These are the current "newest immigrants." Many are joining fellow countrymen and women; others are indeed truly newcomers to the country. In either case, they and those they join and those who will follow in future years comprise America's current "newest minorities."

The nation was founded by immigrants and the children of immigrants. In its relatively brief history, the US has admitted more immigrants than any other country in the world. From 1820, when immigration statistics were first gathered, to 1900, over 19 million legal immigrants were counted. By 1985, the total number had risen to close to 55 million. To be sure, some returned to their homelands, but perhaps as many as 35 million immigrated permanently to the US between 1820 and 1985.

Throughout most of the 19th century the vast majority of people came from northern and western Europe (Chart 1). By 1880 a shift in country of origin was occurring. The peak immigration years of 1880 to 1914 consisted primarily of movements to the US by southern and eastern Europeans. In certain years over one million entered the nation, from Italy, Greece, Poland and elsewhere.

The restrictive immigration laws passed in the 1920s and reaffirmed in 1952 were a direct result of these massive movements. The Immigration Act of 1929 established an annual quota of 154,000 people and restricted or prohibited immigration from certain countries in an effort to retain the racial and ethnic composition of the nation as of 1890. This favored northern and western Europe at the expense of southern and eastern Europe as well as all other parts of the world.

The 1965 and subsequent amendments to the Immigration Act of 1952 shifted emphasis from national origins to family reunification and occupational priorities. Some 270,000 people are allowed to enter the US with no more than 20,000 from any one country. In addition, immediate relatives of US citizens are admitted without limit; they now number about 250,000 annually but that may increase in future years. Refugees are not included in these figures. Each year the president, in consultation with Congress, determines the number to be accepted and from which regions. These average about 100,000 annually.

The 1965 amendments resulted in a dramatic change in type of immigrants. Eighty percent of those admitted from 1820 to 1964 were Europeans; first from the north and west and later from the south and east. By the late 1970s, Europeans were only 13 percent of the total, while Latin Americans and Caribbeans made up 42 percent and Asians 39 percent. The number of Asians has since climbed resulting in a smaller proportion of Europeans.

THE NEWEST IMMIGRANTS

Beginning in the mid-1960s the nation entered a new era, marked by large numbers of immigrants mostly from new sources. These newest immigrants come primarily from Latin America, the Caribbean, and Asia. Since 1965 over 6.1 million have entered the country legally, many as refugees. Numbers have been especially substantial since 1980. Since then, over 2.2 million people have come to the US from either Latin America and the Caribbean or Asia. A recent shift in regional source has taken place and by 1984, those coming from Asia (256,273) far surpassed those coming from Latin America and the Caribbean (195,560). Over the past five years, close to 80 percent of all legal immigrants to the US have come from either Latin America, the Caribbean or Asia. (See Chart 2)

What exactly is meant by Hispanics; by Asians? These racial/ethnic terms are increasingly in use in the media. Yet they can be misleading.

The term "Hispanic" is in fact an American "invention" that denotes all the people of Latin American ancestry. While appearing fairly simple, it leaves many questions unanswered. All people born in or descendant of persons born in Latin American countries are not necessarily "Spanish." Many are Native Americans or Mestizos; others could be of German or Italian ancestry but still come from a Latin American country. Also to be considered are the early settlers of the southwestern US some of whom came directly from Spain. Are their descendants Hispanic?

The concept "Asian" also presents difficulties. If the term refers to anyone from the Asian continent, then Israelis, Turks, Iranians, and others should be included. However, the term does not usually include such groups and is limited to persons of Asian racial background. This includes persons from all Asian countries east of Afghanistan and excluding the Pacific islands. We necessarily rely on responses to Census inquiries on racial identity in this report.

Another problem lies in the heterogeneity of the Hispanic and Asian groups. Hispanics are generally subdivided into Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, and "Other." Though all speak Spanish there are significant socioeconomic differences among these groups that are hidden when examining Hispanics as a whole. Asian groups are equally disparate. The Japanese, the Koreans, the Indians, the Kampucheans - these all represent vastly different cultures.

Other caveats warrant mention. All the "newest minorities" are not "new". Certainly the descendants of the early settlers of the southwest are not "new;" nor are the descendants of the Chinese and Japanese who came to California in the mid-19th century. When determining the number of people of a certain racial/ethnic group, such disparities are necessarily included, but the reader should be aware of the problem.

The question of undocumented aliens inevitably arises when dealing with international migration. Reliable data simply do not exist on their stock or flow. Variations in the number in the country at any given time (stock) range from 2 million to 8 million. Estimates of how many enter in any given year (flow) are equally unknown ranging from 100,000 to 500,000. Furthermore, considerable return migration takes place among these people, particularly if their homeland is nearby. At least half of all illegal immigrants are estimated to come from Mexico with another significant proportion from Central America and the Caribbean.

PURPOSE OF PAPER

Demographic changes affect every segment of society. Whether there are more or less people in a specific area is relevant to that area's economy; whether the proportion of elderly is large or small indicates the types of services that should be offered; whether the proportion of "newest immigrants" is high or low is similarly important for social and economic planning. The purpose of this paper is to illustrate this relationship, with particular emphasis on international migration.

Variations in the three demographic variables: fertility, mortality, migration lead to changes in population size. People are born; people die; most people move once or often between birth and death. Shifts in demographic behavior on the part of thousands or millions of individuals result in significant differences in population size and composition. Of particular relevance to this report is the movement of people across international borders into the US.

Immigration to the US is substantial. On that basis alone, the proportion of immigrants in the total US population will increase. It will be even greater if the fertility of immigrants surpasses that of the resident population as it currently does.

In certain regions of the nation where some immigrant groups are likely to settle, their proportions will be even greater.

One is hard pressed to find many segments of the society that are not affected by changes in demographic behavior, whether fertility, mortality or migration. A demographic dimension should be included in any planning for the future.

THE CURRENT DEMOGRAPHIC PICTURE

According to the 1980 census, of the population of 226 million about 14.6 million were Hispanic and another 3.5 million were Asian. These represent considerable gains since 1970 numerically and proportionally . For Hispanics, growth amounted to 39 percent or over 4 million persons. The Asian population more than doubled (141 percent) over the decade--the largest proportional growth recorded for one racial group in many decades. (Table 1)

By 1980, non-Hispanic whites represented 79.9 percent of the total population of the US with another 11.7 percent black, 6.4 percent Hispanic and 1.5 percent Asian. In 1970 only 5.2 percent of the population were Hispanic and less than 1 percent were Asian.

Since 1980, more changes have occurred. Asians in particular have grown rapidly as a result of new refugee streams from Southeast Asia. Indeed, more Kampucheans and Laotians entered the country in 1981 (and also in 1982 and 1983) than were enumerated in the 1980 census! Undocumented immigration from Central America and Mexico continues at perhaps higher levels than in the 1970s although it remains unclear how much higher. Illegal entries are more likely to be by entire families than was previously the case. Furthermore, the number from El Salvador has undoubtedly exploded in recent years.

Asians and Hispanics are not randomly distributed among the 50 states. (Table 2). Hispanics are in every state but tend to cluster in certain areas. California, with 4.5 million Hispanics, is home to almost one of every three Spanish-origin residents in the US. Nearly 70 percent of all Hispanics reside in four states: California, Texas (3 million), New York (1.7 million), Florida (858,000).

Three-quarters of all Mexican-Americans live in California and Texas; over 60 percent of all Cubans reside in Florida. A similar proportion of Puerto Ricans live in New York and New Jersey. Those from Central America and elsewhere are more scattered though California is home to the largest number.

Asians also concentrate in a few states, with California home to well over one-third, followed by Hawaii, New York, Illinois, Texas, New Jersey and Washington. Three-quarters of all Asians reside in those 7 states. California is the prime residence for all Asian groups with the exception of Indians who are more likely to settle in New York.

Significant differences in fertility behavior are noted among Hispanics and Asians. The fertility of Hispanic women as a group is about 60 percent higher than the overall average. It is highest among Mexican-American women and lowest among Cubans.

Aside from the Vietnamese and the other Southeast Asian refugees, Asian fertility is not particularly high. Japanese fertility is well below the national average as is the Chinese.

Indian, Korean and Filipino fertility closely approximate the average.

The variations noted in fertility and migration among the newest immigrants are reflected in their age distribution. Hispanic groups, with the exception of the Cubans, are young. The Hispanic median age is 23 compared to 30 for the nation. This youthfulness is due to both relatively high fertility and heavy immigration of young adults.

Japanese-Americans have a median age of 33.5 years, much higher than that for the total US population (30.0). The median age for Indians (30.1) and Chinese (29.6) are close to the norm. Filipinos (28.5), Koreans (26.0) and Vietnamese (21.5) have median ages lower than for the country as a whole. These variations reflect the patterns and dates of immigration.

In sum, the newest immigrants to the United States constitute perhaps as much as 10 percent of the total US population in 1985 and, in general, tend to be somewhat younger than average. Their growth in recent years has been phenomenal reflecting not only the changes in US immigration laws in 1965 but also increases in both the level of illegal immigration and the number of refugees accepted from Southeast Asia.

POPULATION PROJECTIONS

Population projections should not be confused with predictions. The latter report what one thinks will actually occur in the future. Projections are simply the mathematical results of various alternative assumptions about future demographic behavior. Given certain clearly stated assumptions about fertility, mortality and migration, the population in any future year can be ascertained. Barring mathematical error, the projection itself can never be incorrect. The assumptions on which the projection is based can and often are incorrect. Indeed "...the purpose of projecting population is not exclusively, or even primarily, to make accurate predictions. Rather it is to identify and chart the likely effects of influences and contingencies that will determine future population size." (1)

This report's projections indicate what would take place under specifically stated assumptions about future demographic behavior. One can then determine what actions should or should not be taken to assure that certain ends are attained or avoided, always being aware that the behavior upon which the assumptions are based could vary in future years.

The assumptions for this report are straightforward and fairly conservative. Net immigration (that is, the difference between the number entering and the number leaving the nation) is 500,000 per year, of whom 20 percent are Non-Hispanic white (primarily from Europe, Canada, Middle East); 11 percent black (from Africa and the Caribbean); 36 percent Asian (from East and South Asia); 32 percent Hispanic (from Latin America and the Caribbean); 1 percent Other (Pacific Islands and undefined). Fertility differentials exist between groups but convergence is projected to occur within 50 years at the current level for the total US population - i.e. 1.8 live births per woman. Life expectancy is the same for all groups and some progress will occur in future years.

These assumptions may be off target; that of annual net immigration of 500,000 is particularly tenuous. Movements from Mexico and Central America could increase significantly in future years. The number of entrants into the labor force of these countries will double by the turn of the century; it is unlikely that enough jobs will be created for these millions of young adults. Furthermore, the possibility of international loan default by Mexico or US military intervention in Central America could lead to massive increases in new immigrants, whether legal, illegal or refugees. A political uprising is possible in the Philippines; will that result in many Filipino refugees? Hong Kong will return to Chinese sovereignty in 1997; how many of its residents will devise means to migrate to the US?

On the other hand, the passage of rigid new legislation by the US government could lead to drastic reductions in illegal movements and a national concern with "too many refugees" could put an end to such humanitarian endeavors. As these projections of the US population are examined, such possibilities should be kept in mind.

Relying on the original assumptions, the population of the US in the year 2000 will total about 268 million (Table 3). Proportionally non-Hispanic whites will decline somewhat to 74.4 percent from 79.9 in 1980. Blacks will increase their share slightly to 13.1 percent. The newest minorities will grow particularly rapidly between now and the turn of the century. From 14.5 million in 1980, Hispanics will number 24 million in 2000 and be 8.9 percent of the total population. Asians, only 3.5 million in 1980 will almost triple their numbers to more than 9 million and comprise about 3.5 percent of the US population.

Thirty years later, in 2030, while the majority group will represent only two-thirds of the total population, Hispanics will constitute 12 percent and number about 35 million. The Asian portion will approximate 16 million and almost 6 percent of the total.

Changes in racial composition will be dramatic. From being 4 out of 5 in 1980, non-Hispanic whites will be only 2 out 3 in 2030. Their numbers will only increase from 180 million to 195 million. In marked contrast the Hispanic population will more than double and almost equal the blacks as the largest minority in the country. The Asian population will more than quadruple over the same period.

To illustrate the impact of an alternative scenario with higher net immigration, 1 million for example, the population of the US in 2030 would be 330 million rather than 295 million. Non-Hispanic whites would be 60 percent of the population rather than 67 percent. Hispanics would number 55 million as compared to 35 million with lower net immigration and be 17 percent of the population. Asians would total 25 million and represent almost 8 percent of the population.

As noted earlier, the newest minorities are far from being homogeneous among themselves. In 1980, 60 percent of all Hispanics were of Mexican background; 14 percent Puerto Rican; 5 percent Cuban; 21 percent other Hispanic primarily from Central America. Because of the mystery surrounding the number of illegal immigrants and variations in the migration of Puerto Ricans (which is not international) it is difficult to project the relative size of the Hispanic ethnic groups in the future "The ethnic mix of the Hispanic population should remain relatively stable for the remainder of this century, although Hispanics from countries other than Mexico, Cuba and Puerto Rico may increase their share somewhat. Here, too, the big unknowns are unregulated immigration from Puerto Rico and illegal immigration, as well as changes in US immigration law." (2)

Major shifts are expected within the Asian population in the US. Movements out of Japan are now minute while increases have been noted among Koreans, Indians, Filipinos and Chinese. Especially marked is the recent growth in refugee movements from Southeast Asia.

By 1990, Filipinos will be the largest Asian ethnic group. Koreans will move ahead of the Japanese just behind the Chinese. By 2030, Filipinos will number close to 3.3 million or four and half times their current size. Koreans will have barely surpassed the Chinese with 2.3 million. The Vietnamese will be numerically larger than the Indians and Japanese. Indeed, by that year there may well be more Kampucheans and Laotians than Japanese.

Given the tendency of new immigrants to settle near their fellow country people, it is quite likely that, although some divergence may occur, the states with the largest numbers of newest minorities in 1980 will also be home to many such people in future years.

California should remain the prime receiving state for immigrants. From its 1980 population of 24 million, California will surpass 31 million in 2000 and 42 million by 2030. By the turn of the century about 52 percent of the population will be non-Hispanic whites and that proportion will fall thereafter to about 39 percent by 2030. By then about as many Californians will be of Hispanic background and another 16 percent will be of Asian ancestry. The highly publicized claims made a few years ago that a majority of Californians would be "Third World Peoples" by the turn of the century may have been anticipatory. Nevertheless, it is not unreasonable to predict that in less than fifty years such a situation will exist in the Golden State if blacks are included in that category.

New York will remain the second largest home for the newest minorities if Puerto Ricans are included. By 2000, about 65 percent of New York's population will be non-Hispanic whites; another 18 percent black; 11 percent Hispanic and 6 percent Asian. All the minorities will continue to grow after the turn of the century while the dominant group will decline to 55 percent by 2030. At that time, some 23 percent will be black; 13 percent Hispanic; 9 percent Asian.

Texas ranks third in the number of newest minorities mostly of Mexican and Central American origin. By 2000, about 58 percent of Texans will be white non-Hispanics compared to 65 percent in 1980. By 2030, Texas may join California as a state with less than a majority being non-Hispanic whites. Blacks will constitute 13 percent of the population; Hispanics 33 percent; Asians about 4 percent. Future levels of illegal immigration could change these proportions significantly.

Other states with significant numbers of the newest minorities include Florida, Illinois, Washington, Hawaii and New Jersey. Their populations should increase substantially in future years.

The next twenty to fifty years will see some dramatic demographic changes in the U.S. Population will increase, though slowly, from 235 million today to perhaps 270 million in 2000 and 295 million by 2030. Given a continuation of low fertility on the part of the resident population and convergence towards that level on the part of future immigrants, any additional growth beyond 2030 should be minor. The population will age over the next half century in part because of low fertility and in part because of the aging of the baby boom. The racial and ethnic composition of the nation will shift drastically. The proportion of non-Hispanic whites will fall; that of blacks will remain fairly constant while that of the newest minorities will grow substantially. New conglomerations of races and ethnic groups will be a significant force in the social evolution of the nation as it enters the 21st century.

IMPACT OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES ON SOCIAL SECTORS

All societal institutions are affected at least to some degree by changes in demographic behavior. When examining these relationships demography "comes to life." Variations in fertility, mortality, and particularly migration are interesting, but when these are shown to be related to important social issues, interest is heightened considerably.

Education has always been highly cherished by Americans,

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irrespective of ethnic or racial background. Because of the baby boom followed by the baby bust, enrollments have fluctuated considerably in recent years. Currently, primary school enrollments are again on the rise the result of the baby boom echo. Furthermore, increased emphasis is being placed on quality education and school administrators are challenged to improve their "product."

Educational institutions face other problems. In those regions where the newest immigrants are settling, issues concerning bi- and even multi-lingual teaching are coming to the fore. In Los Angeles, some 80 different languages are spoken in the public schools and the debate rages as to how best cope with the problems of integrating these young people into American society through proficiency in the English language. With continued growth of the newest immigrants and their descendants, such problems will intensify. The training of future teachers in such exotic languages as Tagalog and Cantonese will be costly but necessary if current patterns of bi-lingual education are to be maintained.

Furthermore, there are different levels of attitudes and success in a school environment. The dropout rate among Mexican and Central American adolescents is a cause for alarm intensifying the need for a more integrated training program. On the other hand, many Asian groups are evidencing an enormous appetite for education. Indeed, Asians are fast becoming the largest college level minority.

Educational attainment among the newest immigrants is also varied, ranging from near illiteracy among some Hmong and Laotian refugees to attainment of more than 17 years of school on average among Indians. Communication problems throughout the society could multiply if the process of educating the newest immigrants is not adjusted to assure competency in speaking and writing English.

Marriage and housing are closely related variables. As individuals reach adulthood, educational training, securing a job, preparing for marriage and family formation often follow, though not necessarily in that order.

Despite the coming of age of the baby boom generation, marriage levels have not been very high because of shifts in the nation's social mores - in particular a tendency to postpone and even to refrain from marriage altogether.

It remains to be seen if the newest minorities will follow these same marital patterns. In their homeland, the Japanese, Chinese and Korean marry at a fairly advanced age. This is also true of educated Indians. Filipinos and Southeast Asians are more likely to marry at earlier age. With the exception of Cubans, Hispanics tend to marry at an early age, though more often than not, these are consensual rather than legal unions. If motherland customs are followed the newest minorities may offer some new alternatives to the rapidly changing marital patterns in the US.

Many of the newest minorities exhibit stronger family ties than do native born Americans. According to the 1980 census, for the overall population, just over three-quarters of all children under age 18 live in two-parent households. Among Asians 85 percent are in such surroundings. Hispanics are not quite as cohesive. Just under 71 percent of all children under 18 live with two parents. However, with the exception of the Puerto Ricans, where only half are in such family situations, other Spanish origin groups approximate the overall average of 75 percent.

Average household size is greater for the newest minorities families than for the resident population as a whole. In the US, households average 2.74 persons; among Asians that climbs to 3.2. For Hispanics average household size is 3.5, ranging from 2.9 for Cubans to 3.7 for Mexicans. Both, family stability and actual number of children are reflected in these statistics.

Whether such patterns will hold in future years is uncertain. "There is ...substantial evidence of a convergence among class, ethnic, religious, and resident groups in many features of family life."(3) In the short run, one might expect that where the newest minorities predominate, housing demands will differ from those elsewhere. The family remains together longer; marital disruptions are less likely. Combined with sheer numbers, these factors should yield greater and different housing needs.

The newest minorities will not constitute a meaningful proportion of the retired population of the US for the foreseeable future. As we have seen, most are considerably younger than the overall population, many being between 25 and 40.

Since the 1960s the US labor force has grown rapidly. The combination of the baby boom generation reaching adulthood and the increase in the proportion of women in the labor force explain that massive growth. The next 20 years promise a reversal of this growth pattern. Although women will continue to enter the labor force, the birth cohort of the 1970s is so small that the number reaching the adult stage of life will be 25 percent less than in the previous generation.

Will the number of entrants into the labor force be sufficient to meet the demands of a growing economy? Will it be necessary to rely increasingly on immigrants or will the growing number of women together with later retirement age solve any possible labor shortages? Such issues could pose new problems for the economy.

While opinion polls of minority families show a reluctance for married women to be working, this opposition is not reflected in the data. In 1980 half of all women aged 16 and over were in the labor force. Among Hispanics it was 49.3 percent. It was considerably higher among most Asian groups, reaching 68.1 percent for Filipino women. Only Indian and Vietnamese women exhibited labor force participation rates that approximate those of the white majority.

Being relatively young, the newest immigrants or their offspring will comprise a greater proportion of the labor force than of the overall population. A majority of immigrants come to this country in their early twenties and thirties and immediately search for employment. Adequate training not only in job techniques but in the English language may pose problems for the employers of tomorrow. Again communication difficulties may arise particularly if no serious attempt is made to adequately integrate these recent immigrants into the mainstream of American society.

Median family income in 1980 was $19,917. With the exception of the Vietnamese, Asian groups earned more than the national average. Japanese earnings were 37 percent greater; Filipino 19 percent. Lowest were the Korean who still earned 3 percent above the norm. Vietnamese income was 35 percent below the average. No Hispanic group earned as much as the national median. Cubans fared best, just 8 percent under the norm; Mexicans were 15 percent below and Puerto Ricans 43 percent. (Chart 3)

The difference in family income between Asians and Hispanics can be summed up in one statistic: percent of families in poverty. Nationwide it is 9.6; for Hispanics it is 21.3; for Asians 7.0. It is thus not surprising that Asians are far more likely to be employed in professional occupations than their Hispanic counterparts. Looking solely at foreign-born residents, 20.3 percent of Asians were classified as professionally employed in 1980 in marked contrast to the 3 percent among those born in Middle America.

The post-industrial society has arrived. We have entered what John Naisbitt calls the "information society."(4) where improved communications are stressed. The combination of hi-tech industries and techniques together with increases in the service industries have almost totally replaced the traditional industrial plants of the earlier 20th century. The future will undoubtedly witness a continuation of this revolutionary change. How will the newest minorities adjust to such a challenging milieu?

The differences in education and income between Hispanics and Asians suggest the emergence of a two-tier economy where Hispanics compete with ghetto blacks for the low level service occupations and the Asians compete with middle and upper class blacks and whites for the emerging new "information society" positions. To be sure, this is an oversimplification and many exceptions will be noted. Concern is expressed about the latest refugees from Southeast Asia and the fear that they may not adjust to American society; many Hispanics have lived in the US for decades and will move up the economic ladder. Yet, the overall picture suggests that Hispanics, on the whole, may be in the lower level jobs while Asians may be in the more prestigious positions as the nation prepares to enter the 21st century.

CONCLUSION

A brief speculative excursion into the 21st century can yield all sorts of pictures - some positive, some negative. The motion picture, Blade Runner, is an example of the latter. The year is 2019, the scene is Los Angeles where the inhabitants of this dismal pollution-ridden metropolis of tens of millions of inhabitants, speak a strange mixture of Asian, Spanish and English. It is not a pretty picture.

French novelist Jean Raspail's The Camp of the Saints is yet another doomsday prediction.(5) It depicts an advanced country faced with the dilemma between accepting millions upon millions of wretched Asian refugees and witnessing the end of their own civilization or refusing such immigration thereby condemning millions of human beings to death on the high seas.

The next century need not be dismal if we adequately plan for the changes that are forthcoming. We are "a nation of immigrants." It follows that we are constantly in flux, ever changing our definition of "What is America?" Previous immigration streams have contributed significantly to the development of the nation, whether culturally, scientifically, or economically. We have all benefitted from immigrant inputs, whether from a Fermi or a Rockne. Subsequent benefits will come from our newest immigrants, Hispanic or Asian.

Los Angeles in 2019 could be the harbinger of a new multiracial society with no majority to determine the appropriate cultural standards; with no language being in predominant use, but with most citizens multilingual. Considerable intermarriage could in the long run lead to the emergence of what Philip Wylie once referred to as a tea-colored society. Eventually, racial discrimination would disappear as all groups participated in the political as well as the economic structure of the city.

Yet, we can be too optimistic about the future. Adjusting to radical change in both age and racial composition will place severe stress on the society. Growing concern is expressed about the failure on the part of many Hispanics to complete their education thereby retarding their progress. On the other hand, Asian success stories are noted everywhere. Indeed, this may explain the growing anti-Asian feelings among some Americans. But these successes are not found among all Asian groups and evidence is mounting that the most recent Southeast Asian refugees may lack the training and tools needed to fit into American society.

Little has been said about black Americans in this report. Yet, their status will be severely affected by the demographic changes of the future. Among the earliest immigrant groups, blacks have yet to recover from 300 years of bondage. With the advent of the civil rights legislation of the 1960s, social acceptance seemed to be around the corner. Today, there is some question as to whether such progress will continue, particularly for those not prepared for the economic changes that will take place in future years.

American blacks are facing their own immigration challenge as the number of black newest immigrants from Nigeria, Ethiopia, Haiti, Jamaica, Dominican Republic and elsewhere grows every year and heterogeneity within the black population increases.

The challenge facing the nation as it prepares to enter the 21st century is serious, but that challenge can be met. A difficult question is being asked, and like it or not, it must be answered: "What kind of nation do we want in 20, 50, 100 years?"

A somewhat similar challenge was extended to the nation as it entered the 20th century. What had been a predominantly white Anglo-Saxon Protestant society, with a small proportion of recently freed slaves and a minute group of Chinese and Japanese on the west coast, was facing the immigration of millions upon millions of eastern and southern Europeans, many Catholic or Jewish and speaking foreign languages.

What kind of society were we becoming? The debate was fierce and violence occasionally flared. Much of the rhetoric was flagrantly racist and membership in the Ku Klux Klan and other like minded organizations rose. The result was the imposition of restrictions on immigration but not until after some 15 million people had arrived, mostly from eastern and southern Europe.

The American scene was premanently changed, and as most would agree, for the better. All Americans have benefitted from the incursion of new peoples and the resulting heterogeneity, at least of the white population.

There are more differences than similarities between that immigration stream and the one presently in progress. The numbers are about the same, between 600,000 and 800,000 annually. The sources are drastically different; from Latin America and Asia rather than from Europe. Any future heterogeneity will not be limited to European whites; it will be interracial in nature.

At no time during the earlier immigration stream was the fertility of the resident population below replacement, though it was falling as the nation industrialized. Today, fertility is well below the level needed to replace the population without the assistance of immigration. Within the next few decades, the long dominant non-Hispanic white population will no longer be a majority in California or Texas. Within a century, the nation too may well consist of many minorities but no majority. This is the supreme challenge.

In the past, the problem was how best assimilate, or at least integrate, the newest immigrants into the majority culture. How strong will that "majority" culture be when it itself becomes but another minority? Will interracial harmony prevail or will intergroup hostility increase as the many minorities strive to be "numero uno."

Clashes are occurring in some cities: between whites and Vietnamese along the Gulf Coast; between French-Canadians and

Hispanics in Lawrence, Massachusetts; and elsewhere. The debate on limiting future levels of immigration and attempting to end illegal entries continues. Today the debate is far more sophisticated than it was a century ago. With a few exceptions, racism is not raising its ugly head. Rather, the protagonists are addressing the question posed above, whether or not they realize it. "What kind of society do we want to become in the 21st century?" More specifically, what will be the future patterns of cultural adaptation?

Some prefer a "status quo". That is, a continuation of the present situation, despite changing racial and ethnic proportions, under an Anglo-conformity umbrella; that is to say, a "salad bowl" though not a "melting pot." Integration if not assimilation would be encouraged. In such a society, the newest immigrants would be required to learn English early on to ease communication with the majority leadership.

Taking issue with this concept, advocates of cultural pluralism point out that immigrants do not always "melt" into American society. Some groups prefer their own ethnic identities. Then there are the so-called "unmeltable ethnics" - blacks, Chicanos, and Native-Americans. Will they become integrated into American society and will some of the newest immigrants join them?

Still another mode of adaptation has resulted in the voluntary development of "ethnic enclaves". Certain groups are economically successful despite any evidence of acculturation. They preserve their identity and internal solidarity. In such a milieu, immigrants move ahead economically despite little knowledge of the host culture and language. Current examples are Cuban and Korean enclaves in certain metropolitan areas.(6)

Ethnic enclaves may be a part of the social firmament of the 21st century. Perhaps the future will see entirely new patterns of integration and/or assimilation. Whatever direction is taken,, the ability to communicate must be given the highest priority. The residents of a nation must interact comfortably if the society is to persist. The nation's identity is at a crossroad. Decisions made now regarding immigration policy on the part of the American people through their government, and decisions made by the immigrants themselves as to their choice of adaptation will have tremendous effect on the nature of the American society in the year 2000, 2030, 2050.

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TABLE 1. U. S. POPULATION BY RACE, 1950 - 1980.

	POPULATION IN MILLIONS				
YEAR	TOTAL	WHITE	BLACK	HISPANIC	ASIAN
1950	151.3	131.7	15.0	4.0	0.6
1960	179.3	152.7	18.8	6.9	0.9
1970	203.2	168.7	22.6	10.5	1.4
1980	226.5	181.9	26.5	14.6	3.5

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION

YEAR	TOTAL	WHITE	BLACK	HISPANIC	ASIAN
1950	100.0%	87.0%	9.9%	2.6%	0.4%
1960	100.0%	85.1%	10.5%	3.8%	0.5%
1970	100.0%	83.0%	11.1%	5.2%	0.7%
1980	100.0%	80.3%	11.7%	6.4%	1.5%

PERCENTS MAY NOT ADD TO 100 DUE TO ROUNDING

TABLE 2. NEWEST IMMIGRANTS TO U.S. BY STATE OF SETTLEMENT, 1980.

STATE	HISPANICS		ASIANS	
U. S.	14608673	100.0%	3333625	100.0%
CALIFORNIA	4544237	31.1%	1230732	36.9%
NEW MEXICO	476859	3.3%	6608	0.2%
WASHINGTON	119832	0.8%	144053	4.3%
TEXAS	2988130	20.5%	118095	3.5%
ILLINOIS	639885	4.4%	148587	4.5%
FLORIDA	857676	5.9%	55362	1.7%
NEW JERSEY	493443	3.4%	103216	3.1%
NEW YORK	1668016	11.4%	284236	8.5%
HAWAII	71387	0.5%	467752	14.0%
SELECT STATES	11859465	81.2%	2558641	76.8%

HISPANICS=OF SP ORIGIN

TABLE 3. TOTAL US POPULATION, 1980-2030, BY RACE.
Numbers in millions.

	1980		2000		2030	
	No.	Prop.	No.	Prop.	No.	Prop.
Non-Hispanic White	181.9	80.3%	198.9	74.4%	201.8	68.7%
Black	26.5	11.7%	35.2	13.1%	37.4	12.7%
Hispanic	14.5	6.4%	23.8	8.9%	35.7	12.2%
Asian	3.5	1.5%	9.0	3.4%	17.3	5.9%
Other	0.1	.0%	0.5	0.2%	1.5	0.5%
Total	226.5	100.0%	267.4	100.0%	293.7	100.0%

* Level of Net Immigration is 500,000 per year.

CHART 1.



1861-1900

1901-1930

1931-1960

CHART 2.



CHART 3.


MEDIAN FAMILY INCOME
TOTAL US, RACIAL & ETHNIC GROUPS
1979 DOLLARS (Thousands)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
28
TOTAL
WHITE
BLACK
JAPAN
PHILLIPINES
KOREA
CHINA
VIETNAM
INDIA
MEXICO
CUBA
PUERTO RICO

Chairman MILLER. Thank you.
Dr. McAdoo.

STATEMENT OF HARRIETTE PIPES McADOO, PH.D, PROFESSOR, SCHOOL OF SOCIAL WORK, HOWARD UNIVERSITY

Dr. McADOO. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman and members of the select committee, I am very honored to have this opportunity to share with you this information about black families.

Blacks compose the largest ethnic group of color in the United States. The most important characteristic of black families is their great diversity. Afro-Americans have been here on this continent longer than most immigrant groups. Yet, they have been unable to realize the benefits experienced by other groups.

One of the characteristics of an oppressed ethnic group is that members of a group are denied the acknowledgement of their own diversity. This is shown by the continuous use of the phrase "the" black family, as if all families of Afro-American descent are a monolithic group. To do so indicates an ignorance of economic, cultural, and historical differences within black groups.

The black population grew twice as fast as the nonblack population from 1980 to 1984. Blacks are younger, and they are more fertile than nonblacks. Black children now constitute 15.4 percent of all American children. Black women outnumber black men by 1.4 million, or 15 million women to 13.6 million men. This imbalanced sex ratio has made it more difficult for black women to find spouses and to remarry once a divorce occurs, thus perpetuating single parent formations.

Frazier, in reference to the black family structure over 45 years ago, noted the formation of several distinct family structural arrangements that were the result of social conditions that have historically confronted blacks. Social conditions led to the formation of different family structures, some with two parents and some that were one-parent in structure.

Three major events have disrupted family structural formations: the first was enslavement, followed by the northern industrialization, and then increases in poverty.

Historically, free men and freed men in the North and the South had family structures that had two parents and were puritanical and patriarchal in structure. Enslaved Africans who lived on plantations that allowed long-term monogamous unions, or who were bought by persons with smaller farms, also tended to have traditional husband-wife units.

In contrast, those Africans who were enslaved within the large southern plantations devoted to specific crops, such as cotton or tobacco, were unable to form traditional stable units. They were forced to live a form of polygamous arrangement, with the white owner as head of the mother-child domestic units of both races. When the importation of slaves was legally ended, the breeding of slaves for America's internal distribution further eroded the husband-wife units. At this point in time, and immediately following emancipation during Reconstruction, the emergence of a matriarchy was one of the strong functional survival techniques that grew out of these bleak social conditions. At the same time there was a continuation of the two-parent structure in other families.

The next disruption to the families occurred with the industrialization of the northern cities and the migration of adult family members in search of jobs. Families were temporarily disrupted and removed from some of their family and community supports.

The families that consisted of women and children accounted for no more than 25 percent of the black families from the point of Emancipation until the early 1970's. At that time, the increasing stress upon the families led to an increase of families headed by females. This is related to the high unemployment of black males.

Several explanations, other than economic ones, have been given for the variation of the black family. One view is that the traditional family was destroyed by slavery. However, the data show that immediately after enslavement, over 75 percent of black families had both family members present. Gutman's work clearly documented the strong family patterns that existed even on plantations. Others have felt that African family forms have been retained in the form of single mother units. Anthropologists refute this contention in favor of an economic stress cause.

An unmarried mother-child unit is alien to almost all traditional African cultures. Such a family unit would not be allowed to exist—in fact, probably could not exist—independently of the family.

Poverty has led to further structural changes in families. There has been a decline, yet the poverty rate for all families is still the highest that his has been since 1966. Children, regardless of race, now compose the largest group of impoverished persons in the United States. Forty-six point 5 percent of all black and 39 percent of Hispanic children now live in poverty, compared to only 16.5 percent of white children. The actual number of black families in poverty showed a slight decrease, while Hispanics showed no change. But 1.2 million white families now are above poverty.

Families move in and out of poverty. Periods of poverty are approximately 3 years for white families but extend much longer for black families. The much heralded strengthening of the American economy is not trickling down to families of color.

Poverty is related to the changes in family structure. If divorce occurs, two-thirds of the family's income leaves with the fathers, who seldom have custody of the children.

The concept of the feminization of poverty has different meanings in black and white families. In all groups, regardless of race, women who are raising their children without a spouse are the most economically vulnerable units. In white single mother units, this is due to the increase in divorce and the refusal or inability of fathers to support their children. However, poverty attacks blacks regardless of gender. Black families were impoverished before divorce occurs, an event that occurs twice as frequently than in other families. When a divorce occurs and the family unit loses the income of the father, the black mother could not add income by going to work, for she is already working.

This drastic increase of single-mother homes is related to the financial situations of too many black fathers. Marriages tend to break up as financial stresses increase.

Poverty levels were also reflected in the fact that pregnancies of blacks, in or out of wedlock, often found the father unable to provide sufficient support to the family.

The race and marital status of a single mother is highly predictive of poverty. The age and the number of children within the household is another important contributing factor. The larger the family and the younger the children, the greater the poverty.

In looking at education and employment, the primary and secondary education of blacks is inferior to that of whites. One major problem that poor and black children face is the teachers' expectations of poor achievement. Teachers have been shown to give more positive reinforcement to white, middle-class, and female students. These expectations are often internalized by the black students, who then fulfill the prophecy of failure. The high achievement of blacks from the Carribeans is often attributed to their higher self esteems that result from an early environment of high expectations in a nonracist atmosphere. These immigrants are often genetically and culturally closer to Africans, so genetics must be ruled out as a causative factor. My own research has found higher self esteems in black children in supportive environments with strong black role models. Parents who are poor and not well educated are often intimidated by the school system. They do not have the knowledge to guarantee that the educational systems work to the advantage of their children.

One theory on poor achievement is that black students have a sense of malaise and helplessness, or an external locus of control. They feel that the events of their lives act upon them and they do not have the individual power and control to overcome barriers to their education. Another theory is that black children are not socialized within their homes to be as competitive in academics as they are in athletics. This competitive edge is what would enable black students to overcome earlier deprivations.

The vast majority of blacks are not educated within an integrated environment. It has been found that 75 percent of all black students in public schools are concentrated within approximately 2 percent of the Nation's school districts. There are only 202 school superintendents in the United States who are responsible for educating more than 50 percent of all black children between kindergarten and the 12th grade. Any significant changes in black education will have to occur within these schools.

One earlier proposed solution to lower achievement was racial integration of students, in order to expose black children to the resources that are available to nonblacks. However, the increases in segregated housing patterns prevent neighborhood school integration. The realization has arrived that quality education can, and must, be provided regardless of the racial mix of the classroom and the neighborhood.

If the school systems with the largest poor and black enrollments could be targeted with resources, with strong expectations of achievement, and close cooperation with the families, many of the educational deficiencies could be removed.

Despite the increase in the number of black high school graduates from 1975 to 1980, the percentage of high school graduates who have enrolled in college has declined. Enrollments for blacks are concentrated in the junior colleges and in the first 2 years of universities.

Blacks, along with other ethnic groups of color, except Asians, are underrepresented in higher education. Blacks represent 9.2 percent of all postsecondary enrollments; Hispanics, 3.9 percent; Asians, 2.4 percent; and native Americans, 0.7 percent. There has been a general leveling off in participation of persons of color in education since 1975. Blacks have shown enrollment decreases in both 2- and 4-year colleges, while Hispanics and Asians have increased.

There has been a decline in the number of doctorates earned by blacks. Blacks are only 8 percent of full-time professional employees in higher education. The American Council on Education found that blacks are concentrated in the lower positions and few are granted tenure. Blacks are being hired and granted tenure at a rate that is below the retirement and extinction rate. In addition, fewer blacks are now enrolled in medical, dental, and other professional schools, a fact that will accelerate the decline in the number of middle-class black families.

Male unemployment and underemployment are the most serious problems of blacks. The rate of participation in the labor market in 1983 for black and Hispanic young males was at the lowest in history. Race is still a powerful determinant of who does and who does not get employed.

Life expectancy differences between blacks and whites continue, with whites having an advantage of living half a decade longer. Health problems are more serious among blacks due to the undesirable living conditions, diets, and work conditions that expose them to more carcinogens. The frustrations, stresses, and anger related to their employment situations, living conditions, and lessened ability to support their families, are acted out through violent attacks on others. Because most violent crimes are directed at those in one's immediate environment, and since most blacks live in racially segregated environments, the victims of this violence are usually other blacks and not whites.

The decline in the educational achievements, health, and employment of blacks is an issue that has importance beyond the black community. The lack of educational attainment will increasingly become a greater concern to all Americans. It is predicted that by the year 2020, the American population will be composed of 35 percent ethnic groups of color. Increases of younger blacks and Hispanics means that a majority of the labor force may be composed of these uneducated groups and also women. Their lack of education and occupational prospects will result in low incomes that will cause the national productivity to decline. The aging white population will be forced to increasingly depend upon this group to provide the taxes for Social Security and other governmental services that will be needed by the aged nonethnic population. The increases of children and people of color who are poorly educated and in poverty will eventually lead to "diminished futures" for all of us.

These are serious policy issues that need to be addressed in order to avoid serious threats to the quality of life in the entire Nation.

[Prepared statement of Harriette Pipes McAdoo follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HARRIETTE PIPES MCADOO, PH.D., PROFESSOR, SCHOOL OF SOCIAL WORK, HOWARD UNIVERSITY

TESTIMONY PRESENTED TO THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES

Dear Sirs:

I am honored to be able to share this information with you about Black families.

Blacks compose the largest ethnic group of color in the United States. This is an ethnic-racial group that has existed in a lower caste-like status in our country.

The most important characteristic of Black families is that there is a great deal of diversity within Black communities. Afro-Americans have been on this continent longer than most immigrant groups. Yet because of the continuing discrimination experienced by this ethnic-racial group, Blacks have not been able to move totally to realize the benefits experienced by other groups.

One of the characteristics of an ethnic group's oppression is that members of a group are denied the acknowledgement of their own diversity. This is evidenced by the continuous use of the phrase "the Black family," as if all families of Afro-American descent are a monolithic group. To do so indicates an ignorance of economic, cultural, and historical differences within the Black groups. Social programs and policies continue to be designed without an apparent awareness of the many intragroup differences that have formed over the generations.

A stereotypical view of Blacks, and other groups of color, is found in the customary approach of making only racial comparisons in describing problem areas. Social scientists repeatedly fail to make the appropriate cross tabulations for both race and economic differences, in order to make more accurate group comparisons. Therefore, what are often described as being racial differences are in reality social class differences. For example, adolescent pregnancy rates are much higher for Blacks than whites. However, when the data are controlled by economic levels of the families, racial differences fade away. Too early pregnancies in all races result in poverty and poor health care. The closer the Black groups are to middle class status, the more similar are the teen pregnancy rates across races.

Demographic Characteristics

The Black population grew twice as fast as the non-black population from 1980 to 1984, and was at a high of 28.6 million on July 1, 1984. Blacks have a younger age group and higher fertility than non-blacks. They increased by 6.7 percent from 1980 to 1984, in contrast to the 3.2 percent population increase of whites.

Blacks were 11.8 percent of the population in 1980 and had increased to 12.1 by 1985. The average age of Blacks was 26.3 years and 32.2 years for whites. Black children now constitute 15.4 percent of all American children (U.S.


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Census-Series P-25, 1984). The Hispanic population is composed of Blacks and non-blacks and thus is not counted as a separate racial group. Hispanics totaled about 15.4 million people.

Black women outnumber Black men by 1.4 million, or 15 million women to 13.6 million men. This imbalanced sex ratio has made it more difficult for Black women to find spouses and to remarry, once a divorce occurs, thus perpetuating single parent formations.

Black Family Structures

Frazier (1939), over forty-five years ago, noted the formation of several distinct family structural arrangements that were the result of social conditions that had historically confronted Blacks. Three distinct social conditions lead to the formation of different family structures, some that were two-parent and some that were one-parent in structure. Three major disruptions have disrupted family structural formations: (1) the first was enslavement; (2) followed by the northern industrialization; and then (3) increases in poverty.

Freemen and freedmen in the North and South had family structures that had two parents and were puritanical and patriarchal in structure. Enslaved Africans who lived on plantations that allowed long-term monogamous unions, or who were brought by persons with smaller farms, also tended to have traditional husband-wife unions, often with additional non-married kin in residence. These patriarchal families who were craftsmen, farmers, and small businessmen, had a head start on the larger group of southern plantation Blacks. Though living often just above poverty themselves. They were in a position to obtain education from missionaries and in colleges, before the new Jim Crow laws segregated all schools. They often became upwardly mobile into middle class status. These families that are now just four or five generations from enslavement have histories of college education that often go back three or four generations. This group has produced many of the educational, civil rights, and business leaders of the Black communities.

In contrast, those Africans who were enslaved within the large Southern plantations devoted to specific crops, such as cotton or tobacco, were unable to form stable traditional families They were forced to live a form of polygamous arrangement. The plantation owner was head of the families and often controlled more than one mother-child unit on the plantation, one who was white and others who were enslaved (McAdoo, 1981). When the importation of slaves were legally ended, the breeding of slaves for America's internal distribution further eroded the husband-wife units (Gutman, 1976). At this point in time, and immediately following Emancipation during Reconstruction, the emergence of a matriarchy was one of the strong functional survival techniques that grew out of these bleak social conditions (Frazier, 1939).

The next disruption to the families occurred with the industrialization of the northern cities and the migration of adult family members in search of jobs. Families were temporarily disrupted and removed from some of their family and community supports. Many Black families did benefit from the industrial jobs in the north. Their children were able to benefit from the northern school and went on to form a core of Blacks who were able to enter professional jobs.

The families that consisted of women and children accounted for no more than 25 percent of the Black families from Emancipation until the early 1970s. At that time, the increasing stress upon the families led to an increase of families headed by females. The high unemployment of Black males has meant that the fathers were unable to assume the traditional role of provider of the family when a child is born. Individuals in these families have had many obstacles that have prevented them from becoming self-sufficient.

Several explanations, other than economic ones, have been given the variation of Black family structures. One view is that the traditional family was destroyed in slavery, despite the data that immediately after enslavement over 75 percent of the families had both parents present. Gutman's work clearly documented the strong family patterns even on plantations. Others have posited that African family forms have been retained in the forms of single mothers. Anthropologists refute this contention, in favor of an economic stress cause. Sudarkasa (1981) pointed out that an unmarried mother-child unit is alien to almost all traditional African cultures. Such a family unit would not be allowed to exist, in fact probably could not exist, independent of the family. Children are born into intense family networks and would be the responsibility of the entire extended family groups, and would not be allowed to fall into lower economic status as has occurred in America. Widows traditionally were married to appropriate males relatives; errant fathers felt the severe pressure of the elders, who functioned to ensure the stability of the entire family. Some of these same cultural patterns have continued to the present, modified by the American experiences. Afro-American cultural norms tend to prevent children from being given away unless there are absolutely no family alternatives, resulting in many forms of informal adoption.

Poverty

The latest disruption that the families have faced, the increased impovertization of families, has led to further economic and structural changes in families, as they have adapted to the deteriorating social conditions.

Poverty within the United States has been steadily increasing for the five years between 1979 through 1983. In 1984 the poverty rate for white families decreased from 12.2 percent to 11.5 percent, while the Black rate decline from

35.7 percent to the high level of 33.8 percent. Yet, the poverty rate for all families is still the highest that it has been since 1966, (U.S. Census-P-60, No. 149, 1980).

As an economic unit the family has lost ground. Children regardless of race, now compose the largest group of impoverished persons in the U.S. (Elderly people are no longer the poorest comparatively better off, because of the indexing of Social Security payments. The elderly poverty rate has declined in 1984 to 12.4 percent, the lowest that it ever has been.) Children are disproportionately poor, for 46.5 percent of all Black and 39 percent of Hispanic children now live in poverty, but only 16.5 percent of white children are in poverty.

In 1984 the poverty level for a family of four was set at $10,609; and $8,277 for a three person family. However, the real income of Black families had no significant change between 1983 and 1984, while Hispanic and white family incomes improved. The actual number of Black families in poverty showed only a trace of a decrease, while Hispanics showed no change, but 1.2 million white families are now no longer in poverty. The much heralded strengthening of the American economy is not trickling down to families of color.

Families move in and out of poverty. Periods of poverty are three years for white families but extend much longer for Black families.

Feminization of Poverty in Families of Color

Poverty is no longer only an issue of families being poor, but particularly are issues related to the changes in family structure that have caused more women to have to raise their children alone. Women who are married and employed earn only one-third of the family income. If divorce occurs, two-thirds of the family's income leaves with the fathers, who seldom have custody of the children.

The concept of the feminization of poverty has different meanings in Black and in white families. In all groups, regardless of race, women who are raising their children without a spouse are the most economically vulnerable (Pearce and McAdoo, 1983). However, in white single mother families this is a concept that portrays the increases in divorces and the refusal or inability of fathers to support their children. This has forced many women and their children to move from stable financial levels into levels of poverty. Mothers who had not worked outside of the home were forced to seek employment without the previous training and experience in the labor market, and faced gender biases. Some were unprepared to support themselves and sank into poverty.

Poverty attacks Blacks regardless of gender. Black families were impoverished before divorce occurred, an event that occurs twice as frequently than in other families.

When a divorce occurs and the family unit loses the income of the father, the mother could not add income by going to work, for she was already working.

The percentage of children who lived in single mother homes was 50.6 percent in 1984, a marked increase from the 33.7 percent in 1970 and 23.6 percent in 1960. The Black rate did double over these 24 years, while the white race more than doubled in the same time. This drastic increase is related to the financial situations of too many Black fathers. Marriages tend to break up as financial stresses increase.

Poverty levels were also reflected in the fact that pregnancies of Blacks, in or out of wedlock, often found the father unable to provide sufficient support to the family. This was in turn made worse by welfare policies that did not reinforce the maintenance of the family unit when support was provided. Single parenting by teens is a serious problem, but this age group bears just 40 percent of babies outside of marriage. The majority of these babies are born to women in their twenties (Children's Defense Fund, 1984). Most adolescent mothers are supported by their extended families and are not reflected as separate units in the poverty statistics. However, when a young mother does maintain a separate household, poverty is alarmingly high. 100 percent of Black and 98 percent of white teen mothers are in poverty (Kamerman, 1985). Over 90 percent of all AFDC families are headed by single mothers, according to the Congressional Budget Office. Nearly two-thirds of women receiving AFDC had their first child when they were teenagers (American Public Welfare Association, 1985).

The race and marital status of a single mother is highly predictive of poverty. In addition, the age of the children within the household is another important contributing factor. 64% of Black single mothers are in poverty. But when the children are under the ages of six, over 72 percent find themselves in poverty. This should be compared with the non-black overall poverty rate of 40 percent and 57 percent when the children are under six (6) years. The number of children in the household is another factor that is predictive of poverty for single mothers. If there is only one child in the family, the poverty rate is 50 percent; it is 66 percent for two children, 71 percent for three children; and 85 percent for families with four children (Kamerman, 1985). These increasingly higher poverty rates for the larger families reflect the greater strains related to parenting alone, and the advancing ages of the mothers with associated health problems.

Education and Employment

The primary and secondary education of Blacks is inferior to that of whites. The high proportion of children of color in poverty, learning problems that are related to poor prenatal medical care, and stressed parents, all contribute to the lessened ability of children to profit from the education that is provided. A problem that poor and Black children face, is the teachers' expectations of poor achievement. Teachers have been shown to give more positive reinforcement to white, middle class, and female students. These expectations are often internalized by the Black students, who then fulfill the prophecy of failure. The high achievement of Blacks from the Carribeans is often attributed to their higher self esteems, that result from an early environment of high expectations in a non-racist atmosphere. These immigrants are often genetically closer to Africans, so genetics must be ruled out as a causative factor. My own research has found higher self esteems in Black children in supportive environments, with strong Black role models. Parents who are poor and not well educated are often intimidated by the school systems. They do not have the knowledge to guarantee that the educational systems work to the advantage of their children.

Genetic inferiority explanations of poor achievement have been rejected. One theory on poor achievement theory is that Black students have a sense of malaise and helplessness, an external loci of control. They feel that the events of their life act upon them and they do not have the individual power and control to overcome barriers to their education. Another theory is that Black children are not socialized within their homes to be as competitive in academics as they are in athletics. This competitive edge is what would enable Black students to overcome earlier deprivations.

The vast majority of Blacks are not educated within an integrated environment. It has been found that 75 percent of all Black students in public schools are concentrated within approximately two percent of the nation's school districts, or in 350 out of 16,000 districts in the nation (Moody, 1985). There are only 202 school superintendents, 120 Black and 82 non-black, who are responsible for educating more than 50 percent of all Black children between the kindergarten and twelfth grade. Any significant changes in Black education will have to occur in these schools.

One earlier proposed solution to lower achievement was racial integration of students, in order to expose Black children to the resources that were available to non-blacks. However the increases in segregated housing patterns prevent neighborhood school integration. The realization has finally arrived that quality education can, and must, be provided regardless of the racial mix of the classroom or neighborhood. Resources must be made available in order to meet the educational needs of the children, wherever they may be found.

Unfortunately, resources that could now be used to provide remediation, enrichment, and intensive instruction, have become more limited, as government policies have shifted away from the goal of eliminating racial and economic differences in education. If the school systems with the largest poor and Black enrollments could be targeted with resources, strong expectations of achievement, and close cooperation with the families, many of the educational deficiencies could be removed. Community-wide pressure will need to continue to be placed on schools and support will need to be given to families to reinforce achievement. Governmental support must be increased for families and local community groups in the private sector do not have the needed resources.

Despite the increase in the number of Black high school graduates from 1975 to 1980, the percentage of high school graduates who enrolled in college has declined. In 1982, only 36 percent of Black seniors entered colleges, a decline from 45 percent in 1981. Enrollment for Blacks tend to concentrate in junior colleges and in the first two years of universities. Enrollment in two year colleges is three times greater than in four year colleges, and there is a strong dropout pattern prior to graduation (ACE, 1984).

Blacks, along with other ethnic groups of color, except Asians, are underrepresented in higher education. Blacks represented 9.2 percent of all post-secondary enrollments;

Hispanics, 3.9 percent; Asians, 2.4 percent; and Native Americans, 0.7 percent. There has been a general leveling off in participation of persons of color in education since 1978. Not only are Blacks underrepresented, Blacks have shown enrollment decreases in both two and four year institutions, while Hispanics and Asians have increased. There had been a decline in both the absolute number and the percentage of degrees earned by Blacks between 1976 and 1981, while all other ethnic groups of color have registered increases.

Another theory on poor achievement is that Blacks enter white schools and universities to find that in reality they are in hostile environments (Peters, 1985). Empirical support to the last theory has been found in Allen's (1983) examination of the experiences of Black collegians. Allen, in a sample of Blacks enrolled in predominantly white state supported schools across the nation found that the students were highly motivated to achieve; they had positive self concepts; they reported that they felt that they were well prepared for college; were mostly from middle-class backgrounds; and were from stable intact families. In spite of these positive factors, they were ambivalent about their experiences at white schools and with white faculty. They felt isolated and reported that they did not really feel a part of the campus life. Sixty-five percent had experienced racial discrimination, often subtle seldom openly hostile.

They wanted more Black role models and peers on the campus.

Black college students will have even greater difficulty in the future to find role models for there has been a decline in the number of doctorates earned by Blacks when all ethnic groups of color are combined. They count for only 8 percent of full-time professional employees in higher education. The American Council on Education found that Blacks are concentrated in the lower status positions that would not allow upper mobility into higher status university positions. Blacks are less likely to be hired on tenure tracks or to be granted tenure (Wilson, 1984). Blacks are being hired and granted tenure at a rate that is below the retirement and extention rate. The future does not bode well for college students being able to have professors who will act as role models or give the security of emotional support, and be able to help interpret the environments of higher education. In addition, fewer Blacks are now enrolled in medical, dental, and other professional schools, a fact that will accelerate the decline in the number of middle-class Black families.

Employment

Male unemployment and underemployment are one of the most serious problems of Blacks. The unemployment rate of Black male teenagers was 44 percent at the end of 1984, almost three times as high as white male teens (16 percent).

Only 23 percent of Black and 35 percent of Hispanic teens are employed, compared to 48 percent of white teens. The rate of participation in the labor market in 1983 for these two ethnic male groups was the lowest in history. Education achievement does not appear to pay off for Blacks. The unemployment rate of Black youth who complete their high school diploma (38 percent) is higher than that of white high school dropouts (24 percent).

Race is still a powerful determinant of who does and who does not get employed. Blacks are underrepresented in well-paying or status jobs. They tend to be employed in low-skilled and the most insecure positions.

The youth employment and training programs that were implemented during the 1962 and 1970s have been found to produce positive results Those who completed the programs, when compared to those without benefit of these programs, had higher earnings and job placements (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1984). Unfortunately, two of these programs, Job Corps and the Work Incentive (WIN) program are among those being reduced because of policies of the federal government to not be responsible for youth training and placement programs.

Health

The death rate among poor Blacks is still significantly higher than for whites. Living conditions were found to be the major factor in deaths of minors, more so than the availability of health services. Race was the major predictor in infant deaths in a New England urban setting. If the deaths involved premature births, low birth weight, or poor prenatal care, 90 percent were Black (Wise, 1985). The death rate for older youth and children was clearly linked to environment, rather than race. The leading cause of death for inner city youth, regardless of race, was due to injury or violence.

Life expectancy differences between Blacks and whites continues, with whites having an advantage of living half a decade longer. In 1979, Blacks lived an average of 68.5 years and whites 74.6 years, a difference of 6.10 years. By 1983, both groups had added an average of one year to their lives, with Blacks living to 69.6 years and whites to 75.2 years, still a difference of 5.60 years to the whites' advantage (DHHS, 1985).

Health problems are more serious among Blacks, due to the undesirable living condition, diets, and work conditions that expose them to more carcinogens and stress related diseases. Stress, anger, depression, and low self-esteem are particular problems of those in Black communities. All of these are the consequences of poverty, discrimination, and occupational isolation (Gary, 1984). The inability to pay the related expenses results in poor Blacks not having access to preventative medical care, and the overuse of emergency facilities for primary care.

The frustrations, stresses, and anger related to their employment situations, living conditions and lessened ability to support their families, are acted out through violent attacks on others. Because most violent crimes are directed at those in one's immediate environment, and since most Blacks have ghettozied lives, the victims of the release of violence are usually other Blacks.

The decline in the educational achievements, health and employment of Blacks is an issue that has importance beyond just Black communities. Attempts to increase the educational opportunities and attainments of Blacks is no longer an issue of concern only within Black enclaves. The lack of educational attainment will increasingly become a greater concern to all Americans, for it is predicted that by the year 2020 A.D. the American population will be composed of 35 percent ethnic groups of color (ACE, 1984). This increase in population of the comparatively younger age of Blacks and Hispanics, means that a majority of the labor force may be composed of these under-educated groups and also women. Their lack of education, and occupational prospects, will result in low incomes that will cause the national productivity to decline. The aging white population will be forced to increasingly depend upon this group to provide the taxes for Social Security and other governmental services that will be needed by the largely aged non-ethnic population. There are serious governmental policy issues that need to be addressed immediately in order to avoid serious threats to the quality of life of the entire nation. The increases of children and people of color who are poorly educated and in poverty, will eventually lead to "diminished futures" for all of us (Hodgkinson, 1985).

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Response to Question Submitted by Congressman Lehman

Question. I have seen data showing that after 12 years the median income among Jamaican black families in South Florida is equal to the median income for all families, while median income for native black families is substantially lower? Why?

Answer. The difference between American blacks and Caribbean-African immigrants or the European immigrants are threefold: (1) Despite severe hardships in their native lands, they were enabled to keep strong intact family patterns and were able to cling to their religious beliefs and cultural practices, before and after immigration. These provided strength and social supports for them. In contrasts, enslaved Africans had their religion, cultural practices, and often the basic integrity of their families systematically destroyed. This had a destructive influence on individuals and families that are passed from one generation to another.

(2) The migration for Jamaicans, and other ethnic groups, was done by choice in hopes of greater opportunities for education and jobs. There was an expectation of success and the motivation to strive. Upward mobility was felt to be possible if one worked hard enough and had appropriate opportunities.

In contrast, the dehumanization of Afro-American's entry into our country and their life experiences beat into them an expectation that they would not succeed, that the odds were against them, and that delaying gratification would not be rewarded for them, as it was for whites. For example, white high school drop-outs earn more than Afro-American high school graduates, and even some black college graduates.

(3) Probably the most crucial difference between the success of Jamaican black families and American black families can be attributed to the different "mind set" that develops with the children of the two different cultural family groups.

The Jamaican children grow up within a predominantly Afro-Caribbean environment in which possible role models are provided for them. The real leaders of their country look like them. They grow up hearing about persons who have succeeded in the past or who have gone to America and have done very well. They have not had to face the experiences of being looked down upon, overtly or covertly, because of their racial group. Their teachers have not conveyed to them expectations of intellectual inferiority.

In other words, they often have positive experiences, even when poor, that are similar to those of American or European whites in their own environment. They come to America primed to achieve, with the firm belief that they will achieve and succeed to the extent of their abilities and/or personal efforts. This crucial psychological factor will explain why Jamaican and many Asian immigrants perform and earn as well, and sometimes even better, than the native born white or black individual.

Native born blacks, on the other hand, are not given these feelings of efficacy, of being in control of the important events or institutions in their lives. The black churches may be the only arena in which poor blacks have a sense of power.

Role models are often not present for poor blacks that would provide energizing examples of upward mobility. Instead, models of failures or deviant lifestyles may be the more prevalent. Children with the ability to achieve do not often receive the reinforcement to remain in school, to achieve, to work hard, in hopes of realizing a possible dream. The viable black role models are often far removed from their lives. Children unfortunately often experience racial rejection and attacks on their self esteem.

The psychological damage that can occur in such environments, has been passed on in the three short generations since slavery into the present, where the feminization of poverty has kept many within the cycles of poverty. In each generation some have achieved and have earned incomes sufficient to equal any groups, but the barriers have been many. There is a need for a milieu that will duplicate the positive, self-generating Jamaican environments for our own Afro-American children and families.

Chairman **Miller**. Thank you very much.

The committee will now recess to record our votes on the House floor. When we return, we will continue with the panel.

[Whereupon, the committee was in recess.]

Mr. **Wheat** [presiding]. I would like to mention to members of the audience who were not here before we took our momentary break that at the same time we conduct this hearing the House of Representatives is in session and is debating very important farm legislation. Chairman Miller, as a result, has been momentarily detained. He will be back shortly. But we will continue with the hearing.

The next witness is Dr. Ray Hammond. Dr. Hammond, would you please give your testimony.

STATEMENT OF RAY HAMMOND, M.D., EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, EFFICACY COMMITTEE, INC.

Dr. **Hammond**. Like my colleagues here, I would like to express my thanks also for this invitation to share some of the ideas and thoughts that the members of the Efficacy Committee have been developing over the past 5 to 10 years.

Since Israel Zangwill first proclaimed in 1908 that "America is God's crucible, the great melting pot where all the races of Europe are melting and reforming," the melting pot metaphor has seized the American imagination as a grand and noble ideal. Nonetheless, the need for these hearings is ample testimony to the fact that there yet remains a significant gap between the ideal and the reality. Moreover, there is probably no group for whom this gap has been more intractable than black Americans.

Why has this been so? Why is the black community as a whole still so clearly lagging—whether one looks at such parameters as poverty indices, or rates of unemployment, dropping out, incarceration or teenage pregnancy? To many people who are themselves the descendants of immigrants, this is a burning question, as they are familiar with the obstacles they and/or their ancestors had to overcome and the sacrifices that had to be made.

Of course, there is an obvious answer to these questions, and that is that the experience of black Americans has been radically different from that of other groups. Black Americans were enslaved and brought here forcibly for the sole purpose of making America a land of opportunity for others. In the course of that enslavement, they suffered not only the loss of their freedom, but the weakening and even destruction of critical internal institutions such as the family. Within 15 years after the Great Emancipation, they were once again relegated to the backwaters of American society and systematically denied the opportunities for educational, economic, or political development that are crucial to the progress of any group. This is an obvious answer to the question of the lagging development of black America, but like many an obvious answer, it is woefully inadequate in helping us to fully understand the origins of and potential solutions to the problems of the black community.

One area in which this answer does little to help us is in understanding why there continues to be a substantial gap in the performance of blacks on standardized tests, grades, professional examinations, and job performance ratings. Certainly, there is a component of this gap which can be laid at the doorstep of poverty or cultural bias. But if one controls for family income or looks at examinations which are relatively culture-free, the differences persist.

Let me share with you a few statistics taken from an article which was published recently (by Dr. Jeffrey Howard and myself).

In 1982, the college board, for the first time in its history, published data on the performance of various groups on the SAT, the scholastic aptitude test. The difference between the combined median scores of blacks and whites on the verbal and math portion of the SAT was slightly more than 200 points. Differences in family income did not completely explain the gap. Even with incomes over $50,000, there remained a 120-point difference. These differences have persisted in the 2 years that followed.

In 1983, the NCAA proposed a requirement that all college athletic recruits have a high school grade point average of at least 2.0 out of a maximum of 4.0, and a minimum combined SAT score of 700. This rule, intended to prevent the exploitation of young athletes, was strongly opposed by black college presidents and civil rights leaders. They were painfully aware that in recent years less than half of all black students had achieved a combined score of 700 on the SAT. Over a range of family incomes from $5,000 to $50,000, Asian-Americans consistently produce a median math SAT score 140 to 150 points higher than blacks, with the same family income.

The pass rate for black police officers on the New York City sergeant's exam is 1.6 percent. For Hispanics, it is 4.4 percent, and for whites, 10.6. These are the results after half-a-million dollars was spent by court order to produce a test that was job related and nondiscriminatory. No one, even those alleging discrimination, could explain how the revised test was biased.

Florida gives a test to all candidates for teaching positions. The pass rates for whites was more than 80 percent; for blacks, it is 35 to 40 percent. This is just a sampling of the data that is available.

This is a problem of more than academic interest. A significant component of individual or group status in a society such as ours is determined by intellectual achievement. Moreover, intellectual performance plays a key role in the process of intellectual development—that is, the process of expanding the skills, capabilities, and powers of observation and analysis of an individual or group. Anyone who consistently underperforms is likely to suffer real losses in societal esteem—to say nothing of self-esteem. More importantly, they are likely to find themselves unable to take advantage of opportunities to advance their status.

It was precisely this understanding of the critical role of intellectual development that led generations of civil rights activists to make great sacrifices in the name of educational opportunity. The cruel irony is that 30 years after the landmark decision of *Brown* v. *Board of Education*, most major metropolitan areas are watching large numbers of minority youth turn their backs on a free education by dropping out. Equally as tragic is the fact that many of those who persist fail to achieve at levels commensurate with their ability.

In observing and seeking to explain these facts, we reject the notion that inferior performance is a reflection of the lack of ability or intelligence. Rather, we posit that much of this performance gap is behavioral in origin and that it is the result of a remediable tendency on the part of many blacks to avoid intellectual competition. This avoidance originates in the centuries-old projection of an image of black intellectual inferiority, an image which frequently has been internalized by blacks and which raises significant doubts and fears whenever they are faced with the prospect of intellectual competition.

More recently, that image has been given the patina of scientific respectability by those who argue for the genetic origin of the intellectual performance differences. Faced with the prospect of confirming this awful rumor of inferiority, we believe that many black children and adults choose to take the less anxiety-provoking path of avoiding and even disparaging intellectual competition and achievement. For example, striving to set and meet high intellectual standards is often spoken of as "trying to be white", while no such opprobrium is attached to high standards in the realms of sports or entertainment.

What can be done about this situation? How are we to best address this issue of intellectual development as it affects black Americans, and especially black youth? This is obviously a complex and multifaceted problem, but we would like to offer the following observations and opinions:

First, the Government should continues to play a role as the protector of access to the opportunities, both academic and in the job market, that are crucial to the process of development.

Second, it is time to mount a national movement to set new expectations of greatly improved academic achievement for black children. In addition, they must be taught the efficacy of such performance behaviors as disciplined effort, moderate risk-taking, and goal-setting in the arena of intellectual endeavor.

Third, it will fall to minorities, and especially blacks, to silence the rumors of inferiority by taking full advantage of every opportunity for intellectual performance and development.

Our project in Detroit is an example of what can happen when people choose to focus on their responsibility in addressing a vexing problem. The Detroit public schools, the Detroit business community, and most importantly, a growing number of black professionals, are saying "These are our children. We must be responsible for ensuring that they have every opportunity to fully develop their gifts and talents." Though the job of meeting this challenge has just begun, we are convinced that this task can and must be accomplished. It is not just a matter of making the ideal of inclusion a reality; it is also a question of whether this and succeeding generations will continue to bear the awful weight of the rumors of inferiority. We have committed ourselves fully to the task of ensuring that this will not be so.

Very briefly, let me add a very quick outline of the program that we are doing in Detroit. It involves the deployment of primarily black professionals, who are trained in a seminar setting, in the issues and concerns we have expressed here—intellectual development and performance psychology. They then submit to a fairly rigorous process of preparing to go into the schools and over an 8-week period train high school students at the ninth grade level in those very same issues.

We take them through a series of six modules that look at these issues, that address the concerns that many students have about their own intellectual performance and development, and then challenge them by giving them more effective tools, teaching them how to take risks, teaching them how to set goals, teaching them how to look at their successes and failures. We also challenge them to go out and begin to actually deliver on the potential that we know they have.

Very quickly, I would say that what we have found is that you can get very dramatic results fairly early. We are now finding, as we had suspected from the very beginning, that in order to continue those results, a major follow-up component will have to be added. That is one of the things we are going to be doing this year. So the final results are not in, but we are very encouraged about it, excited, and we are looking forward to the future years.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, Dr. Hammond.

[Prepared statement of Ray Hammond follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RAY HAMMOND, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE EFFICACY COMMITTEE

Since Israel Zangwill first proclaimed in 1908 that "America is God's crucible, the great melting pot where all the races of Europe are melting and reforming," the melting pot metaphor has seized the American imagination as a grand and noble ideal. Nonetheless, the need for these hearings is ample testimony to the fact that there yet remains a significant gap between the ideal and the reality. Moreover, there is probably no group for whom this gap has been more intractable than black Americans.

Why has this been so? Why is the black community as a whole still so clearly lagging - whether one looks at such parameters as poverty indices, or rates of unemployment, dropping out, incarceration, or teenage pregnancy? To many people who are themselves the descendants of immigrants, this is a burning question as they are familiar with the obstacles they and/or their ancestors had to overcome and the sacrifices that had to be made. Of course, there is an obvious answer to these questions and that is that the experience of black Americans has been radically different from that of other groups. Black Americans were enslaved and brought here forcibly for the sole purpose of making America a land of opportunity for others. In the course of that enslavement, they suffered not only the loss of their freedom, but the weakening and even destruction of critical internal institutions such as the family. Within 15 years after the Great Emancipation, they were once again relegated to the backwaters of American society and systematically denied the opportunities for educational, economic, or political development that are crucial to the progress of any group. This is an obvious answer to the question of the lagging development of black America, but like many an obvious answer, it is woefully inadequate in helping us to fully understand the origins of and potential solutions to the problems of the black community.

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This is a problem of more than academic interest. A significant component of individual or group status in a society such as ours is determined by intellectual achievement. Moreover, intellectual performance plays a key role in the process of intellectual development -- that is, the process of expanding the skills, capabilities, and powers of observation and analysis of an individual or group. Anyone who consistently underperforms is likely to suffer real losses in societal esteem (to say nothing of self-esteem). More importantly, they are likely to find themselves unable to take advantage of opportunities to advance their status.

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In observing and seeking to explain these facts, we reject the notion that inferior performance is a reflection of the lack of ability or intelligence. Rather, we posit that much of this performance gap is behavioral in origin and that it is the result of a remediable tendency on the part of many blacks to avoid intellectual competition. This avoidance originates in the centuries-old projection of an image of black intellectual inferiority - an image which frequently has been internalized by blacks and which raises significant doubts and fears whenever they are faced with the prospect of intellectual competition. More recently that image has been given the patina of scientific respectability by those who argue for the genetic origin of the intellectual performance differences. Faced with the prospect of confirming this awful rumor of inferiority, we believe that many black children and adults choose to take the less anxiety-provoking path of avoiding and even disparaging intellectual competition and achievement. For example, striving to set and meet high intellectual standards is often spoken of as "trying to be white," while no such opprobrium is attached to high standards in the realms of sports or entertainment.

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- The government should continue to play a role as the protector of access to the opportunities - both academic and in the job market - that are crucial to the process of development.

- It is time to mount a national movement to set new expectations of greatly improved academic achievement for black children . In addition, they must be taught the efficacy of such performance behaviors as disciplined effort, moderate risk-taking, and goal-setting in the arena of intellectual endeavor.

- It will fall to minorities, and especially blacks, to silence the rumors of inferiority by taking full advantage of every opportunity for intellectual performance and development.

Our project is an example of what can happen when people choose to focus on their responsibility in addressing a vexing problem. The Detroit Public Schools, the Detroit business community, and most importantly a growing number of black professionals are saying, "These are our children. We must be responsible for insuring that they have every opportunity to fully develop their gifts and talents." Though the job of meeting this challenge has just begun, we are convinced that this task can and must be accomplished. It is not just a matter of making the ideal of inclusion a reality; it is also a question of whether this and succeeding generations will continue to bear the awful weight of the rumors of inferiority. We have committed ourselves fully to the task of insuring that this will not be so.

EFFICACY HIGH SCHOOL PROJECT IN THE DETROIT PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM

INTRODUCTION

Education is a central factor in preparing minority youngsters to lead responsible, meaningful, and fulfilling lives. It is also essential to the solution of many of the problems we face in inner city communities throughout the nation. Yet, there are serious difficulties with the educational process, particularly for many minority youth. High dropout rates, poor academic achievement, and mediocre performance on standardized tests suggest that, as a community, we are not succeeding in educating large numbers of our children. For too long the assumption has been that the fault lies in the educational system alone. Our survey of the available data and research on psychological aspects of performance, our discussions with students, parents, and teachers, and our own observations suggest that the following additional factors are also of great importance:

(1) Low expectations held by the society at large about the academic capability and potential of minority students.

(2) Lack of support for the intellectual development of minority youth within the general culture, their own peer groups, and, in some cases, within their homes and communities.

(3) Inadequate preparation in basic skill areas--a factor which can create large gaps between a student's real potential and his or her actual performance.

(4) Lack of understanding of the requirements for success in the real world. Students from minority backgrounds may simply not be aware of operating procedures and norms which underlie success in the larger society.

(5) Lack of an overriding sense of the importance of academic excellence in the advancement of minority people. Without a broader perspective on the social meaning of intellectual development, many students are not sufficiently motivated to engage in the rigors of the academic process.

In short, we view the academic performance deficiencies of minority students as a combination of both external and correctable internal problems. It is the purpose of this program to give the student, and particularly the student defined as a low-achiever, the encouragement to make the necessary commitment to their own intellectual development and to the support of their fellow-students' growth.

Our approach emphasizes the following points:

- Performance is a complex phenomenon determined as much by social interaction variables as by ability. Such variables include: self-confidence, the expectations of others, fear of failure, and the presence or lack of support for development in the home, the peer group, and the community.
- Performance-related behaviors, such as moderate risk-taking, goal-setting, and networking can be taught and learned.
- Individuals who are willing to assume personal responsibility for their outcomes are in a more effective position to affect those outcomes.
- The way we think about our successes and failures has important effects on our confidence in facing future challenges. Specifically, success should be attributed to ability and failure should be viewed as a form of feedback, indicating the need for more intense effort or for a different approach to the task.

Our experience in the high school and college setting convinces us that this approach, particularly when it is delivered by people who genuinely care for the students, can have substantive effects on the thinking and behavior of those students. Furthermore, we have seen demonstrable and statistically significant evidence of those effects within a short period of time (notably, in a pilot project at Northwestern High School).

The attached document will outline our proposal for addressing these and other problems in the high schools of the Detroit public school system. Our target population will be those students who have been most explicitly defined as "below-grade-achievers," i.e. Chapter I students. It is our goal to help those students redefine themselves as capable of academic excellence. We also want them to understand and adopt the commitments and behaviors they will need if they are translate their abilities into academic achievements.

OBJECTIVES AND EVALUATION

PROJECT OBJECTIVES

Our goals for this project are as follows:

(1) Training of all ninth grade Chapter I students in the psychology of performance as a means of enhancing their performance.

(2) Developing a corps of volunteer, from the metropolitan Detroit community, who are willing to invest their time, serve as role models, and communicate useful educational material to the students.

PROJECT EVALUATION

We would like to see for our students statistically demonstrable effects on:

(1) Dropout rates

(2) Grade-point averages

(3) Standardized test scores

(4) Rates of postsecondary training

PERSONNEL

VOLUNTEERS (FACILITATORS)

On the basis of our experience at Northwestern High School, we project the need for 20 volunteers, working 3-4 days per semester, to train all ninth-grade Chapter I students at most high schools. This means that a corps of at least 240 volunteers will be required.

Volunteer training will consist of a 4-day seminar delivered in two 2-day sessions. The sessions will be separated by approximately one month's time. During these sessions volunteers will be trained in the fundamentals of the psychology of performance (see enclosed brochure). We expect that out of each seminar group of 20, approximately 15 persons will be suitable facilitators. We would like to include 1 or 2 staff persons from prospective high schools in the seminar in which volunteers are trained. Ideally, one of these staff persons would act as a half- or full-time liaison with the program in their high school.

After satisfactory completion of the seminar, volunteers will be trained, over the next 6-8 weeks, in the delivery of one of the six instructional modules which comprise the high school program. Training will include: (1) a formal introduction to the module topic, (2) at least 3 practice sessions with other volunteers, and (3) a dress rehearsal. After satisfactory completion of training, each volunteer will be certified as a facilitator by an Efficacy Boston trainer.

Once certified, volunteer facilitators will be responsible for the delivery, on one or more days each semester, of one or more modules (see list below under Program Delivery). They will either deliver the presentation or act as a support person for another facilitator. Their presentations will be monitored by a local area coordinator and/or a member of the Efficacy Boston group. Local area coordinators will be responsible for scheduling volunteers, acting as a liaison with the particular school, overseeing the follow-up process, and otherwise ensuring the smooth operation of the project.

STUDENT TRAINING

HIGH SCHOOL STAFF PRESENTATION

Prior to the delivery of the first module, a 2-4 hour presentation will be made to the entire staff of the high school. This presentation will outline the perspective, goals, and methodology of the Efficacy program. In addition to informing the teachers about the program, it will serve as an opportunity to enlist their assistance in following the students and reinforcing the concepts from the program.

PROGRAM DELIVERY

Modules will be delivered by facilitators, in groups of 2 or 3, over an 8-week period. The intent is to communicate to the students, in an engaging and thought-provoking way, much of the same information which the facilitators have learned about the psychology of performance. Specifically, we want students to appreciate the importance of expectancies (whether held by themselves or others), effective performance behaviors, and correct attribution of successes and failures. Modules combine lecture material, small group discussions, games, written exercises, and interactive dialogue between the students and the volunteers (see booklet, distributed to all students at the closing assembly, for copies of the handouts). Modules are entitled as follows:

(1) WHO AM I?
(2) BRINGING LOW
(3) MODERATE RISK (2 SESSIONS)
(4) VISION
(5) GOAL-SETTING (2 SESSIONS)
(6) WIN-WIN

At the completion of the modules, a closing assembly will be held for all students who participated in the program during that semester. This assembly will include the following: (1) adult and student speakers; (2) dramatic presentations by students illustrating the concepts they have learned; (3) a review of the theme ("In everything you do, your goal is to find out how good you can be") and the goals we hope each student will adopt (e.g. staying in school, setting and meeting high academic standards, going on to further postsecondary training); and (4) enlisting the support of the parents who have come to the assembly.

FOLLOW-UP

Present plans call for formal followup through a newsletter distributed to the students, the efforts of the staff liaison in the school, and periodic assemblies. Occasions of particular interest for followup efforts would be:

(1) The beginning of each semester
(2) Periods immediately prior to standardized tests
(3) The latter part of the junior year and early part of the senior year

At these times we would be making special efforts to encourage and support students.

NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION

In addition to the training the volunteers offer students, they will continue to conduct themselves in a way that nonverbally communicates the following messages to students:

(1) "You are important and special enough to us, as members of the Detroit community, that we are willing to leave our jobs and share this time with you."
(2) "We are asking you to accomplish things which we know you can do, because we have accomplished them."
(3) "We believe in you."

These messages are as important as the specific material that the students learn in the modules. They provide the kind of emotional and psychological support that the students will need to act on the training they have received.

STATEMENT OF DAVID H. SWINTON, PH.D., DIRECTOR, SOUTHERN CENTER FOR STUDIES IN PUBLIC POLICY, CLARK COLLEGE

Dr. SWINTON. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am David Swinton, director of the Southern Center for Studies in Public Policy at Clark College. I am pleased to be here to share some of our own findings about what we consider an extremely important issue with this committee.

This topic is very complex and the shortness of time obviously will not permit us to discuss this topic in all of its complexities. I have submitted written testimony and I am pleased to hear the record will remain open so that that testimony can be extended. I would also like to take the opportunity to provide the committee with several other papers, prepared both at our center dealing with these general matters, as well as some other references that I think would be useful for the committee's deliberation.

What I want to talk about briefly is the current economic difficulties of the black population, and why this population is having those difficulties.

At the present time, more than 30 years after *Brown*, and 20 years after the civil rights revolution of the 1960s, a distressingly large proportion of the black population continues to experience serious economic difficulties. The economic distress for these blacks is serious, whether we measure it in absolute terms in comparison to some standard of poverty, or whether we measure it in comparison to the economic status of nonblack Americans. More alarming, however, in my view, is the fact that the progressive trend that was so widely heralded in the late 1960's and early 1970's ended in the mid-1970s. In fact, the proportion of the black population experiencing serious economic distress has been increasing in both an absolute and a relative sense for the past decade.

A few facts on recent trends in income and poverty will make this clear. First, in constant dollar terms, income received by the black population has been declining for about the last 10 years. By the way, whenever I use dollar numbers, I am talking about constant 1983 dollars, dollars adjusted for inflation.

In 1983, the median black family income was $14,506, and in 1970, that figure was $16,111. So the black population has lost more than $1.5 thousand in median family income since 1970. The proportion of the black population with incomes below the poverty level has increased since the early 1970s, and was at a significantly higher level in 1983 at 35.7 percent than it was in 1970 when it was 33.5 percent. That increase is more dramatic when measured from the mid-70s.

The proportion of black families receiving very low incomes—say incomes less than $10,000—jumped to 38 percent from 31 percent in 1970, a 22-percent increase. Even the oft-cited increase in the proportion of blacks in the higher income class did not continue uninterrupted throughout the last decade. This percentage increased until 1979, but then declined rather dramatically until 1982, and even though there was a healthy rebound in 1983, the proportion of blacks receiving incomes greater than $35,000 in 1983 was still lower than it was 5 years earlier.

This situation reflects, in part, the deterioration in the economic position of all working-class Americans which has occurred since the early 1970s. However, the facts also clearly reveal that the impact of this deterioration has been much greater for black Americans. As a result, all of the indicators of relative economic position continue to show that there are large, glaring racial disparities in this country.

Moreover, most of the racial gaps have widened during the last 10 years. For example, whereas in 1970 the typical black family had about 61 cents to spend for every dollar that the typical white family had, in 1983 the typical black family had only 56 cents to spend for every dollar that the typical white family had. While black poverty rates were almost 36 percent in 1983, white poverty rates were only about 12 percent. By the way, that rate comparison is somewhat misleading because a much larger proportion of the white poor are people beyond the working age, retired people on fixed pension incomes, et cetera. A much larger proportion of the black poor are families in the middle of the process of trying to raise children.

The recent erosion in the economic position of blacks reflects an erosion in all regions of the country. However, it is particularly distressing to note that the sharpest erosion in both absolute and relative terms has occurred in those regions where blacks had made the most progress up until the early 1970's. Poverty rates in the Midwest region more than doubled since 1970, and poverty rates increased by over two-thirds in the Northeast. The near doubling of black poverty rates in the Midwest corresponded to an increase of a few percentage points for whites in that region. In fact, conditions for blacks in the Midwest have fallen to below the conditions in the South, and the conditions in the Northeast are almost as bad as they are in the South. The Midwest is now the region in which blacks have the lowest incomes, highest poverty rates, and overall highest degree of racial inequality. This situation is due almost entirely to faster deterioration in the non-South since the actual position of blacks in the South has not improved much relative to their 1970 position.

In my view, the low and deteriorating economic situation of blacks has serious consequences for black families and children. One of the most distressing features of this problem is that it most heavily impacts young blacks at the stage who are initiating their adult lives. The increase in the numbers of blacks with incomes below or near the poverty level implies that increasing numbers of blacks lack the resources to form and adequately maintain stable families in the urban environments in which most blacks currently live. We believe that the severe economic problems of blacks is a major cause of the increasing incidence of single parent families, declines in the marriage rates, and increases in the family disruption rates. Moreover, the long duration of this distress may give rise to an alteration in basic black community norms and expectations about individual life roles and responsibilities. This possibility portends even more distressing conditions for the long term.

The record of the past decade is cause for alarm, I believe, for most Americans of good will, especially since this follows two decades during which social policies were explicitly designed to alleviate the problems of black poverty and inequality. The dismal results of this period gives rise to several questions. Why have the policies and programs of the past two decades been so ineffective in reducing black poverty and inequality. What is the likely future course of racial inequality if current policies or Reagan administration policies are continued? What must be done to alleviate the problem of black poverty and racial inequality?

Unfortunately, I won't have time to address all three of those questions in any kind of detail. What I would like to do is focus most of my attention on the first question—Why have the policies and programs of the past two decades been so ineffective in reducing black poverty and inequality?

Based on our studying of this problem for more than 4 years at the policy center we have concluded that the primary reason why the efforts of the last two decades have been so ineffective in solving the problems of racial inequality is that they were based on an erroneous understanding of the problem. Thus the solutions implemented either incompletely or ineffectively addressed the true forces generating and perpetuating the problem.

Let me just briefly describe that erroneous understanding. The understanding that guided the efforts of the recent past correctly identified the major source of low income and inequality among blacks as insufficient earnings. A large part of the lower and unequal income reflected black problems in the labor market. The principal thrust of earlier efforts, therefore, was aimed at addressing the labor market problems of blacks. Although this meant that as much as 30 percent of overall income inequality was being ignored—because it derives from property income and other sources—this omission would have been tolerable if the efforts to address the labor market difficulties had been successful.

The basic understanding which guided efforts to improve things in the labor market assumed erroneously that labor markets, by and large, were like what we call perfectly competitive markets, except for the irrational phenomenon of discrimination. In other words, it assumed that we somehow have almost a perfect meritocratic system operating in this country, where people get what they deserve when they are prepared to contribute. This view is erroneous.

However, the acceptance of this assumption essentially meant that policy formulators misjudged the ease with which racial inequality and lower earnings could be corrected. The model supports the assumption that each worker will receive the earnings and employment that are warranted by their productivity and their willingness to work. Thus, according to this understanding: if labor markets function well, all racial inequality can be attributed to two factors lower black contributions to output—due either to lower willingness to supply labor and/or lower potential productivity—and irrational racial discrimination. Moreover, it was also widely believed that the personal deficiencies of blacks in terms of ability to contribute were the more important constraints on black progress. This belief followed from the general conclusion of the conventional wisdom that market forces ought to eliminate discrimination once it had been made illegal and was no longer enforced by Government action.

This understanding led to two basic policy thrusts. The first effort focused on improving the potential contribution of blacks to output. It was assumed that because of the longstanding discrimination in education and the workplace, blacks had less human capital and were, therefore, less productive than whites. A variety of employment training and education programs were introduced to eliminate the human capital disadvantages of blacks.

Second, a program was established to prevent white discrimination against blacks who were already adequately prepared. Although there were a variety of enforcement mechanisms incorporated into of equal opportunity programs, the major thrust of the EEO effort was educational with a high degree of reliance on voluntary compliance and protracted negotiations. This approach was undoubtedly a result of the general belief that discrimination is irrational and will tend to be eliminated by market forces anyway.

There was a widespread expectation that over time these two policy thrusts would bring about a dramatic reduction in racial inequality. However, as we have seen, this has not occurred. In fact, the proportion of blacks experiencing serious labor market difficulties increased after the implementation of the human capital and antidiscrimination policies. In the main, this deterioration was caused by a reduced relative rate of employment for blacks since 1970.

The reduction has been particularly severe for young blacks, that is, those under 25 years old. However, it has also affected black males of all ages and, in a relative sense, the employment rate for black women has also declined. Moreover, the strong progressive trend in relative wages and occupation distribution observed until the mid-1970's has not been maintained since. In fact, in the last few years there has been deterioration in the relative wages of blacks.

The lack of progress in the last decade cannot be attributed to failure to implement the human capital strategy. In fact, there can be little doubt of the fact that we have probably succeeded in increasing the human capital of blacks. The dramatic reduction in the quantitative gaps in years of school completed are well known. Moreover, literally hundreds of thousands of blacks experienced the employment and training programs each year of the period in question. Yet, despite these improvements in human capital, there has been a deterioration in the labor market position of blacks at least relative to whites. Indeed, there seems little doubt that the black population of the past decade is the most highly prepared black population in the history of this country.

Although it is not as clear cut, it is also the case that we cannot attribute the lack of success to a failure to implement the types of antidiscrimination activities suggested by the conventional wisdom of the last decade. Discrimination not only was officially outlawed, but the Government went even further in some instances by requiring affirmative action. Surely, under the circumstances, free market forces should have had free rein to eliminate discrimination. Yet, evidence suggests that disparate treatment continues.

In order to understand why the policies of the past did not end black poverty and inequality, or why black poverty and inequality exist at all, it is first necessary to understand that the conventional wisdom about how the labor market works is wrong in most of its particulars. The economy does not work like a perfectly competitive model. This is not a perfect or near-perfect meritocratic system. Specifically, the economy does not automatically guarantee full employment or equal employment, regardless of the racial composition of the population.

Under the normal workings of a market economy, the amount of employment is determined primarily by factors which are independent of the availability of labor. Moreover, the distribution of employment by type of job are determined primarily by the production technology which is also largely independent of the distribution of productive ability among the work force. The rewards associated with each type of job is also largely a product of a complex social process of wage determination which is also largely independent of the productivity of individual workers.

The implication of these considerations is that there can and usually is a large amount of unwarranted inequality in a laissez faire market economy. By unwarranted inequality I mean inequality that is not required by the distribution of productive ability among the work force. Under these circustances, many individuals will experience unemployment, even though they are as willing and as capable of work as other fully employed individuals. Moreover, many individuals will experience poverty level wages, even though they have sufficient productive ability of work on jobs which pay others nonpoverty wages. Indeed, the aggreate level of poverty and unemployment is a fundamental characteristic of the economic system which is independent of the characteristics of the population.

The primary function of the labor market is merely to match the available jobs to the available work force. Labor market processes thus determine who is employed on which jobs, but not how many of each type of job is available. They determine who is employed and who is unemployed, but not how many are employed and unemployed. They determine who receives low wages and who receives high wages, but not how many receive low wages and how many receive high wages.

Once one fully appreciates the above facts about how our economic system works, then one is in a position to better understand the economic problems of blacks. Since the aggregate level of employment and the overall distribution of earnngs is a characteristic of the economic system, these characteristics are not generally affected very much by expansions in human capital or the extent of discrimination. The economic system will not automatically absorb all available labor and jobs commensurate with their productive ability. If more labor capable of performing highly remunerative or highly skilled work is available than is required, the excess will simply be unemployed or underemployed. If 40 percent of the jobs pay low wages, then 40 percent of employed workers will have low wage jobs, irrespective of their skills and abilities.

The belief in the competitive model blind analysts and policymakers to the fact that the primary reason for the historic black disadvantages has been a shortage of good opportunities rather than a shortage of ability among blacks to make a contribution to this society. Indeed, the limited training and education of blacks is itself more an effect of limited economic opportunities than a cause.

Past policies failed because they failed to expand opportunities in general, or expand opportunities for blacks in particular. Indeed, it was the worse stroke of historical luck that the equal opportunity movement was implemented during a period in which there has been a general increase in the scarcity of good opportunities. Throughout the seventies, and into the eighties, there has been a secular increase in unemployment, so much so that economists have taken to revising what is considered full employment on a regular basis. Moreover, structural shifts brought on by a variety of factors and these factors are all external to the labor market—has resulted in an increase in low-wage jobs and a relative decrease in high-wage jobs. The situation has been further exasperated by the rapid growth of the white female and the white youth labor force during this period, which are themselves partly a reflection of this increase in economic difficulties that male workers are facing in this country. In short, we have been attempting to increase opportunities for blacks during a period when opportunities in general were declining relative to the size of the working age population desiring opportunities.

Under the circumstances that have existed in our economy during the past decade or so, poverty rates, unemployment and underemployment had to increase. There are simply more willing and capable workers than there are good jobs. Under such circumstances, the increase in poverty, unemployment and underemployment is clearly a result of our economic system's failure to generate the level and structure of labor market demand which is required to have full and complete employment.

Thus over the past decade, the competition between black and white workers has intensified. The increased scarcity of good opportunities did not necessarily have to be disproportionately borne by blacks. In principle, fair labor markets would allocate the burden equitable. However, labor market processes are not inherently fair. They rely on a variety of practices and traditions that are disadvantageous to blacks. The standard use of contacts, credentialism, nepotism, racism and so forth are all a part of the normal functioning of the labor market in this country, and under the circumstances all of these kinds of practices will inevitably result in black disadvantages.

In principle, antidiscrimination policies effectively implemented could have enabled blacks to improve their situation even during this period of increasing job security EEO enforcement. However, in the type of labor market we have been discussing, one could not expect to be helped by automatic market forces. Given the increased relative scarcity of good job opportunities, discrimination was not economically irrational for white employers or workers if they have greater concern for white well-being or for the well-being of some whites, or even if they are merely concerned about pursing their own selfish best interests. And since one is to be presumed to care more for one's own self, family, and friends, than for complete strangers, it was economically rational for whites to attempt to increase discrimination under the circumstances that we have been describing. Moreover, in a situation where the benefits of discrimination are increasing, as they were during this period, it seems unlikely that effective enforcement of EEO policies could be easily implemented to improve the situation of blacks since the society is economically, politically, and socially dominated by the very same whites who stand to lose most by such a policy. The current reversals of effective affirmative action strategies were predictable under the circumstances.

These considerations suggest that improvement for blacks will likely only be attained under the circumstances in which there is a general improvement in economic conditions. In particular, unwarranted inequality must be reduced. The number of low-wage jobs must be reduced, and the number of high- and middle-wage jobs must be increased. Prospects for attaining greater racial equality in the face of the current level of economic difficulties are, indeed, bleak.

Greater progress for blacks can be pursued through more effective equal opportunity policies even without a general economic improvement provided that more effective EEO policies can be implemented. However, as we noted above, the implementation of more effective EEO policies under the current economic circumstances will be difficult. An alternative to traditional civil rights policies would be to stress black economic development. This strategy would obviate the need to change the social practices of whites in the labor market in order to create equal opportunity for blacks.

In the absence of significant economic improvement, more effective equal opportunity policies, or black economic development, future prospects for the black population are, indeed, bleak. Current economic trends—the persisting high level of unemployment; the shift to low wage service jobs; the decline in major industries due to foreign competition, the increasing international weakness of the economy, the increasing attack on affirmative action policies, and the assault on income support programs—all suggest that the economic difficulties of blacks will persist and most likely intensify in the near-term future.

Thank you.

[Prepared statement of David Swinton follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID H. SWINTON, DIRECTOR, SOUTHERN CENTER FOR STUDIES IN PUBLIC POLICY, CLARK COLLEGE, ATLANTA, GA

At the current time more than 30 years after Brown, and 20 years after the Civil Rights revolution of the 1960s, distressingly large proportions of the Black population continue to experience serious economic difficulties. The economic distress for these Blacks is serious either measured in absolute terms relative to the poverty level or in relative terms when compared to the economic status of non-Black Americans. More alarming, however, is the fact that the progressive trend that was so widely heralded in the late 1960s and early 1970s ended in the mid 1970s. Indeed the proportion of the Black population experiencing serious economic distress has been increasing in both an absolute and a relative sense for at least the past decade.

A few facts on recent trends in income and poverty will make this clear. First in constant dollar terms income received by the Black population has been declining for about the last ten years. In 1982 the median Black family income was at its lowest point for the last ten years. In 1983 median Black family income was $14506 in 1983 dollars whereas the 1970 figure was $16111. The proportion of Black persons with incomes below the poverty level has increased since the early 1970s and was at a significantly higher level in 1983 at 35.7 percent than it was in 1970 at 33.5 percent.

The proportion of Black families receiving very low incomes (incomes less than $10,000) has been growing since 1970 and in 1982 was 38 percent vs 31 percent in 1970. Even the oft cited increase in the proportion of Blacks in the higher income class (incomes greater than 35,000) did not continue uninterrupted throughout the last decade. This percentage increased until 1979 but declined after that year until 1982 and even after a healthy rebound in 1983, the proportion of Blacks receiving high incomes is lower in 1983 than it was five years earlier.

This situation reflects in part a deterioration in the economic position of all lower working class Americans which has occurred since the early 1970s. However, the facts also clearly reveal that the impact of this deterioration has been much greater for Black Americans. As a result all of the indicators of relative economic position continue to show glaring racial disparities. Moreover most of the gaps have widened during the last ten years. For example wheras in 1970 the median Black family received about 61 cents for every dollar the median white family received in 1983 the typical Black family only had 56 cents for every dollar a typical White family had. While Black poverty rates were almost 36 percent in 1983 White poverty rates were only about 12 percent. The doubling ofBlack poverty rates in the Mid West corresponded to an increse of a few percentage points for Whites in that region.

The recent eroision in the economic position of Blacks reflects an erosion in all regions of the country. However, it is particularly distressing to note that the sharpest erosion in both absolute an relative terms has occurred in those regions where Blacks had made the most progres up until the early 1970s. Poverty rates in the Mid West region more than doubled since 1970 and increased by over two thirds in the Northeast. In fact conditions for Blacks in the Mid West have fallen to below the conditions in the South and the conditions in the Northeast are almost as bad as they are in the South. The Mid West is now the region in which Blacks have the lowest incomes, highest poverty rates, and overall highest degree of racial inequality. This situation is due entirely to faster deterioration in the non-South since the actual position of Blacks in the South has also deteriorated slightly relative to their 1970 position.

In my view the low and deteriorating economic situation of Blacks has serious consequences for Black families and children. One of the most distressing features of this problem is that it has most heavily impacted young Blacks at the stage of initiation of their adult lifes. The increase in numbers of low income Blacks and Blacks with incomes below or near the poverty level implies that increasing numbers of Blacks lack the resources to form and adequately maintain stable families in the urban enviorenments in which most Blacks currently live. We believe that the severe economic problems of Blacks is a major cause of the increasing incidence of single parent fanmilies declines in the marriage rates and increases in the family disruption rates. Moreover, the long duration of this distress may give rise to an alteration in basic Black community norms and expectations about individual life roles and responsibilities.

Every American of good will or who is concerned about the future of the union must be alarmed by these dismal statistics. Especially since this record follows two decades during which social policy was explicitly designed to alleviate the problems of Black poverty and inequality. The record of the past decade gives rise to several key questions: lm20:rm65

1. Why have the policies and programs of the past two decades been so ineffective in reducing Black poverty and inequality?

2. What is the likely future course of racial inequality if current policies or Reagan adminstration policies are continued?

3. What must be done to alleviate the problem of Black poverty and racial inequality?

Each of these questions will be briefly addressed in what follows.

Why have the policies and programs of the past two decades been so ineffective in reducing Black poverty and inequality?

The primary reason why the efforts of the last two decades have been so ineffective in solving the problems of racial inequality and excessive Black poverty is that they were based on an erroneous understanding of the problem. Thus the solutions implemented either incompletely or ineffectively addressed the forces generating and perpetuating the problem.

The understanding that guided the efforts of the recent past correctly identified the major source of low income an inequality among Blacks as being caused by insufficient earnings. A large part of the low and unequal earnings reflected Black problems in the labor market. The principal thrust of earlier efforts therefore have been aimed at addressing the labor market problems of Blacks. Although this meant that as much as thirty percent of overall inequality was being ignored this ommission would have been tolerable if the efforts to address the labor market difficulties had been successful.

The basic understanding which guided efforts to improve things in the labor market assumed erroneously that labor markets by and large work like perfectly competitive markets except for the irrational phenomenon of discrimination. What this assumption essentially meant is that policy formulators misjudged the ease with which racial inequality and low earnings could be corrected. The perfectly competitive labor market model supports the assumption that each worker will receive the earnings and employment that are warranted by their productivity and willingness to work. Thus if labor markets function like the perfectly competitive model all racial inequality could be attributed to two factors -- lower Black contributions to output (due to lower willingness to supply labor and/or lower potential productivity) and irrational racial discrimination. Moreover, it was also widely believed that the personal deficiencies of Blacks in terms of ability to contribute was the more important constraint on Black progress. This belief followed from the general conclusion of the competitive analysis that market forces ought to eliminate discrimination once it had been made illegal and was no longer enforced by government action.

This understanding led to two basic policy thrusts. The first effort focused on improving the potential contribution of Blacks to output. It was assumed that because of the longstanding discrimination in education and the workplace Blacks had less human capital and were therefore less productive than Whites. A variety of employment training and education programs were introduced to eliminate the human capital disadvantages of Blacks. Second a program was established to prevent White discrimination against Blacks when they were equally productive. Although there were a variety of enforcement mechanisms incorporated into enforcement the major thrust of the effort was educational with a high degree of reliance on voluntary compliance and protracted negotiations. This approach was undoubtedly a result of the general belief that discrimination is irrational and will tend to be eliminated by market forces any way.

There was a widespread expectation that overtime these two thrusts would bring about a dramatic reduction in racial inequality. However, as we have seen this did not occur. In fact the proportion of Blacks experiencing serious labor market difficulties increased after the implementation of the human capital and anti-discrimination policies. In the main this deterioration was caused by a reduced relative rate of employment for Blacks since

1970. The reduction has been particularly severe for young Blacks i.e. those under 25 years old. However, it has also affected Black males of all ages and in a relative sense has also affected Black females. Moreover, the progressive trend in relative wages and types of employment observed strongly until the mid 1970s has not been maintained since. In fact in the last few years there has been deterioration.

The lack of progress in the last decade cannot be attributed to failure to implement the human capital strategy. In fact there can be little of the fact that we have probably succeeded in increasing the human capital of Blacks. The dramatic reduction in the quantitative gaps in years of school completed are well known. Moreover literally hundreds of thousands of Blacks experienced the employment and training programs each year of period. Yet despite these improvements in human capital there has been a deterioration in the labor market position of Blacks. Indeed there seems little doubt that the Black populition of the past decade is the most highly prepared Black population in our history.

Although it is not as clear cut, it is also the case that we can not attribute the lack of success to the failure to implement the types of anti-discrimination activities suggested by the conventional wisdom of the last decade. Discrimination not only was officially outlawed but the government went even futher in some instances by requiring affirmative action. Surely under the circumstances free market forces should have had free reign to eliminate discrimination. Yet evidence suggests that disparate treatment continues.

In order to understand why the policies of the past did not end Black poverty and inequality or why Black poverty and inequality exist at all, it is first necessary to understand that the conventional wisdom about how the labor market works is wrong in most of its particulars. The economy does not work like a perfectly competitive model. Specifically the economy does not automatically guarantee full employment or equal employment irregardless of the racial composition of the population.

Under the normal workings of a market economy, the amount of employment is determined primarily by factors that are independent of the availability of labor. Moreover the distribution of employment by type of job is determined primarily by the production technology which is largely independent of the distribution of productive potential among the work force. The rewards associated with each type of job is also largely a product of a complex social process of wage determination which is also largely independent of the productivity of individual workers.

The implication of these considerations is that there can and usually is a large amount of unwarranted inequality in a laissez faire market economy. Many individuals will experience unemployment even though they are as willing and as capable of work as other fully employed individuals. Moreover many individuals will experience poverty level wages even though they have sufficient productive ability to work on jobs which pay others non poverty wages. Indeed the aggregate level of poverty and unemployment is a fundamental characteristic of the economic system independent of the characteristics of the population.

The primary function of the labor market is to match the available jobs to the available work force. Labor market processes thus determine who is employed on which jobs but not how many of each type of job is available. They determine who is employed and who is unemployed but not how many are employed and unemployment. They determine who receives low wages and who receives high wages but not how many receive low wages and how many receive high wages.

Once one fully appreciates the above facts about how our economic system works then one is in a position to better understand the economic problems of Blacks. Since the aggregate level of employment and the overall distribution of earnings is a characteristic of the system these characteristics are not generally affected very much by expansions in human capital or the extent of discrimination. The economic system will not automatically absorb all available labor in jobs comensurate with their productive ability. If more labor capable of performing highly remunerative or highly skilled work is available than is required the excess will be unemployed or underemployed. If forty percent of the jobs pay low wages then forty percent of employed workers will have low wage jobs irrespective of their skills and abilities.

The belief in the competitive model blinded analyst and policymakers to the fact that the primary reason for the historic Black disadvantages was a shortage of good opportunties rather than a shortage of ability to contribute. Indeed the limited training and education of Blacks was more of an effect of the limited economic opportunities rather than a cause.

Past policies failed because they failed to expand opportunities in general or for Blacks in particular. Indeed it was the worse stroke of luck that the equal opportunity movement was implemented during a period of a general increase in the scaricity of good opportunities. Throughout the seventies and into the eighties there has been a secular increase in unemployment. Moreover, structural shifts brought on by a variety of factors has resulted in an increase in low wage jobs and a relative decrease in low wage jobs. The situation has been further exasperated by the rapid growth of the White female and the White youth labor force during this period. In short we attempted to increase opportunities for Blacks during a period when opportunities in general where declining relative to the size of the working age population desiring good opportunities.

Under the circumstances that have existed in our economy during the past decade or so poverty rates , unemployment, and underemployment had to increase. There are simply more willing and capable workers than there are good jobs. Under such circumstances the increase in poverty, unemployment, and underemployment is clearly a result of the failure of our economic system to generate the level and structure of demand required to have full and complete employment.

Under the circumstances the competition between Black and White workers intensified during the last decade. The increased scarcity of good opportunities does not necessarily have to be disproportionately borne by Blacks. In principal fair labor markets would allocate the burden equitably. However, labor market processes are not inherently fair. They rely on a variety of practices and traditions that are disadvantageous to Blacks. The standard use of contacts, credentialism, nepotism, racism and so forth are all a part of the normal functioning of the labor market and under the circumstances all would result in Black disadvantages

In principal anti-discrimination policy effectively implemented could have enabled Blacks to improve their situation. However, in the type of labor market we have been discussing one could not expect effective implementation to be helped by automatic forces. Indeed discrimination is not irrational for Whites employers or workers if they have greater concern for White well being or some Whites well being than they do for Black well being or even if they selfishly pursue their own best interest. And since one is to be presumed to care more for ones own self, family and friends than for complete strangers it is rational for Whites to discriminate. Moreover in a situation where the benefits of discrimination are increasing it seems unlikely that effective enforcement can be easily implemented to improve the situation of Blacks in a White dominated society. The current reversals of effective affirmative action policies are predictable under the circumstances.

These considerations suggest that improvement for Blacks can be obtained if there is a general improvement in economic conditions. In particular unwarranted inequality must be reduced. The number of low wage jobs must be reduced and the number of high and middle wage jobs must be increased. Prospects of attaining greater racial equality in the face of the current level of unwarranted inequality are indeed bleak.

Alternatively greater progress for Blacks can be pursued through more effective equal opportunity policies. However as we noted above the implementation of such a set of policies under the current circumstances will be difficult. An alternative to traditional civil rights policies would be to stress Black economic development. This strategy would obviate the need to change the social practices of the labor market in order to create equal opportunity.

In the absence of significant economic improvement, more effective equal opportunity policies, or Black economic development future prospects for the Black population look bleak. Current economic trends: the persisting high level of unemployment, the shift to low wage service jobs, the decline in major industries, the increasing international weakness of the economy, the increasing attack on affirmative action policies, and the assault on income support programs all suggest that the economic difficulties of Blacks will persist in the near term future.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you very much.

I would have to say that the testimony presented by this panel, when combined with the demographic information received from Mr. Bouvier paints a bleak picture in terms of the concerns of this committee. All of the problems you have outlined are greater in the poor community to begin with, and then in the poor minority community, than they are in the white community.

Dr. Swinton, there were two statements in your testimony that I think are really very, very important ones to consider.

First, that there are an increasing number of black families and black individuals who are unable, because of unavailable resources to begin or maintain a family. That, in an of itself, is a very, very serious statement. When you combine that with Dr. McAdoo's discussion of the environment of that family, should they make that decision, and the opportunities for family disruption that can occur within that family unit, you are really talking about a community under very, very severe stress. You are talking about a situation and an environment that leads you to ask the question of whether or not you can have what we consider normal development among those children and within those family units given that kind of stress.

It leads one to conclude, as Dr. Hammond did, that the community has to look at this situation and recognize it for what it is.

Second, I am concerned by your remark, or suggestion, that the rewards of discrimination are going to be greater in the future than they have been in the past, because there will be a larger better trained minority population competing for a decreasing number of high wage, middle-income jobs. The jobs out there may be increasing, if the predictions are correct, but the future wages received may, in fact, return to that family inadequate resources to remove some of the stress, or to participate in the American society as we know it.

Having said all of that, I just wonder, when you listen to this combined testimony, where you think we might be headed. I think we acknowledge that there has been a lightening-up of enforcement of civil rights laws. Are the rewards of discrimination greater now than they were in the past? Are minority families going to be squeezed further, even in a growing economy?

I just throw that out to each and every member of the panel. That is a rather frightening picture if, in fact, it is accurate. My interpretation of your testimony may be wrong, and please feel free to tell me so.

Dr. SWINTON. I think you have accurately interpreted my testimony, and I think all of the evidence shows that you are not mistaken about saying that there is severe stress on this particular population group. Just looking at the dramatic increase in family disruption rates, and the number of kids living with one parent that has occurred in the last ten years, it shows that there is something dramatic and serious going on with blacks.

Now, I think the direction for solving the problem is also implied in what I said and, in particular, we have to understand that we cannot solve this problem without making our economic system work better. We cannot solve the problem unless we start thinking about stimulating our economy to create jobs with the types of income that is required to support families. We must create enough jobs to support the entire number of families that we will have in the *future* given our population growth rate and immigration. We must think about where the jobs will come from. They will not be there automatically. I think we have to start specifically doing things to make sure that enough jobs with adequate wages exist in our economy.

We have gotten on a treadmill, we're trying to adjust to a lot of these problems by letting the market do what it will, but the only thing the market can do, and what it is doing, is to lower wages or export jobs. In order to deal with international competition and other things. This process will increase the difficulties of families who earn their living in the affected segments of the market. Thus the natural market reaction will certainly exacerbate the problems that we are currently experiencing. This will continue to create a two-tier kind of economy, which will contain a scarcer set of higher paying opportunities.

I was a little surprised myself when I was looking at some data the other night, about the fact there was a fairly dramatic increase in the proportion of not only black but white families with high incomes between 1970 and 1982. At the same time, the proportion of black and white families with low incomes also increased more in absolute terms. So we get the middle falling into the bottom, we get a few in the middle moving to the top, but we're getting a large increase at the bottom and a little increase at the top.

I don't think we're going to solve the problem by picking at the poor, by training them, or by doing any of these kinds of things. We are only going to solve the problem if we make our economic system work better, to produce more good-paying jobs, et cetera. I don't believe that the market will do that. We will need explictly well-designed Government policies, not aimed at the people, not aimed at discrimination, not aimed at changing practices, but aimed at changing the workings and operation of our economic system. We need policies to change the growth rate, the types of jobs that are being created, the numbers of jobs that we are losing, the number of high wage jobs that are going away, and so forth. We have got to stop the current economic deterioration. We have to turn this around in order to keep the economic problems of blacks from getting more serious.

Dr. HAMMOND. I would like to add to the solution Dr. Swinton brings up because, as I think I suggested in our testimony here, one of our concerns is that, as things are developing now, it may well be that a very large number of black children who are going through the educational system are not going to be in a position to take advantage of a number of those jobs if and when they become available.

Our thrust and concerns, I think, are two, one of which is that certainly I think there has to be a sense on the part of all citizens—and certainly for black citizens—that they are considered important to society as a whole, that their contribution is valued. In addition to that, there has to be a major thrust within the black community itself, I suspect largely led by the black middle class, to begin to make that kind of expectation and communication to our kids.

So we see a very important sort of partnership that needs to go on between the Government, both as a protector of access to the jobs we hope for, and perhaps the generator of additional opportunities, and second, a community rising up and in a sense taking very strongly the responsibility for its kids and making it clear to those kids that they are important, that they do, indeed, have a future, that our history bespeaks the fact that we have had to deal with adversity but it can be overcome. So I think that both thrusts have to be pursued at the same time.

Dr. SWINTON. I would like to comment on that point, because I think that is a general point that is getting much more play than it deserves—not that I disagree with it. It's a complementary strategy. However, I think it is a little bit misleading to say that such efforts have not been going on because they have been going on. There have been dramatic increases in black school enrollment, dramatic reductions in the high school dropout rate, dramatic increases in college enrollment rates. All these improvements, in fact, occurred from the late sixties through the midseventies.

The erosion in some of the educational gains which we are seeing now is a result of the fact that despite following the advice to seek more education many kids found nothing when they got out of high school. They found less than they expected when they got out of college.

Now, I don't think the black community is internally in the position to compete head-to-head with whites in the kind of labor market situation which currently exists. They can't do it. If we are going to have to fall back on that kind of strategy, when whites control access to most jobs, make most of the hiring decisions, the colleges, the scholarship funds, so forth, it is not going to work. I don't think we should give too much emphasis to what can be done internally. Blacks have to do things internally, and they are doing them, in order to survive and cope with this problem. But society also has to understand that unless some external factors change, these internal actions taken by blacks are not going to be productive and are going to create more frustration. They are going to find failure even after such actions. The reality of the matter is that a black child who sticks it out through all the hardships, the inferior schools, the teachers who don't believe in him, the communities that don't believe in him, will find when he leaves high school still that he or she has a very low probability, of finding a good job at any point in time during the last 15 years.

Dr. MCADOO. Mr. Chairman, your assessment of the picture we are drawing is very accurate. It is bleak and it is very depressing. There would be no one simple resolution of the problems. I think the main area that we need to try to work in is the area of unemployment of the black male. If any one aspect could help improve the condition of black families, this one could. Efforts would need to be made in job training, and employment, in order for black fathers and matters to provide economic security for their families.

I think the problems are too vast for any one segment to handle alone. We need the cooperation of the private and public sector. Many of the black community organizations have been very active. For instance, the Congress of National Black Churches, that is composed of all of the historically black churches, has a massive program going that will go into every Sunday school, every black church in the United States, with emphasis on educational and economic development and child rearing practices within black communities.

I think the important point is that we have to realize this is not a problem that can be bottled up in the black community, but it has an impact on the whole society.

Dr. BOUVIER. I have one comment. My comments are not directed in this direction because I concentrated on immigration, but clearly there is a very strong relationship here as well. The economists—and I hasten to add I am not an economist—the economists often disagree on whether immigration is a plus or minus factor in the American economy, but most of them agree that, at least in the short run, there is a definite negative factor, especially illegal immigration, on young blacks. I think there is general agreement on that point.

Chairman MILLER. Excuse me, if I might. This is a different, question than whether or not it's a plus or a minus for the American economic system, isn't it?

Dr. BOUVIER. That's right, different from the overall system.

Chairman MILLER. Some will argue that it's a plus because it has held down wages in manufacturing and other sectors of the economy.

Dr. BOUVIER. Yes; I'm not disagreeing with that point. They all disagree on that point on both sides. On this one, they don't disagree.

Chairman MILLER. I think that is an issue, what the impact has been on the black community in America.

Dr. BOUVIER. I'm talking about especially the teenage black, the incredible unemployment and so forth, and the impact of illegal immigration in these areas.

Another area to consider also is the growing tendency—I referred to ethnic conclaves earlier—and these are economic enclaves, where over a period of a few years the American eventually drops out of the low-paying jobs and you have an entire economy which is totally consistent of mostly illegals. In other words, there are people in Los Angeles who say that it has been 5 or 10 years since they have hired an Anglo or a black in, say, the garment industry. As a result, even if there are job openings there, they are literally closed to many of the poor blacks and whites as well. So this is another factor that I think contributes to the problems we were discussing this morning.

Chairman MILLER. Mr. Coats.

Mr. COATS. I think there is no disagreement over the depressing picture that we are looking at here. I think the panelists have all defined that very well.

But the question, I guess, that arises—and there seems to be some differences in opinion among the panel—is how best do we move forward? We have come through a couple of decades of massive Government intervention, and we still are looking at a picture that maybe is at least as depressing, if not more depressing, than it was when we started.

Dr. Hammond, if I understand your approach correctly, you are putting more emphasis on internal change within the black community in terms of attitude and expectations—I think you used the phrase "the creation of an intellectual work ethic"—which leads me to interpret your statements as saying that "ethic" has to be generated from within, on an internal basis within the community.

We just had an address in our community of Fort Wayne, IN, by a Dr. A.F. Poussaint, who is a professor of psychiatry and associate dean for student affairs at Harvard, who pretty much said the same thing. He said that the dissolution of the black family is a major problem within our society, but the solution really has to come from within the family. Again, it's an attitude and expectations type of thing.

I think this is in stark contrast to Dr. Swinton's approach, which he just addressed, and I guess it raises some questions in my mind as to which direction we should stress.

Dr. Hammond, specifically I would like to ask you to elaborate a little bit about your program in Detroit and what you have accomplished there, and whether or not your results support your theories. Can you elaborate on that a little bit?

Dr. HAMMOND. Let me add that I think there may be less difference than there appears to be, in the sense that I absolutely agree that children coming through the high school system have to see something at the end of that process. There has got to be an incentive to commit one's self to that kind of rigorous academic process. So that to the extent there is the reality of poor opportunity or very little opportunity, it would be very difficult to get any children, particularly black children, to commit to that process. So again, I would stress as I did in my testimony that I think there is a critical role for the Government in the sense of, in fact, making sure those opportunities are present and that there is an economy that is going to meet the needs of our people—by that I mean the American people as a whole.

I still, want to stress, however, that I think there is an important way in which we have to understand better and facilitate better the process of internal development, strengthening the kind of internal institutions that are critical.

I was just holding a conversation with Dr. McAdoo and I was saying one of the things I have just been trying to understand is why is it there are some families that face the adversity, face the difficulties, and yet persist, and yet others give up in the face of the same set of circumstances. I have been intrigued by the work of, for example, of a gentleman named Reginald Clark, who has done some ethnographic work and looked at families that are single headed and yet the children in those families are able to achieve well in school, as opposed to other families which have two parents present and children don't achieve well.

Now, clearly, the demographic correlation is important. There is a clear relationship. But I am not sure it is always causative. What we are striving to do in efficacy is to understand better how you can strengthen the internal resources that a family brings to bear when there is adversity to be faced. That certainly doesn't let any of us off the hook, including myself, a person who has benefited greatly from a number of governmental policies that were instituted. I can trace that very directly. I know myself to be, in a very real way, a child of the civil rights movement. I came into Harvard in 1967 when 2 years prior there had been five blacks in the entire class. The year I came in there were 50, and the year after that there were 120.

A combination of governmental movement and what I think are very powerful internal forces, generated by the black community and other people, who saw the need for a change in the way business was done in this country, produced a situation where now some 20 years later I can sit here and talk about these kind of issues. That process, I am suggesting, has to continue to go on. There has got to be a partnership in which people within the black community like myself, who have been beneficiaries of that process of governmental and community contribution and work, reach back and begin to reach kids in the public high schools in Detroit. That is what we strive for.

As I said before, we train, by and large, black professionals who go into those schools and communicate very clearly that we have very high expectations for them. We know there are problems; we know there are difficulties. We are not asking them to deny the reality of what has to be faced out there. But we also suggest there may be another way to look at it and to consider themselves as people with a future. We combined that with what we think are some important, what we call performance behaviors. We want kids to come to understand the importance of risk and risk taking in the growth process; we also want them to be able to identify the right kind of risks to take. We try to understand and help them understand the importance of setting goals, the importance of a vision, a long-term sense of what you can be and where you can go.

We talk about behaviors, for example, called win-win. How do you develop cooperative networks within your family, within your community, that allow you to support each other and encourage each other in the process of development? So again, this is not to deny the importance of what Dr. Swinton has said. I think that is critical. But we also want to stress that we think that has to go hand in hand with the process of internal development that can be supported and encouraged by local governments, but that we feel also in a real way that you have to be led by members of that community, and in our case particularly, the black middle class.

Mr. COATS. In this effort, is it necessary that the change in attitude and the internalization of some of these things be communicated by blacks to blacks? Is it possible for nonblacks to communicate that? In other words, there are a lot of efforts going on around the country, where whites from the suburbs are going into black communities attempting to achieve that change in attitude. Are we wasting our time? Is that possible? Is that counterproductive? What's your opinion on that?

Dr. HAMMOND. I think in a very real way our experience has been, again, that it has a particular impact—for example, in several schools that we go into, we have had the good success to have alumni of that high school come back as volunteers. Again, our experience has been that that has had a very profound effect on the kids, that they look at that person who, in fact, in many cases gone on to a very successful career, and begin to see a different set of possibilities for themselves.

So in a very real way, I think that—and this is why I think the lead in much of this has to be taken by members of the black community, although it can clearly be supported. One of the things we are working on this year is beginning to involve the teachers, the guidance counseling staff, in the more effective process of reinforcing what we hope is the process we are beginning with the students.

Dr. McAdoo. I would also like to respond to that. There is less of a disagreement than may be apparent. I think we need a very close cooperation within the black community, both middle class and working class, and I think the program he is talking about is very excellent, particularly if it can help erase the sense of helplessness that many blacks feel, and this sense of helplessness is passed from parent to child. The important thing is that once the black community leaders work with the children and help them become more competitive and help increase expectations, it is important that there are governmental programs that will allow them to be able to realize their potential. Otherwise, they will become even more depressed if they are prepared to move out into nonexisting jobs. I have done research——

Mr. Coats. Let me just interrupt you for a second.

Is it critical that there are governmental programs for this? Wouldn't it be preferable to have private sector programs? Doesn't that, in a sense, say that here you are teaching intellectual creativity, the promotion of a "we can do it attitude," the promotion of self-esteem and so forth, and as soon as you finish that process, you're saying, "But we have made a place for you over here. You can't fit in anywhere else, so we have had to create and force a place for you through the Government." Doesn't that undermine what you're trying to do? Wouldn't we be better off expanding opportunities in the private sector rather than the Government sector? It seems to me that undermines the very thing you're trying to do.

Dr. McAdoo. Preferably these jobs probably should come from the private sector. However, they are not there. That is why I'm really——

Mr. Coats. But if they're not there, shouldn't our efforts be directed toward getting them there, rather than saying, "Well, we'll just have to go the Government route." I think that tends to undermine the very thing you're trying to accomplish.

Dr. McAdoo. I just finished this last year codirecting a Ford Foundation funded project that was looking at what are the barriers to self-sufficiency in young families. There were four areas identified, and job training and job placement were the top criteria. We did an extensive assessment on all the State programs that we felt were successful in moving people through dependency into independency, both in the private sector and in the public sector. It became very obvious that you do need cooperation and integration between both. No one area is able at this point to meet the needs of all of the children and young families. The important thing is that we have cooperation between the black community, the white community, the private sector and the Federal and State governmental level programs.

Mr. COATS. I agree with that. I am just trying to pinpoint where we should end up, what our ultimate goal should be, and where we should place our emphasis.

Dr. MCADOO. I don't think there should be an either/or decision——

Mr. COATS. No; I am not suggesting either/or. I am just suggesting an area of primary emphasis.

Dr. SWINTON. May I comment on that point?

Mr. COATS. Surely.

Dr. SWINTON. To clarify the areas of disagreement—because I think there are some areas of disagreement—the disagreement is primarily in stress and emphasis rather than in kind. I think there is a very grave danger in this kind of analysis—and I think you are, in fact, falling into it—I think the danger is that people will attribute the problems in the black community to these things.

Now, I don't deny that the phenomena that you are trying to address are there and need to be addressed. However, they are not the cause of the economic difficulties blacks are having, or of the decline in the situation that blacks have confronted. But I think that is a very important point to keep in mind.

My testimony suggested that almost the entire effort needed to be in the private sector. The problem is a failure of the private sector, not a failure of the public sector. The private sector, the private economy, has not generated the right amount of economic growth, the appropriate amount, the needed amount, the necessary amount of good jobs, et cetera.

Mr. COATS. For the economy as a whole, or for blacks, or are you referring to——

Dr. SWINTON. For the economy as a whole, which as a consequence produces a concentration of problems in the black population.

Mr. COATS. Do you feel we're on the right track right now?

Dr. SWINTON. No; I don't.

Mr. COATS. Well, we have added 8 million jobs in 1½ years.

Dr. SWINTON. If you count it from the low-employment base we were at, sure. But——

Mr. COATS. That's my question. Are we on the right track now?

Dr. SWINTON. No; we're not on the right track now.

Mr. COATS. But we've added 8 million jobs.

Dr. SWINTON. I just finished answering your question. I said if you count it from that base—the economy always fluctuates up and down. What we are doing is moving toward a steady level of accepting 7 percent unemployment as the acceptable rate of unemployment in this country. We are also losing continuously thousands of high-paying jobs, replacing them with low-paying jobs, and I think we're in much more danger down the road. We are sort of lucking out right now, for a whole variety of complex reasons. But I think if we continue to respond to the economic problems, to the increased difficulty of competing with lower-wage based foreign countries, if we continue to rely only on private incentives and so on, we will be in for much more serious problems than we are now in the not too distant future.

So no; I don't think we're on the right path. I think philosophically we're on the wrong path. Philosophically, we no longer understand that the Government has an important role to play in seeing that the economy functions well. The economy will not function well, will not do the right things, by itself.

I, by the way, am chairman of the committees in three schools on academic excellence. I am not saying that kind of thing doesn't need to happen. That stuff needs to happen. But that is not going to make any difference to the overall standards of living of most of the black population.

By the way, just one other comment on this issue. People always ask the question why do some people make it and other people don't. That question has a very obvious answer. Since the beginning of history there has been a normal curve. Some people are stronger, some are more capable, some are more intelligent, et cetera. So that is always going to be the case, no matter what you do. There is going to be a distribution of outcomes. The real issue is where does that distribution sit, what determines where that distribution sits, and I am suggesting to you that we have allowed the distribution to drift to the point where people who are less capable, less motivated, et cetera, can't survive, even though they have sufficient capabilities, sufficient motivation to survive, if our economy would perform well. I'm saying we're letting these people go by the side. No matter what we do, we are always going to have some people who make it.

It's like musical chairs, if I may give an illustration. If we take 10 of the people in this room and use those five chairs, and let's say let's run around, then maybe those who play musical chairs a little better and who are stronger will find a chair and sit in it. Then we come up with these great theories that it is their increased dexterity and intelligence that enabled them to get the chairs and that's why the other people don't have chairs. But if we start off with five chairs and 10 people, no matter what we do, we're going to end up with five people sitting and five people standing.

I'm saying that's the situation we're drifting into in this country. We are starting off with five chairs and we have 10 people. We can't fit them all into five chairs. I am suggesting that we should create 10 chairs to go along with 10 people.

Mr. COATS. I don't think anybody disagrees with that. I think we are all trying to create enough job opportunities for everybody who needs and wants to have a job. We may approach that with different philosophies. Economists obviously disagree as to how we should best go about that. I'm not an economist, and I don't have all the answers. But I think the goal is the same, and that is to provide the opportunities for everybody.

I think the question that remains unanswered is about the opportunities that might be available in the future. In our changing society and our changing workplace, whether we like that change or not, the question is whether people whose positions have changed, when they reach new opportunities, will be qualified and have the skills to fulfill them. I think that brings us to the question of what kind of things we need to do within those areas of not only blacks, but poor whites, Hispanics, or whatever ethnic group it is. If they do not receive the proper training, if they haven't within their communities internalized the proper attitudes, then regardless of the number of opportunities that are available, we may not have the attitudes and the skills necessary to qualify. I think that is part of the question we are trying to answer here.

In that regard, I do believe strongly that our committee should look to models of success. There are obviously people that have made it, families that have made it—black families, Asian families, white families. There are white families that haven't made it. There are single-parent families that have succeeded and failed, and traditional parent families that have failed and succeeded. I really think we do need to spend some time on the opposite side of the coin to see if we can find some common denominators and find some models which we could look at.

Apparently my time just expired.

Chairman MILLER. Mr. Levin.

Mr. LEVIN. I think this back and forth exchange has been very, very illuminating, Mr. Chairman. I think as the discussion evolves, the question becomes in substantial measure whether there is a national problem here or not.

Dr. Hammond, I missed your testimony but I caught your comments later on. I want to look further into the developments within the Detroit school system. I think the question I would ask of you is this.

You say there is no disagreement basically among you, but I think you are sometimes heard as saying there isn't a national problem here but it is basically a problem within the black community, and the answer is for the black community to take hold of this issue, to work on issues of motivation and aspiration, and that, really more than anything else, is it. By the way, nonblacks in America, by and large, will love that message, for obvious reasons, right, because that places essentially none of the onus on nonblacks.

So it would be helpful to me, and I think to lots of others, if you could just carry this dialog during my 5 minutes one step further and clarify—I think Dr. Swinton has tried to elaborate what he thinks are differences between you. It would be helpful if you could reply as to what you see those differences to be, if any.

Is it a national problem, or basically one within the black communities of America?

Dr. HAMMOND. It has been very interesting to us, for me, at least, during the 5 years I have been discussing this, that almost no matter what you say, people tend to get the impression of the summary you just made. For example, in my own testimony I went to great lengths to talk about what I thought were the important contemporary and historical effects of slavery. In the article we talked about persisting problem of discrimination. But our concern is, that even as you take those factors into account, there are some clear instances where such factors do not explain all of the differences. Unless we are willing to address issues that in many instances are internal, we are not going to abolish the differences completely.

That is my concern. There is no question that we have got to continue a thrust that addresses issues of discrimination, that addresses issues of opportunity, no question at all about that. But if we simply look at those factors and are unwilling, because we are afraid it will be interpreted as another form of blaming the victim, if we are afraid to look at what may be important internal issues, then I think we are really going to sell out the long-term interests of a large number of black youth and even black adults.

Again, that has been our focus, not to the exclusion of looking carefully and importantly at the issues of opportunity and discrimination, but rather, simply saying that that is not the whole story.

Mr. LEVIN. No one is saying it is the whole story, are they?

Dr. HAMMOND. No; I'm not. We're not saying that the internal issues are the whole story at all. We are simply saying they are important factors that have to be looked at, must be dealt with, and our feeling is that a large part of the leadership there must come from the black community.

Mr. LEVIN. On the other hand, is anyone saying that the external factors are everything? Dr. Swinton said——

Dr. HAMMOND. No; I don't think so.

Mr. LEVIN. In theory or in practice, since in practice he is working on internal factors.

Dr. HAMMOND. Agreed. That's one reason why I'm saying that some of the differences may be less important than they are made out to be. Certainly, because most of my work is directed toward addressing those internal issues, those are much more salient for me. That is not to say the others aren't important, or that I'm discounting these other factors. I think they are very significant.

All I am saying is I think we cannot back away from a careful look at dealing with these internal issues because of fears that all of the onus will then be placed on internal issues. We just have to be careful that that doesn't happen. We cannot, however, just ignore them.

Dr. SWINTON. Mr. Levin, I really appreciate your formulation of that issue because it really clarifies in my mind what I have been trying to point out is a difference. I think what I am trying to do is point out that the issues I address are national problems and that these other issues are not national problems. Furthermore, I am trying to point out that, in my opinion, their internal problems are not something that we need to be that worried about if we solve the national problems. In other words, I don't think we need to worry, Mr. Coats, that we will get down the road generating a lot of jobs and people won't prepare themselves to do those jobs.

I think if we have learned anything at all in our social-economic history, it is that the population is very adaptable, very responsive to even the appearance of opportunities, and go to great lengths in moving and retraining and reeducating themselves, and I think it is quite clear that this is no exception with the black population.

We have had one of the greatest migrations in the history of the world to take place in the last 30 or 40 decades, with literally millions of blacks moving from what they thought were less opportune regions in the South to what they thought were more opportune regions in the North, with no Government programs, with no financial aid to move there, simply from the feeling that there was some opportunity there. We have even had evidence in this last period of attempts to change things that people are very responsive to opportunities.

A lot of people look at the experience, for example, in education the wrong way. When opportunities were opened up, rather dramatically and suddenly, from about 1964 to 1968, and especially after Martin Luther King was shot, literally hundreds of thousands of black kids, who had not necessarily been doing so great in high school, took the opportunity to subject themselves to the strain and torture of going to higher educational institutions without great preparation, and so on, withstood the racial environments they found there, et cetera. Every indication that we have tells us that if the opportunities are there, if the jobs are perceived, people go into it.

By the way, if you look at areas where blacks have sort of been most successful in penetrating over this period of time, you will find that it is really the so-called high tech areas. It is the word processors, the computer operators, blacks do much better in getting themselves trained and into those "high tech" jobs than they have done with receptionist jobs and the traditional kinds of things.

So I believe that the horse is the economy, and the opportunities that are created by the economy shape how people plan and conduct their lives. When the opportunities are there, when they see their neighbors get jobs, we won't have to worry about this transformation. It will take place for blacks as it has taken place for every other group when opportunities open up. All the problems we heard about in the early 20th century with other ethnic groups suddenly have vanished. It vanished because these people have found economic status. They have found economic opportunity, not because we ran in and worked on their motivation, et cetera.

Also——

Mr. Weiss. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if my friend from Michigan would yield just on exactly that point.

In New York, we seem to have exactly the opposite experience, though. In New York, there is a tremendous dropout rate, both in the Hispanic and black student community. There are jobs going begging. What's happening is that New York's financial community, for example, is either engaged in moving out of the city of New York or importing workers from out of the city of New York. I don't know how that squares with the description you just gave us, that people rise to opportunities.

Dr. Swinton. In the first place, I would say that if you look at the employment statistics in New York, you will find that a good proportion of the clerical jobs in New York over the last two decades have been converted to minority occupancy. So literally hundreds of thousands of minority kids have penetrated that occupational category.

In the second place, I think your statement is over-exaggerated. Certainly, I am not saying that every kid is prepared, nor will every kid ever be prepared. So that you will always find some proportion of the population who may not be suitable or adaptable for clerical work. On the other hand, there are still other types of work that need to be done in this society that is not being done here anymore, jobs that are being exported overseas, et cetera, and so on, that don't——

Mr. Weiss. Eighty percent of Hispanic kids in New York are dropouts. I don't have the figures here, but in excess of 60 percent of the black kids drop out.

Dr. SWINTON. Yes. This problem is worse in New York, partly in response, as I said, to these kids not finding economic success, even when they stayed in school. So this has penetrated back down to the community, because despite the economic success and opportunities that you say are there, they don't find jobs there when they go looking for jobs. Somehow they aren't able to get all of these jobs that you are saying exist there. I don't believe they exist there, and I don't believe people are willing to hire many of these kids who graduate from the high school system in New York.

People are moving in many places for lots of reasons, not all having to do with the inabilities of those people there to work those jobs. Those people aren't getting a chance to prove that they can work those jobs, to prove that they can learn those jobs, et cetera and so on.

Chairman MILLER. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Wheat.

Mr. WHEAT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

One of the things that I find remarkable about the testimony is that, despite your assertions to the contrary, Mr. Swinton, I hear a remarkable degree of similarity and complementary testimony among all the members of the panel. That is why in particular I would like to question you about your assertion that there is a major difference in the focus here.

I understand your emphasis on the external system, that is, that changing the economic structure of this country is more important, in your view, than changing many of the internal features of the black community. I am not sure, however, that I would agree with the argument that changing this country's economic structure is a national problem but changing many of the internal features of black communities is not a national problem. I am curious as to whether you believe so strongly in your position that you would have resources pulled away from the human capital formula within black communities, that is, change what's been described as the intellectual development potential in black communities and put more money into the overall economic structure of the country?

Dr. SWINTON. I'm not sure what you mean by pulling resources away.

Mr. WHEAT. Well, are you suggesting that there is a need to pit the two against each other?

Dr. SWINTON. Yes, I am. I am precisely suggesting that the problems and economic difficulties of the black population are not human capital problems, are not motivational problems. By the way, there are literally scores and perhaps even hundreds of studies that have been done, using scientific methods, that don't find these differences in motivation and work ethic that everybody keeps talking about. We did an exhaustive analysis of this literature and couldn't come up with one study that has produced collaboration of that hypothesis—except for hearsay stuff.

But, yes, I am suggesting exactly what you think I'm suggesting. I am suggesting that the path we are going down now, we are tending to lay the blame and responsibility at levels of the society where the problem cannot be solved.

Mr. WHEAT. Do you believe that we can, in fact, improve the human capital condition of black Americans—there are clearly studies, and we have heard some today that indicate that the achievement level for black Americans is not on par with the achievement level of nonblack Americans.

Dr. SWINTON. I know that. What I'm saying is that's not a significant explanation or a significant cause of black economic distress. It is more of a consequence than a cause.

Mr. WHEAT. You are not then suggesting that we should not continue to devote resources to——

Dr. SWINTON. I am suggesting that. I am suggesting that we should not focus much national energy on that issue, that our national energy should be focused where the problem is, that we are failing as a society to create sufficiently remunerative jobs in the numbers that can absorb all Americans.

By the way, I make it a national problem because the problem is not a black problem. The problem is that——

Mr. WHEAT. I don't disagree with your attempt to suggest that the change in the economic structure is a national problem. I would tend to disagree that the problems that exist within the black community, especially in terms of noncompetitive or noncomparable achievement on test scores is not also a national problem. But I did want to get a clarification as to what you thought the resource development should be.

I can understand your view that focusing time, attention, and resources on the internal problems of the black community, as we have called them here today, could draw attention away from what you consider to be a greater problem. I can also see how there might be a characterization of the problems you talk about as being problems that don't require much Government action. Further, I appreciate the fact that when we talk about the necessity for the economic structure to change you stress that is necessary for the private sector to play an important role. You point out that our economic structure will not and cannot change unless there is strong governmental action and motivation to encourage the private sector to change the economic conditions that fail to create opportunities for black Americans. I appreciate also the need to increase overall opportunity, which is what you're suggesting.

Do you also think that there should be some enforcement efforts to guarantee that opportunity throughout the entire economic structure available to black Americans and other minority Americans on a proportional basis to white Americans?

Dr. SWINTON. Well, I don't know about a proportional basis, but I do think there should be equal opportunity policies and that they should be enforced. However, as I have emphasized, I think the difficulty of doing that in a society like ours, when we have these larger problems, is much more immense than we realize. This is attributable to not having enough, mainly political support, to have the wherewithal to implement aggressive equal opportunity policies in the kind of circumstances that we have.

My feeling about—I guess what I'm saying about the human capital thing is, if the concern is primarily with the economic problems of the black community, the breakdown in the family structure, the deterioration in the capacity of this community to survive, that working on those human capital motivational things will do practically nothing further. That's why I am trying to argue against giving that a very high profile in policy considerations. Moreover, the other type of strategies will also have the side benefit of solving the motivational and human capital problems that we are looking at.

So that is why my stress is where it is in that response.

Dr. **Hammond**. I wish that I could be quite as sanguine as Dr. Swinton about that. I still agree, of course, that the opportunity has to be addressed, that the jobs have to be there, and people have to know they are preparing for something.

However, let me add very quickly that one of the reasons that I think these distinctions tend to be drawn more strongly than they need to be is because this issue is often visualized in terms of the placing of blame. When we get into discussions about blame, there is always a tendency to start pointing in another direction.

I would like to suggest that, rather than the issue of blame, the question becomes one of responsibility. What are the various responsibilities that all those who can have an impact on this situation have? I think there is a responsibility within the black community to address some of these issues. There is clearly a responsibility for the Government, for the private sector, to address a number of the issues that Dr. Swinton has carefully outlined here. But I still want to stress that there is a responsibility within the community also to look at a number of these issues and begin to ask ways in which we can address them.

I also have to disagree that dealing with these issues has no effect whatsoever. Within the purview of the work that we have done, which has been limited to colleges and now high schools, you can get real differences in the academic performance and even extracurricular involvement of students who begin to understand what some of the motivational and psychological issues underlying achievement problems are. Similar results, I think, have been achieved in some dropout programs.

I do want to stress that a number of studies, one of which is a very exhaustive one that just came out of the University of Michigan, are beginning to show that there probably are important correlates, for example, between the high academic achievement of Asian children and a number of things that are done around motivational and attitudinal approaches and strategies within those families. So I don't think we can dismiss motivation or dismiss the psychological issues as being unimportant. I think they are very significant. Obviously, they are not significant in a vacuum. There has got to be an overlying sense that there are opportunities out there for them. I would not at all disagree with that.

I also wouldn't suggest that motivational issues are insignificant. I think they are very important.

Mr. **Wheat**. Dr. Hammond, I would agree with Dr. Swinton, that there is a vital need to have intense Government action to create more economic opportunities. But I also agree with your assertion that the internal problems do need to be examined and hopefully solved at some point in time.

You pointed to a particular study, on SAT scores. I wanted to get a little bit more information on that study. You stated that the tests show that even when family income differential is taken into account, black scores tend to be about 120 points less than scores achieved by white students.

Is there any study that you have done, or are aware of, that shows the difference over a longer period of time than just 3 years? Has there been significant improvement over the last year, for instance?

Dr. HAMMOND. As far as I know, this data was first publicly released by the college board in 1982. I can add that in a few colleges we have looked at, there is a related phenomenon of what is called overprediction. That is, if you look at the SAT scores and grade point averages of minority students, they will tend to overpredict college performance of those students. Furthermore, in the instances where we have been able to look at it, this phenomenon has been in place for quite some time. It has not just developed in the past 3 or 4 years, but it has perhaps been there for 10 to 15 years.

Mr. WHEAT. You and Dr. McAdoo—Dr. McAdoo, please feel free to join in at any point in time—pointed to similar sets of problems and circumstances which have created motivational problems within the black community. The enslavement of black Americans was one of the primary problems that both of you identified. Honestly, when you go out and talk about slavery as a major factor in black motivation, it is not something that tends to get the attention or the sympathy of a great deal of the rest of America. Quite frankly, it was just too long ago. The people who you are addressing were not the people responsible. Furthermore, they don't feel as if they ought to be held accountable for the sins of past generations.

Given people's reluctance to deal with this issue what lingering effects of slavery and of the tremendous northern migration of blacks are in effect today and how can they be attacked either by Government directly, by the Government assisting family structures or in any other way?

Dr. MCADOO. I can understand the lack of interest in the slavery situation because this is an area of great embarrassment that America would really like to forget about. I think the main——

Mr. WHEAT. That America has forgotten about.

Dr. MCADOO. Well, for all practical purposes, yes.

Again, I don't think it is either/or. You are going to have to work with motivational aspects, but you also are going to have to work with expectations. The example was given of the Asian child who was highly motivated in the home, but when he goes to school, the teacher looks at him and expects him to do well in math. He treats him as if he is good in math and, therefore, he will perform well.

The black child, however, when he goes to school is not met with that same expectation of success but, rather, of failure. This is something that has perpetuated. If you ask what was perpetuated from slavery, I think this expectation of a lack of achievement, the expectation that blacks will be inferior, is something that I think is very serious. It has to be worked on within the family, but also within the community, because parents are unable to overcome the negative stereotypes that many people in the employment sector and also in the schools have against blacks.

Dr. HAMMOND. I was going to add, a study that was very interesting and done at Wellesley College. They took a number of student teachers, all of whom were white, and assigned them four pupils. The students were all matched for IQ and a number of other parameters. The teacher was told that one black student was average, and one black student was superior, was told one white student was average and one white student was superior. They then looked at the ratio of positive-to-negative reinforcement for those students. In other words, how many times did a teacher say, "Johnny, you did that wrong, but it was a good idea. Let's try it again this way." As opposed to "How many times have I told you, don't do it that way?"

There was a very interesting result in looking at the white student who was thought by the teacher to be superior. The ratio of positive-to-negative reinforcement, positive was about 1.5 for every 1 negative. For the average white student, it was about one to one. For the black student who was thought to be average, it was about 1.5 negative to one positive. For the black student who was thought to be superior, it was three negative for every one positive.

Now, what that suggests is that there is firmly entrenched within the larger white society, and to an extent even within the black community itself, a sense in which black and excellent often are not thought to go together, and that it is something that has to be dealt with. It has to be addressed because those expectations are communicated both verbally and nonverbally very efficiently and very effectively.

It continues, not only the experience of slavery but in the media, with the sort of images one sees in the media. Our experience has been that if you ask kids what is out there for them, they will tell you very clearly that it's basketball and it's football, with the exception of the quarterback position because quarterbacks lead and think. It is any of a number of different things. But it is not——

Dr. SWINTON. That's the reality of what is expected.

Dr. HAMMOND. But that's not entirely true.

Mr. COATS. I would just interject that that was true until the Eagles decimated the Redskins Sunday with a black quarterback. [Laughter.]

Dr. HAMMOND. One of the interesting things that Harry Edwards has pointed out, for example, is that in fact the possibilities for some black students in fields like neurosurgery are not as remote as they think, where they could be favorably compared to their chances of being an NBA superstar. But, in fact, what they see is the image or role model that is there, which tends, in addition to the reality to project and to propel a large number of our kids towards sports and entertainment. We think that has to be turned around.

Part of that, yes, has to be made clear that those opportunities are available; but it also has to be a message that we give, and that those who are in the schools and in a position to have authority and an effect on those kids give consistently.

Dr. SWINTON. I would just like to make one short comment about blame and responsibility. I am not really assigning blame to anybody. The reason for the strategy that we have favored has nothing really to do with attempting to avoid blame. It has to do with an assessment of what would be the most effective method of dealing with the problems that we are addressing.

The other point about responsibility, responsibility both entails trying to do things internally and trying to make governments work more effectively. So people who are trying to make public policy more effective are no less responsible or acting in a less responsible manner than those people who are saying that we need to concentrate on our local school systems. So I don't think the distinction is drawn fairly at all. I think it has really been misrepresented in much of the published press that has favored this kind of thinking in the last few years.

Mr. **Wheat**. Dr. Bouvier, I would like to ask a couple of questions of you and change the focus of this discussion just for a moment.

We started off talking about the melting pot, whether it was fact or fiction. Perhaps it has been unstated, but the message has been from the other panelists that there is at least the appearance that black Americans might be an exception to the American notion that eventually the melting pot will work for all of our society. One of the things that you pointed to in particular was the need for new immigrants to be able to communicate in English.

Let me ask you first, your personal opinion, about bilingual education. I don't need a long statement about it, but I am just curious.

Dr. **Bouvier**. It's interesting, that very question you are asking. I turned on the TV this morning to find out more about Gloria and learned that the Secretary of Education is going to make a speech today sort of giving up on bilingual education. That's all I heard about it this morning. I am not sure if that's right or wrong, but I find it difficult to agree with the Secretary of Education on anything.

Anyway, I think what we have heard this morning just makes the points I was getting across in my paper even more complex. Traditionally, the melting pot, was a white phenomenon. Blacks were not considered even remotely as candidates for the melting pot to start with. The concept itself has been sort of—I won't say discredited, I don't see anything wrong with it—but it hasn't worked that well, and that is why the expression "salad bowl" has come around, which is not quite as mixed up as a melting pot.

As I was listening to the very interesting discussion this morning, I think what we are seeing emerging some new areas. I mentioned in my testimony that it won't be very many more years before—certainly in California, and also Texas—before there will be no numerical majority. That is a new phenomenon and it may well be that way for the United States further down the road. I'm saying numerical majorities now, not necessarily power.

This may be a whole new phenomenon. Instead of the whole white and black dichotomy melting somewhat we may see a new situation emerging. That is one of the points that is very important to get across with the dual economy that Dr. Swinton and I mentioned. What happens when we do not have a real majority? There are at least four major groups competing in a sense for the better jobs and so forth. I think what we are hearing this morning addresses that point—where do blacks fit in this overall system as these other groups get larger and larger.

Historically, within the white population, the last one in pushed up the one that came in before. You had this upward mobility within the white population. The blacks moved out of the South and filled in the bottom——

Mr. Wheat. That is part of the reason why we're here.

Let me apologize but we are now facing a time problem. I want to move on and go back to my original question. When you pointed out that being able to communicate in English was a key part of the success of new immigrants, I am wondering whether the inability to communicate in what is considered standard American English is one of the major societal or achievement problems for black Americans. If so, should this problem be addressed in the same way that is addressed with new immigrants that is, teach standard American English to black Americans.

Dr. Bouvier. I apologize for getting carried away and forgetting the original question.

I feel very strongly that in any society there has to be the ability to communicate within the society. I am not advocating a constitutional amendment for English. I do think we are an English-speaking nation and we have emphasized the ability of younger people, wherever they are, to communicate comfortably with other Americans. Otherwise, the society itself is in trouble.

Dr. Swinton. I would just like to comment on that. I think that a society will find ways of rationing scarce opportunities, no matter what you do. If there are some differences between the total experiences of blacks and whites, they will be seized upon as a reason for rationing scarce opportunities. So I think that is not a significant problem. It is not really a fundamental cause of the difficulties blacks are having. Blacks are perfectly capable of working despite these characteristics. But the problem is again the competition and scarcity of opportunities and the traditional processes that lead to a concentration of the resulting problem in the black community.

Dr. McAdoo. I think in reference to the language situation we should probably follow the model used in Africa and also Europe. Everybody speaks three or four languages. There is a national language so everybody can communicate, and then everybody has their native or their own ethnic group language. I think the important thing is handled that biculturalism and bilingualism should be in such a way that people from other ethnic groups do not feel that their language is inferior; that the Vietnamese can maintain his language while at the same time learning English.

Mr. Wheat. Are you then suggesting that we accept "ebonics" as a separate language and teach English as a second language to American blacks, or——

Dr. McAdoo. No. I would say that we have to have standard English. That is the way the world operates in our country, in the business sector and in the schools. Everybody has to be able to communicate in that standard language. But at the same time, we have to be able to allow parents and teachers to realize there is a black dialect that, in many ways, is very different and we have to be able to allow children to understand they have to be functional in both languages—the home language and also the school language.

Mr. **WHEAT**. One more very quick question, Dr. McAdoo. You pointed out that there were a number of different black communities within the United States. We see new immigrants coming to this country all the time who are black also. Are they becoming a big part of the larger black experience in this country? Are the cultural attitudes that they bring with them, which appear to be more achievement oriented than the attitudes of black Americans already residing in this country? Are the attitudes of black immigrants being felt within the black community? Are they going to change perceptions of native black Americans?

Dr. **MCADOO**. I think we have the same experience in the black community that we have had in the white ethnic community. Each group tends to prefer to maintain their own culture and their own religion, and also their own residential patterns. So we have many different communities—the African immigrants, the Caribbean immigrants—so all of them are maintaining ethnic diversity. But at the same time they are functioning as Americans, again a biculturalism that many ethnic groups have experienced.

Mr. **WHEAT**. Thank you very much, Dr. McAdoo, and the entire panel. I appreciate your cooperativeness and your eloquence.

Chairman **MILLER**. Thank you very much. I think this has been an outstanding discussion and debate for the committee and for the record. We thank you for your time and your effort to be with us.

The next panel that the committee will hear from includes Dr. Sassen-Koob, who is an associate professor, School of Architecture and Planning, Columbia University; Mr. Vu, who is the father of Miss Trang Vu, who will be accompanied by Kim Cook, who is the executive director of the Mutual Assistance Association Consortium of Northern Virginia; and Suzan Harjo, executive director, National Congress of American Indians here in Washington, DC.

I would tell the members of the panel that Mr. Vu does not speak English but Kim will translate for him. His daughter Trang does speak English.

We will start with you, Dr. Sassen-Koob.

STATEMENT OF SASKIA SASSEN-KOOB, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, GRADUATE SCHOOL OF PLANNING, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Dr. **SASSEN-KOOB**. I am very glad that the issue of immigration, the new immigrants, was brought in this panel, together with the issue of blacks. I think there has been a tendency in the press and among scholars and policymakers to perhaps emphasize the competitive issues that are certainly present between the two as to any discussion on the labor market, but I think it is also very important to emphasize that there are tendencies in our economy and in the way people are organized within the communities within which they live, that emphasize noncompetitive aspects between the two.

I was asked to emphasize particularly on the issue of women and the labor market absorption of immigrants, both Hispanics and Asians. Before that, I would like to emphasize some of the tendencies in the economy that I think one of the panelists already emphasized as well, and I must say that from my own research I would support some of the statements made by Professor Swinton which suggests there is a problem out there in the economy. It cannot only be found within the immigrant communities or within the black community.

If you look at the census data and compare just 1970 and 1980, and you look at the kinds of occupations and jobs that our economy is generating, it is very evident that there is an expansion of high-income jobs and that there is an expansion of low-wage jobs, and that what is shrinking is the supply of middle-income jobs. There still are a lot of middle-income jobs in this economy, that is true, but the trend is a very alarming one.

What this means is that it is quite possible that the mobility paths of immigrants and of the current generations of blacks will follow a different curve than was the case with earlier immigrations and also is the case I think with earlier generations of native Americans, of Anglos.

That is to say, with education, for example, it is not enough just to have a BA. You either have a very high level of education to gain access to these very good jobs, or you might as well drop out because the jobs that are available don't even require a high school degree very often. So the fact that more and more blacks may be getting BA's or may be available for getting BAs may not mean they would gain access to the jobs that are available, because there is this polarization in the job supply which has immediate implications for what kind of education counts. I repeat, a very good education, a very high level education, for an intermediate level of education doesn't count.

I think that these kinds of tendencies present in the labor market and present in the economy need to be taken into account when we make any statement about what the occupational possibilities are for immigrants and I also think for native minorities.

Now, having said that, I would like to mention a few facts about immigrant women. The first one is that most immigrants admitted legally in this country are women, a fact that has been overlooked by scholars, who talk about immigration as if it were one gender—I guess that is assumed then to be male. It has also been overlooked by policymakers.

The fact that most immigrants are women, and the fact that most of these women who are coming over the last 10 or 15 years are women from Third World countries, has major implications. In an economic situation where on the one hand you have certain barriers to educational and occupational attainment for women—and I think the evidence is there—again, we don't need to elaborate on that—and on the other hand, an economy that is generating this large supply of low wage jobs, a large share of which have been in the past stereotyped as female jobs, this means something that is both good and bad. On the one hand, a large share of the jobs that are being generated and that require low levels of education are, in fact, going to be jobs available to women, be it immigrant women, black women, or native women.

On the other hand, what it also means is that the occupational careers of women are going to reflect that same polarization, a heavy concentration in the low wage jobs and a rising concentration in the very high income jobs. For a lot of the immigrant women, I think there is going to be a bunching effect at the bottom or at the lower level clerical jobs.

Just to mention New York City, where I have done quite a bit of work, it is interesting to see, for example, that from 1980 to 1984 New York had one of its largest increases in jobs. Most of those jobs went to women, again divided amongst very high income jobs and a lot of low income jobs.

Now, coming back to immigrant women legally admitted, while most of the immigrants legally admitted are women, they represent only a third of those saying that they have an occupation at time of arrival. We know from subsequent studies taken at a later date that a lot of these immigrant women actually joined the labor force as a function of this step of migration. Two-thirds of the women coming do not declare an occupation. By the time they have been here several years, they have an occupation. So the fact of migration for women really means also a way of entering the labor force. I think this is something to take into account when we just look at the data of what women are saying when they are being legally admitted. A lot of these women never held a job and never expect to hold a job. In fact, the economy is such—and here again, this expansion in the supply of low wage jobs is a significant fact—that there is going to be a growing demand for women willing to take low wage jobs.

Futhermore, immigrants are distributed very irregularly with very heavy concentrations in the major cities—almost half of all immigrants counted by the 1980 census lived in the 10 largest cities in the United States. You compare the total population for the United States, those 10 cities account for only 11 percent of all U.S. citizens. So you can see that the degree of concentration of immigrants in a few major cities is much higher than what it is for the native population. This means that all these labor market trends that I mentioned have acquired particular significance in particular locations and that the impact of immigrants on the general labor market is much higher because of this concentration than what you would infer from their share in the total population.

Now, coming back once again to legally admitted immigrant women, if you look at immigrants controlling for age, immigrants coming within the working age group, then you see that 40 percent of them are women and 33 percent of them are men. In other words, given an economy which is going to demand low wage female labor, you have, in fact, a higher share of working age women in the entering immigrant population than you have men of working age in the immigrant population. What we need to bring into the picture are the figures or the estimates on undocumented or illegal immigration.

It was believed for a long time that most illegal immigrants were men. This was in part derived from the fact that most illegal immigrants apprehended were Mexican, where indeed there was a very large share of males. Now we know that even within the Mexican illegal immigration women represent almost half; that is to say that even among the undocumented immigrants, women are going to be representing a fairly high share.

Now, looking at the data we have from the census on occupational distribution of immigrant women, two trends emerge with great clarity. One is a disproportionate concentration of immigrant women in the manufacturing sector. The share of immigrant women who hold jobs in manufacturing is much higher than what is the case for the share of native women. About 60 percent of immigrant women are concentrated in a few occupations which include service workers, low wage service occupations, laborers, and workers in manufacturing.

Manufacturing is a declining sector in this economy. But if you just look at immigrant women, you would think that manufacturing was a growing sector in terms of jobs, because the incidence of manufacturing jobs among immigrant women has, in fact, been increasing.

Now, while there are growth sectors in manufacturing in the economy, electronics being the classic example at this point, overall manufacturing is not a very strong sector in terms of employment, though it still accounts for the same share of GNP that it accounted for over the last century. But in terms of employment, it is definitely a declining sector of the economy.

The fact that immigrant women are heavily concentrated in manufacturing I think has very important implications for what is going to happen with them in the future. There is a growing incidence among immigrant women of heads of households, which is just a tendency that is emerging—it is not very strong yet. Then their heavy concentration in manufacturing spells yet another potential tendency, let's say, that is not very encouraging.

Chairman. MILLER You're talking about key heads of households?

Dr. SASSEN-KOOB. Yes. It is emerging among certain nationality groups. Still, the strongest tendency is for immigrant women to be in complete households—in fact, multiple earner households. The fact that they are in multiple earner households also makes it possible for them to take these very low wage jobs. But insofar as they will lose those complete households at some point, then holding very low wage jobs is not going to be good.

The final point—I don't know how much time I have left.

Chairman MILLER There is unfortunately, only a little time left. We're juggling about three different things here. Mr. Wheat has gone to vote, and he will come back and hopefully we will keep going. I know you have some time problems, also.

If you could conclude in the next 3 or 4 minutes, I would appreciate it.

Dr. SASSEN-KOOB. A significant fact in terms of the immigrant communities—and this is something that may only hold for the first or the second generation, and eventually that effect may decrease—is that immigrant communities tend to have control over the resources that are contained within the immigrant community. That is to say, they come with very little, but the little they come with they will have control over.

Comparing this with the case of, say, the black communities in the large northern cities, where control over the key resources is either held by other private sectors, or the Government in the form of various kinds of programs, I think there are some very interesting differences that emerge.

The immigrant community may start poor, but the fact that it has a certain kind of control over its resources makes possible certain occupational opportunities for the members of the community that I think blacks are less likely to have. The implication here is that if the Government is going to allocate resources to black communities, or to immigrant communities for that matter, the communities should have a certain level of control over those resources.

Just a very simple example that illustrates the point. Insofar as an immigrant family can own a restaurant, they can provide jobs to other members of the family, so there is a sense of building up a future for the children, et cetera. If the immigrant family does not own the restaurant but an outsider that owns the restaurant, the situation is a very different one. I just use this very simple example to illustrate the importance of control over resources, even if those resources are limited, in explaining some of the success stories that we know about immigrants. I think, in fact, some of the people here at the table are a good illustration of that.

Let me just finish with one final statement. We all know that immigrants are hard workers, their rates of employment fairly high, et cetera, and their rates of unemployment are very low. What we need to take into account is the shape of the labor market out there. There is a strong tendency towards polarization and I think that the present generation of immigrants is going to suffer the effects of that polarization in the same way that blacks have and will continue to, and the fact that many of the immigrants are coming from third world countries can easily lead to some sort of interpretation that this generation of immigrants has not done as well as early European ones because they come from third world countries with other economic traditions.

I think that would be a fundamental mistake and that is why I believe it is of central importance, whenever we discuss immigrants and how they are doing, to look at what is happening out there in the economy. The paths for upward mobility in the current economic period look very different. You either make it way at the top, with a good education, at a very high level of education, or you have the bunching effect at the bottom. At the bottom I am now including sort of lower clerical jobs which don't earn a lot of money and where there are not many career possibilities or promotion possibilities.

Thank you very much.

[Prepared statement of Prof. Saskia Sassen-Koob follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PROFESSOR SASKIA SASSEN-KOOB, GRADUATE SCHOOL OF PLANNING, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, NEW YORK CITY

IMMIGRATION.

Focus - Women and Families; how the economy affects family structure and job att
- Differences among various nationalities

General trends in immigration:

1) Large increase in absolute numbers; levels continue to rise. Entries stood at well over half a million per year in 1980s. (See attached Tables 1 and 2).

2) A reversal in the shares held by Europeans and Third World immigrants. Europe accounted for over half of all immigrants in 1960; by 1980 this share was down to one-seventh of all immigrants admitted. It would be lower still if undocumented entrants were recorded. (See Table 1).

3) Over half of all immigrants admitted are women. This share is higher for some nationalities. This is fairly unique according to international migration data (e.g. United Nations, 1978). It has received little attention by the U.S. Congress in its debates on immigration, or by scholars. (See Table 3).

4) Though the estimates for overall undocumented migration vary widely, there is increasing evidence that the share of women among undocumented immigrants is rising and reaches over half in some nationalities. The estimates for the undoc Mexican immigration --historically an almost excusively male migration, put the the share of women at almost 45% (Warren and Passel, 1983).

5) The geographic concentration of immigrants makes their impact (economic, social, cultural) greater than their actual share in the overall population. Almost half of all immigrants reside in ten large cities. These in turn account for only 11 percent of the U.S. population. This high concentration of immigran carries major policy implications.

6) The fastest growing nationality group is Asian. Between 1970 and 1980, the Asian population in the U.S. according to the Census counts increased by over 100%. For those same years and same data base, the Hispanic population increased by 61%.

Economic characteristics of Asian and Hispanic populations, 1980.

7) The 1980 Census counted 1.8 million Asians (includes Pacific Islander) in the labor force. Of these, 1.66 million were employed and almost 86,000 were unemployed. Almost half of all Asians in the labor force (804,000) were women. Slightly over 5% of these women were unemployed. Median income among all Asians was 22,075. About 14% of all Asians were below the poverty level (amount to almost half a million). See Table 4.

8) The 1980 Census counted over 6 million Hispanics in the labor force. Of these, 5.4 million were employed and half a million were unemployed. Almost half of all Hispanics in the labor force were women (2.4 million) . Over 8% of these were unemployed. Median income among all Hispanics was 14,711$. About 24 percent of a Hispanics were below the poverty level. (See Table 4).

Sassen-Koob p.2 (September 26, 1985).

9) According to the 1979 Current Population Survey, the occupational distribution of the foreign-born experienced signifcant changes over the last several decades. Before 1950 and from 1950 through1964, managers and professionals represented about 29%; by 1975-79 this share had declined to 18%. Similar declines were experienced in clerical and sales crafts occupations. On the other hand, other blue-collar occupations doubled their share from 17% to 35%, service occupations went from 15% to 21 % and farm workers from 2% to 7%. (See Table 5).

Women Immigrants.

10) Of all working age immigrants admitted from 1970 to 1979 (Age 16 and over), 33.7% were men and 40 percent were women. (The remaining 26 percent were children). (Houston, Barrett and Kramer, 1984).

11) For many women, immigration becomes a vehicle for joining the labor force. Thus, although women are most of the immigrants in working age, they represent only about 35% of those reporting an occupation upon admittance over that same decade. The 1980 Census, which counts also immigrants who may have been residin for many years, found a female labor force participation rate of around 50 perc among immigrants for the period 1970-1980.(Bach and Tienda, 1984).

12) The occupational concentration of immigrant women in higher than that of native women and than that of immigrant men as well as native men. If we If we consider the five states in which most immigrants are living (New York, California, Texas, Florida and Illinois) the sharpest difference in occupationa distribution is between antive and immigrant women in operative jobs: only about 8 percent of native compared to 20-25 percent of immigrant women held operative jobs. Nowhere does the occupational distribution of men contain this large a divergence among native and immigrant men. Probably the second largest difference is in clerical jobs: 37-40% of native women held such jobs in 1980 compared with 25 to 30 Percent of immigrant. About half of all immigra women are concentrated in two occupations, operatives and services.

13) There are variations by nationality. Nearly 70 percent of all Hispanic women in the five states cited above held operative, service or laborer jobs in 1980. Among Asian women the figure was 40%. The figure for all women workers in the U.S. was only 29%. (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1983) (Sassen-Koob, 1984). The incidence of low-wage jobs among Asians may be growing, pointing to a new phase in Asian migration: a labor migration is beginning to replace the middle-class migration of the 1970s. (This pattern also was found among Colombians and Dominicans, for example, but at an earlier period--these are older migrations).

14) The evidence by industry shows a similarly high concentration in certain sector About a third of immigrant women were in transformative industries (garment, textiles, food), compared to about one-sixth of native women. The second largest concentration was in social services where from 22 to 27 percent of all immigrant women in the five major states held jobs. Finally 23 to 30 percent of immigrant women are in the distributive and producer services. (This latter fact points to a role for immigrants in the so-called post-industrial economy, since these services are the core of such an economy. See Sassen-Koob, 1984b).

TABLE 1

Immigrants Admitted
by Selected Origin,
1960, 1979

Selected Origins	1960	1979	1980
Europe	138,426	60,845	72,121
Asia	24,956	189,293	236,097
Africa	2,319	12,838	13,981
Latin America and the Caribbean	66,440	179,061	190,661
Mexico	32,684	52,096	56,680
Caribbean	14,047	74,074	73,296
Central America	6,661	17,547	20,968
South America	13,048	35,344	39,717
Total Immigrants Admitted:	265,398[1]	460,348[1]	512,860[1]

Source: Immigration and Naturalization Service, "Tabulation of Immigrants Admitted by Country of Borth," (Unpublished, 1981).

Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1980 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, "Tabulation of Immigrants Admitted by Country or Region of Birth", (U.S. Department of Justice, 1983)

[1] Also including origins not listed here.

TABLE 2

TABLE 7 IMMIGRANTS ADMITTED BY AREA, CARIBBEAN , HISPANIC AND ASIAN

	Caribbean	Central America	South America	Asia	Total
1955-1959	78,557	26,825	42,278	98,856	246,516
1960-1964	120,337	43,658	100,131	117,140	381,266
1965-1969	351,806	51,344	119,219	258,229	780,698
1970-1974	318,680	44,159	104,676	574,222	1,041,737
1975-1979	413,715	73,794	155,765	879,178	1,522,432
1980	73,296	20,968	39,717	236,097	370,078
Total	1,356,391	260,748	561,766	2,163,702	4,342,621

*Excludes Mexico

Source: INS, Tabulation of Immigrants Admitted by Country of Birth, 1954-1979. (1981, Unpublished).

INS, 1980 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, " Tabulation of Immigrants Admitted by Country or Region of Birth", (U.S. Department of Justice, 1983)

TABLE 3

Distribution of countries sending immigrants by % female. (1972-79)

Countries with 50% or more female immigrants
41 countries

Countries with under 50% female immigrants
45%-50% = 28 countries
Under 45% = 14 countries

Source: INS data

TABLE 4

ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS BY RACE AND SPANISH ORIGIN, 1980

	White	Black	Asian and Pacific Islander	Spanish Origin
Total Labor Force	90,507,346	10,838,021	1,788,369	6,075,414
Employed	84,134,204	9,300,661	1,665,706	5,421,433
Unemployed	5,205,468	1,272,784	85,788	552,723
Female Labor Force	37,558,407	5,243,841	804,083	2,374,838
Employed	35,297,665	4,625,693	758,397	2,127,752
Unemployed	2,161,216	584,947	43,395	239,197
Median Income ($)	20,840	12,618	22,075	14,711
Mean Income ($)	24,279	15,721	25,681	17,360
Persons, Poverty Status Determined	184,431,365	25,661,955	3,610,970	14,343,741
Income in 1979 below Poverty Level	17,301,567 (9.3%)	7,752,010 (30.2%)	503,089 (13.9%)	3,409,754 (23.8%)

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1980 Census of Population and Housing: Provisional Estimates of Social, Economic, and Housing Characteristics (March) 1982.

TABLE 5

OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE FOREIGN BORN

1950-1979 (IN PERCENTS)

Year of Entry	Professional Managerial	Clerical Sales	Craft Workers	Other Blue-Collar	Service Workers	Farm Workers
1975-79	18.1	11.2	6.6	35.4	21.3	7.2
1970-74	20.3	15.6	11.[illegible]	31.0	17.8	3.7
1965-69	24.0	24.0	12.9	24.7	18.3	3.1
1960-64	30.4	20.9	12.0	21.4	13.0	2.3
1950-59	29.0	19.2	13.8	23.3	13.0	1.8
Pre-1950	27.1	25.4	13.5	16.6	15.4	2.0

Source: Current Population Survey, November, 1979.

TABLE 6

OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF MAJOR HISPANIC GROUPS, UNITED STATES [redacted], 1980

Occupation	United States, 1980					
	All Workers	Whites	All Hispanics	Mexicans	Puerto Ricans	Cubans
White Collar	52.2	53.9	34.2	29.2	38.8	44.7
Blue Collar	28.1	27.7	41.6	44.7	39.0	39.5
Services[a]	16.9	15.4	20.3	20.3	21.6	15.9
Farm	2.8	2.9	3.8	5.7	0.6	0.0

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, 1981, Geographic Profiles of Employment and Unemployment, 1980;

[a] Transport included in Services.

TABLE 7

OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION BY ETHNICITY, QUEENS, NEW YORK CITY, 1980.
(Percentages)

	Blacks	Jews	Italians	Irish	Other European Ethnics	Puerto Ricans	Colombians	Other Hispanics	Asians	Others
Management	8.9	13.4	8.6	11.4	14.7	11.7	11.5	11.3	2.8	7.9
Professional & Technical	24.6	31.0	18.0	31.4	21.5	13.3	3.8	13.6	41.7	22.8
Sales	6.0	8.8	7.0	1.0	5.1	11.7	3.8	3.4	8.3	7.9
Clerical	14.1	27.2	18.0	24.8	24.9	21.7	15.4	15.9	22.2	18.5
Crafts	7.7	4.2	6.2	5.7	9.0	3.3	15.4	12.5	0.0	13.6
Operatives & Laborers	14.5	3.1	18.0	5.7	7.9	16.6	19.2	20.5	8.3	9.3
Transport	4.8	2.3	6.3	2.9	1.7	1.7	0.0	1.1	0.0	2.9
Services	19.4	10.0	17.9	17.1	15.2	20.0	30.9	21.7	16.7	17.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total N=(1269)	(248)	(261)	(128)	(105)	(177)	(60)	(26)	(88)	(36)	(140)

Source: Cohen and Sassen-Koob (1982).

(Special Survey)

TABLE 8

OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION BY NATIONAL ORIGIN AND SEX, QUEENS (NYC), 1980

(percentages)

	Colombian	Puerto Rican	Other Hispanics	All Hispanics
White Collar, Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Male	44.4	28.6	41.7	37.0
Female	55.6	71.4	58.3	63.0
Blue Collar, Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Male	62.5	66.7	55.2	59.2
Female	37.5	33.4	44.8	40.8
Services, Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Male	44.4	25.0	43.5	36.5
Female	55.6	75.0	56.5	63.5

Source: Cohen and Sassen-Koob (1982)

(Special Survey)

Chairman MILLER. What is your time problem? Can you wait until the other panelists testify?

Dr. SASSEN-KOOB. And then what would happen? Are there questions?

Chairman MILLER. Yes.

Dr. SASSEN-KOOB. When is this panel concluding?

Chairman MILLER. It is supposed to conclude at 1 o'clock.

Dr. SASSEN-KOOB. OK, fine.

Chairman MILLER. Just let us know if you have a problem.

Miss Cook.

Ms. COOK. I guess, according to tradition, the father should go first.

Chairman MILLER. Fine. You will interpret for us, is that correct?

Ms. COOK. Yes. Mr. Vu will make his statement and I will try my best to translate.

[Mr. Vu Van Ngo reads statement in Vietnamese.]

Chairman MILLER. Thank you very much.

We are going to have to recess for a minute because I have to go vote. Mr. Wheat will be back. I will return right away for the translation.

[Whereupon, the committee was in recess.]

Mr. WHEAT [presiding]. I will call the hearing back to order.

Mr. Vu, thank you very much for your statement. I understand, Miss Cook, that you're going to translate for us?

Ms. COOK. Yes.

Mr. WHEAT. Thank you very much.

STATEMENT OF VU VAN NGO, PARENT, AS TRANSLATED BY MS. KIM COOK

PREPARED STATEMENT OF VU VAN NGO

My name is Vu Van Ngo. I was a research specialist for the National Development Research Program in Viet Nam before my wife, our seven children and myself were evacuated by the U.S. out of Viet Nam on April 22, 1975 because of my employment with the U.S. Embassy.

We were given an order by the U.S. ambassador to go to the Philippines. Each member of our family was allowed 3 pounds of belongings. In our mind we were thinking that we were leaving Saigon for temporary shelter away from a possible enemy attack to the Capital. But upon arrival to the Philippines we were told that we could not go home again and that we were destined to be resettled in the U.S. Our shock and sorrow were so deep. Even though we wanted to escape from communism we were not prepared to say good bye to our home.

After one week in the Philippines, one week in Guam and three months in the camp in California, our family was sponsored by a church in Arlington, Virginia. Our family received food stamps and Medicaid but not welfare, seeing that the church and government assistance was only temporary.

To guarantee the future of our seven children, my wife and I took the only available work for us, labor work. I went to work as a maintenance worker for a theater in the day time and pumped gas at a gas station at night. My wife worked as a cook for a Vietnamese restaurant from 10 A.M. to midnight.

At the beginning, our family met with many difficulties adjusting to our new way of life. Some of them were transportation and language. Even though we had to do hard work which we were not familiar with, and our pay was not much, we were very happy that we were able to provide for ourselves and our children. Our wish was that our children would be educated, become good citizens for our new country and not forget their mother tongue. We also had hope that some day we would be able to go back to our country again.

After ten years of hard work, our family now has a better living, probably fifty percent better than what we used to have in Viet Nam. Our motto is "work more and save more". To us that is the key to being successful in America and happiness in the home.

We hope that by working hard we could pay more tax to both the State and the Federal government. This is our contribution as a refugee to prove that refugees bring contributions and not burdens to their new country which so generously welcomed us.

I also would like to mention that our family would not be where we are today without the help of many new American friends affiliated with the church that sponsored us and the mutual support in our community from people who found themselves in the same boat.

Ms. COOK. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, my name is Vu Van Ngo. I am a refugee from Vietnam. I was a research specialist for the National Development Research Program in Vietnam before my wife, our seven children and myself, were evacuated by the United States out of Vietnam on April 22, 1975. We were evacuated because I was an employee of the U.S. Embassy.

We were given an order by the U.S. Ambassador to go to the Philippines. Each member of our family was only allowed 3 pounds of belongings. In our mind, we were thinking that we were leaving Saigon for temporary shelter away from a possible enemy attack to the capital. But upon our arrival to the Philippines, we found out that we had lost our country and were destined to be resettled in the United States. Our shock and sorrow was so deep. Even though we wanted to escape from communism, we were not prepared to say goodbye to our home.

After 1 week in the Philippines, 1 week in Guam, and 3 months in the camp in California, our family was sponsored by a church in Arlington, VA. Our family received food stamps and Medicaid, but not welfare, seeing that the church and the Government assistance was only temporary and not enough for the future of our children.

To guarantee the future of our seven children, my wife and I took the only available work for us, which was labor work. I went to work as a maintenance worker for a theater in the day time and for a gas station at night. My wife worked as a cook for a Vietnamese restaurant from 6 a.m. to midnight. We never had a day of vacation or holiday.

At the beginning, our family met with many difficulties adjusting to our new way of life. Some of them were transportation and language. Even though we had to do hard work which we were not familiar with, and our pay was not much, we were very happy that we were economically independent and that we were able to provide for our children and ourselves. Our wish was that our children would be educated, become good citizens for our new country, but not forget their mother tongue. We also had hope that some day we would—I'm sorry, this part he did not read. The statement that Mr. Vu gave to me last night, he cut some parts of it out today. So I am not going to say what he did not say.

Mr. WHEAT. OK.

Ms. COOK. After 10 years of hard work, our family now has a better living, probably 50 percent better than what we used to have in Vietnam. The reason for our success is that we believe in "work more and save more," to live together and save together as an extended family. To us, that is the key to being successful in America and to keep happiness in the home.

We hope that by working hard we could pay more taxes to both the State and Federal Government. This is our contribution as a refugee to this country. We want to prove that refugees bring contributions and not burdens to our new country which has very generously welcomed us.

I also would like to mention that our family would not be where we are today without the help of many American friends affiliated with the church that sponsored us, and the mutual support in our community from our own people who found themselves in the same boat.

Thank you for having me here to explain to you about the situation of one Vietnamese refugee family.

Mr. **Wheat**. Miss Cook, thank you very much for your translation. I would appreciate it if you would let Mr. Vu know that we are grateful that he testified today and, that his success story is, in fact, one that the committee appreciates being able to hear. It is an important and significant contribution to the United States, not only in terms of our economy, but in our continuing and growing dynamic national spirit. Thank you very much for coming today.

Mr. **Wheat**. Our next witness is Vu Thu Trang.

STATEMENT OF VU THU TRANG, DAUGHTER

Ms. **Vu Thu Trang**. My name is Trang Vu. I am a refugee from Vietnam. I came to the United States in 1975. At that time I was 14 years old and the oldest girl in my family. I escaped from my country with my parents, with one brother and five sisters. My parents made the decision and preparation to escape. I did not take part in this decision. Therefore, I was not prepared to leave my country, my grandparents, relatives and friends behind. This was the reason for much of my sadness during the first 4 years of my stay in the United States.

I had finished the sixth grade in Vietnam. One week after our arrival to Arlington, VA. I was sent to Stratford Junior High School. I had to repeat the sixth grade because I did not know any English. At that time the school also had no English as a second language for foreign born students. I was good in math because I could understand the numbers, but the other subjects which were taught in English were very difficult for me. I was told to try to get along in these classes even though I had no idea what was going on. It took me 2 years before I could acquire enough English to understand most of the material. In high school I was getting along easier and was in mainstream classes.

The first few years in the American school were very traumatic for me because I was not able to communicate with my teachers or classmates. I was afraid every day to go into a class because I could not explain how I felt or what I wanted to others. This experience as the only Vietnamese in the classroom and not being able to communicate made me shy and more fearful than I was. At that time I so much wished that there was someone I could go to who could help me and explain to me in my own language.

After school I went home to take care of my five younger sisters. The youngest was only 1 year old. I also had to prepare dinner for the family since my parents were working two jobs until midnight every day.

I missed having my parents at home with us like when we were in Vietnam, and our family rarely had a chance to see each other, even at dinner time. I also missed the extended family life we had in Vietnam where we lived in the same home with my grandparents who loved and took care of us when my parents were away at work. But I felt that I was luckier than many other Vietnamese refugees who had a much harder time than I had. Many of my friends who had to suffer in Vietnam for the last 10 years, or those who escaped without their parents, sisters or brothers, are suffering much more than I was when I first came here. In my limited ability and time, after helping out my parents at the restaurant and taking care of my sisters, I tried to volunteer my time in our community to help other young people in a similar situation as myself during the first few years in this country.

Thank you.

Mr. **Wheat**. Thank you very much.

Miss Harjo.

STATEMENT OF SUZAN SHOWN HARJO, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL CONGRESS OF AMERICAN INDIANS

Ms. **Harjo**. Thank you. My name is Suzan Shown Harjo and I am the executive director of the National Congress of American Indians, which is the oldest and largest national Indian organization. I am Cheyenne and Creek and I'm a citizen of the Cheyenne and Arapaho Tribes of Oklahoma.

We have a prepared statement, which I hope will be included in the record of this hearing. I have attached to that statement, not necessarily for the record, an article that I wrote in 1977 when I worked with the Native American Rights Fund, which I hope will be of benefit to the committee members in illustrating the complexity of Federal Indian law and its application on the Hill, and the ways in which the political process and the legal processes for Indian people are intertwined.

Just very briefly about myself, when I introduced myself I said that I was Cheyenne and Creek, and that is something that I say and use for the convenience of people who are not Cheyenne or Creek, in the same way that the term "Indian" is used for the convenience of people who don't understand the intricacies of our various Indian nations and tribal systems. The name of my Indian nation is "Tsitsitas," and that means "Human Being." The word "Cheyenne" came about as a result of the French trappers hearing two words that the Lakota or Sioux people used to say in reference to the Tsitsitas people, and those were "Shebeya" or "Shehena", the red people and the people who speak well.

The Tsitsitas were broken up by families and clans and sent to Oklahoma and to Montana after our victory at the battle of the Little Big Horn. This was a concerted effort on the part of the Federal Government to decentralize us, to break us up by families and clans, and to separate us, one from the other.

My father's people, Creek or Muskogee, are from what is now the southeastern part of the United States, who were among the people that President Andrew Jackson forcibly marched to what was to have been the first Indian State, Oklahoma, which itself means "red man." The President took that action over the strenuous objections of the Supreme Court. Jackson, during that era, said that John Marshall had made his decision, now let him enforce it.

To this day, most Indians from those tribes who were forcibly marched to Oklahoma by Andrew Jackson are Republicans, because Andrew Jackson was a Democrat; in the same way that most Indians in what is today the State of Minnesota are Democrats because Abraham Lincoln was a Republican and hanged many Chippewa Indians very publicly and in a brutal and unjust way.

I go into this somewhat personal history to demonstrate the complexity of our histories, our separate histories. We have some 500 Indian nations in the United States, many more, of course, throughout the hemisphere, and it is impossible to understand the modern Indian situation without this kind of historical and cultural context. As oral history, extended family and traditional religious cultures, we look at ourselves and our pasts and our futures in a different time continuum than do most other cultures. As owners of valuable resources with legal property rights, we are constant targets of those who would take by legal, illegal, and policy changes what we have left.

As a minority population, we have little or no political clout and find ourselves at the bottom of everyone's priority list who is elected to national office. As Indian people, we are barraged by stereotypes about us, from the advertising world to sports. Earlier there was a statement that I heard in a different way, although I'm a sports fan myself. The statement was that the Eagles had decimated the Redskins with a black quarterback. To our way of thinking, we have to filter what we hear through a lot of different kinds of images.

It would be unacceptable, in this day and age, for a football team to be called the Jews or the blacks or the Vietnamese. But there are lots of football teams—the Indians, the Redskins. I don't know if we should take that as a compliment or otherwise. It is in some ways the least important thing we have to deal with.

But the general stereotype of Indians that is pervasive in this country—and that same old movie that is running through everyone's head—has a lot to do with our economic situation, with the high rate of alcoholism in our communities, with the fact that even though we have in some of our Indian nations sufficient resources to lift ourselves from poverty, we have been unable to do that.

We are discriminated against in the educational system primarily because of rampant ignorance. We are discriminated against in our home territories by our neighbors because they are the most immediate competitors for our resources. We have terrible health conditions. There is at this moment, as we speak, with the President of the United States having vetoed the Indian Health Care Improvement Act last year, an epidemic of hepatitis B amongst Alaskan Natives. The population that had the greatest number of incidences of bubonic plague last year, the year before, and the year before that, in this country, which many people don't realize exists, were Indian people, the smallest population in this country. Indian women get and die from, to a greater extent than any other people in this country, cervical cancer. We have the highest rate of diabetes. The highest recorded incidence of diabetes in the world exists on the Gila River Reservation in Arizona.

We ceded to the United States, in legally binding treaties and other contracts, a territory for the United States to govern over in exchange for protection against encroachment against our property, for the provision of health, education, and other services. These are hard contracts to get out of. The administration has worked for its duration to get out of those commitments, attempting to cut the Indian budget by up to one-third in each budget proposal, saying that instead we should be turned over somehow to be the beneficiaries of private sector initiatives. As a practical matter, we are not going to have steel mills springing up on Indian reservations and we're not going to have "mom and pop" uranium stores. What we need in Indian country is an internal Indian reservation-revolving economy. We need a better educational system, a greater commitment of Federal dollars, and we don't want to be put into the melting pot. We don't mean to foster separatism, but we are separate, we are unique. We were here first. This is our indigenous land.

We know, as you well know, what is said about the melting pot. There is no question but that the melting pot is a fact. The cliche that is used is absolutely true: the scum floats to the top and everything on the bottom gets burned. We have been among the ones burned the most.

Thank you very much.

[Prepared statement of Suzan Harjo follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SUZAN SHOWN HARJO, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL CONGRESS OF AMERICAN INDIANS

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am pleased to appear before this Committee to discuss the experiences of Indian people in the United States. At the outset I would like to point out that we have been referred to as "Indians" for only 500 years. Prior to that we were, and remain, Tsististas, Lakota, Dine, Muscogee, Ojibway and several hundred other nations. We still maintain 300 separate languages and dialects. The Indian population today is about two million. The population at the time Columbus landed in what is now Cuba in 1492 is under dispute, but many estimates put it at 10 million. The death of Indian people by disease epidemics from contact with Europeans is one of the greatest natural catastrophies of all time. In cases where these epidemics were deliberately inflicted - such as the U.S. Army's delivery of smallpox-infested blankets to certain Indian nations - the catastrophies also should fall in the category of national disgraces.

Today Indian people have the highest birthrate in the nation and also the highest mortality rate. The average age of death for Indian people is 45 and the median age is only 18. In terms of age, we are the demographic reverse of the United States as a whole.

The experiences of most minorities in the United States has been one of a struggle to gain a place in the melting-pot - social acceptance, economic power and equal rights. The experience of Indian people is just the opposite. Our struggle is one to avoid being subjugated in the melting-pot, and to preserve our land, our water, our traditions, our unique legal rights. Indian nations are inherently sovereign, and have negotiated approximately 600 treaties with the U.S. government. In this, we are different from racial and ethnic minorities. We ceded billions of acres of land and untold natural resources in return for a protected land base; water, hunting, gathering and fishing rights; and educational and health services. While many provisions of treaties have been broken unilaterally by the U.S., treaties are still the "Supreme Law of the Land", as they are characterized in the U.S. Constitution. Nothing is more doomed to failure than an effort to toss Indian people in to the general melting-pot or to deal with Indian people on a strictly racial basis. Our legal status requires that we be dealt with on a government to government basis.

We cannot do justice to the suggested subject of Indian experiences with the U.S. government in the few minutes allowed in a hearing. We do welcome, however, the opportunity to present a broad overview, and hope that this will further your interest in examining Indian issues, both historical and contemporary, and that it will guide the decisions you make as Members of Congress.

During the Colonial Period, the British Crown entered into numerous treaties with Indian Nations, but did not formulate any coordinated policy. The lines established by the Crown in 1768, beyond which no European settlements were to occur, were routinely violated. Relations between colonists and Indians were often cordial, with Indians providing food, meat and skills necessary for the immigrants to adjust to their new habitat.

Following the Revolutionary War, the Ordinance for the Regulation of Indian Affairs and the 1787 Northwest Ordinance were passed, promising no taking of Indian lands without Indian consent and requiring laws for the preservation of peace and friendship with the Indians. The first Indian law passed by the First Congress of the United States, the first of the Indian Nonintercourse acts in 1790, stated that only Indian land transaction without Congressional approval would be void, and President Washington interpreted this to the Seneca Nation as assurance that "in future, you cannot be defrauded of your lands."

Indian nations east of the Mississippi, however, were under constant pressure to give up their lands. The infant U.S. general government did not enforce its favorable Indian laws against the powerful colonies-turned states. During this period, most of the Indian lands in the East were stolen. Following the Indian Removal Act of 1830, most of the Indian population in the Southeastern United States was forced to move to Oklahoma. The West at that time was not considered habitable by white people.

The mid-19th century brought a great influx of European settlers to the West, lured by land and gold. And, the coming of the railroad brought both accelerated migration and the destruction of the buffalo herds. The U.S. government, reflecting the pressure for Indian land and gold, began an aggressive policy of military action against Indians followed by negotiation of treaties. Between 1853 and 1856, fifty two treaties were signed.

Assimilation, always an element of U.S. policy with regard to Indians, has dominated U.S. Indian policy in the late 19th century and through part of the 20th century. Assimilation for Indian people meant cultural genocide - a concerted effort to destroy Indian languages, traditions, customary laws, dress, religions and occupations. Assimilation also has meant the abrogation of treaties and the demand that we give up land, water, forests, minerals and other natural resources.

Three major ways in which the goals of assimilation were to have been accomplished were 1) through federal franchising on Indian nations given to anxious Christian denominations; 2) through a culturally unravelling imposed educational system designed to separate child from family and instill non-Indian values; and 3) through federal efforts to break up tribal landholdings, turn Indians into individual landowners and impose taxes on their lands.

The U.S. education efforts directed at Indians, until recently, have been based on the premise that Indian people are inferior to white people. The first Congressional appropriation for Indian education funds was in 1819, when $10,000 was set aside in a "Civilization Fund." Indian people were to cast aside their traditions and be educated into the culture and religion of the dominant population. In 1871, President Grant delegated to churches the responsibility of nominating Indian agents and directing the education efforts on reservations. In fact, churches were assigned to specific reservations, and others were not allowed entry into it. The aim of government-sponsored church-directed education was strip Indian people of their religious views, practices and languages. Indian religious ceremonies, including the Sun Dance and Ghost Dance, were prohibited. In schools, children were forbidden to speak their native tongues. By the end of the 19th century there were many off-reservation boarding schools and day schools on reservations.

The establishment of boarding schools for children was a deliberate attempt to disrupt traditional child rearing practices. Children were forcibly removed from their homes for up to twelve years, and parents and other relatives were not allowed to visit the children during the school year. Children were taught that their traditions were savage and immoral. There are many accounts of parents in this century camping outside the gates of boarding schools to get a glimpse of their children. Most Indian grandparents and many parents today are the products of boarding and other government schools. For those whose childhood was spent in boarding schools, there is little in the way of role models for rearing children. There have been major efforts in the past couple decades to recoup from these past experiences and to re-establish traditional Indian family values. Those values often include an extended family with sharing of child care among relatives. Extended family identification is central to citizens of Indian nations. The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 broke the chain of wholesale expatriation of Indian children when it recognized the traditional kinship system and the non-parental rights of extended family members.

Education today, fortunately, is coming under increasing tribal control, primarily as a result of important education reform acts of the 1970s. The result is culturally relevant curricula which includes an emphasis on tribal history, Indian languages and increased self-esteem. Indian education is the most decentralized of Indian programs, and the one in which the government has the least hold. While Indian tribes and parents are finally gaining control over Indian schools and have made the few remaining boarding schools into institutions which are administered by Indian boards and serve children with special needs, the federal government under this Administration is attemping to lessen the commitment to Indian education. The Bureau of Indian Affairs is engaged in an aggressive campaign to get Indian children to attend public schools by redrawing school boundaries, instituting new student counts which will result in less money for BIA schools, and footdragging in maintaining school facilities among other devices. Fortunately, there are a number of Members of Congress who are vigilent where Indian education is involved, and some of these practices have been held in check.

While curricula for Indian-controlled schools is vastly improved, the same is not true for the history texts used by most students in grade schools, high schools and colleges around this country. Most history courses relegate Indian matters to a few pages or at best a chapter. At Thanksgiving, most schools have an "Indian Unit." During Indian Unit time, or when there is a day or week set aside as an "Indian Awareness" time, our office receives many calls from students wanting information on Indian issues, posters, pictures, etc. We are glad to provide what we can, but wish that an understanding of Indian history and contemporary issues were put in a more natural context.

A recent study of thirteen newly-issued college history textbooks by Fred Hoxie of the Newberry Library in Chicago, revealed that most of the new books still persistent in treating Indian history with ignorance, misrepresentation and apathy. Most of the textbooks reviewed by Hoxie did not include new scholarship work on native population at the time of Columbus. It makes a big difference in your view of history whether there was one million or twelve million tribal people here at the time of European immigration to North America. We have many problems with textbooks which refer to the Battle of the Little Big Horn as a "massacre," while the deaths of 300 unarmed and sleeping Indian men, women and children at Wounded Knee is referred to as an "incident."

The Indian land base has gone from 138 million acres in 1887 to approximately 50 million acres today. There are many reasons for land loss, including flooding for Corps of Engineers projects, creation of national monuments, taking of land for tax defaults and welfare payments, invalidation of wills and BIA forced sales on the open market. The 1887 Allotment Act or Dawes Act alone resulted in the loss of over half of the Indian land. Of the 48 million acres left after the Allotment Act had taken its toll, 20 million acres were desert or semiarid and not suitable for cultivation. The federal government promised to irrigate these lands and "to make the deserts bloom." For most of these arid reservations, this promise remains unfulfilled.

The Allotment Act allocated land on reservations which had been guaranteed by treaties. Every family head was to receive 160 acres and a single person 80 acres. The idea was that Indians should become farmers and thereby become more civilized. This notion of farming was not well received by many tribes, and was particularly onerous to many Indians in the Plains. The land was to be held in trust status for 25 years. Indians deemed "competent" by the federal government could end the trust status, own the land in fee simple and become U.S. citizens. Any land outside the allotted acreage was declared to be "excess" and sold to non-Indian settlers. Sometimes in western movies you see white settlers lining up and at the shot of a gun will all go running to claim land. Often this was Indian land declared excess by an act of Congress.

Much of the remaining land has been lost through the inheritance system managed by the federal government. Under this system, a nightmare of fractionated land has developed. Land is passed on to every member of a family to be held jointly, with escalating numbers of landowners through the generations. This has made management and land title issues most difficult, as consent of the landowners had to be gained for transactions to occur. In many cases, heirs have moved away and their whereabouts is not known. At the Sisseton-Wahpeton Reservation in South Dakota, the first reservation to undergo allotment, people literally own square inches of land. A result has been that the land is of little economic value to the Indians, so it is leased out by the Bureau of Indians Affairs (BIA) to non-Indians. Most non-Indian farmers and ranchers have had very cheap long-term land leases of these Indian lands. Several years ago Congress passed the Indian Land Consolidation Act to provide authority to tribes and invididuals to consoldiate and better use land holdings. However, it will take many years before any real improvement will be realized, and the method of separating the fractionated interests from the Indian heirs in one of the Act's provisions has been determined to be unconstitutional in one federal circuit.

During the allotment period U.S. citizenship was conferred on Indian people, whether they wanted it or not, if their land was held in fee status. In 1919, a law was passed making Indians who had served in World War I U.S. citizens, and in 1924 the Indian Citizenship Act was passed. The federal definition of Indian is one who is a citizen of an Indian nation, and courts have held that the Indian definition is political, rather than racial.

The Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), passed in 1936, finally put a formal end to the allotment policy, and the Indian land base has remained relatively constant since that time. The IRA also contained provisions for the establishment of a revolving credit fund to foster economic development and mechanisms for chartering and organizing Indian governments. This interest in tribal self-government was short-lived. During the period from World War II to 1961, there occured a series of disruptive assimilation efforts to force Indians into the melting-pot. This era is referred to as the "Termination Period." During the 1950s, federal Indian policy involved the termination of tribal-federal relationship with certain Indian governments, the liquidation of their estates, the transfer of federal responsibility and jurisdiction to states and the physical relocation of Indian people from reservation to urban areas. Terminination legislation affected more than 100 tribes, bands and rancherias; some 12,000 individual Indians were disenfranchised and 2.5 million acres of Indian land was removed from trust status. Today, many of these tribes are attempting, via federal legislation, to be restored to their former status. In recognition of the disastrous effects of this policy, Congress already has restored several Indian tribes in Wisconsin, Oregon, Oklahoma and Utah.

Since the 1960s, U.S. policy has placed more emphasis on tribal self-determination. A number of important laws directed at this goal have been enacted,but none in its implementation has met the expectations for reform. Among these laws are the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 and the American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978.

The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act directed the Secretary of Interior, upon the request of any Indian tribe, to contract with the tribe to "place, conduct and administer programs." This was a radical departure from the system of undisguised paternalistic government-run programs on reservations. This is, however, far from a completed process. While there are now schools and health and law enforcement programs administered by tribes, the BIA and the Indian Health Service (IHS) still have veto power over contracts the tribes wish to negotiate. Often there are massive bureaucratic and financial obstacles to tribal government efforts to contract to administer their own services. And, important training, technical assistance and funding aspects have yet to be implemented as mandated.

The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 was designed to strengthen Indian families by stopping the practice of removal of Indian children from their homes and placing them with non-Indian families off the reservation. From 1969 to 1974, 25-35% of Indian children were separated from their families and placed in foster care, adoptions or institutions. Eighty five percent of Indian children in foster care were in non-Indian homes. During this same period, one in four Indian children in Minnesota under age four were adopted. In South Dakota, Indian children were sixteen times more likely to be in foster homes than non-Indian children in that state. In Washington Indian children were placed in foster homes at rates ten times higher and in adoptions nineteen times higher than non-Indian children in that state. By 1980, Indian children were placed out of homes at a rate five times higher than other children. Placement for children, whether it be in Indian or non-Indian homes, still is very high. In 1980, Indian children were twenty two times as likely to be placed out of the home in South Dakota and and twenty times as likely in Minnesota as other children in those states, The Indian Child Welfare Act recognized tribal jurisdictional authority regarding custody proceedings, and the practice of non-Indian adoption over the objection of the extended families has been halted in great part.

Another indication of Congressional and Administration concern for preservation of Indian culture was exhibited in the passage in 1978 of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act. That Act states, "it shall be the policy of the United States to protect and preserve for American Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express and exercise the traditional religions of the American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut and Native Hawaiians, including but not limited to access to sites, use and posession of sacred objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremonies and traditional rites."

The hoped-for protection of and access to sacred sites and areas has not been made possible by the American Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA). Governments and courts in the U.S. seem to have no trouble accepting the fact that there are holy places in Jerusalem, Bethleham and Mecca, but do not give the same credence to areas of spiritual significance to American Indians. Most tribal religions have a center at a particular place, be it a river, mountain, plateau, valley or other natural feature. The problem of lack of access is exacerbated by the increased development on federal lands in the West, where many Indian religious sites are located. Access to sacred areas are needed for spiritual renewal and communication, and many feel that development of certain areas threaten their religions with extinction.

The First Amendment and AIFRA have not been of much use in protecting Indian people's ability to freely exercise their religions. The courts have taken the curious position that to prohibit an action (i.e, building of a ski resort on a mountain sacred to Indians) would constitute the establishment of religion. In an inventive and tragic opinion, a court ruled that the Tellico Dam could cause to be flooded sacred Cherokee areas, which included many burial sites, because the land was not "central" to their religion. This criteria of centrality is not easily proven, especially since many tribal religious beliefs are not allowed to be publicly discussed. The flooding of Indian graves by the Tellico Dam is but an isolated example of the violation of Indian beliefs and sensitivities regarding our ancestors. Nearly all of the human remains unearthed in this country are Indian. There are many thousands of Indian human remains in museums and universities all over the country. The Smithsonian, by its own account, has 12,000 Indian bodies in its collection. This is a matter that the National Congress of American Indians and others are currently discussing with the Smithsonian Institution, and may be a matter which will need Congressional attention if these remains cannot be returned to tribes for reburial.

This Committee is particularly involved with family issues, and the issues described above - the taking of land, forced relocation, an institutionally racist educational system, removal of Indian children from their homes, U.S. government paternalism, obstacles to self-governance, stripping of tribal recognition and denial of religious freedom - continue to place great stress on Indian families. Symptons of these policies are, not surprisingly, high unemployment and alcohol and drug abuse. Indian unemployment stands at about 65% and in some tribes as high as 90%. Alcoholism has greatly increased since World War II among Indian people, and it would be difficult to find an Indian family not directly affected by it. The 1980 Census shows the alcoholism rate for Indians to be 451% higher than the rest of the U.S. population. Even though alcohol and drug abuse is the number one social problem among Indian people and alcohol-related diseases and deaths are the biggest killers of Indians, the Bureau of Indians Affairs and the Indian Health Service has never made the prevention and treatment of this abuse as a priority.

Thank you for asking me to appear before your Committee. The National Congress of American Indians particularly welcomes opportunties such as this because it represents an audience which does not routinely consider Indian policy. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have

ANNOUNCEMENTS

Eastern Indians Assert Legal Claims to Land: Based On 1790 Act

The assertions of tribal claims to the lands in the Eastern United States have commanded the greatest attention and least understanding of any Indian-related issue to arise since the takeover of Wounded Knee in 1973. During that year, politicians decried extra-legal activities, often reacting violently to the image of M-16-toting Indians, and challenged Indians to take their collective case to the courts to test the validity of their historic claims. At that time, the Indian people in Maine had been pursuing tribal claims to their original homelands for nearly a year in the federal courts. Their case, which has become the cause celebre of the Eastern Indian land claims, was generally ignored by officialdom and unknown to the public, whose interest is rarely aroused by the quiet pursuit of remedies through legal channels.

In the post-termination era and for the first time in the history of the Federal-Indian relationship, Indian governments and individuals have access to the courts through their own attorneys' vigorous advocacy and through the federal government's recognition that, as a matter of law, not practice of policy, certain cases must be brought. Indian people throughout the country, following the advise and example of the increasingly litigious non-Indian society, have taken a collage of cases into the courts at an accelerative rate in recent years. Legal assertions of longstanding tribal claims to land, water and other resources have resulted in numerous affirmations of Indian rights and equally numerous attempts to dismantle decisions favorable to the Ipdian interest. Indian advances in the courts have provided a national soapbox for demonstrations of demogogic skills by some politicians who, in 1977, raise the spectre of an armipotent Indian people brandishing weapons fashioned of legal technicalities and documents of antiquity and taking aim at the heart of private and corporate holdings. While this reaction has accompanied most recent assertions and confirmations of tribal rights, it is particularly prominent in the areas of Indian fishing rights in the Northwest, Indian water rights in the Southwest and Indian land rights in the East.

Court victories of the tribes in the East have evoked a flurry of political acts and rhetoric, the substance and timing of which indicate both the range of ignorance of the facts surrounding the cases and the lack of allegiance to the process defined by the American system of justice. In the Congress, the potential for legal return of tribal lands has been called "the controversy of the decade." Bills have been proposed to retroactively ratify the illegal transactions through which the tribal lands were taken—thus, by the rewriting of history, the bills' sponsors suggest that the legislative branch should deny the Indians their voice before the judicial branch.

Woven into and throughout the fabric of the land claims controversy is the thread of a policy articulated in another era—might makes right. In the name of practicality, more than one public representative has measured the value of justice against the cost of property, opted for the latter and recommended unilateral extinguishment of the rights of Indians. Those endorsing this approach may threaten more than the rights of Indian people by their view that the American judicial system cannot withstand the test of large and difficult cases.

Eastern Indian Land Claims

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Indian people, with ever-present historic inhibition, well know the risk of taking matters to a win-or-lose forum. Loss can be devastating. Winning, however, often assures continuation of exhaustive challenges which mar the victory. Tribal leaders in the East have maintained a willingness to consider alternatives to prolonged litigation, demonstrating that theirs are not vengeance cases but, rather, vehicles for the return of a sufficient land base to assure future economic viability and cultural survival. Until this year there was little interest on the part of potential defendants in entering into settlement talks, leaving certain of the tribes with no alternative but to file and prosecute their cases. 1977 has seen much activity in the various cases and claims, which differ greatly from tribe to tribe and state to state. At present, a negotiation process is being defined in the claims against Maine; settlement talks are underway in South Carolina; mediation is occurring in Gay Head, Massachusetts. Elsewhere, tribal cases are at separate stages of trial preparation and settlement exploration. Everywhere, there is the search for the ultimate and overall solution to the Eastern Indian land claims, with the more thoughtful students of the issue having concluded that there is no single magic answer short of obtaining separate agreed upon settlements or allowing each case to continue in the courts.

It is predictable that, in the near future, the Indian tribes and American people will be called upon to make difficult decisions, the more honorable of which will be based upon fact, not rumor. It is for this reason that the following information is provided; although it must be emphasized that, while the facts and background information remain constant, the circumstances surrounding the separate claims are subject to rapid change. Others have distributed "factual" information in attempts to obtain support for expedient solutions. Taking the electoral adage approach—as Maine goes, so goes the Nation— the Governor of Maine has warned his counterparts of massive claims within their states, grimly predicting that "we could bankrupt America on the basis of $10 billion or $25 billion per state." The Governor failed to note that he was using the outside figures in the largest Indian land claim to arise since the Alaska Native settlement. He also neglected to mention that most Indian title questions have been settled for a century or more. Or, as it was put to the Governor by the Senate Indian Affairs Committee Chairman, "the Nonintercourse Act claims are only restricted to a very few states because the Congress was involved in every land taking after what happened in the original 13 colonies . . . . As my colleague, Senator Hayakawa, said, 'Most of the land was stolen fair and square from the Indians because Congress ratified, out in the West, each and every one of those.'"

Throughout this discussion, one important fact should be kept in mind. Although the Eastern Indian claims all arise out of violations of the Indian Nonintercourse Act, each claim in its historic and modern text is different. Each tribe once possessed a reservation and lost that reservation through disputed transactions. The reservations were created under vastly different circumstances, and were lost under equally different circumstances. The history, habits and cultures of each of the Eastern tribes are unique to each of the tribes. Their contemporary history differs. So do their plans and expectations for the future. No two tribes have approached their claims alike. And no two claims will be resolved alike.

The Historical/Legal Basis for the Claims

The claims of the tribes to lands in the East are based upon state and private takings of their lands in violation of the Indian Nonintercourse Act (25 U.S.C. 177). The Act provides that any conveyance involving any interest in Indian property which is not approved by the federal government is void *ab initio*. It is now settled law that this provision applied to both the recognized and unrecognized tribes, and to tribes located within the original thirteen states as well as other parts of the country.

The establishment rule of law is that transactions purporting to extinguish Indian possession and title to Indian lands must be executed with the participation and consent of the sovereign. This rule, recognized by the European Nations, was adopted in the "new world" to prevent hostilities between the Indians and non-Indians which often occurred when Indians dealt with individual colonies, states or private speculators or traders. This scheme of guaranteed federal protection of Indian lands was adopted in the Constitution, Article I, Section 8, and implemented by the First Congress with enactment in 1790 of the first of a series of Trade and Intercourse Acts, which provided in pertinent part:

> . . . . no sale of lands made by any Indians, or any nation or tribe of Indians within the United States, shall be valid to any person or persons, or to any state, whether having the right of pre-emption to such lands or not, unless the same shall be made and duly executed at some public treaty, held under the authority of the United States. 1 Stat. 137, 138.

Shortly after the passage of the first Trade and Intercourse Act, President George Washington interpreted the Act in a speech to the Seneca Nation in New York:

Here, then, is the security for the re-

> mainder of your lands. No state, no person, can purchase your lands, unless at some public treaty, held under the authority of the United States. The General Government will never consent to your being defrauded, but it will protect you in all your just rights. But your great object seems to be, the security of your remaining lands; and I have, therefore, upon this point, meant to be sufficiently strong and clear, that, in future, you cannot be defrauded of your lands; that you possess the right to sell your lands; that, therefore, the sale of your lands, in future, will depend entirely upon yourselves. *But that, when you find it for your interest to sell any part of your lands, the United States must be present, by their agent, and will be your security that you shall not be defrauded in the bargain you make.* That, besides the before mentioned security for your land, you will perceive, by the Law of Congress for regulating trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, the fatherly care the United States intends to take of the Indians . . .
>
> American State Papers (Indian Affairs, Vol. 1, 1832), p.142. Id. at 923-24. (Emphasis Added).

Subsequent Acts have slightly amended the original Act, but the central purpose of forbidding any and all purchases from the Indian people absent federal governmental consent remains unchanged to the present day.



From left to right: CORNPLANTER (1740-1836), Iroquois leader, chief of the Seneca Indians; OSCEOLA (1800-1838), Seminole Indian leader; TOMOCHICHI (1650-1739), Creek Indian chief.

Case Law Development Regarding Applicability of Such Defenses as Adverse Possession

Without exception, case law has developed on the side of the tribes in their claims to lands taken in violation of the Indian Nonintercourse Act.* Also without exception, the courts have ruled that the passage of time cannot defeat the tribal claims, judging as inapplicable the defenses of adverse possession, laches, statutes of limitations, bona fide purchaser for value and so forth.

The most recent of these rulings was issued on July 12, 1977, by Senior U.S. District Judge Edmund Port (NDNY) in an Oneida test case against two New York counties for damages for two years of trespass. In the 47-page opinion, Judge Port defined the instant issues and addressed the broad concern:

> This case tests the consequences of the failure of the State of New York to comply with the provisions of the Indian Nonintercourse Act, enacted by the first Congress in 1790 and reenacted in substance by subsequent Congresses to the present date .

The issues can be summed up as follows: (1) Have the plaintiffs established that the transfer of land by the 1795 treaty to the State of New York was in violation of the Nonintercourse Act? (2) Have any of the defenses asserted by the defendants been established? (3) Are the defendants liable to the plaintiffs for damages resulting from defendants' use and occupancy of part of the subject land during 1968 and 1969? The answer to the first question is yes; to the second, no; and to the third, yes.

Although the present owners of the 100,000 acres may have acted in good faith when acquiring their property, such good faith will not render good a title otherwise not valid for failure to comply with the Nonintercourse Act.

> Although it may appear harsh to condemn an apparently good-faith use of a trespass after 90 years of acquiescence by the owners, we conclude that an even older policy of Indian law compels this result.

United States v. Southern Pacific Transportation Company, 543 F.2d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 1976). Furthermore, it is incumbent upon "(g)reat nations, like great men, (to) keep their word." *Federal Power Commission v. Tuscarora Indian Nation*, 362 U.S. 99, 142 (1960) (Black, J., dissenting).

The posture in which this case has been presented is reminiscent of *United States v. Forness*, 125 F.2d 928 (2d Cir.), *cert. denied*, 316 U.S. 694 (1942), in which the Second Circuit said:

> Although there is directly before us only one lease, on which the annual rent is but $4, the question is of greater importance because the Nation, by resolution, has cancelled hundreds of similar leases.

Likewise, the impact of the Oneidas' claim will reach far beyond the boundaries of the present suit.

Nor is the problem limited to this case, this particular land transaction, the Oneida Indian Nation, or even this area. Other Indian tribes have similar claims in several other states. Litigation brought by the tribes themselves, or by the federal government in their behalf, is already pending. Further suits brought by the United States are imminent. The Department of Justice has alerted the United States Marshal for this district that, unless Congress extends the statute of limitations for such suits beyond July 18, 1977, an action on behalf of the Cayuga and St. Regis Mohawk tribes will be commenced immediately. The Marshal was given this advance notice because it is anticipated that the suit will involve some 10,000 defendants.

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*Pertinent cases are: *Johnson v. M'Intosh*, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); *Worchester v. Georgia*, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); *United States v. Santa Fe Pacific R. Co.*, 314 U.S. 339 (1941); *Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida*, 414 U.S. 661 (1974); *Joint Tribal Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton*, 528 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1975); *Narragansett Tribe of Indians v. Southern R.I. Land Development Corp.*, 418 F.Supp. 798 (D.R.I. 1976).

The potential for disruption in the real estate market is obvious and is already being felt. News reports indicate that title companies have refused to insure titles in areas where Indian land claims exist, even if law suits have not yet been commenced.

The greater part of the disruption and individual hardships caused by litigation such as this could be avoided by seeking solutions through other available vehicles. This in no way is intended to be critical of the plaintiffs' conduct. The trial of this case demonstrated that they have patiently for many years sought a remedy by other means—but to no avail. The aid of the United States as guardian has been sought for the purpose of instituting claims against the State of New York, to challenge not only the 1795 sale but other treaties with the state. The remedy afforded by Congress against the United States for alleged breach of trust has been and is presently being pursued before the Indian Claims Commission. Finally, it is within the power of Congress to dispose of the matter under the constitutional delegation of power.

The aptness of what was recently said by Chief Judge Kaufman is striking. "As in so many cases in which a political solution is preferable, the parties find themselves in a court of law." *British Airways Board v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey [footnotes and citations omitted]*.

The statue of limitations referred to by Judge Port extends to claims for monetary damages (in trespass cases, for example) filed by the United States on behalf of Indian tribes and individuals. While the Senate had long since approved an extension of the statute, the measure had languished in the House since mid-March, blocked by Members intending to eliminate the claims altogether. The increased pressures of the impending deadline and possible court actions served as a bottleneck in settlement talks between parties who were about to meet under less amicable circumstances. Presumably related by time only, a few hours after Judge Port filed his decision in Federal District Court in New York, the Federal District Court in New York, the House passed an extension to the statue. With these events as a background, the nature and status of various tribal reservation claims will be next considered.

NEW YORK: Cayuga, Mohawk and Oneida Claims

As of September, 1977, three Indian land claims have been asserted in the State of New York by the Cayuga, Oneida and Mohawk Nations. The Departments of Interior and Justice have concluded that these tribal claims have merit and are prepared to file on their behalf for recovery of lands and monetary damages for 180-plus years of trespass. The Cayuga claim area of 62,000 acres includes a three-mile wide strip surrounding the northern half of Lake Cayuga in Cayuga and Seneca Counties. The St. Regis Mohawk claim area of 10,500 acres adjoins the existing reservation in Franklin and St. Lawrence Counties and includes two islands in the St. Lawrence River and meadow lands along the Grass River. (The Cayugas and Mohawks are represented in these claims by Gajarsa, Liss & Sterenbuch.) The Oneidas' claim 246,000 acres bordering Lake Oneida to the southeast in the Counties of Oneida and Madison. (The Oneidas' research is nearly completed on a larger claim to approximately six million acres of original Oneida homelands, which extend in a narrow strip through central New York from the northern to the southern borders of the state.)

The 246,000 acres, located in the heart of the Oneidas' aboriginal territory, were confirmed to the Oneida Nation in the 1794 United States Treaty with the Six Nations of the Iroquois Confederacy. One year later, the State of New York, embroiled in conflict with the new federal government over state authority to negotiate Indian land purchases, began a process of systematic erosion and coersion in attempts to gain title to the lands reserved in perpetuity as Oneida lands. Possession of practically all of the 246,000 acres was claimed and taken by New York State through a series of illegal transactions (25 unratified "treaties") forced upon the Oneida people between 1795 and 1842. Only a decade prior to the first of these transactions, the people of the Oneida Nation were hailed as "victorious allies" in the Treaty of 1784, in recognition of their significant contribution to the success of the Colonial government in the Revolutionary War, and assured of federal protection in the possession of their lands.

"By 1846, the Oneidas' landholdings in New York had been diminished to a few hundred acres," stated Senior U.S. District Judge Edmund Port in his July 12 ruling in the Oneida test case. "The social and economic pressures on the Oneidas naturally resulted in the alienation of their land," continued Judge Port's account of developments after 1795. "In addition, white settlers living in the areas continually encroached on the Oneidas' land. Land speculators were always urging the Oneidas to sell their reservations. At the same time, New York began agitating for the removal of the Oneidas and other Indians to western lands. The policy of removal was not universally accepted among the Oneidas, and the problem was exacerbated by the efforts of outsiders, clergy and advisers, to urge the Oneidas to move west. The Oneida Nation was split into several factions by these pressures. As a result, by the 1840's, three distinct bands of Oneidas existed. One band stayed on the remaining Oneida reservation land in New York; one group of almost 600 had settled on about 65,000 acres in Wisconsin; and another group of about 400 had moved to Ontario, Canada.

"Unfortunately, the pressures on the Oneidas to part with their land did not cease once removal had been effected. The Oneidas' meager landholdings in New York were reduced further as a result of a New York statute which divided the tribal landholdings and gave the Oneidas an option to sell their land. This option to sell, coupled with the state of extreme poverty in which they lived, more or less forced the sale of much of the remaining Indian land. The loss of land in Wisconsin was much more drastic. In 1887, the Dawes Act, or General Allotment Act, was enacted by Congress. This Act broke up tribal landholdings, distributed individual parcels to individual Indian families, and removed restrictions on the transfer of title. Again, because of the poverty of the Oneidas, they then lost their land through sales, tax sales, or mortgage foreclosures. By the time of the Depression, the extent of the Wisconsin Oneidas' landholdings had decreased from 65,000 acres to approximately 600.

"These forces which acted to deprive the Oneidas of their land had a similar adverse impact on the social conditions of the Oneida Nation. After the Revolutionary War, the Oneida Nation was extremely disorganized because of the displacements which had occurred during the many years of fighting, first against the French and later against the British. The Tribe was suffering from famine and widespread alcoholism. The poverty they then experienced became locked in a vicious circle with the loss of their land. These problems were complicated by the Oneidas' illiteracy. Prior to 1800, at the time the great mass of their land was lost, only a few Oneidas had even a minimal ability to understand English orally. None could read or write. This state continued through the early 1900's, during the time of removal. In fact, up through the 1950's, a translator was needed at meetings of the Oneida Nation of Wisconsin in order to explain actions of the federal government. . . .

"Despite these conditions of poverty and illiteracy, and although their attempts to redress grievances were totally futile, the Oneidas did protest the continuing loss of their tribal land. . . . The Oneida Indians never abandoned their claim to their aboriginal homeland. The small area of land they now occupy lies within the boundaries of the aboriginal land. Furthermore, they never acquiesced in the loss of their land, but have continued to protest its diminishment up until today."

Today the three bands of the Oneida Nation, numbering over 10,000 people, remain in reservation communities in New York, Wisconsin and Canada. Since 1909, the Oneida people have documented their attempts to regain their original lands, petitioning each United States Administration since the turn of the century for relief and assistance. Finally, in response to a petition to President Carter and Interior Secretary Andrus, the Solicitor's Office completed its investigation, concluded that the claim was meritorious and requested the Justice Department to pursue the Oneida claim to lands reserved in the 1794 Treaty.

June 7, 1977 In a meeting with representatives of the New York Congressional delegation and the State's Gover-



NATIVE AMERICAN RIGHTS FUND

Eastern Indian Land Claims

*These tribes are not presently being represented by NARF in any land claims nor and Attorney General, Interior and Justice officials announced their intention to bring actions on behalf of the Cayugas, Oneidas and Mohawks to recover land and monetary damages for illegal occupation of more than 215,000 acres in New York State. "The New York suits," stated Interior's public announcement, "would be based on the view that the lands involved were ceded to the State in treaties not authorized or formally participated in by the United States as required by the Indian Nonintercourse Act of 1790. The suits would seek ejectment and damages against those persons claiming an interest in the lands.

"The position which we are now taking on behalf of the tribes is that, as a matter of law, the United States should pursue their claims," stated Solicitor Leo M. Krulitz in the Interior news release. "However, we realize that the filing of a complaint may have an adverse effect on land transactions in the claimed areas and meetings have been held with the tribes and representatives of New York State to discuss alternatives to litigation."

June 8, 1977 The Oneida Nation Litigation Committee, responding to the Interior-Justice announcement, delivered the following statement to members of the New York and Madison Congressional delegations:

"While it is not the intention of the people of the Oneida Nation to cause undue hardship to our non-Oneida neighbors in New York State, neither is it our intention to continue our history of deprivation, denial and unjust treatment. Our responsibility to the present and future generations of Oneida people requires that we seek redress for the past generations of hardship. Our historic relationship with the people of the United States, however, requires that we explore every possible alternative in order to avoid the economic disruption which prolonged litigation may cause in New York State.

"We believe the fault lies with the government of New York State and the United States. It was they who promised to secure and protect our title to these lands forever and then broke these promises. It should, therefore, we believe, be their responsibility to right these centuries of wrongs. The burden and hardship should not fall upon our non-Oneida neighbors.

"We commend the Administration of President Carter for taking steps to redress these wrongs and stand ready to cooperate with both governments in an attempt to secure a fair and just resolution to these claims. It is our hope that the federal government and New York State would join with us in obtaining such a resolution—one which could greatly reduce and possibly eliminate the danger of eviction to non-Oneida homeowners in the claim area. In the absence of a fair and just settlement, however, we will have no alternative but to pursue our remedies, including the return of all our lands, through the judicial system."

The land of Gahnona (New York) was once laced by our trails we had trod for centuries, trails worn so deep by the feet of the Iroquois that they became your roads of travel as your possessions gradually ate into those of my people. Have we, the first holders of this region, no longer a share of your history? Glad were your fathers to sit down on the threshold of the Long House; rich did they hold themselves in getting the mere sweepings from the door. Had our fathers spurned you from it when the French were thundering from the opposite side to get a passage through and drive you into the sea, whatever had been the fate of other nations, we might still have had a nation, and I might have had a country.

1808, Cayuga Chief, New York.

June 9, 1977 The New York State Conference of Mayors and Municipal Officials adopted a resolution presented by Oneida Township Mayor Herbert Brewer urging the Congress to extinguish all Indian claims to lands in the State because of the "immediate need for a fair and just settlement of all American Indian claims based upon aboriginal title." The resolution of the 475 New York cities and villages found that the claims to land —

"are based on allegations of aboriginal title and of violations of laws and treaties of the United States which occurred several generations earlier...

"are made against innocent citizens, and against municipalities themselves, who were not parties to any actions which constitute alleged violations of laws or treaties or which resulted in the termination of possession or title of American Indians...

"threaten to invalidate titles which have been recognized as valid for many scores of years and to dispossess from their homes, farms and businesses citizens who have relied on and have committed their lives and resources to the security and validity of these titles...

"(and) any wrongs done to American Indians came about because of the policies and actions of state and federal governments as representatives of all people and not from the actions of those individuals or municipalities who must now defend, risk and perhaps lose their property and finances...."

The association resolved to recommend and urge that the Congress declare:

"That no right, title and interest in and to land of any person, firm or corporation, state or any political subdivision thereof, or any municipality therein, shall be declared invalid, and (none) shall be deprived of right, title or possession of any lands by reason of existence of aboriginal title or violations of laws or treaties of the United States relative to aboriginal title;

"That all prior conveyances of any land or water in any state or territory, or any interest in said lands or water, including hunting and fishing rights, shall be deemed to have extinguished any aboriginal title to or interest in said areas; and,

"That all claims based on claims of aboriginal right or title or use and occupancy of land or water, including hunting and fishing rights, in any state or territory, shall be determined by, and if found valid, shall be paid only by the United States of America."

June 30, 1977 Representative William F. Walsh (R-N.Y.) attempted to amend the bill providing for fiscal year 1978 appropriations for the Justice Department by inserting the following language: "None of the funds appropriated by this title may be used to represent the Cayuga Indians in any action at law or suit in equity to recover any damages or real property from the State of New York or any owner or prior owner of any real property located in the State of New York." The amendment was supported by two other Republican Members from New York, Reps. Benjamin Gilman and Robert McEwen.

Opposing the amendment was Rep. John M. Slack, Jr. (D-W.Va.), who chairs the State-Justice-Commerce Appropriations Subcommittee: ". . . if the Indians in New York have a legitimate claim and the Department of Justice is authorized to represent them or authorized to be involved in some way in the matter, I think that the Department should be permitted to do so. The funds provided in this bill are to carry out programs which are authorized. Therefore, I urge the defeat of this amendment." The amendment was rejected on division by a vote of 27-43.

In urging for the amendment's passage, Rep. Walsh stated, "I am hopeful this matter can be settled without court action, but since the Department of the Interior has requested the Department of Justice to proceed on behalf of the Cayuga Nation, I feel we must act immediately on this matter before the House. If the case is not settled out of court, I hope to prevent use of any funds by the Justice Department for a lawsuit against the State of New York or any of its subdivisions or its residents. I am sure the argument will be made that the Cayuga Nation does not have the money to prosecute its claim. On the other hand, 6,000 residents of the cities, towns and villages of these two counties and the State of New York do not have the funds to defend such action either.

"It is about time we attempt to call a halt to the *mea culpa* attitude of the United Stated Government with respect to Indian nations. These treaties with the Indians were examined and found to be valid in New York more than 170 years ago. The present breast-beating posture continues to fly in the face of history. No doubt many crimes have been committed against the Indian nations of this country, but an equally serious crime will be committed against the citizens of this country if these actions against innocent parties are allowed to continue. I think it is totally improper for the federal government to finance legal action against a group of its citizens and possibly force upon them the unnecessary burden of legal expense.

"I am not unsympathetic to the Indian cause. In fact, I represent the Onondaga Indian Reservation which is located in my district. But this action involves some of the finest farming and recreational areas in the country, property valued in excess of one-half billion dollars, including Eisenhower College at over $30 million.

"Two wrongs will not make a right. The owners of these properties purchased them in good faith. Title companies have insured their title. Insurance companies, banks and other financial institutions have loaned money to mortgage these properties. The life savings of these 6,000 residents are wrapped up in their homes and farms.

"Now because some pointed-headed bureaucrat with nothing better to do decides the government should pursue this claim, these people may have to go to some tremendous legal expense to defend their lands. Frankly, I think it is time decent, law abiding, hard-working tax paying citizens of this Nation got a break. What an innovation it would be for the government to come to their assistance for a change. Well, here is our chance. Limit the funds of the Justice Department to the prosecution of criminals rather than the harassment of American citizens."

June 16, 1977 Rep. Walsh wrote a "Dear Colleague" letter to all Members of the House, urging for an extention to the statute of limitations on the United States filing of Indian claims for monetary damages: "In New York State a number of such land claims are being advanced, in particular by the Cayuga, Mohawk and Oneida Nations. The Indians have shown some willingness to discuss their claims out of court with the State of New York. If H.R. 5023 is not passed, however, the Indians will be forced to bring their suits immediately to avoid losing the option of seeking redress in the court. The same situation holds true nationwide, and if we force the Indians' position by defeating H.R. 5023, several state governments will be in the same position as New York . . . A meeting with the deputy attorney general of the State of New York convinced me New York and other states facing similar claims need more time to prepare their cases, and that it is absolutely imperative that we extend the deadline. The claims by the Cayugas alone involve almost $1 billion, so I'm sure you appreciate the scope and seriousness of this matter on a nationwide basis . . . . The states will need all the time they can get to assist them in settling these claims."

June 27, 1977 Rep. Lloyd Meeds (D.-Wash.) presented to the Judiciary Committee an amendment to H.R. 5023 which would prohibit the Attorney General from taking action on any claim for monetary damages on behalf of an Indian tribe or individual referred to the Justice Department after June 1, 1977.

June 29, 1977 Interior made its final recommendation to Justice to bring action on behalf of the Cayugas, Mohawks and Oneidas.

July 1, 1977 Interior issued its public announcement that Justice had agreed to bring the three New York suits. The news release made clear that two of the claims "were first referred to Justice in 1975 and the third was initially referred in 1976."

July 11, 1977 Rep. James Hanley (D.-N.Y.), in whose district lies a portion of the Oneida claim area, stated on the floor of the House of Representatives that he was considering the introduction of "harsh legislation" to extinguish the Oneida claim to land. He was later informed that such action would constitute a Fifth Amendment taking, compensable at fair market value at the time of taking—well in excess of one billion dollars.

July 12, 1977 Judge Port delivered his decision in the Oneida test case against two New York counties for two years of trespass, ruling on the Oneida side on every issue. The lands in question in the test case constitute roughly half of the lands involved in the case to recover the 246,000 acres from the same two counties.

July 21, 1977 Rep. Hanley wrote to New York Governor Hugh Carey, and the Justice and Interior Departments urging that discussions begin as soon as possible on a negotiated settlement of the Oneida claim. In his press release regarding the letter, Hanley said: "The recent decision by U.S. District Court Judge Edmund Port, upholding the Oneida Indian Nation's land claims in Central New York, calls for immediate legislative and administrative action to resolve this controversy. Judge Port's ruling puts to rest, for even the most skeptical observer, the hope that these Indian land claims are merely nuisance suits to harass the government. Whether we like it or not, the federal courts are taking these cases seriously. Regardless of how we feel personally about the merits of the case, and I, for one, consider the land claims to be nonsensical, the decision of the courts requires that we address ourselves to the problem at once. I have long warned of the potential disruptive impact of these lawsuits. Two years ago, I urged our state and federal governments to accept an out-of-court settlement which would have made this continued litigation unnecessary. Unfortunately, my warnings were not taken seriously, and today we find ourselves in our present predicament."

MAINE: Passamaquoddy and Penobscot Claims

The President's special representative has expressed confidence that a negotiated settlement can be reached by the first of the year in the historic land claims case in Maine. Following a series of meetings in Maine during the month of August, Judge William B. Gunter (Georgia Supreme Court, Rtd.) stated that he will conclude his role in the matter by pressing for mediation and settlement within three months. Unless settlement is reached within this time, he predicts that the economic consequences will become severe within the state. Judge Gunter was assigned by the President in March to study the Indian land cases in Maine and in Mashpee, Massachusetts. Widely perceived as a mediator, negotiator and representative of OMB, he has described his role variously as catalyst, fact-finder and "more that of a judge."

Earlier, on July 15, 1977, Judge Gunter recommended that the President urge Congressional extinguishment of the legal rights of the Indians in Maine if they did not acquiesce in his proposed settlement terms. (Details of that recommendation appear in the chronological listing on page 12.) The Passamaquoddy and Penobscot Governors reacted to the recommendations in a joint statement of July 26, stating that they were shocked that the President's representative made no provision for negotiating with them and appalled that he had recommended that 90% of their claims be extinguished without compensation should they not accept his offer. "We spent five years getting the courts to force the federal government to act as our trustee. Now this man says that if we don't accept his terms, the President should protect the big timber companies by taking away our rights. I just don't understand it," stated Governor Francis Nicholas of the Pleasant Point Passamaquoddy Reservation.

Governors Nicholas, John Stevens of the Indian Township Passamaquoddy Reservation and Nicholas Sapiel of the Penobscot Indian Island Reservation said that the very recommendation that the claims should be settled was further affirmation of their longstanding belief in the validity of these claims and that, in this regard, "Judge Gunter has come to the only conclusion that any rational man could reach." The State's top political officials, Governor James Longley and Attorney General Anthony Brennan, have consistently maintained that the claims are without merit and, therefore, too weak to settle. However, when Interior and Justice concluded otherwise and informed the court that they intend to file suit on the Indians' behalf unless settlement is reached, the State's politicians recommended total extinguishment of the claims in order to avoid the test of litigation.

At the request of the White House, Indian, State and Congressional representatives from Maine met in late July to discuss the recommendation with Judge Gunter and Robert Lipshutz, Counsel to the President. In separate sessions, the State rejected the recommendation, the Congressional delegation urged that settlement talks continue and the Indian representatives insisted upon negotiation, stating that they would consider the recommendation "a point of departure." Following these sessions, Judge Gunter met with various parties in Maine and found the climate favorable for a negotiated settlement.

1777 - 1977 The Passamaquoddy Tribe and Penobscot Nation recounted the events of 200 years and the facts of their land case in their statement of March 8 1977:

> Both our nations fought on the side of the Americans in the Revolutionary War pursuant to a treaty negotiated by a federal Indian agent in 1777. Because of our efforts, much of Maine is in the United States today rather than in Canada. In that 1777 treaty, the federal government promised to provide us with supplies and promised to protect our hunting grounds. That federal treaty, however, was never ratified by the Congress and, in a series of transactions starting in 1794, Maine and Massachusetts took practically all our lands (ten million acres, half of the present State of Maine) and left us totally destitute.
>
> For 150 years we knew nothing but hardship, although we did keep alive our reservation communities, our cultures and our languages. In 1971 our prospects brightened considerably when we discovered that, even though our 1777 federal treaty had not been ratified, the state transactions through which we lost our lands were legally void under the 1790 federal Indian Nonintercourse Act, since they had not been federally approved. When we asked the federal government to represent us in our claims, however, the government refused, saying that the Nonintercourse Act did not protect us. We sued the government (and the State of Maine), and in 1975 won a decision holding that the Nonintercourse Act does protect us and imposes a trust

responsibility on the federal government to represent us in our claims.

On February 28, 1977, the Department of the Interior and the Department of Justice announced that they had concluded that our tribes have valid claims to at least five million acres in the State of Maine, and they intend to file suit for return of between five and eight million acres of land on June 1, 1977, unless a settlement is negotiated before that time. The government also announced that it will seek monetary damages for the wrongful use of our lands. As a matter of grace, we agreed that the government should take no immediate action against any of the 350,000 homeowners and small business people within the claim area, and said that we would accept a substitute claim against the State of Maine or the federal government for the value of our claim against these individuals.

The State of Maine, which has steadfastly refused our offer to negotiate, responded to these developments the following day by having the Maine Congressional delegation submit identical bills in the House and Senate providing for the total elimination of our claims by retroactively ratifying these illegal transactions. While the members of the delegation tried to tell us that these bills would preserve our rights to sue for money (as though that should be enough), anyone who reads the legislation can see that it leaves no claim at all.

February 25, 1977 In its modified litigation report, the Department of the Interior committed itself to a central role in the efforts to achieve a just settlement of the Passamaquoddy and Penobscot claims. With tribal agreement, Interior recommended to the Justice Department that:

> Claims be filed on behalf of the Passamaquoddy and Penobscot Tribes for those lands which the Tribes actually used and occupied as of 1790. Thus, omitted from the claims are those coastal areas which had been substantially settled by non-Indians by that time, and those lands which had been granted prior to 1790, the date of the passage of the first Trade and Intercourse Act. . . . these coastal areas are presently the most densely populated portions of the claimed area. Therefore, the Tribes have agreed at this time to seek an alternative legislative solution with respect to these coastal areas.
>
> With respect to those areas . . . in which a claim will be asserted, the Tribes have indicated their intention not to pursue any remedy against any homeowner or other small property owner if they can substitute a satisfactory monetary claim against an appropriate sovereign body for the full value of such claims. Accordingly, we have agreed to assist them in developing a legislative package submitting a monetary claim in lieu of other claims and to support them in obtaining passage of appropriate legislation.
>
> With respect to the coastal areas on which land and trespass claims will be withheld at this time, we have agreed to work with the Tribes for a similar just legislative solution for these claims.

February 28, 1977 The Justice Department announced its intention to proceed on the Tribes' behalf. In requesting an extension of time to report to the Court, the Justice motion stated:

> There are two basic reasons for the extension. First, an extension is necessary to enable plaintiffs to adequately prepare proposed claims discussed herein and to coordinate them with other claims against major landholders in the affected areas. While substantial work has been completed additional work is required.
>
> Second, the President has announced that in response to the request of the Maine Congressional delegation he is appointing a special representative to help the parties reach an amicable settlement for submission to Congress. The extension of time is necessary to allow all parties to engage in meaningful settlement talks and to permit Congress sufficient time to adopt any agreement reached. As stated in our memorandum of January 14, 1977, only Congress can correct past injustice to the tribes without causing new hardship to other citizens of Maine. We therefore fully support and endorse the settlement process. On the other hand, if it proves unsuccessful, we have no choice but to proceed with the litigative course. . . .

March 4, 1977 Senate Indian Affairs Committe Chairman James Abourezk (D-S.D.) declined to hear the extinguishment bills, H.R. 4169 and S.842. He responded to the Justice announcement and to the proposed extinguishment legislation in a meeting of the American Indian Policy Review Commission. (The Maine delegation had requested that the Commission not take a position on the land claims issue at that time and the Indian Governors agreed, in order to avoid precipitous action in the Congress regarding their litigation and settlement talks. The Commission agreed to withhold full consideration of the issue and commended the Indian people in Maine for their patience and statesmanship. One Commission Member, however, later violated the agreement. Rep. Lloyd Meeds, D-Wash., within weeks of the meeting, published his Separate Dissenting Views to the Report of the Commission, which included a chapter recommending extinguishment of the legal rights of the Passamaquoddy and Penobscot people. As his views, prepared by a private attorney at a cost of $37,000 to the Commission, dissented to a non-existent Commission position, he urged for inclusion of a settlement on the Maine land claims in the Commission Report. At the final Commission meeting, a brief and hastily prepared statement was inserted into the Report.) In the March 4 meeting, Sen. Abourezk made the following statement:

> I think it is highly commendable of the Administration to come out as they have with a very positive position on this, to say that we are going to help the tribes because we owe them that duty . . . . I would say that, speaking only for the Senate Indian Affairs Committee, I do not intend to have any hearings on that legislation that was introduced . . . . If the time comes when we ever have to have hearings on anything, it will not just be on that legislation. It will be on the entire question of negotiations of the rights of the Indian tribes in Maine, and where the justice of the situation can be aired to the Congress. It is not going to be any one-sided consideration of that kind of a bill, and I don't much like the bill either myself. I just want to say that on the record. It just seems to me that it would be a very one-sided attempt to obviate and preclude any just claim on the part of the tribes. Now, for how many years have we been saying that the Indians ought to get into the political process and the legal process, and once they are in it they get screwed up against the wall. That is not very good encouragement for Indian tribes to do that kind of a thing; the same thing we have been encouraging them to do. They are entitled to their day in court, and I commend the Indian tribes of Maine . . . for their efforts to negotiate this matter in a very reasonable manner . . . . I don't know about the House, but I'm not going to hold any hearings . . . .

March 12, 1977 President Carter announced the appointment of his special representative in the Maine and Mashpee cases, Judge William B. Gunter, whose identity was unknown to the Indians prior to the public announcement. House Interior Committee Chairman Morris Udall (D.-Az.) and Indian Affairs & Public Lands Subcommittee Chairman Teno Roncalio (D.-Wy.) responded to the recent events in a news release the same day, stating that they would "take a dim view" of any party not participating in good faith in the negotiations:

> Whatever the ultimate merit and legal validity of these claims, there is no denying the impact that they have had within the affected states and communities . . . . Yet, despite this impact, we must support the right of the tribes to initiate and proceed with litigation to try their claims. Under our Constitution and system of law, every individual has a right to his day in court, whatever the ultimate legitimacy of the claim. If we deny it to one, we can deny it to all. Nevertheless, we are not unsympathetic to the local problems caused by the claims nor the desire for an expeditious solution and settlement of the claims . . . . We are advised that there is a serious effort to achieve a negotiated settlement. We understand that the Indian tribes, the Interior Department, and the Justice Department support this approach and have obtained consent from the Federal District Court to extend, until June 1, the deadline for filing the Federal suit. We also understand that, at the request of certain members of the Massachusetts Congressional delegation, President Carter has agreed to appoint a Federal mediator to work toward a negotiated settlement. At this time, we would strongly urge this approach.
>
> Therefore, we feel that it is inappropriate for the Congress to involve itself in the dispute at this time. Under existing circumstances, it is our position that the House Committee will initiate no legislative or oversight activity on the matter in order to facilitate the possibility of a negotiated settlement.

Brother, the white people on this river have come and settled down upon the land which was granted us. We have warned them off, but they say they despise us, and treat us with language only fit for dogs. This treatment we did not expect from Americans— particularly when the general court of this state granted the land to us themselves. We expect they will keep good and support their promise.

1778, Penobscot Chief Orono to Massachusetts Military Commander John Allan.

March 20, 1977 The President's special representative held a "get-acquainted meeting" with the State and Indian Governors and their counsel, the Maine Congressional delegation, Interior and Justice officials and members of the President's legal and public relations staff. Judge Gunter, who characterized his role as that of a "catalyst," was never to call a meeting of all the parties. Subsequently, Judge Gunter held separate sessions with all of the above parties, private interests, members of other Eastern states' Congressional delegations, representatives of the Office of Management and Budget and the chairmen of Congressional committees with jurisdiction over Indian legislative matters. At Judge Gunter's request, legal issues were briefed over the next two months by Maine Attorney General Brennan, Attorney Edward Bennett Williams (Special Counsel to the Maine State Governor), NARF attorney Tom Tureen for the Tribes, Professor Archibald Cox (Special Counsel to the Passamaquoddy Tribe and Penobscot Nation) and others.

One meeting held during Judge Gunter's period of review was with representatives of the American Land Title Association, which was reported in the ALTA publication, *Capital Comment*:

> ALTA representatives met in May with Judge William B. Gunter . . . . The purpose of the meeting was to express the title insurance industry's concern with pending and potential Indian land claims. The uncertainty of status of land titles in Maine and Mashpee because of such claims was given particular emphasis. Federal Legislative Action Committee Chairman Dawson described the difficulties of transferring land in the 'claim' areas because of the inability of sellers to provide assurance of marketable title. Dawson also stated that the interest of ALTA is essentially identical to that of the land owners. As long as there is a question regarding title to property, he explained, hardship and injustice will be experienced by land owners holding property in good faith.
>
> In order to alleviate these inequities, the ALTA representatives recommended that any federal legislative solution include the following two ingredients: (1) land owners, purchasers, lenders and local tax authorities must be assured that existing titles are marketable and insurable; and

(2) land owners must not be subject to financial liability for trespass damages or any other forms of damage.

Judge Gunter stated at the meeting that his primary concern is to relieve the economic uncertainties that have resulted from the Indian claims. However, the judge stated that if legislation is proposed to extinguish aboriginal title, he feels confident that the Indians would challenge such extinguishment on constitutional grounds unless it provides full compensation for the value of the extinguishment title.

Judge Gunter indicated that he had been told that the Maine Indian tribes, the Passamaquoddys and Penobscots, have placed a claim as high as $25 billion to reflect the full compensation for the value of 12½ million acres in Maine that are under dispute.

ALTA Special Indian Research Counsel John Christie, Jr., stated that he is confident Congress could devise a solution that would be upheld constitutionally and agreed to furnish the judge with a legal memorandum in support of this position. Later in May, ALTA forwarded to the Judge a legal analysis indicating that a legislative proposal can be—and should be—developed to resolve the hardships and inequities that have resulted from the pending Indian land claims. It was contended that such legislation would clearly be within the power of Congress to enact and would not give rise to any valid fifth amendment claims. Presently, ALTA's Indian Land Claims Committee is structuring a legislative approach and language that would protect present and past land owners from financial liability or any other form of damages and would make certain that present titles are marketable and insurable.

Judge Gunter said he was uncertain as to whether he would recommend a legislative solution. His present focus is on the need to devise a procedure by which the litigation will continue to an end, with Congress determining a ceiling on the amount of property and money damages that could be recovered if the Indians prevail.

Following a June meeting with the Chairmen of the Senate Indian Affairs Committee and the House Interior Committee, Rep. Udall and Sen. Abourezk communicated with Judge Gunter and President Carter and issued a joint statement calling for a Congressional-Administration effort to provide funds for neutral third party mediators for each claim, where needed. Such an initiative, the Chairmen stated, "places a premium on obtaining the agreement of all affected parties" without extinguishing "those Indian claims which are meritorious and thus repeating historical injustices to the Indian people." Their requests for the mediation effort and for consultation prior to the announcement of recommendations regarding the Passamaquoddy and Penobscot case went unanswered.

July 15, 1977 Judge Gunter submitted his written recommendation to the President:

A. MY ASSIGNMENT

My assignment was to examine the problem created by these claims for approximately ninety days and then make a recommendation to you as to what action, if any, you should take in an attempt to bring about a resolution of the problem.

I have not acted as a mediator in this matter; my role has been more that of a judge; I have read the law and examined the facts; I have met and conferred with affected parties and their representatives; I have attempted to be objective, realizing that no one person can ever attain total objectivity; I have tried to come forth with a recommendation that, in my own mind, is just and practical; and I now proceed with a brief statement of the problem and my recommendation.

B. THE PROBLEM

The pending court actions based on these tribal claims have the unfortunate effect of causing economic stagnation within the claims area. They create a cloud on the validity of real property titles; and the result is a slow-down or cessation of economic activity because property cannot be sold, mortgages cannot be acquired, title insurance becomes unavailable, and bond issues are placed in jeopardy. Were it not for this adverse economic result, these cases could take their normal course through the courts, and there would be no reason or necessity for you to take any action with regard to this matter. However, I have concluded that this problem cannot await judicial determination, and it is proper and necessary for you to recommend some action to the Congress that will eliminate the adverse economic consequences that have developed to date and that will increase with intensity in the near future.

I have concluded that the Federal Government is primarily responsible for the creation of this problem. Prior to 1975 the Federal Government did not acknowledge any responsibility for these two tribes. Interior and Justice took the position that these two tribes were not entitled to Federal recognition but were "State Indians." In 1975 two federal court decisions, one at the trial level and another at the appellate level, declared that the Constitution adopted in 1789 and a Congressional enactment of 1790 created a trust relationship between the Federal Government and these two tribes. In short, the Federal Government is the guardian, and the two tribes are its wards. After the appellate decision, Interior and Justice concluded that the tribal claims would be prosecuted against private property owners owning property within the claims area and against the State of Maine for the properties owned by it within the claims area. Therefore, we have the unusual situation of the Federal Government being, in my mind, primarily responsible for the creation of the problem, and it is now placed in a position by court decisions of having to compound the problem by court actions that seek to divest private property owners and Maine of title to land that has heretofore been considered valid title. The prosecution of these cases by the Federal Government brings about the adverse economic consequences already mentioned.

I have concluded that the states of Maine and Massachusetts, out of which Maine was created in 1820, bear some responsibility for the creation of this problem. The states procured the land in the claims area, whether legally or illegally I do not now decide, and sold much of it. The State of Maine now owns, I am informed, somewhere between 400,000 and 800,000 acres of land in the claims area.

I have concluded that the two tribes do not bear any responsibility for the creation of the problem, and I have concluded that private property owners owning property within the claims area do not bear any responsibility for the creation of the problem.

The problem is complex and does not lend itself to a simple solution because it is old and large. The factual situation giving birth to the problem goes back to colonial times and the early years of our life as a nation under the Constitution. Adding to the complexity is the fact that the problem is social, economic, political, and legal.

Enough about the problem—I move on to my recommended solution.

> **1790, Cornplanter (Seneca) to George Washington:** When your army entered the country of the Six Nations, we called you the Town Destroyer . . . When you gave us peace, we called you Father, because you promised to secure us in possession of our lands. Do this, and so long as the lands remain, the beloved name will remain in the heart of every Seneca.

C. THE SOLUTION

I have given consideration to the legal merits and demerits of these pending claims. However, my recommendation is not based entirely on my personal assessment in that area. History, economics, social science, justness, and practicality are additional elements that have had some weight in the formulation of my recommendation.

My recommendation to you is that you recommend to the Congress that it resolve this problem as follows:

(1) Appropriate 25 million dollars for the use and benefit of the two tribes, this appropriated amount to be administered by Interior. One half of this amount shall be appropriated in each of the next two fiscal years.

(2) Require the State of Maine to put together and convey to the United States, as trustee for the two tribes, a tract of land consisting of 100,000 acres within the claims area. As stated before, the State reportedly has in its public ownership in the claims area in excess of 400,000 acres.

(3) Assure the two tribes that normal Bureau of Indian Affairs benefits will be accorded to them by the United States in the future.

(4) Request the State of Maine to continue to appropriate in the future on an annual basis state benefits for the tribes at the equivalent level of the average annual appropriation over the current and preceding four years.

(5) Require the Secretary of Interior to use his best efforts to acquire long-term options on an additional 400,000 acres of land in the claims area. These options would be exercised at the election of the tribes, the option-price paid would be fair market value per acre, and tribal funds would be paid for the exercise of each option.

(6) Upon receiving the consent of the State of Maine that it will accomplish what is set forth in numbered paragraphs

(5) and (6) above, the Congress should then, upon obtaining tribal consent to accept the benefits herein prescribed, by statutory enactment extinguish all aboriginal title, if any, to all lands in Maine and also extinguish all other claims that these two tribes may now have against any party arising out of an alleged violation of the Indian Nonintercourse Act of 1790 as amended.

(7) If tribal consent cannot be obtained to what is herein proposed, then the Congress should immediately extinguish all aboriginal title, if any, to all lands within the claims area except that held in the public ownership by the State of Maine. The tribes' cases could then proceed through the courts to a conclusion against the state-owned land. If the tribes win their cases, they recover the state-owned land; but if they lose their cases, they recover nothing. However, in the meantime, the adverse economic consequences will have been eliminated and Interior and Justice will have been relieved from pursuing causes of action against private property owners to divest them of title to land that has heretofore been considered valid title.

(8) If the consent of the State of Maine cannot be obtained for what is herein proposed, then the Congress should appropriate 25 million dollars for the use and benefit of the tribes (see paragraph numbered (1)), should then immediately extinguish all aboriginal title, if any, and all claims arising under an alleged violation of the 1790 Act as amended, to all lands within the claims area except those lands within the public ownership of the State. The tribes' cases could then proceed through the courts against the state-owned land. If the tribes win their cases they recover the land; but if they lose their cases they recover nothing against the state of Maine. However, in the meantime, they will have received 25 million dollars from the United States for their consent to eliminate economic stagnation in the claims area and their consent to relieve Interior and Justice from pursuing causes of action against private property owners to divest them of land titles that have heretofore been considered valid.

It is my hope that the Congress can resolve this problem through the implementation of numbered paragraphs (1) through (6) above. Paragraphs (7) and (8) are mere alternatives to be utilized in the event consensual agreement cannot be obtained.

Reaction to the proposal was immediate. One-half hour after receiving the recommendation, and minutes before Judge Gunter's press conference, President Carter called the proposal "fair, very judicious and wise." Judge Gunter later told reporters that the President "wants to think about it some more" and "to study it in a little more detail." The Maine Congressional delegation called it a "positive step toward resolution of a very complex issue," but would make no "definitive statement" until "numerous questions" raised by the proposal were answered.

Senator Abourezk called the recommendations "precipitous" and "devoid of fairness and understanding of the historical nature of the land claim." Sen. Abourezk stated that Judge Gunter "was appointed to mediate," but, "instead, the recommendation by Judge Gunter seeks to interfere in the controversy by recommending that the legal rights of the In-

Massasoit, Chief of the Wampanoags

dian tribes be arbitrarily taken away by Congress. What is more unfortunate about the recommendation is that Judge Gunter has acted as though he were conducting a trial without benefit of the rules of evidence and other aspects of due process."

A *Washington Star* account of the Judge's press conference noted that Judge Gunter "recalled that Carter is 'in an effort to balance the budget in the fourth year of his administration'." The account translated the proposal in this way: "For every $1 that the two Indian tribes want, they would get a tenth of a penny. For every acre they want, they would get about 380 square feet—about equal to the space in a two-room apartment. That would be the price the federal and state governments would pay to bring to an end the tribes' attempt to get back or be paid for, nearly two-thirds of all the land in the state of Maine . . . . It was already plain, though, that the proposal would have wide appeal in Maine: it would provide complete protection for owners of private property, including individual citizens and small businessmen as well as the 'big seven' paper companies that dominate the Maine economy."

> The conclusion is inescapable that, as a matter of simple statutory interpretation, the Nonintercourse Act applies to the Passamaquoddies. The literal meaning of the words employed in the statute, used in their ordinary sense, clearly and unambiguously encompasses all tribes of Indians, including the Passamaquoddies; the plain language of the statute is consistent with the congressional intent; and there is no legislative history or administrative interpretation which conflicts with the words of the Act.
>
> *Judge Edward T. Gignoux in Joint Tribal Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton*

A *Boston Globe* news analysis stated that the proposal "rests unbalanced on the scales of justice. On one side are the property rights of private landowners in the state of Maine. On the other side are the legal rights of the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy Indian tribes. In the settlement proposed . . . the scales appear tipped somewhat in favor of property rights. The implication of the imbalance is that Gunter's proposal, which has not yet been accepted by either the President or the state or Indian tribes, may cloud the legal rights of the Indians. Gunter's proposal appears to deprive the two tribes of their right to pursue their land claims in Federal court, particularly if they do not go along with the proposal. . . . The reason for Gunter's action is clear. He has stated time and again that his chief concern was the economic cloud over all land and business transactions in the state because of doubt over the eventual outcome of the Indian claims."

In numerous expressions of public concern, including a three-page telegram with an 11-page listing of signatories, President Carter was urged not to adopt the proposed approach by top Democratic and Republican leaders in Maine, five former Commissioners of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, civil and human rights activists, celebrities, Indian people respected as representative of the range of voices throughout Native America, members of the established bar and public interest concerns and representatives of the religious and international communities:

Dear Mr President:

We the undersigned urge you not to adopt the approach to the Maine Indian land dispute recommended by your special representative. While we applaud Judge Gunter's understanding that the Indian claims warrant an out of court settlement, and agree that the federal government has a duty to provide relief for the small defendants in these actions, we deplore his failure to consider the rights of the Indians and particularly his suggestion that the United States wipe out 99 percent of their claims to land without any compensation if they do not accept his offer.

The Passamaquoddy and Penobscot people have won every round in their long battle to obtain justice within the American legal system. While they have consistently indicated their willingness to discuss a negotiated settlement, they have never asked that the matter be removed from normal legal channels. Your representative has neither attempted to mediate between the parties nor negotiate the federal government's contribution toward a settlement. The figures in his proposed settlement were "pulled out of a hat," according to all accounts of his 7/15/77 press conference. The size of the proposed settlement amply demonstrates that one whose primary responsibility is to guard the treasury cannot hope to fulfill the function of an independent judiciary. It is unfortunate enough that Judge Gunter did not serve as a mediator. But to say that the Indians must accept his proposal or face extinguishment of their claims by the political branches is to make a mockery of this nation's legal and moral trust obligations to Indians and to tell the world that the United States is unwilling to abide by the dictates of its own legally constituted courts.

At the heart of the recommendation is an assumption that this nation, because it is powerful, has the right to take land or claims to land from Indian nations because they are small. This attitude, all too prevalent at various times during our history, has been rejected by every humane and thoughtful American President since George Washington. To return to it now can only reopen the wounds of a dishonorable past, bring shame to this country and produce fundamental disrespect for the rule of law, not only among Indians but among all constitutionally minded people.

We urge you to resist the temptation to follow what must seem an expedient solution, and instead, immediately appoint a mediator to seek a truly voluntary settlement of this dispute.

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SOUTH CAROLINA: Catawba Claim

On August 30, 1977, the Department of the Interior announced that the federal government is prepared to initiate an action on behalf of the Catawba Tribe for return of 144,000 acres in South Carolina. Concluding a year's review of the Catawba Tribe's litigation request by the Departments of the Interior and Justice, Interior Solicitor Leo M. Krulitz has recommended that "the appropriate form of action be a suit for ejectment of the current possessors of the tract and mesne profits for the period of time the tribe has been dispossessed. This is the third time the Catawba Tribe has petitioned the Department to seek relief on their behalf and they have been twice refused for legally incorrect reasons."

The 144,000 acres, located in York and Lancaster Counties, were reserved by the Catawba Tribe in 1763 at the Treaty of Augusta with the British Crown. In return for secured possession of these reservation lands, the Catawbas ceded a tract of land 60 miles in diameter. In 1840, the State of South Carolina negotiated a transaction with the Catawba Indians, which purported to extinguish Indian title to the 1763 reservation. The United States was not a participant in the transaction, nor did the Congress approve the alienation of the Catawba Indian Reservation. It is this transaction resulting in the loss of the 144,000 acre Catawba Reservation which will be challenged by the United States.

For six months, settlement talks have been underway between the Catawba Tribe and the State Attorney General, on behalf of the Governor, in an effort to achieve an out of court solution. The settlement talks have centered on the development of a Catawba Indian Land Claims Settlement Act, which would include the establishment of a Catawba Reservation and tribal development fund, as well as federal recognition for the Catawba Tribe. Rep. Kenneth Holland (D.-S.C.), in whose district the claim area is situated, has represented the South Carolina Congressional Delegation in many of the settlement talks. Describing his role in the process as that of "a pipeline of communications," Rep. Holland has stated that he will introduce the settlement measure in the Congress as soon as the State and the Tribe reach agreement on the major provisions.

In October of 1976, the Catawba Tribe wrote to South Carolina State Governor

James B. Edwards, suggesting alternatives to litigation and detailing the history of their claim. The Catawba Nation was first secured a 15-mile square, 144,000-acre reservation in the 1760 Treaty of Pine Tree Hill. While no copy of that treaty is currently available, the reservation was confirmed in the 1763 Treaty of Augusta between the Southern Indian Tribes, including the Catawba, and the Governors of the Southern Colonies and the King's Superintendent of Indian Affairs. Article Four of the Treaty of Augusta stated:

> And We the Catawba Head Men and Warriours in confirmation of an Agreement heretofore entered into with the White People declare that we will remain satisfied with the Tract of Land of Fifteen Miles square, a survey of which by our consent, and at our request has been already begun, and the respective Governors and Superintendent on their Parts promise and engage that the aforesaid survey shall be completed and that the Catawbas shall not in any respect be molested by any of the King's subjects within the Said Lines but shall be indulged in the usual Manner of Hunting Elsewhere.

Pursuant to this treaty, a survey of the tract, begun after the earlier Treaty of Pine Tree Hill, was completed. This survey by Samuel Wyly clearly delineates the recognized boundary of the Nation's lands. Despite the explicit terms of the treaties signed at Pine Tree Hill and Augusta, the Nation's lands remained the subject of continuing encroachments by white settlers.

By early in the 19th century, most of the lands of the Catawba Reservation had been leased to non-Indians, in violation of both South Carolina law and federal law.

Despite repeated requests for assistance by the Tribe to both state and federal authorities, no action was taken to protect the Catawbas in the possession of their land. In 1840, in response to pressure from the lessees of Catawba lands, the State of South Carolina acted to extinguish Catawba Indian title to the 144,000-acre reservation. On March 13, 1840, the Treaty of Nation Ford was signed by the Catawba Indians and the Commissioners representing the State of South Carolina. On December 18, 1840, the South Carolina legislature ratified and confirmed the treaty. Because the United States in no way participated in or consented to the alienation of the Catawba Reservation as required by the Indian Nonintercourse Act, the Catawba Tribe retains the right to use and occupy the lands of the 15-mile square tract.

While the failure of performance of the State under the treaty is not relevant to the federal cause of action, it is interesting to note that the State did not honor the terms of the Treaty of Nation Ford. Rather than securing $5,000 worth of land in North Carolina or an unpopulated area, as called for by the treaty, in 1842 the State instead purchased for $5,000 a 630-acre farm within the boundary of the original 1763 reservation as the new home for the Catawba Indians. The treaty also called for additional payments totaling $16,000 to be made by the State to the Catawbas, and as a result the State sporadically appropriated varying amounts of money for the welfare of the Catawba Indians. In apparent recognition of its unfulfilled obligations, the State continued to appropriate funds in a sporadic manner long after the sums required by the treaty had been paid. The Tribe continues to reside on the 630-acre reservation to this day.

> We know our lands are now become more valuable. The white people think we do not know their value; but we are sensible that the land is everlasting, and the few goods we receive for it are soon worn out and gone. . . . Besides, we are not well used with respect to the lands still unsold by us. Your people daily settle on these lands, and spoil our hunting. We must insist on your removing them.
>
> *1742, Treaty Negotiation, Philadelphia Canassatego, Six Nations Spokesman.*

In 1848 and again in 1854, Congress enacted legislation authorizing the use of federal funds to remove the Catawbas to Indian country west of the Mississippi. The federal monies were not spent because of the failure of the Catawba Tribe to find a new reservation.

In the early 1900's, the Catawba Tribe petitioned the United States for assistance in securing a return of its reservation or payment of compensation for its loss. On June 29, 1909, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs denied the petition of the Catawba Tribe. The Tribe's petition was supported by several extensively researched briefs which argued that the reservation was lost in violation of the Indian Non-Intercourse Acts and therefore the United States was under a duty to prosecute the claim for the Tribe. The Tribe's request was apparently denied because the Department of the Interior viewed the Catawba Indians as "State Indians," notwithstanding the fact that Congress had acknowledged in 1848 and 1854 the tribal sovereignty of the Catawba Tribe.

This interpretation of the scope of Non-Intercourse Act protections and the federal trust responsibility has been thoroughly repudiated by *Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. County of Oneida*, 414 U.S. 61 (1974), and *Joint Tribal Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton*, 528 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1975).

Throughout the 1930's efforts were made to bring the Catawba Indians under federal jurisdiction. In 1937 and again in 1939, legislation which would have extended federal jurisdiction over the Catawba Tribe was introduced but not reported out of committee, apparently because of opposition within the Department of the Interior. With the failure of the proposed legislation, the Bureau of Indian Affairs entered into negotiations with the State of South Carolina and the Tribe to provide limited assistance for a rehabilitation project. These negotiations culminated in a 1943 Memorandum of Understanding whereby the State of South Carolina purchased a 3,434-acre reservation, entirely within the boundary of the original 1763, 15-mile square reservation. The State conveyed the 3,434 acres to the Secretary of the Interior in trust for the Catawba Tribe of Indians. The State did not convey the 630-acre "Old Reservation" to the United States.

The Tribe organized under the Indian Reorganization Act and adopted a constitution and bylaws which were approved by the Secretary of the Interior. Pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding, the Bureau of Indian Affairs provided limited services to the Catawba Tribe, mostly in the areas of soil and moisture conservation and timber resource management. Civil and criminal jurisdiction remained in the State of South Carolina and education remained the responsibility of the State. Neither the Department of the Interior nor the

Catawba Indians have ever maintained that the United States assumed full guardianship jurisdiction over the Catawbas despite the use by the Department of the Interior of the Indian Reorganization Act as authority to acquire lands for the rehabilitation of the Tribe.

In establishing this limited and unique relationship with the Catawba Indians, the United States, as well as the State of South Carolina, was aware of the existence of the unresolved claim arising out of the 1840 Treaty and it is clear that none of the parties to that agreement intended the purchase of lands by the State or the establishment of a limited federal relationship to have any effect whatsoever upon the Tribe's land claim.

The federal relationship lasted only sixteen years. In 1959 the 3,434-acre federal reservation was sold pursuant to the Catawba Division of Assets Act. 25 U.S.C. 931, et seq. The sparse legislative history and the files of the Bureau of Indian Affairs indicate that the Act was limited to lifting federal restrictions from the 3,434-acre federal reservation, thereby returning the Tribe to its pre-Federal reservation status—the objective of "rehabilitating" the Tribe supposedly having been accomplished.

The history of relations between the Catawba Indians and both the State of South Carolina and the federal government reveal a pattern of continuous and persistent efforts by the Tribe to have both State and federal law enforced to protect its lands from non-Indian encroachment. The requests were repeatedly and effectively ignored both before and after the State purported to extinguish Indian title to the reservation. But the unresolved claim has persisted to this day and the State has periodically acknowledged its existence. Thus, shortly after the Treaty of Nation Ford, the Governor of South Carolina reported to the legislature that the treaty had not been carried out and that an "informal" experiment had been developed which would allow the Catawba Indians to reside on a farm near their old reservation. As late as 1941, the State was attempting, through the purchase of the small federal reservation, to reach a final settlement with the Catawba Indians. The attempt was unsuccessful. The Catawba Tribe believes that it is in its interest, as well as the interests of the citizens who reside upon Catawba Reservation lands and indeed the State of South Carolina itself, to seek a final determination of this longstanding and unresolved claim.

Connecticut, Massachusetts and Rhode Island

The following five tribal claims to lands within the States of Massachusetts, Connecticut and Rhode Island are in various stages of trial preparation, some having been in the courts for several years, with mediation and negotiation occuring to varying degrees in the normal course of litigation.

This section will outline those tribal cases in the courts as of September, 1977 to be presented in greater detail in subsequent issues.

Wampanoag Tribal Council of Gay Head v. Town of Gay Head

In this suit, the Wampanoag Tribal Council of Gay Head is seeking return of approximately 250 acres of "town-owned" land, although the Tribe's potential claim could include all of the town area, 3,600 acres. Over a year ago, the Town began seeking a negotiated settlement to the case. The first negotiating session was held last November and, on December 9, 1976, the Town voted to cede 243 acres of "common land" to the Tribe. The transfer of this land would require enabling legislation by the State of Massachusetts. The Gay Head Taxpayers Association, representing the non-Indian landholders, protested legislative action prior to the establishment of overall ownership. On July 8, at the request of all parties, Massachusetts Governor Dukakis appointed Harvard Law School Dean Albert M. Sacks to mediate in the dispute. Mediation is underway and continues as of date of publication.

Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corporation

The Mashpee Tribe is seeking a declaration of ownership to approximately 13,000 acres in the Town of Mashpee, Massachusetts, and has exempted from their claim all individual homeowners within the claim area. The defendants include the Town of Mashpee, represented by Attorney James St. Clair, and the State of Massachusetts, several real estate developers, a utility company and a nationwide group of title insurance companies. Judge William B. Gunter, the President's special representative, has been assigned to study the case.

The area of Mashpee was guaranteed to the Tribe by the Plymouth Colonists in 1665. At that time, the Colony pledged that the land would be perpetually owned by the Tribe's descendants and that it would never be sold without the consent of all of the Indians of Mashpee. In 1869, the State Commissioners sought the opinions of the Mashpee Indians of a plan to end the Tribe's ownership of the lands and to allot them to individual Indians or sell them at auction. The large majority of the Tribe voted against any plan to make their lands alienable. Nonetheless, the State adopted laws, in 1870, which resulted in the alienation of virtually all of the Tribe's territory.

Few non-Indians moved into Mashpee, however, until shortly after World War II, when a wave of development began which continued until the filing of this lawsuit. This massive development brought a large influx of non-Indian residents, who took control of the Town government away from the native population and who closed off access to the many ponds, rivers and shore areas of Mashpee, preventing the Indian people from continuing their traditional activities of shell-fishing and related endeavors. This process was gradually eroding the way of life of the Mashpee Indians and these grievances, as well as the historic violation of their rights under both the Nonintercourse Act and the promises of this country's first European colonists, led to

the filing of their claim for recovery of their ancestral lands.

The Tribe hopes that this suit will enable it to preserve the remaining open space and wetlands of Mashpee, which still cover most of the land, and halt the massive overdevelopment which could destroy their territory. The Tribe has made a series of settlement proposals to the Town, based on the conservation of most of the remaining open spaces, and has offered to share that open land with other Mashpee residents. While the Town government and real estate developers have resisted such proposals, a growing group of non-Indian homeowners and residents have supported the Tribe's call for a negotiated settlement based on principles which would conserve both the Tribe's heritage and the beautiful character of Mashpee's woodlands and marshes.

The defendants will attempt to challenge the Mashpee Indians' very existence as a Tribe at a trial now scheduled for October 17. The Tribe views that attempt as a strategy of desperation and is preparing to present its own members and a group of expert historians and anthropologists to refute what the Tribe regards as an outrageous attack upon its identity and heritage. The Tribe will show that its members and their ancestors have lived together continuously upon this same land for more than three centuries. The Tribe will also show that, while they have been forced to coexist with the colonists who arrived in Massachusetts in the 1600's and their descendants, they have retained their tribal identity and their community against all of the pressures from the dominant society which urge them to simply disappear. The defendants' efforts to revitalize the idea of termination and deny the right to survival of the Mashpee Tribe, and to repudiate the first promises made by white Americans to Native Americans, will be the focus of the forthcoming litigation.



Narragansett Tribe v. Southern Rhode Island Land Development Corporation and Narragansett Tribe v. Murphy

In 1880, the State of Rhode Island purported to dissolve the Narragansett tribal government and require sale of the remaining 3,200 acres of tribal lands, without the participation and consent of the United States. The Tribe is seeking return of this land. Last summer, the State moved to dismiss the case on sovereign immunity grounds, but the motion was denied. A stay in litigation has been requested by both sides in the case and the Tribe is making progress in negotiating a settlement with property owners. The Tribe is preparing a settlement proposal through which part of the undeveloped land would return to the Tribe, with landowners receiving compensation from the federal government.

Western Pequot Tribe of Indians v. Holdridge Enterprise, Inc., and Schaghticoke Tribe of Indians v. Kent School Corporation

In the first action, the Western Pequot Tribe is seeking the return of 800 acres of land. In the second action, the Schaghticoke Tribe seeks the return of approximately 1,300 acres of land. The Tribes' complaints allege that the aboriginal and reservation lands of the Tribes have been taken from them without the consent of the federal government in violation of the Nonintercourse Act.

In recent months, the Tribes have won two important decisions in Connecticut which held that affirmative defenses based on passage of time cannot bar claims by Indian tribes under the Nonintercourse Act. Western *Pequot Tribe of Indians v. Holdridge Enterprises, Inc.*, Civ. No. H-76-193 (D. Conn.) (Ruling on Motion to Strike, March 4, 1977); Schaghticoke Tribe of Indians v. Kent School Corporation, 423 F. Supp. (D. Conn. 1976). These decisions followed an earlier opinion by Judge Pettine in *Narragansett Tribe of Indians v. Southern*

Rhode Island Land Development Corporation, 418 F. Supp. 798 (D. R.I. 1976).

In the Western Pequot case, the defendants also raised the defense that claims under the Nonintercourse Act could only be brought by the United States. The Court denied the Tribe's motion to strike this defense without prejudice in order to give the United States an opportunity to decide whether it would participate and voluntarily intervene in the case. There has been no decision to date.

In the *Schaghticoke* case, both sides are now in the middle of discovery and preparation for trial. One defendant in the case, Connecticut Light and Power, has offered to deed to the Tribe the land claimed in this suit in exchange for a flowage easement which would be obtained pursuant to the Federal Power Act. The return of this land is highly significant to the Tribe because it now cuts off the Tribe from access to the Housatonic River.

> Where today are the Pequot? Where are the Narragansett, the Mohican, the Pocanet, and other powerful tribes of our people? They have vanished before the avarice and oppression of the white man, as snow before the summer sun.
>
> *1811, Shawnee Chief Tecumseh.*

Conclusion

As noted earlier, the Indian land claims differ vastly in their sets of historical and contemporary facts, reflecting the unique past and present of each Indian nation. In the process of pursuing its claim, each tribe is evaluating its internal needs and organization, as well as its future relationship with both the United States and the individual states. Different relationships will emerge. Some tribes may retain their state relationships, while others may seek to establish closer ties with the United States. From this process should emerge enlarged and secured reservations in the East, with the Eastern Indian nations joining with the tribes of the West to give a broader perspective of Native Americans in the United States. From this process will emerge, therefore, both a new profile of American Indians and a new understanding of Native America, past, present and future.

Mr. **Wheat**. Miss Harjo, thank you very much for your statement.

Let me apologize to the panel in that we are required to leave this room by 1 o'clock, so we will have a very short time for questions.

Let me start by asking you whether there is a continuing resentment among native Americans over the lack of resources devoted to conditions among native Americans, and whether there ought to be intense Federal activity to improve those conditions? Or do you believe that the problems which face the native Americans are ones which ought to be approached strictly by the native American community itself?

Ms. **Harjo**. There has to be an intensive Federal effort. As I said, for the most part these programs are promised to us through legally binding treaties. These are contractual agreements.

The Constitution of the United States, which a whole lot of people don't read—it's not really in vogue, I find—says a lot of things about Indians. For one thing, it says treaties shall be the supreme law of the land. If treaties are the supreme law of the land, and these treaties promise these kinds of services and resources, then it is simply a fundamental constitutional matter. They should be fulfilled.

The Constitution says Indians are not taxed. There is constant effort, by Federal and State and local entities, to attempt to tax Indian reservation-derived resources—we're not talking about individual job taxes but reservation-derived resources—despite what it says in the Constitution.

The other thing that the Constitution tells us is that Congress will deal with foreign nations and among the several States and with the Indian tribes. It doesn't say among Indian tribes; it doesn't say to meddle as in paternalism; it says "with" Indian tribes, as it says "with" foreign nations. That means that Congress has another kind of relationship with Indian tribes that is constantly misunderstood by policymakers and the general population. That is at the root of our problem.

The Federal commitment has to continue. It has to be intensified. Even if our budget were tripled, it wouldn't move the deficit numbers a whit. Nickel and diming us to death is doing just that. We're in a survival mode right now. We have no other way to relate to the United States except through the Congress, through its policies, and we hope that you will help instruct the administration as to its responsibilities.

Mr. **Wheat**. Miss Harjo, I wish I had time to enter into a further dialog with you, but your entire statement will be made a part of the record, as well as the article that you mentioned.

I would just like to ask very quickly of the Vus, since it has been pointed out that the ability to speak English is such a major part of being able to acculturate, Mr. Vu. how have you been able to overcome that particular problem and become economically successful in this country?

Mr. **Vu Van Ngo**. I speak English a little. Because I work here, I don't have time for school. I don't have time for tutors. I work double jobs, but I speak English a little.

We have a grocery store and a restaurant, and my kids go to the college. When I come here and go to work, I need the job. I need a job, the money. You pay me $1, $2, $3, that's OK. I did it. I needed money and I needed a job. I don't care how much you pay for me, I don't question that.

When I come here I have $100 in American money. I came with just $100. After that I go to work. The first year I have $100. I go to Guam and go to California. After that I keep my savings. I get my job for the cleaners, for the theater, and they pay me $2.75 for 1 hour's work. I work there 2 years. I walk. I don't have a car.

Then Sunday I must walk from Arlington County to Springfield. The Sunday, a holy day, they don't have a bus go to there. Sometimes I'm hungry. I don't have $2 to go to McDonald's.

I worked two jobs and my wife worked two jobs, 16 hours a day. I sleep only about 4 or 5 hours a day. We have money. My daughter here takes care of the family. My wife and me work together and we save our money.

If I need anything, or don't know, I go to the State, to the county, and the county helps me. The police help me. The Federal tax helps me, the State and everything.

I opened a restaurant and it is very good for me. I really thank you and my God for me—I don't know how to say it. [Speaks Vietnamese.]

Ms. Cook. He said that he is very happy that he has chosen this country as his home.

Can I just say one word. I think that the Congress is now looking at the refugees as part of the immigrants, and we would like to ask you to look into this when it comes to the refugee act and the appropriation of the refugee funding. The refugees don't have a choice, you know, that the immigrants have to prepare to come here.

I think the story that you heard was that a lot of us are now still suffering in Vietnam waiting to be reunited with our families, like their grandparents. Or a lot of us are still suffering in the refugee camps. We are appealing to the Congress, to your sense of humanity, that the refugee act should be continued and that some priority be given to the refugee program.

Thank you.

Chairman Miller [presiding]. Thank you.

Miss Cook, In the discussion, Trang said she didn't get to see her family because both the mother and father were working two jobs. This is common in the refugee community——

Ms. Cook. Yes, it is.

Chairman Miller. But when you're all done working the four jobs, you are still talking about very limited resources, are you not, for that family?

Ms. Cook. Yes. Like Mr. Vu said, the reason that they have the appearance of being successful is because they never spent anything. He wouldn't even want to spend $2 on the hamburgers. They are one of the more successful stories. But I think there are a lot of sacrifices that are going on in the family and in the community so that we can make it in America.

Many parents don't want to eat so that there is enough for their children. I think Federal programs like the free school lunch is very important to a lot of our children.

Chairman MILLER. Miss Trang, is it common among your friends, for the parents to be working like this?

Ms. VU THU TRANG. Yes.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you.

Miss Harjo, you heard the debate earlier about the questions of national economic issues versus the question of what the black community itself should be doing about developing the capacity to compete, the capacity to participate. I just wonder how relevant you think that debate is to the American Indian community, when you're talking about a community that has even a worse economic situation and a more desperate situation, in my time, especially with reservations—I shouldn't say especially because urban Indians aren't doing that well, either—but in terms of the reservation Indians, I just wonder how you see that debate taking place. I mean, economic development on reservations has been a disaster. Just where do you think the emphasis should be put?

Ms. HARJO. For the most part, past economic development efforts have been inappropriate to the territory. Just as the white people generally have tried to change the shape of the land, there has been an effort to, over time, to turn Indians who aren't farmers into farmers and to turn a remote, geographically isolated area that doesn't offer very much, except maybe flat land, into a tourist attraction, so a lot of motels spring up under Federal programs on Indian reservations and they went bust because no one would go there. They were nice places to hold meetings in if you were from that community, but, in fact, they weren't serving the purpose.

Indian reservations have been the dumping grounds for so long, we are looking now at possibly being the dumping grounds for nuclear and hazardous wastes. This is a frightening thing. The Laguna Reservation, for example, the Laguna Pueblo in New Mexico was very successful for a while because of their uranium mine. That perhaps was not the very best business they could go into, but in fact it was the only business they could go into.

Now Indian tribes are looking at other kinds of economic possibilities, joint venturing, and we find that we are roadblocked. The Congress, for example, while it finally passed after about a 15-year fight, the Indian Tribal Governmental Tax Status Act, would not allow industrial development bonding authority for Indian tribes. That wouldn't have helped every tribe, but it would have helped a few and it would have helped in joint venturing.

The Indian Financing Act and the Bureau of Indian Affairs is too regulated to be truly effective. Any time that Indian tribes start to make money, there is an effort locally that has ramifications nationally, especially in these halls, to stop that moneymaking activity or to divert it to the State or local government that adjoins the reservation. We see this in the bingo issue, where Indian tribes have gone into bingo, like churches and the Moose and Elks and everyone else has for years, so when Indians start making money, people get all upset about it. So there is all this encouragement saying, "Get into the free enterprise system; go out and make a buck." Then we go out and make a buck and everyone says, "Stop that; you're Indians. You're not supposed to be doing that. You're in the past tense and you shouldn't be taking our money." It is as if the money is a non-Indian thing and we shouldn't have any of it. It is an odd situation.

But as I said when you were out voting, we are not going to see steel mills springing up on Indian reservations, and we do need things like shopping centers and the infrastructure kinds of things, where you have the money revolving within the Indian community and not to the border towns, which just use that Indian money against us, to challenge us in courts, to try to deny us our rights.

Chairman **Miller**. Miss Cook, to what extent do we see the dispersal of the Vietnamese community or Indochinese community after they arrive here? Are they following historical patterns of new arrivals in terms of grouping together? We know there is a large community in northern Virginia and in Los Angeles. But has there been any greater dispersal?

I know when many of the refugees were first brought here they were taken to Minnesota and a lot of incompatible places and decided they would rather be in Los Angeles. Does that look pretty much like the traditional patterns of immigrants, or is there a wider dispersal?

Ms. **Cook**. I think that U.S. policy is to have a much wider dispersal. I don't know whether it is because of the local government pressure on the Federal Government to ask the voluntary agencies who settle refugees that they have to disperse them. I think this policy, of course, is wasteful because people will want to be together. And this is a free country. So I might have to suffer when I go to Virginia to be with my sister, say, if I were a refugee, but I would rather take the suffering than be separated from my sister.

I just saw two Cambodian children that took a bus and left the unaccompanied minor program in Nebraska to come here and be with their sister. They were punished because they had left that unaccompanied minor program. Therefore, when they came here, they were not a part of the unaccompanied minor program, which meant that you would be supported and allowed to go to school until you're 21.

Chairman **Miller**. The requirement was they be separated from a member of their family?

Ms. **Cook**. Exactly. Then the second policy is to discourage second day migrations. That is at the convenience, for people who have received a lot of money, to provide services for refugees because they don't want to plan for—really, we would like very much for you to look into the amount of money that has been spent on the refugees and us being blamed for that cost. Actually, it doesn't get to the people. Now the money is given directly to the local counties which makes it even more difficult for the community to be involved at all.

Chairman **Miller**. I assume I am correct that there has been a tremendous secondary migration from the original settlements of the refugees; is that not correct?

Ms. **Cook**. Pardon me?

Chairman **Miller**. There has been, in fact, substantial secondary migrations since their first destination; is that right?

Ms. Cook. Yes; but what I meant was it was not only inconvenient for the refugee, it makes it a topsy-turvey kind of affair for the Government, because people need it to be together in order to even assimilate to American society. Yet there is a very large secondary migration movement, and yet we have not been able to ask the Government to do anything about this to help us.

For some reason, ethnic communities were looked at as a barrier for assimilation into American society, but it has been proven that it isn't true. With the Cubans or Hungarians or even the earlier immigrants, that when you first come here you do need your own ethnic community. Actually, it is your own ethnic community that gives you the job, even though you don't have English or you don't know the people in the society.

This year, for the first time, the Office of Refugee Resettlement is trying to experiment with some kind of program to encourage secondary migration, but actually discourage the people that have found each other to go away from each other. Their goal is to take people out of the Washington metropolitan area, or out of California, back to Minnesota, wherever that is, and you spend money doing that. You know, we just felt that because of the fact we did not come here with political unity, we did not have any leaders, it has been very difficult for us to speak to anyone about our needs.

Chairman Miller. So the Vietnamese community initially wants to settle together, like other Asian groups, and then obviously the second generation has moved elsewhere? In my area in the San Francisco Bay area, Asians are fairly widely dispersed, although certainly many of them found Chinatown and San Francisco a comforting fact when they first came here.

Ms. Cook. Yes.

Chairman Miller. You think it's transitional?

Ms. Cook. Yes; also, at most, one generation. I think I agree with my black bothers and sisters who spoke before you here, that a lot of it depends on the economic situation for us. In many ways we have to congregate in one place so we learn where the jobs are or how to go to work, or to get the jobs. If people are educated, given the kind of talent that they can compete in the larger society, people would not mind dispersing or living like everybody else.

Chairman Miller. Thank you very much.

We thank the entire panel, and if you would thank Mr. Vu for his time, we appreciate it very much, and also Miss Trang for her time.

Ms. Cook. Thank you for having us.

Chairman Miller. The committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:20 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

[Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:]

"We, the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union..."

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OCT 1985

September 27, 1985

The Honorable George Miller
Select Committee on Children,
Youth and Families
385 House Office Building Annex 2
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Mr. Miller:

Enclosed please find two copies of our monograph entitled "A Kind of Discordant Harmony: Issues in Assimilation." This monograph is respectfully submitted as testimony to be published in the September 26, 1985, record of your committee's hearing on "The Melting Pot: Fact or Fiction."

Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

Iris Crumbly

Iris Crumbly
Program Associate

Enclosures

Board of Directors: S. I. Hayakawa, Ph.D., Honorary Chairman; John Tanton, M.D., Chairman; Stanley Diamond; Leo Sorensen; Gerda Bikales, Executive Director

number
2

A Kind of Discordant Harmony: Issues in Assimilation

by

Gerda Bikales
and
Gary Imhoff

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A Kind of Discordant Harmony: Issues in Assimilation

More so than in most other societies, the assimilation of minorities has been a subject of burning interest in the United States. Attempts to define it, measure it, explain it, and influence it have given rise to that most American of academic disciplines, the *sociology of assimilation.*

In most societies, assimilation is a matter of concern primarily to the minority. In those societies that are receptive to assimilated members of the minority, the major problem for the elders of the minority group is how to minimize cultural loss over the course of generations. Minority leaders constantly search for that elusive point when their group's members have assimilated sufficiently to partake of the opportunities found only in the economic and social mainstream, but are not yet detaching themselves emotionally from the culture of origin and endangering its survival.

In closed societies, those that offer their minority members no rewards in return for assimilation, the likelihood of losing minority cultures is much diminished. In those countries, the minority leadership's major responsibility is to find entry to the broader opportunities of the mainstream society, without unleashing anti-minority sentiments.

In both receptive and closed societies, the burdens and anxieties of adjustment are carried almost entirely by the minorities. The majority societies, secure in their position and confident of their cultural relevance, are largely oblivious to the painful cultural struggles going on within their minority communities.

But in the United States, as in few other countries, the majority is intimately involved in and even responsible for assimilating minorities. In this sense, the experience is uniquely shared between the majority and the minority. Our national identity was shaped by our immigrant fathers and grandfathers and by their adjustment to those who came here before them, just as surely as that of our children and grandchildren will be shaped by immigrants coming today and by their adaptation to us. Both immigration and assimilation have defined our history and our sense of ourselves as Americans.

And as long as large numbers of immigrants continue to settle in our midst, their adjustment and that of their young will continue to be a subject of serious interest to the American public.

The Expectation of Anglo Conformity

The degree of cultural assimilation which American society has expected of immigrants has changed significantly over time. These expectations have ranged from full conformity to English norms in the colonial and early national periods, to the melting pot model formulated during the large immigration waves in the early years of this century, to the later reaction of cultural pluralism and its present manifestation as the "salad bowl."[1]

The current political debate, in which the assimilation of culturally different groups is equated with intimidation and coercion, tends to obscure the fact that bilingualism and biculturalism actually have had a very short history as philosophic movements in this country. In the colonial and national periods of the United States, the English impulse was toward neither assimilation nor toleration of those with cultural differences. The overwhelming sentiment was instead what we may call European; it combined suspicion of the outsider with conditional forebearance of him, and had only limited provisions for the culturally variant to enter fully into the polity.

Colonists insisted upon Anglo conformity. English colonists assumed that native American Indians were neither to be assimilated into English culture nor to be treated as equal participants in the English colonies. They were, rather, separate nations with which the English either had a treaty or were at war. The French and Spanish colonists on this continent were treated similarly.

During the national period there was indeed increased non-English immigration into the former English colonies of the United States. But this immigration was small, probably not more than ten thousand people in any one year, and it was scattered throughout the states.

It should be conceded that the relatively large migration of Germans into Pennsylvania worried the framers of the Constitution. German migrants were not assimilating rapidly into English culture. They established German-language schools for their children and published German-language newspapers. Though in most other respects they were quite compatible with those of English stock, they clung to the German language with determination. But Germans were a minor problem; there were simply not that many of them. There didn't have to be a national social decision over whether to assimilate them into Anglo-American culture or to exclude them altogether from American culture. And the "problem of the Germans" was unique throughout the national period.

Blending Into The Melting Pot

The United States was not confronted with a significant flow of non-English speakers other than Germans until the 1880's, and the reaction toward these foreign language speakers initially followed the earlier pattern: rejection of their foreignness combined with a provisional willingness to accept them if they became thoroughly assimilated. But the heavy immigration of many southern and eastern Europeans from the 1890's through the 1910's eventually resulted in a different, an identifiably American, attitude toward the strangers in our midst. Israel Zangwill's plays about Jewish immigrants to the United States, *Children of the Ghetto*, *Dreamers of the Ghetto*, and *The Melting Pot*, produced between 1892 and 1903, came to symbolize the change and gave us an enduring metaphor. America, ran the new mythology, was a place where people of many nationalities and many languages could come together and live in a kind of discordant harmony while they assimilated to the national norm. People of many cultures could shed their old mores and tongues, learn the new ways and new language of the new country, and become a new people, not just an extension of the English colonies.

For newcomers, this positive myth promised easier acceptance in the new country and illuminated a path of achievement which led toward that acceptance. For native Americans, it showed how tolerance for the newcomers' differences could eventually help the process of their Americanization. Coming to America meant entering into a covenant: the immigrant would learn English and a skill useful in the United States, and he would participate in our political system by becoming a citizen and voter. In return, he would be accepted as a political equal, and his temporary differences from native-born Americans would be tolerated. Zangwill's title permanently labeled this contract, this pattern of assimilation and toleration, as "the melting pot." It lasted for well over a half-century, from sometime before the turn of the century until the 1960's. And though it has come under constant political attack since the 1960's, most Americans are still committed to the melting pot as the most viable principle for integrating immigrants into a society ever renewed by their arrival.

The melting pot worked because of the expectations of the migrants. America was the Promised Land, the land where the streets were paved with gold. The typical migrant to the United States intended to make his future here and expected to sever most of his ties to his home country. Many migrants failed to find success in the wide swings and uncertainties of the competitive economy, and many disappointed migrants eventually left the United States. Contemporary studies suggest that perhaps a third of those who came to this country around the turn of the century, during the first peak years of immigration, returned to their home countries.

But return was not the expectation; success was. The migrant committed a good deal of money to his passage. The distance, the difficulty, and the crushing expense of an ocean voyage to the United States restricted migration to those who were willing to take a very large gamble on achieving a permanent future in this country. The difficulty and the expense of communication across the Atlantic tended to wither the ties to family and friends left behind in the Old Country. An exchange of letters between the United States and Europe was not significantly swifter or easier in 1890 or 1900 than it had been in the colonial period.

In return for what seemed a nearly irrevocable commitment to life in this country, the migrant received the liberty which the new world offered as well as tangible economic rewards. The opportunity to participate in a dynamic, growing, seemingly limitless economy was open to him — if he learned English, learned a skill, and worked hard. And even if he failed to find a more comfortable life for himself, he was at least confident that his children would do better.

The United States, too, was rewarded in several ways. First, it got cheap labor, workers to clear the fields as the frontier moved westward and workers to staff the factories which opened in urban centers. Second, it received important psychological gratification from being regarded as the land of opportunity, the land to which people wished to migrate. The accommodation of migrants which the melting pot symbolized was essential to the self-image of the United States as a land of opportunity and freedom. And, at first almost against its will, the United States started to appreciate and enjoy the pungent mixture of cultures which its migrants brought to it. By becoming more open and welcoming to the cultural contributions of migrants, the United States gained richness of color and texture for its own. Melting pot immigration brought a new cosmopolitanism to America that softened the austerity that had long been a cultural norm.

The Rise of Cultural Pluralism

Though the cultural climate must have been more congenial for newcomers during the era of the melting pot than in the days of Anglo-conformity, many did not accept the "melting" process gracefully. The notion that immigrants must abrogate their ancestral loyalties and undergo a gradual process of complete cultural metamorphosis in America was first academically challenged by Horace Kallen in 1915. Kallen was a Harvard-educated professor of philosophy of Jewish descent. He advanced the concept of "cultural pluralism" as the organizing principle most befitting American nationality. Cultural pluralism, Kallen said, would encourage the maintenance of the individual's ethnic group ties and culture of origin; the American nation would be an amalgam of its many separate cultural parts.

Until the 1960's, the melting pot and cultural pluralism may have been somewhat in intellectual opposition, but in practice they complemented each other quite well. Melting pot ideology did not demand a total meltdown, and tolerated a full range of melting rates. By acknowledging that immigrant cultures had valuable contributions to add to the pot, it left space and time for a variety of cultural expressions to flourish.

Tossing In The Salad Bowl

In the 1960's, there was a revolution in the unwritten pact between Americans and the aliens who came here. This revolution did not begin at the volition of new immigrants. It began, rather, in the civil rights movement of black Americans. While generation after generation of migrants had come to the United States and assimilated, native-born American Negroes had not been readily accepted into the body politic. The physical distinctiveness of blacks and their history of slavery in the United States had acted as barriers, keeping white Americans from extending to them the acceptance they granted to white migrants. Blacks whose families had been thoroughly Americanized for generations were not accorded the toleration or the basic rights of citizenship which were extended to first-generation European migrants.

In the 1960's, the painfully slow progress toward full civil rights for blacks provoked a reaction against this rejection. There were variations within this outgrowth of the civil rights movement, denoted as "black rights," "black pride," or even "black separatism," but they all emphasized both their differences from white Americans and the virtue of being different. In fact, at the height of the black pride movement, it was common to be proud only of these distinguishing characteristics.

The black pride movement provided a model and a basis upon which other ethnic groups could build. Hispanic Pride, Native American Pride, Asian Pride, Polish Pride — in general, Ethnic Pride — is an invention of the 1960's and 1970's. Certainly, ethnically identifiable neighborhoods existed prior to this period; and ethnic celebrations based on religious or national holidays preceded these decades, as did exaggerated expressions of the value of being Irish, or Italian, or whatever. But what has been different about the last two decades has been the shift in relative importance which was accorded to being "American," as opposed to belonging to a distinct racial, cultural, or ethnic subgroup in American society.

While Kallen asked that minority cultures be given tolerance and understanding, the Ethnic Pride Movement demanded that they be accorded equivalent standing in the society. This was, in effect, a demand that the United States become a multicultural society as a matter of conscious public policy. There was no longer to be an officially sanctioned culture, loosely based on the heritage and language of the Republic's founders.

The melting pot would no longer serve as the model of American society and accommodation to it. It would be replaced by the "salad bowl," a metaphor that conveys a mixture in which the elements combine without losing their individual character.[2] A carrot exchanges flavor with a stick of celery in a stew, but remains distinctive in a salad. A thin dressing, in the salad metaphor, is all that is necessary to unite the many different ingredients and to reduce friction between them.

Barriers to Assimilation

In the era of the salad bowl, the majority culture of the United States faces serious challenges to its chosen mission of continually reintegrating itself through the assimilation of its new immigrants. Along with the rejection of the melting pot, a combination of powerful forces are at work weakening the impulse towards assimilation:

- immigration (combined legal and illegal) is at the highest level in our history;

- for the first time, a majority of migrants speak just one language — Spanish. This majority concentration of Spanish speakers among new migrants has already lasted for more than a decade and promises to continue for the foreseeable future;

- the nearness of the countries from which many Spanish-speaking migrants come, and the relative convenience and low cost of travel and telephone communications, ensure that many new migrants will maintain their ties with their home countries;

- the pattern of concentrated settlement of Spanish-speaking migrants in this country creates Spanish-speaking enclaves in some cities, a few cities in which Spanish is the dominant language, and entire regions of this country in which Spanish is already a viable language;

- the growth of Spanish-language communications within the United States enables migrants who prefer not to speak English to receive their information and entertainment solely in Spanish while they live in the United States. They are served by an ever expanding radio and television Spanish language network, and by major English language networks eager to use new technologies to provide Spanish translations of regular programs;

- the growth of a distinctly Hispanic consumer market has made it profitable, not only for ethnically oriented products but also for mainline goods and services, to advertise in Spanish;

- the change toward a more sluggish economy, marked by chronic job shortages, has lessened the certainty of economic rewards for English-language proficiency;

- the presence of a vocal Hispanic leadership which gives lip service to the need of Hispanics to learn English while excoriating any practical English-language instruction that does not also reinforce the native language;

- the definition of the inability to speak English as *prima facie* evidence of membership in a disadvantaged and discriminated-against group entitled to affirmative action benefits, has rewarded limited English-language ability;

- the breakdown of institutional support for assimilation, symbolized by the growth of bilingual education and bilingual voting and the controversy surrounding seemingly innocuous Congressional proposals to recognize English as the official language of the United States, has eroded the moral position of those who urge the integration of Spanish speakers into an English-language nation.

The Available Evidence on Assimilation

In view of these impediments to assimilation, is there any reliable evidence to indicate that today's immigrants are not assimilating into our society as rapidly as previous migration streams? There were, after all, widespread complaints against the first generations of Italians and Eastern Europeans — claims that they were obviously indigestible lumps which would never melt in the melting pot. Looking back on this rhetoric, we see that the complaints originated in the difficulties any society has in dealing with the first generation of any group of migrants. The pessimistic predictions of the period proved baseless — the children and grandchildren of those settlers have been thoroughly woven into the fabric of our national life for decades.

In the search for answers about the workings of the assimilative process today, we can draw upon information from several studies of Spanish-speaking migrants which have appeared in the last few years. Regrettably, there has been no comparable output of studies on other migrant groups, even of those which have been sizeable.

In reviewing these studies, our first and most important question is whether Spanish-speaking immigrants are reluctant to identify themselves as Americans. We are, after all, able to tolerate wide disparities among the life styles, languages, and even ideals of people who have made an emotional and political commitment to being American. But those who have a basic reluctance or inability to identify themselves as part of this polity inspire less tolerance in us. Following are some of the available study results on this and related questions.

John A. Garcia's "Political Integration of Mexican Immigrants: Explorations into the Naturalization Process" (*International Migration Review*, Vol. 15, No. 4, Winter 1981) examines several earlier studies of the political integration of Mexican immigrants into U.S. society since 1920. Garcia reports that annual rates of naturalization for Mexican-origin migrants varied between 3.89 to 5.88 percent, as opposed to 30.23 to 50.57 percent for non-Mexicans, and that "consistently few Mexicans choose to become naturalized when they satisfy the eligibility requirements. . . . The average rate of naturalization is one-tenth that of other immigrants' naturalization rates, and this pattern has not changed significantly over the years."[3] Garcia's review of the reasons for such low levels of naturalization found that the most significant one was simply that many Mexican migrants didn't identify themselves as American: "Not too surprisingly, the most 'critical' variable for Mexican-born respondents proved to be the extent of social identity with being American (or not identifying as an American). . . .

Individuals with continued attachments to Mexico are more than likely to remain non-naturalized."[4]

An important, though limited, study by James W. Lamare was published in *International Migration Review* in 1982. Lamare, an English sociologist, began with the assumption that "At the core of political integration is widespread popular psychological identification with the political system. Without a strong sense of political community within the population, the persistence of the political system is in doubt."[5]

To test the identification of Mexican-Americans with the United States, he studied seven hundred Mexican-American children aged nine through fourteen residing in El Paso, Texas, in 1978. The children represented first through fifth generation immigrants. What he found is disturbing. "Overall, Mexican-American children, regardless of generation, show only limited commitment to the American political community. To be sure, each generation professes a preference for living in the United States, but only the mixed and second generation consider this to be the best country. None of the five cohorts prefers the label 'American' over identification tags more reflective of their national origin. Lastly, no generation exhibits a strong sense of trust in others."[6] The ambivalence toward the United States, the reluctance to break with the country of origin — these seem to persist through the generations.

This detachment is seen again in the 1983 Hispanic Policy Development Project survey of elected and appointed Hispanic officials. The survey found that the low percentage of voter turnout among Hispanics was a major concern of these officials, as could be expected — 68 percent rated it as either a serious or a very serious problem. Interestingly, the officials did not blame this low voter turnout on several alternative explanations which were offered by the survey: discrimination, an

Hispanic "tradition of individualism," or differences among Hispanic groups. Instead, the report notes: "Several respondents offered similar explanations of why voting rates are lower among Puerto Ricans than among other Hispanics. One man, an advisor in the mayor's office in New York City, put it this way. '[Puerto Ricans] feel that they are here as transients. Because of that, there's no reason to get involved. Because they think they are only going to be here for a while, they don't think of legislation as being important to them.'"[7]

The Southwest Voter Registration Education Project of San Antonio, Texas, and the Hispanic Population Studies Program of the Center for Mexican-American Studies at the University of Texas at Austin are cooperating on a series of studies of the Mexican-American electorate. One of their published works has found a high degree of political alienation among Mexican-American citizens. Over 71 percent of their *citizen* respondents agreed with the statement that "politics is too complicated," and fewer than 32 percent ever attempted to talk others into voting a certain way. They also found an extremely strong correlation between English-language ability and alienation from political involvement: "First, Spanish monolinguals participate less, regardless of age, on all measures of political involvement. . . . Second, Spanish monolinguals — regardless of age — are less interested in politics and generally more alienated from the political system than are bilinguals and English monolinguals. . . . Third, Spanish monolinguals — both younger and older — are less likely to identify with one of the two major political parties than are English speakers."[8]

The *Miami Herald* conducted an extensive survey of Dade County, Florida, residents in October and November of 1983. It found that an overwhelming majority — 78 percent — of Cuban-Americans in Miami wanted official brochures and signs to be printed in Spanish. It also found that only 39 percent of Cuban-Americans said they frequently had a social conversation, ate together, or played sports together with people of other races or ethnic backgrounds — well below the 50 percent of Dade County whites and blacks who answered that question affirmatively. On the other hand, the paper noted in its generational breakdown of Cuban-American attitudes that younger members of the group supported official bilingual material by a somewhat smaller percentage, 64 percent, and that nearly two thirds of them said they socialized with non-Cubans, compared with only a third of those over 35 years old.[9]

The May 1984 issue of ***Hispanic Business*** surveyed one hundred Hispanic U.S. "influentials," including corporation executives, chosen by its editors. That survey found that 70 belonged to more than one group which fostered cultural identity. Sixteen belonged to only one cultural identity organization, and only 14 belonged to none. The reinforcement from these groups must be effective: 68 Hispanic influentials said they were equally Hispanic and American; 23 felt more Hispanic than American, and only 9 felt predominantly American. It should be noted that 79 of the respondents were American by birth.[10]

Another study of the Hispanic elite yielded similar conclusions. A 1983 survey of the "Hispanic Business Agenda", commissioned by the Coca-Cola Company, was carried out by The Cultural Communications Group. The Group reported that its "results indicate that corporate representatives should use Spanish when speaking with Hispanic retailers and small business persons. Roughly half claimed no language preference, while 43 percent preferred Spanish. Only 4 percent actually reported a preference for English. . . . In Miami, many of the Hispanic leaders preferred Spanish because they spoke little or no English. In this market it appears that even the leaders must be reached via the Spanish language."[11]

The only longitudinal survey of the Hispanic general public which has used the same questions and survey methods consistently covers a short period of time. Yankelovich, Skelly & White, a nationally known marketing research firm, conducted a study of the Hispanic market for SIN, the Spanish International Network, in 1981 and again in 1984. It found that "In 1984, compared with 1981, more Hispanics think of themselves as Hispanics first, and Americans second."[12]

National Allegiance/Orientation

	1981	1984
"Hispanic first, American second	46%	50%
"Equally Hispanic and American	42%	36%
"American first, Hispanic second..."	12%	14%

It also found that "There was a significant increase in the desire to perpetuate Hispanic traditions through succeeding generations."[13]

"We should pass on to our children a sense of belonging to our religious and national tradition."

	1981	1984
Agree/Strongly agree	89%	94%
Strongly Agree	37%	46%

While the Spanish language is becoming the most important mechanism for preserving Hispanic culture/identity,[14] most other traditions associated with Hispanic culture are seen as weakening.

Aspects of Culture or Traditions Most Important to Preserve

	Total Hispanics	
	1981	1984
	%	%
The Spanish Language	81	84
Religion/church	51	53
Care or respect for elders (net)	58	52
Respect for elders or parents (stay with family)	53	47
Music	54	49
Commitment to family	50	43
Holidays and celebrations	41	37
Food and beverages	46	36
Love for life or know how to enjoy life	42	28
Art and literature	48	28

"From 1981 to 1984," Yankelovich, Skelly & White report, "there is no sign of increased commitment to mastery of English, at the possible expense of Spanish; the commitment to Spanish is stronger if anything."[15]

Language Goals of Hispanics

	1981	1984
Bilingualism	79%	74%
Fluency in Spanish	14%	20%
Fluency in English	7%	6%

Finally, a very extensive study on the *U.S. Hispanic Market 1984* by the Strategy Research Corporation of Miami, New York, and San Juan, examines the trends and concludes that:

> Assimilation has been slow because of the large numbers of recent arrivals and will never equal the absorption of other earlier groups of immigrants for several reasons: The importance of multi-language capabilities, pride of individual roots and heritage, increased flow of tourists

> and business between the United States and Latin America, the ability to return home, and the proximity of Latin countries.
>
> Recent studies indicate that there is an increasing use of the Spanish language in the U.S., especially in the Miami area. With increased use of the language, the probability of assimilation decreases.[16]

It seems fair to say that the polls uniformly show that Hispanic-Americans prefer to associate with and to be approached by Spanish-speakers in personal and business relationships and that Hispanics are highly ambivalent about making a commitment to political identification with this country. Yet many of these studies, it must be pointed out, have been conducted for commercial interests: their conclusions are perhaps too comfortably congruent with the case that there is an established and *separate* Spanish market that must be reached in its own tongue.

When these polls' conclusions are stated so bluntly, they seem to be at odds with other, more anecdotal evidence. They make light of the trend toward Americanization which — perhaps only as a matter of faith — we believe must still be taking place. The best evidence, perhaps, of the continued assimilative power of America may be the fiery young Hispanic leaders who, in halting Spanish, exhort new immigrants to hold on to their separate identity — and who lobby Congress for the new multicultural society in impeccable English.

Assimilation and Discrimination

The studies we have reviewed strongly suggest that the assimilative process is slowing down, and point to the possibility of an alternative society, operating in another language, arising within ours. This is clearly good news for the advocates of the "salad bowl" school of cultural pluralism like Professor of Spanish Robert Cordova, who recently wrote: "To prepare American youth for the America and world of the not-too-distant future, the present monolingual, monocultural Anglocentric public education system must be replaced by a multilingual, multicultural, pluralistic one. . . . The Hispanic population is becoming larger and Hispanic culture is becoming stronger. . . . American society and ideas of old no longer exist."[17]

This vision of America would not be without its attractions — if people could feel comfortable and function easily while continually criss-crossing cultural borders. But in truth this balancing act is very unsettling, and few can perform it gracefully on a sustained basis. Cultural pluralism is inherently unstable over time. It is not an organizing principle for a society; but rather a phase from which it must move either toward greater integration or toward fragmentation. The individual caught between cultures must also move forward toward the mainstream culture of the host society, or retreat from it into uncomfortable alienation.

The process of individual assimilation is not easy, and it can often be unpleasant. The individual immigrant who assimilates does experience a sense of loss and, at times, a sense of being lost. It is this individual pain which gives the reaction against assimilation its force and which gives champions of the multicultural state their emotional sway. The discomfort of children learning a new language through immersion and the bewilderment of adults getting a first job in a technological society can be interpreted as complaints against the inhospitality of the new country and harnessed as the energy to run ethnic organizations.

The host society has two possible responses when confronted with the resentment of migrants: in the past, America retained confidence in the value of its own culture and in the validity of immigrants' assimilating to it; at present, however, America seems bent on creating a system which will lessen the need for migrants to assimilate.

In the United States, the natural and inescapable pain of assimilation has been confused with the actual discrimination which has been practiced upon blacks in our society. But the process of assimilation is not discrimination. The difficulties encountered by those who are in the throes of assimilation cannot be helped by anti-discrimination remedies.

Some of the large income differential between whites and blacks in the United States is undoubtedly due to discrimination, for example. But the lesser wages earned by Hispanics who are unfamiliar with English are a result not of discrimination but of their lesser ability to function in this country. This is not to deny that there is actual discrimination against Hispanics in the United States, of course; it is merely to point out that the difficulties of migrants must be distinguished from the disabilities suffered by the victims of discrimination. (There is *no* significant wage differential between white Americans and Hispanics who have good English-language skills.)

It is politically useful, however, for ethnic leaders to confuse the beneficent motivations behind assimilation with racism, to erect a wall of separatism around their particular group by a false analogy to discrimination against blacks. Because the problems of assimilation have been confused with discrimination, the United States has responded to the ethnic pride movement not by asserting the value of American culture and the rewards of assimilating to it, but by encouraging a pattern of cultural separatism. We have become vulnerable to the argument that the pain of assimilation is not the inevitable cost, the price of moving from one culture to another, but rather a social wrong visited upon migrants by a needlessly cruel society.

The bilingual education movement and bilingual voting laws originated in the mistaken belief that the difficulties of assimilation were the result of social discrimination, and that the path of migrants in the United States could be smoothed not by requiring (and assisting) them to adapt to their new country, but by altering the country to fit them. But this course ultimately leads to a dead end. The dominant culture in the United States will be changed by new migrants — it always has been — but it will not shift so radically, so swiftly, and so completely that new migrants need not adapt to it.

The truly open and accepting society will work hard to facilitate the assimilation and integration of immigrants into itself; it will not create special exemptions, special ghettos designed to isolate immigrants and preserve their differences. Bilingual education programs can isolate non-English-speaking children for years within special classes; bilingual voting programs can encourage non-English-speaking adults not to enter into the mainstream of political discussion and debate. They are the programs and symbols of a country which has chosen to divide itself, to adapt to and preserve division, rather than to integrate and be whole.

There is a fine line between cultural enrichment, to be gained from our many immigrant streams, and cultural chaos. One cannot precisely identify the point at which one becomes the other, but, when we meet the demand for equality of immigrant languages and acceptance of uncertain loyalties, we have definitely passed the point of enrichment.

If we abandon the basic direction of this country's melting pot, its acceptance and integration of migrants from other cultures, and continue in the direction of separation and division, the future of American unity becomes problematic. The clearly stated goal of American society must be the integration of ethnic minorities within the mainstream culture of this country. The current course of unwise governmental policies in support of separatism and division is not inalterable. It can be changed.

If it is, we shall all benefit.

Footnotes

[1] For the classification system used in this paper we are indebted to the pioneer work of Milton Gordon, though we have altered and adapted his categories. See especially Milton Gordon, "Models of Pluralism: The New American Dilemma," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, Vol. 454, March 1981, pp. 178-189.

[2] The salad bowl concept has been popularized by a highly visible Miami-based Cuban-American organization, the Spanish-American League Against Discrimination—S.A.L.A.D.

[3] John A. Gercia, "Political Integration of Mexican Immigrants: Explorations into the Naturalization Process," *International Migration Review*, Vol. 15, No. 4, Winter 1981, p. 611.

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 620-621.

[5] James W. Lamare, "The Political Integration of Mexican American Children: A Generational Analysis," *International Migration Review*, Vol. 16, No. 1, Spring 1982, p. 173.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 174.

[7] The Public Agenda Foundation, "A National Survey of Elected and Appointed Hispanic Officials," (in three volumes: *Moving Into the Political Mainstream*, *Moving Up to Better Education and Better Jobs*, and *Recent Hispanic Polls: A Summary of Results*.), N.Y.: Hispanic Policy Development Project, 1984; Vol. 1, p. 11. (Available from the Hispanic Policy Development Project, 717 Fifth Avenue, 23rd Floor, New York, N.Y. 10022.)

[8] Robert R. Brischetto and Rodolfo O. de la Garza, *The Mexican American Electorate: Political Participation and Ideology*, Austin Texas: The Southwest Voter Registration Education Project and the Hispanic Population Studies Program of the Center for Mexican American Studies, 1983, p. 31.

[9] *Miami Herald*, December 18, 1983, Special Supplement, "The Cubans: A People Changed."

[10] D. Carlos Balkan, "100 Influentials and their Critical Issues Agenda for the Eighties," *Hispanic Business*, Vol. 6, No. 5, May 1984. pp. 20, 23.

[11] The Cultural Communications Group, *The Coca-Cola National Business Agenda*, N.Y.: n.d., p. 6. (Available from Coca-Cola U.S.A., P.O. Drawer 1734, Atlanta, Georgia 30301.)

[12] Yankelovich, Skelly & White, *Spanish USA, 1984*, N.Y.: Yankelovich, Skelly & White, 1984, p. 9. Available from Yankelovich, Skelly & White, 575 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022.

[13] *Loc. cit.*

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 10.

[15] *Loc. Cit.*

[16] Strategy Research Corporation, *U.S. Hispanic Market 1984*, Miami, Florida: Strategy Research Corporation, 1984, p. 34. Available from Strategy Research Corporation, 100 N.W. 37th Avenue, Miami, Florida 33125.

[17] Robert H. Cordova, "Bilingual U.S. by Turn of the Century?," *Houston Chronicle*, March 11, 1985, Section 1, Page 15.

EMPLOYMENT FOR PROFESSIONAL BLACK WOMEN IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

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Employment for Professional Black Women in the Twentieth Century

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In a total work force of five hundred and twenty five million Black women, 14.6 percent are in managerial positions and professional specialities. This is a higher percentage than for Black males, where only 9.8 percent hold such positions in the labor force. Yet, both Black females and males lag behind whites; 21 percent of white females and 23 percent of white males have attained those occupational positions (Bureau of the Census, 1983). While employment patterns have changed over the century, high labor force participation rates and strong representation among the ranks of Black professionals have characterized employment for Black women. Most Black women face unemployment, underemployment, or work in low wage clerical, sales, and service occupations. In light of these realities, the minority of educated, professional Black women stand out in sharp contrast. As a consequence, the successes of these women are frequently exaggerated and rarely placed within a context of racial and sex discrimination.

In their introduction to But Some of Us Are Brave, Gloria Hull and Barbara Smith warn:

> A descriptive approach to the lives of Black women, a "great Black women" in history or literature approach, or any traditional male-identified approach will not result in intellectually groundbreaking or politically transforming work. We cannot change our lives by teaching solely about

> "exceptions" to the ravages of white-male oppression. Only through exploring the experiences of supposedly "ordinary" Black women whose "unexceptional" actions enabled us and the race to survive, will we be able to begin to develop an overview and an analytical framework for understanding the lives of Afro-American women (1982, p. xxi-xxii).

There is no group of Black women, outside the elite of Harriet Tubman, Sojourner Truth, Ida Wells-Barnett and Mary Bethune, more subject to "exceptionalism" perspectives than Black professional women. They are assumed to have moved through the cracks of racism and sexism to prestigious employment (Epstein, 1973). There are myths about the ease with which Black women achieve success. In the face of misperceptions and the continued growth of the Black middle class, there is a need for theoretical work which places their achievements within a broader context. Such a perspective would explicate how they are restrained by racial and sexual barriers. It would also highlight how oppression differentially affects poor, working class and middle class Black women and professional Black and white women.

This paper begins that effort by drawing upon the class-differentiated colonial perspective developed by Mario Barrera (1979) in his work on Chicanos. Like Barrera's subjects, middle class Blacks enjoy certain occupational benefits and have greater resources than their working class counterparts. Those resources include increased housing options, access to improved educational setting, better medical care and so forth. Yet, racism is still a major factor in their lives. This is indicated in the ways Blacks form a subordinate segment of the middle class.

Black people have fewer life choices than whites in the same class position. This is especially true for Black females. Blocked access into many traditional "female" occupations forced Black women to seek alternatives. The only significant mobility channel for those with the opportunity was higher education. Both in direct and indirect ways, racism spurred the growth of a small group of Black professional women. As Black women completed their educational training, they found that both racism and sexism shaped the nature of professional employment for them. This paper uses historical research and sociological studies of the Black community to detail the segmentation of Black professional women. Historically, Black professional women have only found significant professional options in two sectors: independent agencies and employers in the Black community, and the public sector. In both cases, they worked as "colonized professionals" in capacities where the majority of their clients were people of color. Institutionalized discrimination limited employment options for them to inside the internal colony. Until recently, professional employment outside the Black community, which was opened to whites with comparable education and training, was closed to Blacks.

Patterns of racial stratification are evident in the genesis of this segment of employed women, their development throughout the twentieth century, and today. The dependency of Black professional females on these two job sectors has had a profound impact on their growth. Early in the century, limited access to public sector jobs kept the cadre of Black professional women small. The New Deal and Civil Rights movement enabled more Black women to gain access to public sector jobs. This development, heralded as a major breakthrough in employment discrimination, is viewed differently today—when it appears as if Black professional women cannot get out of public sector employment. Data from the 1980 census will be used to illustrate that the majority of Black professional women continue to serve a predominantly Black clientele in a few occupational positions: teachers, social workers, counselors, librarians, nurses and other traditionally female professions. The minority of Black women who enter traditionally male professions, also tend to be ghettoized in the public defenders office, city run hospitals, dental clinics, and minority relations for corporate firms. These patterns illustrate the persistence of racial stratification, even in the development of a Black middle class.

Black Women and Employment Discrimination

We will begin an exploration of the unexceptional lives of professional Black women with a look at their history. At the turn of the century, white women—both American born and immigrant—left paid employment when they married (Kessler-Harris, 1982). Yet, Black women found no refuge from the labor market in matrimony. The racism of the day limited their husbands' job options to manual service work. The low wages paid to Black males kept Black females—as daughters and wives—on the job (Kessler-Harris, 1982; Pleck, 1979). While they were forced by economic circumstances to work, only a few occupations were open to women. Racism even further restricted the occupational movement of Black females. Because Black females had fewer occupational choices than white women, thus, they were relegated to the lowest of women's jobs. In the early part of the century many were still on the farm, but as they sought paid employment, the majority could only find jobs as private household workers and laundry workers (Katzman, 1978; Kessler-Harris, 1982).

At the beginning of the 20th century, domestics employment was the most common occupation for all women (Katzman, 1978). But very quickly ethnic and racial patterns emerged. Industrialization created new job opportunities for women. They found employment in light manufacturing, especially the garment and textile industries, canneries and meat packing houses. Many white immigrant women--especially single daughters--filled these positions (Tentler, 1979). American born white women moved into newly created clerical and sales jobs, as well as kindergarten and normal school teaching. As American born white women abandoned domestic work, their positions were filled by immigrant and Black women. Over time, many white immigrant women slowly moved out of private household work and into operative, clerical and sales jobs. Nationwide, Black women remained trapped in domestic work until World War II (Katzman, 1978). Kenneth Kusmer's comments about Cleveland demonstrate the trend which was common of many Northern and some southern cities.

> Prior to World War I, the position of black women was not unique, since a large proportion of immigrant women were

> also mired in lowpaying domestic work. But between 1910 and 1920 foreign-born women began for the first time to obtain white-collar employment in sizable numbers, and at the same time the proportion of immigrant females working as domestics fell from 41 to 25.6 percent (1978, p. 203).

In contrast, 63 percent of employed Black women in Cleveland were domestics in 1920 and this number increased to 69.8 percent in 1930. As both females and members of a racial minority, their limited options reflected multiple barriers.

In their research on Chicago during the depression, St. Clair Drake and Horace Cayton (1970) identified a "job ceiling," which prohibited Blacks from freely competing for positions in the labor market.

> The employment policies of individual firms, trade-union restrictions, and racial discrimination in training and promotion made it exceedingly difficult for them (Blacks) to secure employment in the skilled trades, in clerical and sales work, and as foremen and manager (Drake and Cayton, 1970, p. 112).

The job ceiling was a factor limiting employment options for both males and females. While a tiny number of Blacks in any city would achieve occupational mobility, the majority were unable to translate their education and talents into better jobs and higher wages.

Blanket discrimination in the predominantly white private sector meant that only a few Black women could convert their high school educations into clerical and sales jobs. Drake and Cayton found "most of the colored women in clerical and sales work, prior to the Second World War were employed in the Black Belt (the Black community) and there were less than 1,500 of them: (1970, p. 258).[1] Black establishments could sustain only a few Black women in white collar jobs. Thus, in Chicago, 55.7 percent of employed Black women did domestic work in 1930 and this increased to 64.1 percent by 1940. During World War II many Black women entered new industries and they maintained many of those jobs after the war, especially as "semi-skilled workers in canning factories, paper and pulp mills, cleaning and pressing establishments and in the garment industry" (Drake and Cayton, 1970, p. 262). But they could not make serious inroads into clerical and sales work--even though these are "traditional women's jobs." their plight is vividly captured in Figure 1 below, developed by Drake and Cayton (1970, p. 259).

Insert Figure 1 about here

Professional Employment for Blacks

Before the Civil Rights era, a college education was one means of increasing employment options for Blacks. But as Black professionals they were limited to two segments of the market: the private sector in the Black community and the public sector. First, they served the Black community as independent entrepreneurs or as employees of Black organizations, churches, business and schools. This was the case for most physicians, dentists, ministers, lawyers and college professors. In fact, the migration of many Blacks and the development of Northern Black ghettos during World War I did much to promote the growth of this tiny elite (Spear, 1967). Thus, the majority of Black physicians were located in cities, where the concentration of Blacks insured a sufficient number of paying patients to keep their offices open (Myrdal, 1962). Black college professors were frequently employed at private Black colleges and universities, such as Fisk, Lincoln, Spelman and so forth. Many ministers held other jobs to supplement their earnings, but the most successful of this group served large congregations in cities. Many Black lawyers worked in their own small firms, but had difficulty supporting themselves because many Black clients preferred white attorneys who had more clout in the white halls of justice.

Prior to World War II, only a few Black women were educated to be physicians, lawyers, or college teachers. Thus, few could sustain a living as independent entrepreneurs. Instead, Black women working in the private sector of the Black community were typically employed in Black organizations or by Black male entrepreneurs as nurses, social workers and administrators. And their numbers were frequently small.

The second market for Black professionals was the public sector. This is the sectoral location for the majority of Black professional women, who were overwhelmingly employed as primary and secondary school teachers, nurses and social workers. In these traditionally female occupations they were unable to sustain themselves as independent entrepreneurs and were dependent upon various levels of government (local, state and federal) for their livelihoods. Drake and Cayton provide details on Chicago:

> The number and proportion of Negroes employed in minor supervisory capacities by government agencies fluctuates.

> In 1930, there were 161 colored policemen, 120 schoolteachers, and some 400 colored social workers and their activities were confined largely to the Negro community (1970, p. 256).

The development of urban ghettos in the North around World War I, aided the growth of this segment of the labor market. As Blacks moved North, clustered in densely populated districts, and voted, they became powerful constituencies in local urban areas. In the South, public sector professional employment for Blacks was promoted chiefly by the need to provide segregated facilities, including schools, public health clinics, and human service agencies. On the national level, Blacks, as loyal Democrats, were able to participate, (if only in a limited way) in the expansion of the federal job sector. Beginning with the New Deal, the proportion of federal jobs occupied by Blacks has consistently increased (Newman, et. al., 1978).

Education was the major mobility channel for Blacks, thus it was highly valued in the community (Bullock, 1967; Drake and Cayton, 1970). Yet, there were discriminatory barriers which relagated Blacks to few institutions and few families could afford to send their children. In the face of these obstacles, Black parents frequently have to make sacrifices to provide their children with the educational foundation to advance in life (Higginbotham, 1985). E. Wilkins Bock (1971) identified a pattern among rural Black families of sponsoring their daughter's quest for higher education. Males had more employment options without a college education. Educating females afforded the best means to protect females from sexual assaults and abuse because it kept them from working in the homes of white people. Whether one accepts the notion of the "farmer's daughter effect" or not, there is a long history of co-education and support for higher education for both sexes in the Black community.

For many years a college education and even a high school diploma were prized achievements in the Black community. But the educational attainment of the Black population has been steadily improving, this is especially true since the 1940s. "By 1975, black young men and women born after 1940 had completed high school in about the same proportion as whites, and many had gone to college" (Newman, et. al., 1978).

Prior to the Civil Rights movement, the lack of educational opportunities kept the number of Black women in the professions to a minority. In each decade, since 1940, the percentage of Black women employed in professional and managerial positions had remained behind white women (See Table 1). But Black women are often singled out for special acknowledgement because they are more concentrated in the professions than Black men. This contrasts with the experiences of white women whose concentration in the professions is less than for white men (Kilson, 1977).

Table 1 About Here

Barriers to Professional Employment for Black Women

For most of this century, Black women intent upon securing professional training faced serious racial and sex barriers as they challenged their prescribed "places" in the society. Training and employment were often only assured in "all Black" facilities. Yet, Black institutions were only able to accommodate a few Blacks and within them Black females were frequently directed to predominantly female occupations. Upon the completion of their degrees, they found segregation was still a major part of their experiences. In the South, Jim Crow legislation created the parameters for all Black institutions. Black women taught in segregated schools, nursed in the offices of Black doctors and filled other positions within the Black community. In the North, rigid racial barriers also promoted the development of Black social welfare agencies, hospitals, churches and de facto segregated schools (Osofsky, 1971; Spear, 1967). And again, Black women working as professionals would fill the slots in these internal colonies.

It was difficult for Black women to seek professional employment outside of these restricted sectors. This was particularly true in the North, where many cities lacked predominantly Black institutions. There Blacks faced a severe job ceiling and discriminatory barriers competing with whites in the public sector. This was the case of Cleveland. In the 1920s, the city hospitals of Cleveland served Black patients in segregated wards, but "no hospital admitted blacks to nurses' training or internship programs" (Kusmer, 1978, p. 266). Unlike New York City or Chicago, Cleveland never developed a Black hospital, even though there was a movement to build such a facility. Instead, Blacks appealed to public officials, over the protests of white hospital administrators, and demanded changes in the discriminatory policies of the tax-supported city hospital. "In September, 1930 five black women were admitted to the hospital's nurses' training program. In the following year, the first black intern was admitted to the staff. The hospital's policy of segregating Negro patients also came to an end at this time" (Kusmer, 1978, p. 267-68). Private hospitals remained unchanged until a later period, but opening public facilities to Black professionals was certainly monumental.

The history of nursing in Cleveland is illustrative of an important fact. Public sector discrimination was particularly problematic for Black professional women, because they were concentrated in occupations more dependent upon employment in this sector than were Black professional men. Jane Edna Hunter, a nurse who founded the Phyllis Wheatley Society (a residence and job training center for Black girls), arrived in Cleveland and was unable to practice her profession. There was no place for a "nigger nurse," thus, Hunter devoted her life to human service work (Kusmer, 1978). Other Black women with college degrees found their employment options were shaped by the nature and degree of discriminatory policies in the public sector.

In the South, a number of public sector jobs were set aside for Blacks, because Jim Crow policies dictated segregated facilities. This was especially true in the teaching field, where Blacks had a monopoly on the jobs, even though they were paid less than white teachers and taught larger classes in deteriorating facilities (Myrdal, 1962). Yet in the North, urban policies with regard to public sector employment for Black professionals was more mixed. De facto segregation was frequently the rule for designating where children were schooled, but cities varied in whether or not they hired Black faculty to staff those facilities. Philadelphia, Gary, Indianapolis, Cincinnati, Columbus, Dayton and other cities hired Black teachers and administrators to work with Black pupils (Tyack, 1974). While this practice had many drawbacks, it did foster employment options for Blacks. In New York and Chicago, Blacks had to fight for teaching opportunities, but were able to make serious inroads into these professions. Many taught in predominantly Black institutions, but a few were found in integrated and predominantly white schools. Many other cities hired white teachers to instruct Black children, even though they staffed de facto segregated facilities. The presence of discrimination and the Jim Crow policies had a direct impact on the numbers of Black professionals.

Given that the majority of employed Black professionals women were teachers, they could either find work or not depending upon the specific school policies. This helps to explain Myrdal's (1962) finding in 1930 of only 4.5 percent of full time employed Black women in professional, technical and kindred workers. Myrdal noted the regional variations in employment options:

> In the South, more than 5 percent of the Negro female workers were in professional occupations. The corresponding figure for the North was less than 3 per cent. The main reason, of course, is that the Negro's chances in the teaching profession are much smaller in the North than in the South (p. 318).

Doxey Wilkerson identified the number of Black teachers and administrators employed in the public school systems of several major Northern cities. He found that the municipalities with the best record for hiring Blacks were those who had instituted a policy of hiring Black teachers to teach Black pupils. He also highlighted cities with particularly poor records. For example, Detroit had a non-white population of 150,790 in 1940, but had only 80 Black professionals in the pubic school system. Chicago, whose non-white population was 282,244 had nearly four times as many Black teachers and administrators as Detroit. Pittsburgh was another city with rigid discriminatory policies. They had only three Black faculty in the public school system with a Black population of 62,423 (Tyack, 1974, p. 226).[2]

Black professional women were at the mercy of such policies. Even if they secured teaching credentials, they could be blocked from public school teaching jobs in Northern cities. This was also the case for social workers. There were only a few Black social welfare agencies (many of them supported by white philanthropists), which meant there were a limited number of positions for Black social workers. The expansion of the welfare state (during the Depression and the New Deal) meant new options for Black social workers. But the availability of these jobs to Blacks varied according to the individual cities' labor policies. In the nursing profession, Black women worked with Black physicians and as public health nurses who served the Black community. They were frequently barred from private predominantly white hospitals that delivered health care to white people. Myrdal's research indicates that there "were only 5,600 Negro nurses in 1930, constituting less than 2 per cent of the total number of nurses in the United States" (1962; p. 325).

The minority of Black women able to secure professional employment do merit our praise. But their lives were not without difficulties. The histories reveal a tale of economic success relative to less educated Black women and men. But compared to their white peers, they found their situations lacking. This was evident in both early research and later sociological studies. In his 1938 study, The Negro College Graduate, Charles Johnson (1969) surveyed 5,512 men and women with college degrees. The subjects were all plagued by racial barriers of the age, but women had additional problems. In their jobs as teachers, nurses, and social workers they were routinely paid less than Negro men and white women who held the same positions. Race and sex compounded the barriers they faced to promotions and higher salaries.

The Contemporary Scene

World War II saw the beginning of a slow but steady growth of a significant Black middle class (Wilson, 1978). This meant increases in the number of Black women in professional occupations (refer to Table 1). This growth can be attributed to two major sources: the expansion of the welfare state and the Civil Rights movement. As federal government grew and provided its citizens with new services, Blacks were able to secure a proportion of those jobs. While their numbers in the higher ranks of the federal apparatus are still below par, this is a significant sector of employment for Blacks. (Newman, et. al. 1978). City, county and state government has also expanded to address the needs of a growing and mobile population. Services were expanded to accommodate the "baby boom" cohort. Black professional women have benefited from the need for more teachers, nurses, counselors, and other human service workers. Also the Civil Rights movement demanded access for qualified Blacks to positions which corresponded with their educational attainment. This was especially significant for college educated Blacks, who had been routinely denied access to many areas of professional employment. The increase in Black workers in professional, technical and craft positions was considerable (Wallace, 1980). This segment of the Black work force grew from 11 percent in 1960 to 21 percent in 1980 (Westcott, 1982). The growth of a Black middle class has not been without a unique set of problems. Sharon Collins (1983) comments on the precarious position of middle class Blacks:

> Growth since 1960 within the black middle class is the result of race oriented policies which have created new mechanisms to address black needs. Seen from this perspective, I believe that researchers have presumed, rather than demonstrated, the market integration of the black middle class. Researchers have paid little attention to the types of organizations in which income is earned, black workers' functional relationship to black consumers networks, and the dependency of class mobility on government rather than free market forces. The assumption that the accumulation of human capital has assured black middle-class advancement

> underestimates the dependence of the black middle class on both political relationships and the organization of work roles (p. 370).

Her comments are particularly relevant for Black professional women, who have benefitted some from public relations positions in the private sector, but the majority of Black women have benefitted from affirmative action and new employment policies in the public sector. Their entrance into many jobs has changed the racial composition of the staff of many elementary and secondary public schools, public and private hospitals, social welfare agencies, libraries and other employment settings.

Employment patterns which were evident earlier in this century, are still demonstrated in the sector distributions of professional Black and white women. While the private sector has expanded to include more professional Blacks, the majority of Black professional women continue to secure employment in the public sector. This is evident from Table 2, which presents the percentages of Black and white professional, managerial and administrative women in public, private and other employment sectors (self-employment and unpaid family labor) for fifteen SMSAs in 1980. These metropolitan areas were selected because they each have a large Black population.[3] In fourteen of the fifteen SMSAs, the majority of Black professional women are found in public sector employment, while in every city the majority of white women are found in the private sector. Across the fifteen SMSAs, the average concentration of Black women in public sector professional employment was 57.9 percent. White professional and managerial women were less likely to be found in this sector ($\bar{x}$ = 31.7%). Instead, the highest concentration of white women was in the private sector ($\bar{x}$ = 63.5%), while Black were less concentrated in this sector ($\bar{x}$ = 40.3%).

Table 2 about here

Los Angeles is the only major SMSA with more Black professional women in the private (49.3%) than in the public sector (47.6%). Los Angeles is also distinctive because three percent of the Black professional women in this metropolitan area are self-employed. Across the fifteen SMSAs the concentration of Black women who are self-employed and unpaid family workers is minimal ($\bar{x}$ = 1.7%). More white professional women are found in this category ($\bar{x}$ = 5.2%), the majority of which are self-employed. But Black women are having a more difficult time establishing themselves in this sector.

Overall, we find that Black women continue to depend upon public sector employment to realize their professional aspirations. This is particularly the case in Baltimore and Memphis, where 72.3 and 71.7 percent, respectively, of the professional Black women are in the public sector. In Baltimore, Black women are about a fifth of the professionally employed women in the area, but only 26.9 percent are found in the private sector. This is the employment sector for 55 percent of the white professional women in this city. In Memphis, Black women are about one quarter of the professional women in that SMSA, but only 27 percent are in the private sector, while this is the employment source for 60.4 percent of white professional women. The Los Angeles and New York metropolitan areas have a better balance of public-private sector employment for Black women, but even in these areas Black women lag behind white professional women in securing employment in the private sector.

Black professional women continue to be dependent upon public sector employment for two major reasons. First, they are clustered in predominantly female occupations which are overwhelmingly dependent upon the public sector for employment. And secondly, they continue to face discriminatory barriers in the private sector. This paper only suggests these as dimensions worthy of exploration, based upon a preliminary analysis of the census data. We will briefly discuss these two points beginning with the occupational distribution of professional Black women. Black males and females are found in the labor force in about the same proportions, but there are 71 professional Black males for every 100 professional Black females. But Black males are directed into predominantly male occupations which are frequently more prestigious and they can sustain themselves as independent entrepreneurs. Black females, while they are a majority of the professionals in the race, are overwhelmingly still teachers, nurses, social workers and so forth. For example, for every 100 Black women in nursing, there are six Black males. Males are only 26 percent of the Blacks engaged in pre-school, primary and secondary teaching. Black women have made significant gains in post-secondary education, where they are on par with Black males. Yet, despite their gains in a few areas, Black women, like their white counterparts, are underrepresented in the more prestigious and financially rewarding professional occupations. Among Blacks working as lawyers and physicians, there were 218 and 316 males, respectively, for every 100 Black women in these fields (Matney, 1983).

The continued concentration of Black professional women in a few occupations is evident from an examination of Table 3, Teachers as a Percent of Managerial and Professional Specialty Occupation Workers and Sectoral Location of Black and White Teachers. For the fifteen SMSAs, 40 percent of all Black women, managerial and professional workers are employed as teachers, counselors and librarians. Less than a third ($\bar{x}$ = 30.8%) of white professional women hold these occupations. New York is the only metropolitan area where teachers, counselors and librarians are not the largest professional occupation for Black women. In this metropolitan area, 29.1 percent of professional Black females are found in health assessment and treating occupations, especially nursing. In this case, they are employed in both public and private hospitals and other treatment centers. Many of their white sisters have moved out of sex-segregated occupations into other areas of employment, especially administrative and managerial positions in the private sector. Meanwhile, Black women continue to be employed in a limited number of occupations.

Table 3 about here

The picture of employment for Black professional women also indicates continued discrimination in the predominantly white private sector. Looking again at Table 3, we see that even when both Black and white women work in the same traditionally female occupations, there are significant differences in the sector where they can secure employment. A larger percentage of white women in these occupations are able to find employment outside the public sector. While nearly a third ($\bar{x} = 31\%$) of all white professional women employed as teachers, counselors, and librarians are employed in the private sector, only 17.2% of these Black professional women are privately employed. And the vast majority of Black professional women ($\bar{x} = 82.5\%$) in these occupations are employed in the public sector, while only two thirds ($\bar{x} = 66.7\%$) of their white counterparts are employed in the public sector. There are several cities where over 30% of white teachers are found in the private sector--New Orleans, St. Louis, Philadelphia, New York, Cleveland, Chicago and Miami. These are metropolitan areas with large Catholic populations and consequently significant parochial school systems. And Memphis, with 33.5 percent of the white teachers, counselors and librarians in the private sector, lacks a sizable Catholic population, but the desegregation of public schools spurned the development of many all white Baptist academies. In each case, there are employment options, especially in education, for white teachers in both the public school system as well as private and parochial systems. Some Black professionals are also employed in private and parochial settings, particularly in St. Louis, Los Angeles, Cleveland, New York, Philadelphia, and Atlanta, but they are more frequently employed by local, state and the federal government.

Conclusion

Many people have applauded the progress of Black professionals, especially women, but we also must be clear on the extent to which these changes represent major alterations in the nature of racial and sexual oppression. No one will debate that it is better to work as a nurse, with fringe benefits and compensation for overtime, than to do private household work. And there is equally no debate about the opportunities that public school teaching presents, especially in terms of adequate salaries and many vacation days. It is a sharp contrast to many clerical jobs, where individuals make minimum wage and get two weeks paid vacation per year. At the same time the continued clustering of Black professional women in the public sector is indicative of the nature of racial stratification in the professions. Black women do get to work in professional occupations, but they are limited to serving clients who are predominantly Black or other people of color. Their clients are also generally poor and working class people. Employment in the public sector is also problematic for professionals in this sector, as well as their class co-workers, because both groups are vulnerable to policy shifts. In this sector, "the fiscal health of federal, state and local governments affects wage levels" (Malveaux, 1984, p. 26). These factors not only effect wages, but working conditions, fringe benefits and pensions. While there was once a premium on employment in the public sector (at least in the North) people can now enjoy better work environments and conditions in the private sector. For example, high school teachers in many urban areas fear for their physical well-being on the job.

The history of racial oppression which has shaped a Black professional group and the current reliance on the public sector for a livelihood has to generate questions about the supposed success of Black professional women. It has to temper our tendencies to celebrate the achievements of Patricia Harris, Shirley Chisholm, Phyllis Wallace and Alice Walker. Looking at these "exceptions" detracts us from the serious inequities which exist even among those Black women who have attained heights of which their Black sisters, who lack many advantages, can only dream. The history of racial discrimination and the current restrictions should remind us that we need to identify and explore the ways that racial stratification continue to affect the labor market. This should be an area of concern which is equal to attending to the number of women entering traditionally male occupations and the struggle for comparable work within agencies and businesses.

We must learn from those researchers who have discussed the segmentation of the middle classes of racial minorities. Sharon Collins highlighted the limits of the progress of the Black middle class because their stability rests upon a government commitment to the public sector and enforcement of anti-discrimination legislation.[4] Both of these trends are jeopardized by the Reagan administration with its new definition of government responsibility. Thus, the growth of public sector employment for Blacks will be minimal and few efforts will be made to support affirmative action efforts on the part of the private sector.

In addition to its precarious future, the patterns of employment among Black professionals, especially females, have perpetuated a segmentation of the Black middle class. This is similar to Berrera's observations among Chicanos in the Southwest. There, the Mexican American middle class were also members of the internal colony and shared cultural issues with others in the Chicano community. Barrera notes:

> Chicanos also constitute a colony with a certain coherence across class lines in the sense that they are liable to be in frequent contact with each other. Thus, the bilingual Chicano teacher, a member of the professional-managerial class, comes in contact with Chicano parents from the working class. Chicano social workers are liable to have a largely Chicano clientele, as are other Chicano professionals. (1979, p. 216).

The pattern for Blacks is very much a mirror image, except that many females as well as males in the Black community participate in the professional labor market. Additional research is needed to document specific trends and policies which result in the continued clustering of Black women in traditionally female occupations and their heavy reliance upon the public sector for employment. These are critical but the least discussed characteristics of this population of professional women. The patterns of employment for professional Black women must be discussed. Otherwise as we pass through the 1980s and into the 1990s, we will continue to find Black women teaching in public schools, nursing in public hospitals and coping with heavy caseloads as social workers for the department of welfare. They will still be colonised professionals, caught in either public sector jobs or the few occupations opportunities in the private sector of the Black community. Maybe then researchers will cease to sing the praises of the tiny minority of Black women in formerly traditional male professions who are able to secure employment in the private sector.

Footnotes

1. The non-white population for Chicago in 1940 was 282,244 (Bureau of the Census, 1943). Thus only a tiny minority of Black women were able to secure these white collar jobs.
2. In his research, Doxey Wilkerson used the figures from the 1930 Census and collected data on Blacks in the public school systems in 1940. This paper uses figures for the non-white population in cities from the 1940 Census (Bureau of the Census, 1943).
3. The District of Columbia is omitted because the majority of its residents are employed in the public sector.
4. After an exploration of current data, Collins notes:

> My findings contradict arguments that the growth of a black middle class is evidence of a decline in racial inequality in the United States. Rather, the evidence suggests the existence of race-regulated systems. Although members of the black middle class are not necessarily restricted by occupation, income, or residence, they remain segregated in institutions dependent on federal government subsidy and concentrated in functions created to serve the black consumer and community. Race is implied within the black economy independent of class position. Public sector employees are most likely to be found in federal, state, and local government functions that legitimize and subsidize black under-class dependency. Blacks employed in the private sector remain concentrated in economically underdeveloped areas, or in intermediary positions between white corporations and black consumers, manpower, or policy issues (1983, p. 379).

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TABLE I

OCCUPATIONAL STATUS OF WOMEN BY RACE FOR 1910, 1940, 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1984

OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY	1910 BLACK	1910 WHITE	1940 BLACK	1940 WHITE	1950 BLACK	1950 WHITE	1960 BLACK	1960 WHITE	1970 BLACK	1970 WHITE	1980 BLACK	1980 WHITE	1984 BLACK	1984 WHITE
PROFESSIONAL & TECHNICAL	1.5	11.6	4.3	14.7	5.3	13.3	7.7	14.1	10.0	15.5	15.3	17.4	14.3	17.5
MANAGERS, OFFICIALS & PROPRIETORS, EXCEPT FARM	.2	1.5	.7	4.3	1.3	4.7	1.1	4.2	1.4	4.7	4.2	7.3	3.4	8.8
CLERICAL AND SALES	.3	17.5	1.3	32.8	5.4	39.3	9.8	43.2	21.4	43.4	32.6	43.4	33.0	44.0
CRAFTSMEN AND FOREMEN	2.0	8.2	.2	1.1	.7	1.4	.7	1.4	.8	1.1	1.4	2.1	2.8	2.2
OPERATIVES	1.4	21.2	6.2	20.3	15.2	21.5	14.3	17.6	16.8	14.5	14.9	10.0	12.1	7.4
NONFARM LABORERS	.9	1.5	.8	.9	1.6	.7	1.2	.5	.9	.4	1.5	1.3	2.5	1.7
PRIVATE HOUSEHOLD WORKERS	38.5	17.2	59.9	10.9	42.0	4.3	38.1	4.4	19.5	3.7	5.8	2.4	6.0	1.6
SERVICE WORKERS (EXCEPT PRIVATE HOUSEHOLD)	3.2	8.2	11.1	12.7	19.1	11.6	25.0	13.1	28.5	15.1	23.9	16.5	23.5	15.4
FARMERS & FARM MANAGERS	4.0	3.1	3.0	1.1	1.7	.6	.6	.5	.2	.3	.1	.5	—	—
FARM LABORERS & FOREMEN	48.0	9.0	12.9	1.2	7.7	2.3	3.5	1.0	.3	1.3	.5	.6	.4	1.2

SOURCE: Data from 1910 to 1970 from Aldridge (1975). Her sources were: Data for 1910 from U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1940 Census of Population, *Comparative Occupation Statistics for the United States 1870-1940*, Table 15, pp. 166-172. Data for 1940 from U.S. Bureau of the Census, *1940 Census of Population, Vol. 3, The Labor Force*, Table 52, pp. 87-88. Data for 1950 from U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1950 Census of Population, *Occupational Characteristics*, Table 3 (Washington, D.C., 1963), pp. 11-21. Data for 1970 from U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Social and Economic Characteristics of the Population to Metropolitan Areas: 1970 and 1960 Current Population Reports* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), and U.S. Bureau of the Census, *The Social and Economic Status of the Black Population in the United States, 1972*, Current Population Reports, Series P-23, No. 46 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972). Data for 1980 and 1984 represent women sixteen years and over. All other data are for women aged fourteen and over. Additionally, data for 1980 and 1984 are not strictly comparable to 1970 statistics as a result of changes in the occupational classification. Data for 1984 are from: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Employment and Earnings*, Vol. 31, No. 12, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, December, 1984), Table A-23. Data for 1980 are from: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Employment and Earnings*, Vol. 29, No. 1, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, January, 1982), Table A-22.

TABLE 2

SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF WOMEN MANAGERIAL AND PROFESSIONAL SPECIALTY WORKERS BY RACE FOR 15 SMSA'S

	% PUBLIC		% PRIVATE		% OTHER[1]		SAMPLE TOTAL AND %[2]			
	BLACK	WHITE	BLACK	WHITE	BLACK	WHITE	BLACK	%	WHITE	%
ATLANTA	55.7	35.0	42.5	60.2	1.8	4.8	18,479	(18.6)	81,039	(81.4)
BALTIMORE	72.3	40.5	26.9	55.0	.8	4.5	19,902	(20.4)	77,606	(79.6)
CHICAGO	53.8	26.7	44.8	68.8	1.4	4.5	44,066	(13.9)	251,971	(79.4)
CLEVELAND	53.8	30.0	44.0	66.0	2.1	4.0	10,835	(14.5)	63,946	(85.5)
DALLAS	54.8	32.2	42.6	62.0	2.6	5.8	11,308	(8.7)	119,083	(91.3)
DETROIT	59.3	33.9	39.1	61.9	1.5	4.2	24,257	(15.9)	124,187	(81.3)
HOUSTON	55.5	31.0	42.4	63.2	2.1	5.7	19,418	(15.1)	109,102	(84.9)
LOS ANGELES	47.6	26.8	49.3	65.2	3.1	8.0	36,119	(10.1)	260,742	(73.0)
MEMPHIS	71.7	34.5	27.0	60.4	1.3	5.0	9,040	(25.5)	26,362	(74.5)
MIAMI	60.3	26.8	38.2	66.8	1.5	6.4	9,679	(11.6)	56,701	(88.0)
NEWARK	55.2	33.7	43.6	61.8	1.2	4.5	14,208	(15.8)	75,425	(84.1)
NEW ORLEANS	65.8	31.5	32.8	63.7	1.4	4.8	11,446	(23.5)	35,659	(73.3)
NEW YORK	49.3	26.6	48.8	66.5	1.8	6.9	67,026	(16.2)	346,470	(83.3)
PHILADELPHIA	56.0	29.3	42.2	66.1	1.8	4.6	25,273	(13.6)	160,761	(86.4)
ST. LOUIS	58.2	29.4	40.3	66.3	1.4	4.3	12,939	(13.8)	80,958	(86.2)
$\bar{X}$ PERCENTAGE	57.9	31.2	40.3	63.5	1.72	5.2				

ALL DATA FROM U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1983

[1] OTHER INCLUDES SELF-EMPLOYED AND UNPAID FAMILY WORKERS

[2] TOTALS LESS THAN 100% IN SOME SMSA'S DUE TO PRESENCE OF OTHER MINORITY POPULATIONS

TABLE 3

TEACHERS AS A PERCENT OF WOMEN MANAGERIAL AND PROFESSIONAL SPECIALTY WORKERS AND SECTORAL LOCATION OF BLACK AND WHITE TEACHERS

	TEACHERS AS % OF PMS'S		% TEACHERS IN PUBLIC SECTOR		% TEACHERS IN PRIVATE SECTOR		NUMBER OF TEACHERS	
	BLACK	WHITE	BLACK	WHITE	BLACK	WHITE	BLACK	WHITE
ATLANTA	41.7	29.0	79.8	72.2	19.9	25.1	7,703	23,469
BALTIMORE	40.2	30.4	91.0	70.8	8.7	27.1	8,005	23,590
CHICAGO	37.0	29.1	80.9	64.6	18.9	32.8	16,330	73,258
CLEVELAND	37.2	31.8	77.3	67.8	22.0	34.1	4,036	20,331
DALLAS	44.9	31.3	84.1	73.3	15.5	25.7	5,084	37,285
DETROIT	36.1	33.5	84.9	71.6	14.4	26.2	8,765	41,664
HOUSTON	45.4	32.1	84.4	73.6	15.2	23.3	8,815	35,054
LOS ANGELES	29.8	23.5	77.8	67.7	22.2	28.8	10,784	66,583
MEMPHIS	53.2	32.9	88.1	63.0	11.9	33.5	4,810	8,663
MIAMI	42.0	25.5	86.9	66.3	13.1	31.1	4,085	14,461
NEWARK	34.1	34.7	82.1	70.3	17.6	27.3	4,852	26,199
NEW ORLEANS	53.5	33.9	84.8	56.9	14.9	40.8	6,122	12,090
NEW YORK	23.0	26.5	79.3	62.6	20.1	35.0	15,431	91,930
PHILADELPHIA	39.8	32.9	80.0	60.3	19.8	37.5	10,073	52,880
ST. LOUIS	41.4	33.4	76.3	59.4	23.3	38.7	9,360	27,031
X̄ PERCENTAGE	40.0	30.8	82.5	66.7	17.2	31.0		

ALL DATA FROM U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1983

TEACHERS INCLUDE LIBRARIANS AND COUNSELORS

Figure 1

ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY FOR WOMEN



◆

* The estimate of "economic opportunity for women" in Figure 21 is based on an analysis of 1930 and 1940 Census data, and on the assumption that most of the war-time clerical jobs held by Negro women are only temporary. Not more than 3 per cent of the Negro women held bona fide clerical and sales jobs in 1940. The saturation point for employment had been reached in Black Belt stores and offices. Yet, the high schools were continuing to turn out girls with "white-colla[illegible] rations."

In Michael P. Smith (ed.) Cities in Transformation.
Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage Publications, 1984
pp. 139-171

8

The New Labor Demand in Global Cities

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☐ MAJOR ECONOMIC GROWTH TRENDS over the last decade have come to crystallize in spatial and social arrangements containing significant differences with those of the preceding decades. Economic sectors, localities, and occupations which today account for a large share of economic growth are not quite those central to the immediate post-World War II period.

The chapter examines and documents the proposition that these new spatial and social arrangements entail new patterns of concentration of the benefits of economic growth.[1] These patterns operate to the advantage of (a) centers for the production and export of advanced services domestically and abroad, including finance, management, and control functions; and (b) a rapidly growing high-income stratum of professional, technical, and managerial occupations. These new patterns of concentration in turn operate to the disadvantage of (a) a large stratum of urban areas whose economic well-being is linked with the old manufacturing complex, once the main growth and export sector in the economy; and (b) a large stratum of middle-income white- and blue-collar workers whose jobs have been eliminated from the work process due to the decline of the old manufacturing complex and the technological transformation of the work process.

This economic restructuring carries significant implications. First, economic growth no longer translates into the type of job supply, locational patterns, and sectoral composition that were constitutive of the massive expansion of a middle class in the post-World War II period. Indeed some of the major new growth trends are predicated upon the decline of what were once thriving localities and occupational groups. Second, it is growth trends, not decline trends, which are generating the polarization in the occupational structure, including a vast expansion in the supply of low-wage jobs and a shrinking in the supply of middle-income jobs. Third, the large new immigration, directed mostly to a few major urban centers, can be shown to be primarily associated with this expansion of low-wage jobs as a function of *growth* trends. Correspondingly, the high unemployment among middle-income workers should not be seen as due to displacement by immigrants, but due to the transformation in the work structure. It is this new type of growth dynamic, rather than its particular outcomes, which I describe as peripheralization at the core (1982) to capture the shaping of a new class alignment in advanced capitalist economies.

The first section analyzes the characteristics of production in major growth sectors and how these characteristics induce agglomeration of such sectors in key localities which then come to account for a large share of national economic growth. Foremost among these localities are New York City and Los Angeles, the focus of the second section. The third section examines how the sectoral recomposition generates a restructuring of the job supply which will tend to be particularly pronounced in localities with high agglomeration of new growth activities such as New York City and Los Angeles. The concluding section discusses some of the major implications of these new growth trends, notably the possibility of alliances between, on the one hand, the newly disenfranchised localities and segments of the work force, and on the other, those which have inherited disenfranchisement over the generations. The analysis draws on several sources of data, including my own research in New York City and Los Angeles.

CENTRALIZING GLOBAL MANAGEMENT AND SERVICING

The technological transformation of the work process, the decentralization of manufacturing and of office work, in part made possible by the technological transformation of the work process, and the transnationalization of the economy generally, have all contributed to the consolidation of a new kind of economic center from where the world is managed and serviced. Such economic centers can be characterized as global or regional depending on what scale these operations are performed. That is to say these trends have (1) intensified the role of major urban centers as producers and exporters of advanced services, including finance, management, and control functions, and (2) intensified the decline of old manufacturing centers, including the manufacturing component once basic to the economy and export sector of today's new global management and servicing centers.

These trends have also, and most importantly, intensified the role of advanced services in economic activity generally. The result has been a pronounced increase in the domestic and international demand for advanced services, notably legal, financial, managerial, technical, engineering, accounting, consulting, and a large array of other such services. The weight of this expansion of the advanced services is suggested by the fact that it is the fastest growing sector in the U.S. economy in terms of share of GNP, employment, and exports.

What is important to my analysis is that the particular characteristics of production of advanced services in conjunction with the ascendance of such services in economic activity generally, both domestically and worldwide, are helpful in explaining the centralization of management and servicing functions that has fed the economic boom in global cities like New York and Los Angeles. Advanced services are mostly producer services and unlike other types of services are not dependent on vicinity to the population served.[8] Hence, concentration of production in suitable locations and export, both domestically and abroad, are feasible. A factor inducing locational concentration in the production of advanced services is what has been called the agglomeration effect (Conservation of Human Resources, 1977). Production of these services benefits from vicinity to other services, particularly when there is a wide array of specialized firms. Agglomeration economies occur to such firms when they locate close to others which may be sellers of key inputs or necessary for joint production of certain service offerings (Stanback and Noyelle, 1982: 17-18). This would contribute to explain why, while New York City continued to lose corporate headquarters throughout the decade, the number and employment of firms servicing such headquarters kept growing rapidly (Conservation of Human Resources, 1977; Cohen, 1981). The implications of this concentration of economic activity are further underlined by the fact that producer services are the fastest growing sector in the economy. By 1977, independent producer-services firms accounted for 12% of total employment in the country and 20% of GNP (value added); in-house producer services (those carried on within the firm) accounted for another 5% of employment (Stanback et al., 1981: 6-19; Singelmann, 1978). In 1981, producer services accounted for 31% of all employment in New York City and 25% in Los Angeles (Sassen-Koob, 1983b). It is a common mistake to attribute continuing high growth to the service sector as a whole. In fact, other major services, such as public, distributive, and consumer services, have leveled off since the middle or late 1960s. In other words, the concentration of producer services in major urban centers entails a concentration of a disproportionate share of the growth in employment and in GNP nationwide. Another kind of agglomeration economy consists in the amenities and life-styles that large urban centers can offer the high-income personnel employed in the advanced services. In brief, not being dependent on vicinity to the population served in combination with the existence of agglomeration economies makes possible concentration of production in suitable locations and export to other areas domestically and abroad. As a result, we see the development of global (e.g., New York and Los Angeles) and of regional (e.g., Denver and Houston) centers for the production of such services.

The ascendance of advanced services in economic activity generally is rooted in a number of trends — notably, the technological transformation of the work process, the decentralization of manufacturing and office work, and the transnationalization of the economy generally — the same trends that have contributed to the development of global cities, these cities being, after all, the production sites for such services. The advanced service sector is both an outcome and a facilitator of these developments. Here I can only touch upon a few aspects feeding into the ascendance of advanced services in economic activity. Technology has shifted a number of activities once in the domain of manufacturing onto that of services. The transfer of skills from workers to machines epitomized by the assembly line has found its present-day counterpart in the transfer of a variety of activities from the shop floor into computers with its attendant technical and professional personnel. The functional specialization within the early factories finds a contemporary version in the pronounced fragmentation of the work process spatially and organizationally with its corresponding need for increased centralization and complexity of management, control, and planning. The development of the modern corporation and its massive participation in world markets and foreign countries has made planning, internal administration, product development, and research increasingly complex and important. Diversification of product lines, mergers, transnationalization of economic activities, all require highly specialized skills and have increased the importance of elaborate organizational structures (Chandler, 1977). All of these have also "increased the dependence of the corporation on producer services, which in turn has fostered growth and development of higher levels of expertise among producer service firms" (Stanback and Noyelle, 1982: 15). What were once support resources for major corporations have today become key inputs in corporate decision making (Cohen, 1981). The decentralization of manufacturing has brought about the need for new types of planning in production and distribution, new types of control over financial and international information, as well as the need to regulate and control a highly diversified and geographically dispersed work force.[8]

A major new pattern in the organization of work is the decentralization of office jobs. It involves the shipping or transmission of routine tasks to various foreign or domestic "off-shore" locations, be these low-wage countries or suburban homes. Another form of this decentralization is the relocation of divisional offices in areas with a lower cost of living, e.g., Citicorp's location of its credit center in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. The suburban labor market may assume increasing importance also for less routine tasks because of the large number of highly educated women who because of child care responsibilities may be unwilling or unable to hold full-time jobs outside the home. The push to get individuals to buy computers for personal use acquires added meaning: garment homeworkers provide their own sewing machines and the clerical homeworkers their own computers. Barbados and Jamaica are two key locations for overseas office work because of their high literacy rates and English-speaking population. And they earn about $1.50 an hour for work which in the United States ranges from $4.00 to $12.00 an hour. The decentralization of office work generates, as does the decentralization of manufacturing, a need for centralized control and management (Sassen-Koob, 1983b).

One development that may speed this decentralization of office work is deregulation of the telecommunications industry. Until 1982, companies that needed satellite data-transmission facilities had to purchase these services from one of the international carriers, such as ITT or AT&T. These are basically resellers because the only one that can sell international satellite services in the case of the United States is Comsat, the U.S. representative in the Intelstat system. Comsat has a monopoly on international satellite services and until 1982 could sell those services only to the international communications companies. Since 1982, the FCC has ruled that companies can now purchase these services directly from Comsat, a fact that lowers the cost of acquisition and facilitates access. Now companies can develop their own transmission system. The use of satellite transmission means there is no need to ship the actual tapes or disks from one location to another. Furthermore, transmission costs are independent from location. Thus, in principle, the information can be transmitted, for the same cost, from any location with access to a station. Furthermore, technological developments and growing demand have lowered the price of earth stations equipment and hence the cost of using transmission stations.

Though inadequate, there is considerable evidence to document the weight of the advanced services in economic activity. Between 1948 and 1977, the share of all services in the GNP increased by 3.4%, from 62.6% to 66% of GNP. Except for nonprofit, producer, and distributive services, all other service categories experienced declines in their share of GNP. In terms of employment shares, the patterns change somewhat. Nonprofit and producer services had the highest increases, doubling their shares of employment. Government services also had significant increases. Distributive and consumer services had declines in their shares of employment.

The increase in services is mostly a function of the increase in services as intermediate outputs, notably producer and distributive services (Denison, 1979; Stanback, 1979; Myers, 1980). Services as final outputs have decreased or stagnated. This distinction is often overlooked in general statements about our increasingly service based economy. By 1977, producer services and distributive services had increased to 37% of GNP, while the share of final services, mostly retail, consumer, nonprofit, and government, declined to 29% of GNP (Stanback et al., 1981: 16).

The same characteristics in the production of advanced services that facilitate locational concentration also make possible their production for export. There has been a massive increase in the international trade of such services and in direct foreign investment in services — another form of the export of such services. The data illustrate major patterns. At the national level, the 1980 U.S. international trade balance recorded a $21 billion surplus in the service account. From 1970 to 1980, service exports increased at an average annual rate of 19% to $121 billion in 1980, making it "a decade of unprecedented expansion in these transactions" (DiLullo, 1981: 29; U.S. Senate, 1982). Direct foreign investment in services also has increased significantly, reaching 28.4% of all such investment by 1981 (Whichard, 1982). For example, the top 14 U.S. accounting firms had 746 affiliates in developing countries by 1978 compared with 895 domestic offices (Economic Consulting Services, 1981). It is important to distinguish among the various categories included in the account; for example, receipts of income on U.S. investment abroad increased at a faster rate than receipts for other services: they went from $8.2 billion in 1970 to $36.8 billion in 1980 (DiLullo, 1981: 42). Direct investment outflows during the decade and in earlier years were one of the key factors for this growth. These outflows were one factor in the decentralization of manufacturing and ancillary services. The appropriation of the returns on these investments, on the other hand, contributes to activities feeding the centralization of global management and advanced servicing.

Another indicator of the sale of services abroad is provided by data on individual service industries. The earnings from such sales were found to be rather high for ten major industries in a U.S. Department of Commerce study (1980). For example, for the top 83 advertising firms in the United States, gross income from sales abroad represented 37.6% of their total income in 1980; for the top ten, this share was 51.7% (Economic Consulting Services, 1981: 85). The top eight accounting firms in the United States made 40% of their income from sales abroad in 1977, and in 1978 the two largest made over half their revenues from such sales (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1980: 13-15).

Banking, a key service industry, has expanded its international operations at an accelerated pace over the last few years. From 1971 to 1981 foreign branch assets of U.S. banks had a sixfold increase, from $55.1 billion to $320 billion. A study by the Centre on Transnational Corporations (1981) of the United Nations, found that six countries accounted for 76% of the assets of all transnational banks in 1978. The United States was the leading owner. And within the United States, New York City and Los Angeles are the two major financial centers.

In a classification of the 140 largest SMSAs for 1976, Stanback and Noyelle (1982: 20-26) found a distinct relation between size and functional specialization. Of the 16 largest SMSAs (population over 2 million), 12 were centers for the production and export of producer and distributive services and the other 4 were government and educational centers. Of these 12, 4 were global centers and the remaining 8, regional.[4] Furthermore, controlling for type of service export, the authors found a direct relation between size and type of service export. The larger the SMSA, the greater the weight of producer services compared with distributive services. It should be noted that the larger SMSAs were once predominantly centers for the production and export of manufacturing.

On the other hand, the group of smaller SMSAs (population under one million) had the highest single concentration of "production centers," mostly in manufacturing. Indeed, the authors found that comparing the location quotient of manufacturing in the smaller SMSAs for 1976 with 1959, the importance of manufacturing had inncreased.[5] This was sharpest in SMSAs with populations under 0.25 million where the manufacturing quotient went from 92.8 in 1959 to 113.0 in 1976. In contrast, in the largest SMSAs, this quotient went from 99.0 in 1959 to 90.5 in 1976. In terms of shares of employment the share of manufacturing rises as the size of the SMSA declines. On the other hand, the share of the "corporate headquarters" complex declines with size, ranging from 20% in the largest SMSAs to 8.7% in the smallest.[8]

What we are seeing is a transformation in the urban system as a whole and a shift in functional specialization in the largest SMSAs (Light, 1983; Friedmann and Wolff, 1983; Chase-Dunn, this volume). Comparing the distribution and incidence of economic activities with an earlier period shows the declining importance of manufacturing in the large SMSAs and its increased importance in the smaller SMSAs, a fact pointing to the decentralization of manufacturing. The transformation in the urban economic base has been most pronounced in the large SMSAs. Services have also become more important in smaller SMSAs, partly as a function of the general shift to a service economy and partly due to the fact that any locality requires a core of residentiary and public services. What is notable about the larger SMSAs is the extreme concentration and the high incidence of export activity in services. These are not the sites of governmental bureaucracies as were the capitals of empires of an earlier time. They are centers that produce inputs central to an economic system which over the last two decades has undergone a sharp decentralization in its manufacturing base and a pronounced technological transformation of the work process.

A RESTRUCTURED ECONOMY: NEW YORK CITY AND LOS ANGELES

The combination of decentralized manufacturing, technological transformation of the work process, and centralization of global servicing and management contains major growth trends that have fed the economic boom in New York City and Los Angeles, as well as a number of other major urban centers. And they have given that boom a distinct content that makes these urban centers increasingly similar: the vast expansion of their role as centers for the production of advanced services and management control.

Yet, according to other criteria, these are two very different cities. Each is a consummate instance of what are usually seen as two very different configurations, the declining Frostbelt and the rising Sunbelt: one characterized by a backward and rapidly declining garment industry, and the other by high technology industries; one known for its obsolete and decaying infrastructure, and the other for its modernity and newness; one with declining overall employment levels and the other with an explosion in overall employment.

I will argue that the sharp differences characterizing these two cities have a similar outcome in terms of the socioeconomic structure of the job supply, notably an expansion in the supply of very high-income jobs, a shrinking of traditional middle-income blue- and white-collar jobs, and an expansion of low-wage jobs. I will argue that this outcome is not accidental but is, on the contrary, an expression of systemic patterns that transcend certain domestic configurations, such as Frostbelt and Sunbelt, and that have to do with a basic restructuring at the national and global levels. The same basic processes that feed growth also feed decline. And the massive expansion in the supply of low-wage jobs is as much a function of growth trends as is the large expansion in the supply of very high-income professional and technical jobs.

It becomes important, then, to elaborate on the pronounced differences of New York City and Los Angeles before examining the similarity in the restructuring of the job supply.

There is a vast amount of evidence that shows a relentless decline in old world centers, notably New York City: decline in absolute employment levels and in population size, growth of inner-city poverty, an old and inefficient building structure, and a severely decaying infrastructure. In this context, major growth trends pose problems analytically because we have inherited a conceptual framework for the evaluation of these data that is rooted in a past phase of the development of major cities. In the light of this conceptual framework, these various decline trends have been interpreted as spelling irreversible economic decomposition of old urban centers. The fact that it is evident that New York City has a boom of some sort as suggested by massive high-income gentrification, large-scale construction, and a rise in the share of Manhattan residents with above $50,000 incomes, emerges as a paradox.

New York City was disproportionately affected by the movement of jobs abroad and to the Sunbelt. From 1970 to 1980, there was a decline in the absolute level of employment from 3.7 to 3.3 million, a 35% loss in manufacturing jobs, a 41% loss of headquarters' office jobs, a 15% overall decline in office jobs, as well as the departure of a significant share of corporate headquarters. We can include in this list the decay in the infrastructure and the fiscal crisis (Tabb, 1982).

The Los Angeles region presents at first sight a strikingly different situation as it had one of the highest growth rates in manufacturing employment in the 1970s in the United States as a whole. This region, comprising Los Angeles, Orange, San Bernardino, Riverside, and Ventura counties, has become one of the largest industrial metropolitan complexes in the world. Between 1970 and 1980 when New York

City lost a third of a million manufacturing jobs, the Los Angeles region added 225,000.[7] This represents, furthermore, a significant share of the total net addition in the country of one million manufacturing jobs from 1970 to 1980. Orange County alone, one of the highest growth poles in the Los Angeles region, had reached a total manufacturing employment of 225,000 by 1980, a figure higher than Houston's for that same year (*California Business*, September 1982). Again, unlike New York City where total population and total employment declined in the decade from 1970 to 1980, in Los Angeles population grew by 1.3 million and employment by 1.3 million which is twice Houston's net job addition of 685.900.

Furthermore, the particular content of the major growth sectors in manufacturing in Los Angeles — high technology industries — could hardly contrast more with New York City's manufacturing base, the relentlessly backward garment industry. The aerospace and electronics industries, the high-tech core in the region, represent the largest such concentration in the country and perhaps in the world (Soja et al., 1983). In the decade of the 1970s, this cluster grew by 50%. The growth in employment in high-tech industries has been larger than the total growth in manufacturing employment in Houston over the same decade. Total employment in electronics in the Los Angeles region is higher than in the other major high-tech center in the country, the so-called Silicon Valley in Santa Clara County. The Los Angeles region has increased its share of total U.S. employment in all these industries, except for Aircrafts and Parts where it declined from 22% to 19%.

Finally, the infrastructure of both these cities contrasts sharply, perhaps epitomized by Los Angeles' post-World War II freeway system and New York City's pre-World War II subway system. The typical New York city industrial structure, the loft building, is generally considered obsolete and one of the reasons that New York City's industrial base will not recover from its collapse. Los Angeles has a sprawling modern factory complex that extends into the whole region and is spatially organized into different industrial centers. To this should be added nearby San Diego County with its 62% growth in manufacturing over the last few years and massive projects of industrial parks under construction for both U.S. and foreign companies.[8]

When we disaggregate the data for these two cities, we find major growth sectors amidst New York City's massive decline trends and major declines amidst Los Angeles' massive growth trends. Less well known than the scale of New York City's declines and losses is the scale of the growth trends. While overall employment and population in the city declined in absolute terms, there was a 17% increase in employment in the nine major service industries from 1977 to 1980. Within these industries, some branches had rates of over 50% (computer services) and others hovered around 20% to 30% (management consulting and public relations, engineering and architecture, accounting, protective services, securities, etc; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1981). Two-fifths of the jobs in these industries are in the higher-pay, higher-status professional, technical, managerial, and administrative occupations (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1980, 1981). Similarly, while overall figures in manufacturing generally, and garments particularly, declined, there has in fact been a major expansion in manufacturing jobs, but mostly in forms of organization of work that do not get easily recorded in official figures, notably sweatshops and industrial homework, including homework in electronics (N.Y. State Department of Labor, 1982a, 1982b).

On the other hand, Los Angeles has experienced a massive decline in its older, established industries, notably automobile, once second only to Detroit, rubber tires, and a cluster of industries associated with the automobile industry (Soja et al., 1983). But it also has had declines in Aircrafts and Parts. There has been an associated rapid decline in the share of unionized workers which had fallen to 19% by 1980. Interestingly, the lowest share, down to 13%, happened in Orange County which also had the sharpest increase in high-tech industries. An examination of the job supply in high-tech industries shows a massive expansion in low-wage assembly line jobs, mostly not unionized and held by immigrant or native minority women.[9] Finally, well over a third of the net addition of jobs from 1970 to 1980, was in garments. Both in garments and electronics, sweatshops and industrial homework have expanded rapidly.

Within the national economy, New York and Los Angeles do indeed contain distinct trends of decline and growth associated with Frostbelt and Sunbelt configurations. However, in the context of the major developments briefly discussed in the first section, what comes to the fore is their role as centers for the servicing and management of the vastly decentralized manufacturing sector and for the globalization of economic activity generally.

There are a variety of indicators that can be used to document the growth and weight of these activities in the economies of New York City and Los Angeles, and, in turn, the weight of these two cities as centers for the production of such services and management functions in the economy generally. Already discussed were the unusually high rates of growth in employment in major service industries, with a good share of these jobs in high-income occupations. Second, these two cities have been leading recipients of the massive increase in the magnitude of financial assets and deposits in the United States. By 1980, the Los Angeles area was second only to the Greater New York area in total deposits and savings in financial institutions. And although the difference is still significant, $294 versus $104 billion, the trend is toward a narrowing (Security Pacific National Bank, 1981). The position once held by San Francisco seems to be shifting to Los Angeles. Eleven of the twelve U.S. largest banks headquartered outside California have their sole California office in Los Angeles.

Third, there was a sharp expansion in the numbers of foreign banks and branches and in foreign assets. Assets of all foreign banks and branches increased by 42.6% in New York city from 1978 to 1980, reaching $112 billion. The numbers of foreign banks went from 47 in 1970 to 249 in 1981 (Drennan, 1983). The implementation of International Banking Facilities in 1981 will further add to this internationalization of the banking and financial system. Similar developments have taken place in Los Angeles. Of the 78 foreign agents of international banks in California, 57 are based in Los Angeles (Security Pacific National Bank, 1981). And California is the most important international banking area in the United States after New York. Foreign investment has also sharply increased in other sectors, from real estate to manufacturing.[10]

Fourth, while a large number of Fortune 500 firms moved their headquarters out of New York City, those which remained showed higher growth, especially in international activity. Profits of the 81 city-based firms in the list rose from 19% in 1978 of all 500 Fortune firms to 25% in 1980; in 1980, inflation adjusted profits of city-based firms rose 12.6% compared with a 4.6% decline for 500 Fortune list firms as a whole (City of New York, 1982: 29). By 1980 Los Angeles had increased its number of Fortune 500 firms to 21, still far behind New York City's 81 but a significant concentration nonetheless (*California Business*, May 1982). The Los Angeles region contains, furthermore, 60% of California's largest industrial firms (the *Los Angeles Times* Roster of Leading California Firms, May 18, 1982).

Fifth, these major growth trends also expressed themselves in a sharp increase in construction activity. In the last two years, there has been a massive expansion in construction, mostly of office buildings. Total construction activity in New York City was up 7.1% between 1980 and 1981, compared with 1.2% nationally (Port Authority, 1982: 14). In 1981, awards for office construction in Manhattan amounted to over $600 million in addition to $700 million in 1980. The demand for office space has been very strong in Manhattan: in 1981, for a third consecutive year, the amount of space that was pre-leased exceeded the current inventory of available space, a fact reflected in the 14% increase in the average rental price from 1981 to 1982 (Port Authority, 1982: 15-16). In Los Angeles, there was a 50% increase from 1972 to 1982 in high-rise office space, amounting to an addition of 30 million square feet. A similar boom has occurred in smaller scale office building space. An additional 20 million square feet are under construction in 1982. There has been an associated jump in rental values, and though these are still well below those prevalent in Manhattan, they are among the highest in the country.

Sixth, the available evidence on the incidence of international versus local demand on different sectors in the economies of these cities shows a significant growth effect associated with international demand. The data base at the Conservation of Human Resources Program of Columbia University, elaborated both by Cohen (1981) and Drennan (1983), shows a high concentration of world-market firms in a few major cities and the weight of international transactions in these cities' economic growth trends. Cohen (1981) has constructed a "multinational index" for cities that compares the percentage share of a city's Fortune 500 firms in total foreign sales to their percentage share of total sales. He found that the 107 Fortune 500 firms located in New York City in 1974 accounted for 40.5% of all foreign sales by Fortune firms and for 30.3% of total sales by all Fortune firms. According to this index, New York City and San Francisco are the two top international business centers. The growth of Los Angeles over the last few years and the increased importance in international business of firms not on the top 500 list, particularly firms in the advanced services would, in my estimate, bring Los Angeles ahead of San Francisco today. Clearly, a more composite index needs to be developed.

A taxonomy of economic activities in New York City which distinguishes economic activities responsive to international and national demand was developed as part of the Drennan-Conservation of Human Resources econometric model and data base (Drennan, 1983). It shows trends in real value added (in 1972 dollars) for the five export oriented groups of activities, the local groups, and the overall city's economy. From 1970 to 1975, there were generally declines in value added for all economic activities, with the exception of export consumer services. From 1975 to 1982, total value added in the city grew by 1.9% a year. Disaggregating we see that all local activities had declines and that the largest increase in value added was in export activities: the corporate services with a 4.8% increase per year, followed by its satellite, the corporate ancillary services with 3.5% per year.

In sum, a juxtaposition of the evidence discussed under the six points above, with the evidence on industrial transformation and location discussed in the first section, points to the consolidation of major growth sectors and increased internationalization in a few major cities, foremost among which are New York and Los Angeles. These two sections were attempts to elaborate empirically that which is figuratively conveyed in the notion of global cities. In the next section, I examine the associated restructuring of the job supply in global cities, linking it with the new industrial composition in the economy as a whole, the occupational and earnings profiles of major growth industries and the distinct locational patterns of these industries.

THE NEW LABOR DEMAND: INCOME AND OCCUPATIONAL POLARIZATION

The disproportionate concentration of major growth industries in global cities and their regional counterparts results in a distinct restructuring of the job supply in such cities. There are significant differences in the occupational and earnings distribution of industries. Some, like the distributive services, have a preponderance of middle- and high-income jobs, while others, like retailing, are heavily weighted toward low-income jobs. Thus, a changing incidence of a few major industries in the economic base of localities can bring about major shifts in the socioeconomic characteristics of the labor force. This shift will be even more pronounced when there are strong tendencies toward locational concentration among industries.

To evaluate the impact on the job supply resulting from the industrial shifts and locational concentrations discussed in the preceding sections, we can use data on the occupational and earnings distribution of industries in conjunction with the locational patterns of such industries.

Three trends come to the fore in the available evidence on occupational and earnings characteristics by industry. First, in view of the major shift to services, it is important to note that individual service industries vary greatly in terms of their occupational and earnings distribution. The 1975 Survey of Income and Education (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1976) provides some interesting data in this regard. For example, while professional workers account for 36% of jobs in nonprofit services, they account for only 3.3% in distributive services and 1% in retailing. And while service workers account for only 1% in wholesale trade, they account for 12% in corporate services and 44% in consumer services.

Second, earnings vary not only according to occupation but also according to industry for a given occupation (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1976). The differences in average earnings among industries can only be partly explained by differences in the occupational mix of each of these industries. A ranking of average earnings in each of the occupations for the major industrial groups shows considerable variation. In professional occupations, it varied from 2.02 in manufacturing and 2.11 in producer services to 1.28 in education. The national average for professional occupations was 1.62 in 1975. Among service workers, for example, the index varied from 0.33 in manufacturing, 0.59 in producer services, and 0.90 in transport, communications, and utilities.

Third, the overall result of a different occupational mix and different average earnings for occupations in different industries provides an earnings profile for each industry. Some industries, notably consumer and retailing, are low-paying industries: they have low average pay across occupations and a high incidence of low-earning occupations. Distributive services and public administration, on the other hand, have few poorly paid jobs. Among producer and nonprofit services, there is a polarization with concentrations in both well and poorly paid jobs and occupations. Stanback and Noyelle (1982) ranked the average annual earnings for each industry and occupational subgroup and found distributive services, manufacturing, and public administration to have the highest average rank. The producer services ranked somewhere in the middle while consumer services and retailing were the worst. The data on earnings classes shows a very high incidence of the next to lowest earnings class in all services, except distributive services and public administration. Almost half of all workers in the producer services were in this earnings class, compared with 17% of manufacturing and 18.8% of construction workers. The other half of workers in producer services are in the two highest earnings classes. On the other hand, half of all construction and manufacturing workers are in the middle earnings class compared with 2.8% of workers in the producer services. The highest single concentrations in the top earnings class are in wholesale and corporate services. Stanback and Noyelle (1982: 33) find that "for the services as a whole, the important observation is that there tend to be heavy concentrations of employment in better-than-average and in poorer-than-average jobs. In contrast, in manufacturing and construction the distributions are more heavily weighted toward medium and above-average income jobs."

TABLE 1 Distribution of Employment Among Earnings Classes for Each Industry and for Total United States, 1975 (in percentages)

	Earnings Classes[a]				
	1.60 and above	*1.60 to 1.20*	*1.20 to 0.80*	*0.80 to 0.40*	*0.40 and below*
All industry (total U.S.)[b]	12.0	22.2	27.8	28.4	9.6
Construction	2.5	17.2	61.1	18.8	0.3
Manufacturing	20.4	17.4	45.0	17.2	–
Distributive services	32.2	27.8	30.3	9.3	0.4
TCU	20.9	41.0	36.1	2.0	–
Wholesale	48.5	8.8	21.9	19.8	1.0
Retail	–	7.1	32.9	57.1	2.9
Producer services	13.5	38.0	2.8	45.7	–
FIRE	5.2	46.0	2.3	46.5	–
Corporate services	24.6	27.3	3.4	44.7	–
Consumer services	–	4.1	13.7	16.8	65.4
Nonprofit services	6.8	34.1	10.7	48.4	–
Health	17.3	2.3	24.2	56.3	–
Education	–	54.6	2.1	43.3	–
Public administration	22.1	50.6	20.9	6.4	–

SOURCE: T. M. Stanback, Jr. and T. J. Noyelle, *Cities in Transition*. Totowa, NJ: Allanheld, Osmun, 1982. Based on U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Survey of Income and Education*, 1976.

a. Earning class intervals make use of earning indexes in which the index of the 1975 average earnings for all industry is equal to 1.0.

b. Each line sums up to 100%.

A detailed empirical examination of the major service industries shows a significant presence of low-wage jobs, particularly a subcategory of low-wage jobs with few if any skill and language requirements and no history of unionization — in brief, jobs that both demand the existence and contribute to the expansion of an underclass. Using the data from a New York State Department of Labor (1979; 1980) occupational survey of major service industries, I identified the full array of this subtype of low-wage jobs in the major service industries in New York City. These data have many limitations. Nonetheless, the results are suggestive. First, there were over 16% of low-wage unskilled or semiskilled service jobs, lacking language proficiency requirements and mostly offering few if any advancement possibilities. Such jobs accounted for 10.8% of jobs in finance, insurance, and real estate, 23.9% in business services, and 18% in the remaining service indus-

TABLE 2 Low-Wage, Unskilled Jobs Likely to Employ Immigrants: Select Service Industries, New York City, 1978[a]

	Select Service Industries			
	Finance, Insurance Real Estate[b]	*Business Services*[c]	*Other Service Industries*[d]	*Total*
Managers, professionals and technical	104,460	65,800	140,600	310,860
Services				
Low-wage jobs	30,520	52,430	40,900	123,850
Total	36,980	54,950	83,520	175,450
Maintenance				
Low-wage jobs	9,150	1,980	19,590	30,720
Total	12,700	15,880	45,510	74,090
Clerical				
Low-wage jobs	1,420	5,020	3,450	9,890
Total	201,630	102,140	80,710	384,480
Sales	23,890	10,180	4,490	38,560
Total low-wage jobs[e] (N)	41,090	59,430	63,940	164,460
% of Total	10.8	23.9	18.9	16.7
Total all occupations	379,660	248,950	354,830	983,440

SOURCE: Based on New York State Department of Labor, Division of Research and Statistics, *Occupational Employment Statistics: Services, New York State, April-June, 1978*, 1980, and New York State Department of Labor, Division of Research and Statistics, *Occupational Employment Statistics: Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate, New York State, May-June, 1978*, 1979.

[a] This is derived from a survey by the New York State Department of Labor (1980, 1979). The sample was drawn from establishments (only those covered by New York State Unemployment Law) in select service industries. Excluded from the sample were the following service industries: educational services (SIC 82), private households (SIC 88), and the hospitals industry subgroup (SIC 806). Private households and hospitals contain significant numbers of low-wage jobs known to be held by immigrants. Excluded from the sample were establisments and activities which include significant numbers of low-wage jobs known to employ immigrants, notably, restaurants.

[b] SIC codes 61-65.

[c] SIC codes 73, 81.

[d] SIC codes 70, 72, 75-80, 83, 84, 86, 89.

[e] The jobs identified as low-wage are only a segment of all low-wage jobs. They are those that lack language proficiency requirements, are not part of a well-defined advancement ladder, and are not usually part of a highly unionized occupation.

tries. Second, the highest incidence of such jobs is found in the fastest growing employment sector in the city (and in the nation as a whole), that is, business services.

TABLE 3 Distribution of Total U.S. Labor Force* Among Earnings Classes, 1970 and 1980

	Distribution of Total U.S. Labor Force (%)			
Earnings Classes	*1970*		*1980*	
1.60 and above	11.3	32.2	12.9	37.0
1.59 to 1.30	20.9		24.2	
1.29 to 1.00	18.9	35.8	12.8	24.5
.99 to .70	16.9		11.7	
.69 to .40	22.8	32.0	25.2	38.5
.39 and below	9.2		13.3	
Total	100.0		100.0	

SOURCE: Based on U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1982. *Money Income of Households, Families and Persons in the United States: 1980*. (Current Population Reports: Series P-60, No. 132); and U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1972, *Money Income of Households, Families and Persons in the United States: 1970.*

*Civilian workers 14 years old and over by total money earnings.

The different occupational and earnings distribution of industries in conjunction with the changes in the industrial mix of the economy express themselves in a growing income polarization among workers from 1960 to 1975. Using data from the Survey of Income and Education and from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Stanback and Noyelle (1982: 38-43) show that the shares of employment in the top two earnings classes increased by 2.6%, the share of employment in the middle earnings class decreased by 8.1%, and the share of the lowest two earnings classes increased by 5.5%. These figures assume the national average for each industry-occupation subgroup. But we know that some of the more rapidly growing industries have a high incidence of low-paying jobs or a high incidence of both low and high paying jobs, but not middle-income jobs. Finally, the rate of growth of various earnings categories in the service industries from 1960 to 1975 show a 35% increase in jobs in the highest two earnings classes, an 11.3% increase in jobs in the medium earnings class, and a 54% increase in jobs in the two lowest earnings classes. That is to say, the overall growth in service jobs contains a very pronounced inequality in terms of income. If we extrapolate from these data covering 1960 to 1975 and factor in the further increase in services, particularly service industries with polarized earnings distribution, we can assume even higher economic inequality for the late 1970s and early 1980s. Comparing 1980 and 1970 census data, I found exactly that.

The different earnings profiles of major industries need to be considered in combination with the different locational patterns of industries, notably the relation between a locality's size and industrial mix. The evidence discussed in the first section shows the largest SMSAs to have a disproportionate concentration of producer and distributive services, an above average concentration of consumer and nonprofit services, and a below average concentration of manufacturing and government.[10] Thus, the largest SMSAs are experiencing an expansion in industries with concentrations of high and poorly paid jobs and a shrinking in the share of industries with a heavy incidence of high and medium income jobs.[11]

Income polarization is further fed by several trends that contribute to an additional expansion in the supply of low-wage jobs, particularly in global cities. First, the existence of a critical mass of very high-income workers provides the conditions for a rapidly expanding process of high-income residential and commercial "gentrification." This entails not only a physical upgrading, but also a reorganization of the consumption structure, both of which generate a demand for low-wage workers. All the various components of high-income gentrification are labor intensive: residential building attendants, workers producing services or goods for specialty shops and gourmet food shops, dog walkers, errand runners, cleaners of all sorts, and so on. The demand for low-wage workers to service the high-income lifestyles of the rapidly expanding top level work force is one key factor in the expansion of an informal sector in cities like New York and Los Angeles. Part of the goods and services produced in the informal sector circulate through the modern sector of the economy that caters to these high-income lifestyles. The growth of an informal sector is not only a survival strategy for the poor and unemployed, as is often assumed. Notwithstanding the appearance of marginality, its expansion is fed by key economic sectors. It would explain why this type of configuration is most developed in major urban centers experiencing very dynamic growth and not in cities like Detroit.

Second, there has been an increase in low wage jobs in the manufacturing sector as a result of (a) the social reorganization of the work process, notably the expansion of sweatshops and industrial homework; (b) the technological transformation of the work process that has induced a downgrading of a variety of jobs; and (c) the rapid growth of high-technology industries which are characterized by a large share of low-wage jobs in production. These three trends have resulted in what I call a downgraded manufacturing sector. It is important to note that the *downgrading* of the manufacturing sector is part of major *growth* trends: the development of high-tech industries, the technological transformation of the work process (which has also upgraded a large array of jobs), and the growth of an informal sector that contains a large number of sweatshops. Sweatshops and high-tech plants are often considered to be two very different if not opposing developments, one representing backwardness and the other modernity. Yet both have a similar outcome: an expansion in the supply of dead-end low-wage jobs. (See note 9). Furthermore, they entail a disenfranchisement of workers, notably the drop in levels of unionization most visible in areas with rapid growth in high-tech industries, such as Los Angeles and Orange counties. Finally, the expansion of sweatshops and industrial homework is not only associated with the garment industry (Waldinger, 1983). It is happening in electronics as well (New York State Department of Labor, 1982a, 1982b; Sassen-Koob, 1983a; Solorzano, 1983).[12]

The politicization of the traditional low-wage labor supplies during the 1960s and early 1970s and the often higher wage levels typical of major urban centers such as New York and Los Angeles in the 1960s acquire added significance in the context of (a) their expanded role as centers for the management and servicing of the global economy, and (b) the increase in the supply of low-wage jobs resulting from major growth trends. This was not simply class struggle as usual. It was class struggle in a moment of major restructuring and in locations containing key economic sectors.

The large influx of immigrants from low-wage countries over the last fifteen years, which reached massive levels in the second half of the 1970s, cannot be understood separately from this restructuring.[13] It is a mistake to view this new immigration phase as a result mostly of push factors and as being absorbed primarily in backward sectors of the economy. It is the expansion in the supply of low-wage jobs generated by major growth sectors that is one of the key factors in the *continuation* at even higher levels of the current immigration.[14]

The available evidence for New York City and Los Angeles, inadequate as it is, strongly suggests that a large share of immigrants in both cities represent an important supply of low-wage workers. New York and Los Angeles have the largest Hispanic populations of all SMSAs and the size of their Hispanic population is significantly larger than that of the next series of cities, beginning with Chicago and Miami, each with about 580,000 Hispanics. New York City and Los Angeles also contain, together with San Francisco, the largest concentrations of Asians. Finally, New York City is the major recipient of West Indians. For example, it is interesting to note that although the composition of the two Hispanic populations in New York City and in Los Angeles is very different, they both have some of the worst rankings on various economic characteristics (Table 8.4). The 1980 Census puts Hispanics' median income at $15,447 in Los Angeles and $10,300 in New York City and the share of Hispanics below the poverty level at 21% in Los Angeles and 39% in New York City. The share of Hispanics aged 25 years and older with High School degrees is slightly higher in Los Angeles than in New York City, 39% compared with 35.5%, yet both cities rank poorly among the 13 SMSAs. The 1980 Survey of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (1983) on job patterns for minorities and women in private industry shows that Hispanics in these two cities had, by far, the highest incidence of low-wage semi- or unskilled jobs: 50% of Hispanics in New York City and 56.8% in Los Angeles were laborers, service workers, or operatives. The corresponding figures for whites were 14.1% in New York City and 20% in Los Angeles. This pattern is similar to that found by Çohen and Sassen-Koob (1982) in a 1980 survey of six immigrant groups in New York City. It found Hispanics disproportionately concentrated in service and manufacturing jobs compared with older immigrant groups.[15]

The combination of these various trends expresses itself in an increased income polarization in these two cities. Comparing household income for 1969 and 1979 there is an increase in the high- and low-income strata and a shrinking in the middle stratum. Considering the 1969 and 1979 median income and including the bracket immediately below and immediately above to constitute a middle-income stratum, we find that almost 49% of the Los Angeles and 51% of the New York City households were in the middle stratum in 1969, compared with respectively 38% and 39% in 1979. The higher income stratum increased from 21.5% to 29.5% in Los Angeles and from 19% to 23.5% in New York City. In considering the city rather than the metropolitan region there may actually be an overestimate of middle-income households. New York City, for example, includes boroughs such as Queens and Staten Island which represent very large concentrations of middle-income households, while some high-income locations, notably Weschester County, are excluded even though most residents work in the city. Similarly, in the case of Los Angeles, very high income areas such as Beverly Hills are excluded from the city boundaries. The low-income stratum increased from 29.7% to 32.3% in Los Angeles and from 29.6% to 37.5% in New York City. It should be noted that the large new immigrant influx over the last decade and the pronounced growth in sweatshops and illegal homework make the

TABLE 4 Selected Characteristics of Spanish-Hispanic Origin or Descent Population in SMSAs of 1,000,000 or More Population and 25,000 or More Hispanics, 1980

	Hispanic Median Family Income		*Hispanics Below the Poverty Level*		*Hispanics, 25 yrs. and Over with a High School Degree (%)*		*Persons Who Speak Spanish in the Home as a % of Hispanics Five yrs. and Over*		*Hispanics 18 yrs. and Over Who Speak Spanish at Home and Speak English Well or Very Well*		*Size*	
SMSA	*Rank*	*Value*	*Rank*	*Value*	*Rank*	*Value*	*Rank*	*Value*	*Rank*	*Value*	*Rank*	*Total Hispanics*
Los Angeles, Long Beach, CA	7	15,447	6	21.2	10	39.1	11	82.4	11	60.1	1	2,066,103
New York, NY-NJ	12	10,347	2	39.3	13	35.4	2	96.4	8	64.0	2	1,492,559
Chicago, IL	4	16,551	8	19.5	11	36.1	6	91.7	10	61.0	3	580,467
Miami, FL	5	16,133	10	15.9	5	53.3	1	101.4	12	57.8	4	580,427
San Antonio, TX	11	13,284	5	26.9	9	40.5	7	90.8	2	83.0	5	481,378
Houston, TX	3	17,185	9	18.1	8	44.9	3	93.1	7	73.5	6	424,957
Dallas, TX	6	15,754	7	20.1	12	35.8	5	91.8	6	74.4	7	247,937
Newark, NJ	8	14,596	4	30.1	7	45.2	8	90.1	9	62.0	8	131,655
Philadelphia, PA-NJ	10	13,287	3	33.4	4	56.8	9	88.9	4	80.1	9	116,869
Washington, D.C., MD-VA	1	22,834	13	10.6	1	74.5	1	101.4	3	82.9	10	93,686
Boston, MS	13	9,586	1	42.0	3	57.3	3	93.1	10	61.0	11	65,696
Fort Lauderdale, Hollywood, FL	2	19,174	12	12.2	2	62.5	4	92.7	5	78.2	12	40,345
Cleveland, OH	9	14,502	11	15.3	6	49.3	10	87.2	1	84.3	13	25,475

SOURCE: Population Research and Analysis, Human Resources Division, New York City Department of City Planning.

TABLE 5 Occupational Distribution by Ethnicity, Queens (New York City), 1980 (percentages)

	Blacks	*Jews*	*Italians*	*Irish*	*Other European Ethnics*	*Puerto Ricans*	*Colombians*	*Other Hispanics*	*Asians*	*Others*
Management	8.9	13.4	8.6	11.4	14.7	11.7	11.5	11.3	2.8	7.9
Professional and technical	24.6	31.0	18.0	31.4	21.5	13.3	3.8	13.6	41.7	22.8
Sales	6.0	8.8	7.0	1.0	5.1	11.7	3.8	3.4	8.3	7.9
Clerical	14.1	27.2	18.0	24.8	24.9	21.7	15.4	15.9	22.2	18.5
Crafts	7.7	4.2	6.2	5.7	9.0	3.3	15.4	12.5	0.0	13.6
Operatives and laborers	14.5	3.1	18.0	5.7	7.9	16.6	19.2	20.5	8.3	9.3
Transport	4.8	2.3	6.3	2.9	1.7	1.7	0.0	1.1	0.0	2.9
Services	19.4	10.0	17.9	17.1	15.2	20.0	30.9	21.7	16.7	17.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total N = (1269)	(248)	(261)	(128)	(105)	(177)	(60)	(26)	(88)	(36)	(140)

SOURCE: Cohen and Sassen-Koob (1982).

1980 census figures for the low-income stratum most probably an underestimate.

In sum, the restructuring of labor demand in these two cities contains two major trends. First, there has been a pronounced expansion in the supply of high-income professional and technical jobs associated with the growth of the advanced services and headquarters complex, high-tech industries, and the technological transformation of the work process which has upgraded a vast array of what used to be middle-income jobs. Second, there has been a pronounced expansion of low-wage jobs associated with a general shift to a service economy and, more particularly, with the recomposition of industry, an outcome of (a) the technological transformation of the work process which has, besides upgrading also downgraded a vast array of jobs through the transfer of skills into machines, (b) changes in the industrial mix, notably the decline of older established manufacturing industries in Los Angeles and the rise of low-wage assembly plants in high-tech industries, and (c) the transformation in the organization of the labor process, notably the shift of certain jobs from unionized shops to sweatshops or industrial homework.

CONCLUSION

Economic growth over the last decade has resulted in social and spatial arrangements containing new patterns of concentration of the benefits of economic growth. The evidence shows that major growth industries are characterized by a much higher incidence of jobs at the high- and low-paying ends than was the case in what were once the major growth industries, notably manufacturing. The evidence also shows that income associated with a given occupation varies across industries and, again, tends to be either relatively lower or higher in some of today's major growth industries. Finally, the evidence shows that the locational patterns of major growth industries tend toward a pronounced concentration of the most dynamic ones, notably the producer services, in a few very large cities.

What comes to the fore is an increased polarization in the income and occupational structure of the job supply and an increased concentration of major growth sectors in key localities. The outcomes of economic growth that one could expect on the basis of the experience of the 1950s and 1960s are no longer occurring. The particular historical content of the relation between economic growth and employment, or economic growth and the job supply, typical of the 1950s and 1960s is not part of the new configuration. There *is* economic growth, but it will not eliminate the new middle-income unemployment among white- and blue-collar workers which has reached massive levels in the last few years, precisely the period of pronounced growth in some of the most dynamic industries. And economic growth *is* generating a large array of jobs. But they are mostly low-wage or very high-income jobs. Economic growth is contributing to the expulsion of a wide array of middle-income jobs in contrast to what was the case in the 1950s and 1960s.

These new growth trends should not be seen simply as an instance of "economic recovery." They are predicated on the decline of industrial sectors and occupational groups that were once among the most dynamic ones. The technological transformation of the work process has entailed a shift of activities that were in the domain of manufacturing onto that of the service sector. It has accelerated the shift of skills from workers to machines epitomized in the past by the assembly line and today by the move away from the shop floor and into the computer. In this sense, the shrinking of thee manufacturing sector feeds the growth of the advanced services. Furthermore, the technological transformation of the work process has accelerated and partly made possible the fragmentation of the old industrial complex and the dispersion of the loci of manufacturing activity domestically and abroad. Similar trends are happening in office work. This dispersion has contributed to the demand for advanced services to manage and control the decentralized manufacturing and office sectors.

The evidence points to a new growth dynamic, one whereby growth fails to generate the benefits for a wide segment of the population and a wide spectrum of localities historically associated with such growth. Elsewhere (1982), I have argued that the latest crisis of the system is over and that these new growth trends represent a resolution of the crisis. What is confusing is that this resolution incorporates as a key condition the decline and ongoing crises of sectors of the economy and correspondingly of the work force which as late as the early 1960s were among the most dynamic components in the domestic economy. Today their decline is part of the resolution. The new, growth-induced unemployment of middle-income blue- and white-collar workers is part of the resolution of the crisis. And so is the severe decline in a large number of middle-sized cities whose well-being was associated with the old manufacturing complex. The new growth trends operate to the advantage of cities which are either global or regional centers for the production of producer services, including centralized management and control functions.

The new growth trends carry old costs in new clothes. In so doing, they contain conditions for new alliances among workers and among localities. The fact that the new growth-induced unemployment among middle-income blue- and white-collar workers is structural rather than merely a function of the latest recession, points to possible alliances with low-income workers. Unemployment has been a more prevalent condition among the latter and one that has in the past distinguished these from middle-income blue- and white-collar workers. But the current restructuring of the economy is extracting the costs for this kind of system increasingly also from the middle class. There are here, then, objective conditions for a new alliance insofar as a growing segment of the middle class is being threatened by an economic instability that used to be limited largely to low-wage workers. It is important theoretically and politically to recognize that the new growth dynamic is not predicated on the existence of a thriving middle class as was the case in the 1950s and 1960s.

Furthermore, if a large share of immigrants are employed in major growth sectors, then organizing immigrants emerges as a possibility and so do new alliances between immigrants and segments of the native work force. Where immigrants are primarily a labor supply for *declining* firms, organizing immigrants would most likely lead to the closing of these firms. But raising the cost of immigrant labor in *growth* sectors would be much less likely to threaten the survival of a firm. It becomes politically and theoretically important to distinguish between job and sectoral characteristics. There is a strong tendency to assume backward jobs to be part of backward sectors. Yet, low-wage, dead-end jobs can be part of the most dynamic sectors of highly advanced industrialized economies. There is also a strong tendency to assume that backward sectors cannot be part of major growth trends. Yet my analysis of an expanding downgraded manufacturing sector, one containing sweatshops, industrial homework, and a large incidence of nonunionized, low-wage assembly jobs, suggests otherwise. While a majority of immigrants hold low-wage, dead-end jobs, it is a mistake to assume that these are mostly in backward sectors of the economy which are in decline. The large concentration of the new immigrants in a few major cities acquires added significance once we recognize that major growth industries directly and indirectly generate a vast supply of low-wage jobs and that these industries tend to locate in such cities. Under these conditions, a politicized native low-wage labor supply and an overeducated population generally become problematic and the employment of immigrants highly desirable. For organizing purposes, it is important to recognize the primary location of immigrants in major growth sectors.

The expansion in the supply of low-wage jobs as a function of growth trends and the expulsion of middle-income jobs from economic activity generally are particularly pronounced in global cities and their regional counterparts. These in turn represent a concentration of the benefits of economic growth at the expense of a large number of what were once thriving localities. It is politically important to recognize that these developments are constitutive of the current economic restructuring rather than a distortion brought about by the latest recession. This recognition also brings to the fore the existence of new objective conditions for alliances between the newly disenfranchised and those who have been carrying a disproportionate share of the costs for many generations. And it suggests the possibility of alliances among certain kinds of localities given the thoroughness of their marginality in the current restructuring.

NOTES

1. I discuss the model in Sassen-Koob (1982; 1983b).

2. Standard classifications of economic activities have become increasingly problematic with the technological transformation of the work process. Here I use the classification first developed by Browning and Singelmann (1978), further elaborated by Singelmann (1978: 28-36) and Stanback et al., (1981). In this classification, producer services refer to industries that provide services *mostly* to producers of goods or property related operations. They are then a type of intermediate output (Greenfield, 1966: 11; Machlup, 1962: 39-40). They include banking, credit, and other financial services; insurance: real estate; engineering and architectural services; accounting and bookkeeping: miscellaneous business services; legal services (Singelmann, 1978: 31). Producer services represent the following SIC branches: 60 to 67, 73, 81, 83 (after 1974), 86 and 89.

3. The technological transformation in manufacturing and the possibility of centralizing the management of a dispersed manufacturing base also means that the development of manufacturing in third world countries can rely on the import of advanced services from the highly developed countries. The case of OPEC members is of interest here. After the 1973 increase in the international price of oil and the decision to transform the large influx of oil revenues into vast accelerated development programs, there was an immense rise in the import of services by these

countries. From 1973 to 1978, overall oil revenues for OPEC members were $700 billion. During that same period the value of imports reached $530 billion, of which almost half were for the imports of services. OPEC members accounted for about one third of U.S. worldwide receipts on contracts from 1972 to 1977; these are mostly contracts for construction, engineering, consulting, and other technical services.

4. Of the 11 smaller SMSAs (population between 1 and 2 million), which were also centers for the production of producer and distributive services, all were regional centers (Stanback and Noyelle, 1982: 25). In this classification, New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, and San Francisco were the only truly global centers. Houston, though a recipient of many headquarters over the last few years, was found to be a regional center, a finding confirmed by Cohen's (1981) data which show that the large headquarters which moved to Houston continued to use the advanced services produced by firms in New York and Chicago.

5. These location quotients indicate the ratio of the average share of employment within a given industry group in a given size of SMSA to the share of total U.S. employment accounted for by that same industry.

6. I find the term "corporate headquarters complex" inadequate when dealing with such a wide range of sizes in SMSAs. Any city has legal, accounting, and banking services. But there are only a few major firms which are global in their operations and make a significant share of their earnings from the export of their services. These firms are also the ones that handle the business for most of the large corporations and they are the ones who are concentrated in the major cities. The 8.7% employment share in the "corporate headquarters complex" in the smallest SMSAs most probably describes regional or local market firms. The ascendance of the advanced services in economic activity generally and the development of the modern corporation make a distinction between local, regional, and global service firms increasingly important.

7. It should be noted, however, that this brought the actual number of manufacturing jobs in the Greater New York area to 1.3 million, that is, the same as in the Los Angeles area. The similarity in this level reflects a 19% decline from 1970 to 1980 for New York City and a 23% increase for Los Angeles over that same period. The increase for the United States as a whole was 5%. The high absolute number of jobs in manufacturing in these two areas and the characteristics of these jobs are of significance in explaining the absorption of a good share of the large immigrant influx. Marshall (1983) notes the increasing relative and absolute participation of immigrants in manufacturing in New York City during the 1970s.

8. The magnitude of the increases in foreign and domestic investment and in the construction of industrial parks in adjacent San Diego County is clearly beginning to outpace growth in the Los Angeles area. The available evidence suggests that this represents in good part an expansion of the Los Angeles industrial complex. Of significance here is the nearby 38,600 acre Mesa de Otay, half each on either side of the Mexico-United States border, which it is expected will be developed as a twin-plant zone. To this should be added a novel kind of development, the relocation of plants away from areas that have been major recipients of such plants, notably Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Mexico, and into San Diego County. It seems that these relocations respond to two kinds of inducements: the fact that Southern California has a plentiful supply of immigrant labor, and second, problems of quality control

which require vicinity to technical centers. The combination of resources in an area like Southern California — a large supply of cheap and docile labor *and* of highly trained technical personnel and researchers — points to the development of regions like these as industrial zones for world investment that are an alternative, under certain conditions, to zones in the Caribbean Basin or Southeast Asia (Sassen-Koob, 1983a).

9. It is precisely this characteristic which explains the large-scale deployment of production plants in electronics and other high-tech industries to less developed countries where they employ mostly very young women with no work experience or skill. Garments and electronics are the two most highly internationalized industries: both employ mostly low-wage workers in production abroad and domestically, and both account for the largest share of new manufacturing jobs in one of the high-growth regions in the United States — the Los Angeles area. There is a growing literature on this subject. A good collection can be found in Fernandez et al. (1983). This points to a fungibility between redeploying jobs *to* low-wage countries and immigration *from* low-wage countries to the United States (Sassen-Koob, 1981: 74-77; 1983a; Solorzano, 1983; Garcia, 1983; Waldinger, 1983).

10. Direct foreign investment in the United States reached 89.8 billion in 1981, up from 20.6 billion in 1973. A third of this investment was in manufacturing, with the New York-New Jersey area and California the leading recipients of foreign investment in manufacturing (Conference Board, 1983).

11. There are different locations for various segments of the highly paid new professional stratum. Engineers and technical personnel linked directly with high-tech industry and the associated research operations are clustered in various key high-tech or research locations: Silicon Valley, Orange County, Austin, the Route 128 area around Boston. These are, in some ways, to be distinguished from those employed in the advanced services. The first are ultimately the new cadres of what is today's basic industry, the development and production of microprocessors. The second are involved in control, management, and servicing functions. The locations of these two sets of activities frequently are distinct, but at times they overlap, as in Los Angeles, a site for both the production of control, management, and servicing functions and a site for the production of engineering and technical operations. These distinctions bring to mind some of the work done on the manufacturing sector that views the geographic distribution of industry as a spatial division of labor (Storper and Walker, 1983).

12. In a study on the auto industry in Los Angeles, Morales (1983) found considerable restructuring in the auto-parts branches: a shift from native to immigrant, including undocumented, workers and a shift from less to more automated forms of production which allowed for the incorporation of cheaper, often immigrant workers and expulsion of more highly paid workers. Similarly, see Balmori (1983) on the construction industry in New York City. See also Christopherson (1983) on the regional specificity of segmentation in different immigrant labor markets.

13. Two major changes occurred in immigration over the last fifteen years: a pronounced increase in the levels of entries and a pronounced shift from predominantly European countries of origin (two-thirds in 1960) to Asian and Latin American-Caribbean countries of origin. There are, clearly, labor market implications associated with this shift. These become particularly weighty when we con-

sider the heavy concentration of immigrants in a few major cities: 40% of all immigrants reside in the ten largest cities in the United States; these same cities account for only 11% of the total U.S. population. Since the incidence of urban versus rural residence varies significantly according to nationality, a consideration of the newest immigration, mostly from Asian and Caribbean Basin countries, would reveal an almost total concentration in a few large cities.

14. The fact that immigrants tend to form communities with considerable social and commercial activity, acquires added significance in this context: it becomes a structure for the reproduction of immigrant labor as low-wage labor. Services and goods produced in the immigrant community contribute to lower the cost of living for immigrants. Many goods and services are produced and obtained via the mechanism of family, friendship, ethnic organizations, and so forth, rather than via the market where one needs money to buy them. The overall effect is to lower the share of reproduction costs that has to be met by a direct wage and hence to lower the cost of immigrants as workers to *employers* outside the immigrant community, or to lower the price of goods and services sold by immigrants to *buyers* outside the community, such as prepared foods, specialty items, repair services, and so on, often made in immigrant homes where children and relatives, notably new arrivals, contribute. At the same time, it is politically and theoretically important to emphasize that these same conditions also may give immigrant workers a greater autonomy vis à vis their employers (Sassen-Koob, 1982).

15. Castro (1982) found a much higher incidence of manufacturing jobs among Colombian immigrant women in New York City than was the case in their home country and than had been the case for this particular group of women before departing. Controlling for sex, Cohen and Sassen-Koob (1982) found that about 41% of all Hispanics with manufacturing jobs in the sample were women, again a higher incidence than holds in the United States generally and in countries of origin. See also Wilson and Portes (1980) and Light (1983) on immigrant employment opportunities in ethnic enclaves.

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PUERTO RICAN YOUTH EMPOWERMENT

by Dr. José Hernández

Let us imagine that last year the United States invaded a Caribbean nation having about six million people whose cultural background resembled that of Puerto Rico. Next, in an 85 year time warp, everything took place that has occurred in the Puerto Rican world. Today, the descendants of the migrants in the United States (over two of the six million) turned to us for advice as to what policy to follow in the future. We who have lived through the process would be in a position to use our experience to benefit people much like ourselves.

Most likely, we would begin describing our problems as a racially stigmatized group of second-rate citizens from an outlying possession, situated at the bottom of American society. We would talk about solutions offered by the American "dream," policies that did not function as expected. When asked to reduce the options for action to their most essential elements, we would likely suggest: a) assimilation; b) the civil rights/minority model, and c) pluralism. Each of these would be said to have produced some benefits for the community. But comparing results with the effort and involvement required, most of us would talk about steps forward, and steps back.

We would further describe divisions within our community and our own lives. How most of us must follow the assimilation model in our work careers and economic life. About politics, we would recount 20 years of policies determined mainly by white Anglo responses to the needs and wants of American blacks. True, Puerto Ricans have had some success in organizing ourselves in response to government programs aimed at improving the living conditions of people classified as "minority." Our desire for togetherness has also prompted us to talk about efforts to reshape education and advance a way of life we share with other descendants of migrants from the Caribbean and Middle America. But pressed to explain why pluralism has not succeeded, we would explain that neither economics nor politics have favored the implementation of this idea.

What, then, would we suggest for the future? Some of us would talk about empowerment. We would do so with caution, because this relatively new idea might not promise anything more than assimilation, the civil rights/minority model, and pluralism. The benefits of empowerment might not justify the enormous requirements of energy, attention, time and money. Thinking back to our efforts during the past 20 years, the test of any new idea necessitates another imaginary consideration. Suppose we returned to 1965, would empowerment have worked out better than what we know to have followed the national civil rights legislation? Even though the answer were no, we would still have to address the question: At our point in time, doesn't empowerment make more sense than previous policy directions?

On the chance that the answer to either or both of these questions is yes, I decided to explore the empowerment option. The following considerations expand on *Puerto Rican Youth Employment* (Maplewood, N.J.: Waterfront Press, 1983), which provides the factual evidence and a preliminary version of the notions presented. Of equal importance were the insights gathered during eight years of studying the social, economic and political situation of Puerto Rican teenagers and young adults in the United States. Also, I have lived in Puerto Rican neighborhoods and have been involved in Puerto Rican causes in a variety of ways. Included are the most essential results of observation and interviews in the school, work and community environments of Milwaukee, Chicago, and New York City, and in federal and local government programs. Considering all of this, I returned to ideas developed in *People, Power and Policy* (Palo Alto, CA: National Press, 1974) and with the help of colleagues at the Latino Institute, learned about recent applications of empowerment to the Puerto Rican situation in the United States. I have also read the contemporary literature on empowerment and have taught courses on related topics, with the participation of Puerto Rican college students.

Chances are that by year 2000, as many Puerto Ricans will live in the United States as in Puerto Rico, and that Puerto Rico's political status will remain indefinite. But even if it were resolved, many Puerto Ricans in the United States would likely remain living in their homes—near family, friends, work and community. A new society will have fully emerged from the "surplus" labor force that migrated to the United States during the 1950s and before. Puerto Ricans in the United States will feel a sense of peoplehood and ownership regarding a century of human experience unique to themselves, although related to Puerto Rico, and similar to other racial and ethnic groups in the United States.

Our general purpose here is to discuss a national policy for Puerto Rican youth. They, more than other segments in our community, will be affected by what happens in the next five years. As years go by, the children and adolescents of today will reach maturity and have leadership of the society in formation. Therefore, we must be guided by the situation we want for Puerto Ricans in the year 2000. Our vision will be a legacy to a generation whose lives could be improved by the right choice of policy for the immediate future. This paper was organized to help our discussion by using research results as a background for speculation about the possible benefits of empowerment.

Community Empowerment

The most fundamental research conclusion of the research mentioned above is that Puerto Rican youth have little or no power; that is, the chance to be self-determining in their social, economic and political life, and to influence others accordingly. If things were different, we would not repeatedly find discouraging statistics: only 60 percent completing high school; half of the teenagers in the labor force unable to find jobs; continued employment in routine, low-paid, low-status, insecure and unpleasant occupations; sixty percent of households below or just above the poverty line. Granted a certain margin of error and indications of minor improvements here and there, all of these measures and more describe people stuck at the economic bottom of United States society. Along with this goes a low social evaluation by others and very limited political power, especially the ability to change the system which keeps Puerto Ricans in a stigmatized, disadvantaged and subordinate condition.

For reasons beyond the scope of this paper, young Americans generally have very limited power in the system. Families and other institutions assist them in attaining a successful adult life. But this structure also discourages the effective participation of youth in the decision-making process, especially their urge for innovation. Alienation and apathy result from a perceived lack of integration in an adult society inclined to have cyclical mood swings that bring confusion about such basic values as equality. For minorities, youth could be a peak time for changing places in the inequitable arrangements produced by the American brand of racism and sexism. In the past, ASPIRA, the Young Lords Party and similar organizations have succeeded in fostering involvement in such changes. Today, however, low rates of voting and other forms of political expression show that minority youth do not see these changes as realistically possible. In the final analysis, an escape from adult society into one's leisure world makes more sense than a futile attempt to change the system.

A deeply rooted identify crisis intensifies this situation for Puerto Rican youth. Deprived of understanding, acceptance and opportunity in the United States, they generally consider being Puerto Rican both a positive and negative condition. Except for their families, very little in the environment teaches them something else. If the label "Puerto Rican" were abolished, almost all would fit into American society according to options already available: white, black and Latino. While these alternatives may offer greater power, sentiment and family ties sustain a basic loyalty to a Puerto Rican identity. But this refers only to a certain aspects of life, and is constantly undermined by rejection from authority figures having values traditional to Puerto Rico as a criterion of right and wrong. The low self-esteem typical of Puerto Rican youth stems from their perceptions of futility in measuring up to majority expectations in both the United States and Puerto Rico.

Observers generally agree that a drastic change in this destructive process would benefit the Puerto Rican people in the United States. To some extent, the distinction between "youth" and "community" is redundant. Half of the Puerto Ricans in the United States are younger than 20 years and those 20 to 35 make up almost a quarter of the population. There are now more children born in the United States than the generation of migrants who arrived by tens of thousands in the 1950s. Also, renewed migration from Puerto Rico during the 1970s and early 1980s has meant a further youthening, as thousands of teenagers and young adults have been added again. Today, Puerto Ricans are typically in transition to adulthood or in the initial stages of mature life. What happens in schooling and the quest for jobs is therefore crucial to the future of Puerto Ricans in the United States.

The major question is how greater power can be obtained. The evidence on political participation shows that conventional means promise only a certain degree of the empowerment needed to make a real difference in such institutions as public schools, and in the provision for jobs to earn a decent living:

- at least 75 percent of Puerto Ricans live in areas defined as "central-city," including (but not limited to) the "barrio" or ethnic neighborhoods of New York, Chicago, and several of the nation's largest cities;
- in the barrios most candidates for local office compete with other Puerto Ricans or other minorities for a very limited number of positions, and
- elsewhere Puerto Ricans are generally locked out of local politics by other groups that dominate the system. In either case
- those elected make up a fraction of the many who would work effectively for the community, if the established system allowed for wider involvement and representation.
- Most of the major issues require changes in the opportunity structure of entire administrative units;
- therefore, a major direction in Puerto Rican politics has been to use the executive position of community agencies for various political functions;
- another strategy has been to gain an appointment having a broad scope of influence, as director of a government program, or advisor to a major political figure. Today, more than a dozen Puerto Rican elected officials and a modest number of appointed administrators represent the community at city, state and federal levels. Nevertheless, this remains a fraction of the positions that could be filled, if participation were more equitable and at least, adequate.

What, then, would be needed to empower Puerto Rican youth? First, some sort of organizational arrangement that would provide the experience needed to get involved in politics. As in the process of breaking into a work career, young people need some structure for participation and representation in the decisions made by elected or appointive public officials and agency executives.

The National Puerto Rican Coalition could obtain support for an intern program providing a chance to work and learn in various government settings. It could employ youth to help in lobbying activities and facilitate their participation in such efforts for American youth, in general.

These solutions assume a desire for involvement that is generally absent, however. In order to turn apathy into positive energy, a clearly defined and easy-handed way of organizing people at the neighborhood level is the point of departure. This means raising their everyday experience of alienation from school, unemployment, and poverty to the realization that these are typically Puerto Rican problems, and not matters exclusively of individual or family choice. For the purpose, a communication network is needed: people must be informed as to what is (not) happening in regard to Puerto Ricans. The dissemination of timely, accurate and informative materials is a central goal of the National Puerto Rican Coalition.

But equally essential and currently weak is the process of people defining and prioritizing their wants and requirements for having a decent life. These wishes must then be converted into a message sent through a system of increasing influence to levels where solutions can be sought for common problems. Better coordination of community organizations facilitating the flow of return information could thus be considered.

Secondly, provision must be made for the effective representation of the various segments of the Puerto Rican community in the communication process. This requires an organizational structure in which each segment relates to a group or person who articulates their point of view and wishes. Also, the unification of all segments must be facilitated for action on community issues. When and where it makes an important difference to be Puerto Rican, the structure must count on the support of as many Puerto Ricans as possible.

These requirements go well beyond the present goals and objectives of the National Puerto Rican Coalition. Perhaps the most efficient way of achieving empowerment would be in a national political organization, in which the Coalition would play an essential role. This comprehensive structure would not be attached to an elective or appointive position, or any other political body. Its mission would include such goals as the ability to:

- link major community issues with a national Puerto Rican agenda, coordinating the strength of efforts at all levels;
- retain adaptability to community size, ranging from a few hundred in certain cities to over a million in New York;
- enable Puerto Ricans to negotiate and manage coalitions with other constituencies;
- influence public policy through advocacy of specifically Puerto Rican concerns and broader issues in which Puerto Ricans may have a decided opinion;
- limit other aspects of its program to empowerment functions: community organization and communication, fact finding and reporting, the monitoring of progress

in the implementation of policy directives, and advisory services to government, business and civic institutions;

- avoid substituting for, or duplicating functions attributable in the United States to public officials and agencies, the foundations or voluntary associations oriented toward improving life conditions;
- refer all requests for things other than empowerment to the appropriate sources of help from participating organizations and other agencies;
- dispense money and jobs only to the extent required to fulfill the empowerment functions of the structure. In brief, the comprehensive structure needed is a political organization controlled by Puerto Ricans, broadly representative of our people, and capable of addressing major community concerns as simply and economically as possible—our own system for coping with and gaining advantages from other power systems in the United States.

My reading of our situation in the research completed and personal knowledge of many Puerto Ricans in a variety of places and conditions is that the elements of empowerment already exist in our community. First, because there is a great deal of pent-up energy among Puerto Rican youth, stemming from years of frustration, anger and resentment. Secondly, because we have already taken steps to organize ourselves in response to our perceptions of needs and wants. Along with the National Coalition, several other organizations could be united in the comprehensive structure. In ways later detailed in this paper, effective leadership could emerge among Puerto Rican youth in the United States. In many places there are networks of community ties, friendships and acquaintances that could crystalize into a genuine national constituency.

The third and most convincing argument for empowerment is that we now have the solutions at hand. After so many years of research, thinking and practical efforts, we know what we want. The question of how we can get it demands a similar answer. True, our experience generally shows that the "how" reduces to political power. But the specific strategies needed and considered appropriate to attain political power have yet to be clearly defined and implemented. Later sections of this paper will describe how the comprehensive structure could act to significantly improve living conditions for Puerto Ricans in the next five years. However, a preliminary consideration regards the prices to be paid for the potential benefits of empowerment.

The Costs

First, empowerment would necessitate unity among Puerto Ricans in the United States. The cost would be our willingness and determination to put aside conflicting viewpoints and scattered loyalties for the sake of our people. It is a high price to pay because previous policies have promoted divisiveness among Puerto Ricans and internal struggles are taken for granted in many things that (do not) happen. Moreover, our present system of rewards and penalties for action is tied to the consequences of disunity. We all have something to lose in deciding to work together as a single force.

Secondly, some of the energy, attention, time and money invested in the pursuit of previous policies must be redirected. I am not suggesting that we abandon nor transform the institutions created to benefit the community. What is necessary is to better coordinate their efforts as interrelated parts of a comprehensive structure. Thus, a major discussion point is how effective collaboration could be arranged.

A third price we must pay is our effort to make an inventory of our sources of strength and relate these to the plan for cooperation. Regarding resources for implementing policies we have been accustomed to think first about preparing proposals for consideration by external funding agencies. My perception is that we need to first determine what we would like to (and can) do, on our own. And from a careful assessment of our strength, move to determine what we need from outside.

A fourth price is our actions to program victories. By this is meant support for what may initially appear to be minor successes, and a commitment to move from these to seemingly more important achievements. This is crucial for the average person to perceive some tangible evidence of changes, and to acquire hope and confidence in the general improvement of living conditions.

The fifth price is our effort to obtain a more clearly defined and advantageous relation with the "significant other" groups that influence our world: Puerto Ricans in Puerto Rico, other Hispanic groups in the United States, American blacks, and other oppressed minorities. For example, many of the employment and income problems of Puerto Rican youth are common to issues in the American women's movement. In an era of coalition, it empowers Puerto Ricans to find out how we fit in and can draw strength from our relations with other systems of power.

A sixth price will be our determination to seek the additional resources needed for empowerment to work. Up to now, this has meant reliance on government grants and private foundations. As these funds have continually diminished, alternatives must be considered. This may require us to reorient our approach to resources, away from "the project" to other ways of accomplishing our objectives.

Fixing the Public School Mess

The second major finding of the research completed is that most of Puerto Rican youth are poorly prepared by their schooling for jobs other than the least advantageous in the American labor force. Let us accept the basic assumption that human populations contain a relatively constant level and array of natural ability. The development of talent therefore depends largely on the opportunity structure of the society in which people reach maturity.

In our experience with public education, the record shows that:

- the major avenue for the expression of talent is limited to the less than half who graduate from high school;
- the large remainder (and many high school graduates, as well) are destined to use their talent in ways that promise little or no developmental changes, beyond earning enough money "to get by;"
- some 15 to 20 percent are enabled to have work careers offering an opportunity for using talent in more than routine and repetitive tasks;
- most of these are engaged in technical or organizational specialties typical of skilled manual occupations, office jobs and with pre-determined descriptions of lower-to-middle levels of supervision;
- only a very small percentage of youth reach achievement levels defined by the American majority as deserving a high level of social recognition and financial reward;
- those finding an appropriate environment for the fulfillment of creative talent make up a statistical rarity.

In comparison with other segments of the United States population, the data clearly document an unchanging set of constraints on the evolution of our human resources. True, certain signs of minimal progress can be squeezed out of the numbers. But the past 20 years have signified much greater advances for the rest of the nation's population. My research led to the conclusion that simply having a job contributes much more than formal education to the job occupational and income levels of Puerto Rican youth. This points to structural constraints in the economic order, later addressed in this paper. It also returns the argument to the need for a reform in the educational system, because whatever opportunities develop in the economic order must be accompanied by a significant improvement in the educational attainment of Puerto Rican youth.

On the topic of how we can move from facts to action, the Puerto Rican community's efforts to solve this problem must be cited in evidence. If any concern has ever elicited a broad-based, unanimous agreement among Puerto Ricans in the United States, it has been our desire to fix up what we consider to be a messy situation in the public school system. No other issue has commanded greater attention, energy and talent. As a people, our leadership is mainly composed of educators and professionals in service occupations, such as counseling, social case work, agency activities, and public administrative positions. It is therefore reasonable to expect some signs of success for the use of talent in this direction.

Reality is very different, however. Any fragment of information to the contrary must stand the test of an apparent consensus that only modest progress has been made in solving the public school mess. But more importantly, the repeated experience of alienation from the public school system in the United States has left many Puerto Rican leaders with a critical sense of what is needed in the education of Puerto Ricans. Although the use of this talent has produced alternative plans, the intellectual and emotional path of most Puerto Rican children through the public school system today resembles the experience of the parent generation before 1965.

A first step in changing the opportunity structure for Puerto Ricans would be gaining a much greater level of recognition, enablement and rewards groups and persons with innovative and effective plans to solve the public school mess, and for those with the organizational ability to carry out the plans. This would validate the occupational worth of workers in our community who made great efforts to reach excellence. Validation would in turn serve important purposes among Puerto Rican children. At least, it would provide them with a readily visible example of how Puerto Ricans can be successful at a high level of social recognition in the United States. The major occupational commitments of ethnic groups are known to strongly influence the life of succeeding generations. Having success in public education as a group specialty would greatly enhance the possibilities of developing Puerto Rican talent during the next 15 to 20 years.

The follow-up to this consideration does not involve a need for creating new organizational structures. Advancement in education is a major goal of most Puerto Rican organizations, and in other areas of community concern the predominant mode of action shows a strong academic influence. The crucial need seems to be for an effective link between existing community resources and the groups or persons holding decision-making power over and within the public school system. It is essentially a political, and not an intellectual issue. The missing element is power.

Part of the political problem would be solved by somehow equating the orientation of non-Puerto Rican constituencies with the composition and needs of the school-age population. In the typical political unit, most voters are majority persons, generally older than Puerto Ricans and less concerned with school issues, although vaguely aware that the "Spanish" people consider (bilingual) education a major issue. By comparison, most of the classmates of Puerto Rican children are blacks and Latinos trying to find a place for themselves in a basically hostile environment. In some cases, white Anglo caution about change is strengthened by the black drive for integration. For reaffirming assimilation or gaining in number of minority children, it helps both whites and blacks to think of "Hispanic" children as movable from their neighborhoods to a dispersed set of specialty schools, or as nothing special, if they stay near home. As a general result, the predominent political influences emerging from the general public to the elected officials remain mostly contrary to Puerto Rican concerns in education.

Let us imagine, however, that improvement and efficiency in public education were to become a generic political issue. Regardless of who was to blame, each Puerto Rican child who left the school system or did not reach the fulfillment of talent would represent a negative product. Other such outcomes would be easy to find: the encouragement of girls away from mathematics and the sciences; the general lowering of reading and verbal scores; and serious problems of interfacing with rapid labor force changes and redirections in the American economy. An idea often heard nowadays is to look at the public school system as a major institution in need of being strengthened and reorganized. If this idea were to have broad-based support it might enhance the opportunities of Puerto Rican leaders to implement their plans for reform in public education. That is, if Puerto Rican interests were a genuine part of such reform.

It may be unrealistic to expect such a change on a national level, at least in the near future. But as the municipal governments of the nation's largest cities consolidate their minority leadership, it may begin in certain places. Just as with major policy changes in the past, the reform would vary from place to place. Much would depend on the workability of coalitions with other constituencies and the local importance of the quality-in-education issues.

In any case, there are some practical activities that could be supported with a view to enabling Puerto Ricans to initiate reform:

- much greater resources could bolster networking among Puerto Rican educators and civic leaders;
- their attention could be focused (once more) on developing workable plans for the quality education of Puerto Ricans; but this time, provision must be made for an organizational linkage with the decision-makers over and within the school system, and
- political pressure must be exerted to assure receptivity to the recommendations at the highest decision-making level of a city's public school system, and
- middle management positions such as principal and school district supervisor must be opened to Puerto Ricans oriented to change, in order to implement the plans in areas of significant enrollment.

The last two points are the most important, because they are the elements which generally have not had an adequate chance in attempts to solve the public school mess up to the present time. In many communities Puerto Ricans are not represented in school staffing, except as teacher's aides or instructors incidental to the education of Puerto Rican children. In New York City and Chicago an increasing number of Puerto Ricans have been appointed as program specialists and principals. Puerto Rican district superintendents and even a chancellor of public education have been appointed in New York. But such appointments provide only a partial solution if unrelated to the reform measures developed by our community, or if political circumstances constrain our ability to implement the needed changes.

Another missing element is the participation of Puerto Rican youth in the needed educational reform. Certainly, most of their disaffection has been with the schools attended. But a lack of communication with older Puerto Ricans has also lessened the involvement of youth in proposed changes. Solutions to the public school mess are typically generated from graduate studies, conferences, and academic experience at higher levels—not in consultation with the children and adolescents affected. Thus, what may seem a perfect policy may partly miss the mark and fail to elicit the involvement of the people for whom it was intended. A provision for genuinely participating in change would also enable Puerto Rican youth to make known what few researchers have documented; namely, factors contributing to success or failure at the classroom level. This kind of information is essential for the practical working out of solutions beyond the "model program" stage of development.

Research and programs developed by ASPIRA and the Hispanic Alliance in Chicago have shown that Puerto Rican college students are also interested in fixing the public school mess. With sufficient orientation and organization, college students could serve in part-time and para-professional roles in the elementary and secondary schools. With supervision and guidance from teachers and school officials they could offer career orientation and activities aimed at raising motivation among Puerto Rican children. For example, certain college students could be guest speakers on the Puerto Rican community in social study classes. Others could tutor small groups on reading or simply be available for rap sessions. The general objective would be to facilitate contact between the children and persons much like themselves, who have survived in the educational system.

Since most Puerto Rican college students depend on a part-time job to finance their education, little time is now left for things other than work and study. A special program substituting the para-professional activities just described for the jobs held by college students would make it possible for them to serve in that capacity. It would also be an incentive for high school students to advance their education at the university level. The interpersonal communication and leadership experience would be of considerable value to the community, as college graduates would later assume positions of professional responsibility in labor situations involving Puerto Rican workers.

Recasting the Puerto Rican Image

The third major research conclusion is that Puerto Rican youth are excluded from many career opportunities by job segregation. This means assignment by social and economic forces to such work as repetitive machine operation in factories; janitorial functions; restaurant kitchen help; assistance in institutionalized care and supermarket cashier and stockroom responsibilities. These jobs are considered "Puerto Rican" in much the same way as secretaries and nurses are expected to be women. The point here is not just that Puerto Rican jobs are low-paid, low-status, insecure and unpleasant occupations; but more importantly, the flow of Puerto Rican youth into "nonconventional" careers is impeded by the general public's assessment of what they should be doing for a living.

The usual policy approach to enable Puerto Rican youth to follow nonconventional career lines centers on an arrangement to let a small number in, by exception to the discriminatory pattern of employment. The assumption is that their success will somehow open doors for more Puerto Ricans and eventually the community will benefit from the mobility of its more successful members. The resources needed are often in the form of financial assistance for learning specialities in which Puerto Ricans are hardly represented. Placement on an affirmative action basis is usually considered as a follow-up to training in nonconventional fields. The ultimate goal is supposed to be changes in social restrictions limiting the employment of Puerto Ricans to what are now considered Puerto Rican jobs. Theoretically, Puerto Rican youth could then aspire to any job, as long as they had the required talent, preparation and motivation.

The strategy just described remains crucial to our future as a community and will be discussed in the following section. A more fundamental aspect requires preliminary attention, nevertheless. Frequently overlooked is the fact that the roots of job segregation are in the mental images of people, particularly those held by individuals with power in shaping the labor force: corporate investors, major employers, the clients of big business and government officials. Therefore, a direct and effective way of opening opportunities for Puerto Ricans would be in changing the way we are viewed by these decision makers. In other words, more positive stereotypes may open doors, if a concerted effort were made to portray Puerto Ricans in a more favorable way than the negative tradition initiated by the "West Side Story" and the New York Daily Mirror.

Again, the Puerto Rican community's experience can be called in evidence. Aside from public education, our high-level skills tend to cluster in the general area of visual and performing arts and such verbal skills as writing, conversation and interpretation. This means a highly competitive line of professional work, with very few individuals reaching a high degree of acclaim or even recognition as conventional workers. For Puerto Ricans, discrimination on a group and individual basis makes entry and success in the arts and communication even more difficult than for the average person. But in addition, a distinctly Puerto Rican style or subject matter usually has little or no appeal to decision makers, except as useful to portray traditionally negative stereotypes. As a result, a great deal of talent is misused or not used at all.

The basic policy direction suggested here is to enable this talent to reach some degree of professional fulfillment in changing the public image of Puerto Ricans. In one or another way, a national Puerto Rican multimedia effort is needed, to do the following:

- produce quality material about Puerto Ricans, in a positive and progressive manner, readily distributable to the community and the media;

- act as a surrogate for the network of contacts and influence missing to Puerto Rican artists and writers emerging from obscurity and poverty;
- negotiate cooperative ventures with the mainstream media, aimed at delivering a favorable message about Puerto Ricans to key decision-makers;
- develop major media outlets for a community viewpoint on issues affecting Puerto Ricans;
- serve as a focus and facilitating agent for efforts to create the imagery needed to instill pride among Puerto Rican youth;
- evaluate the impact of various lines of activity in changing the Puerto Rican image in the most effective, economical way, and
- adapt the same strategies to the improvement of the continental Puerto Rican image among the people living in Puerto Rico.

If all of these objectives were in some way fulfilled, Puerto Ricans would be labeled as "good for the United States" by more than the 17 percent shown in research on the American public. With a significant leap in our acceptability to, say, 50 percent or more, every other person in the opportunity structure would be disposed to consider a Puerto Rican for not just the arts and verbal abilities, but a wider range of technical and professional specialities. And, some of the most talented people in the community would be given a chance to develop their careers, in the process.

Community Economic Development

The fourth major set of research conclusions pertain to the many Puerto Rican young people who wish to have a rewarding career, but not necessarily one that requires a college education or highly creative kinds of work. They represent the persons for whom the generalizations are made on the basis of statistical analysis; for example, that:

- women outnumber men by a considerable margin, owing mainly to differences in migration patterns to and from Puerto Rico;
- women have sole responsibility for almost half of the households, a trend begun by older women, but which now includes many aged 20 to 29;
- migration is extensive (including within the United States) but about half have always lived in their community and many more "settle down" for long stretches;
- very low income results from jobs affected by the prevailing male/female wage differentials and the "triple jeopardy" of social restrictions on employment by gender, ethnicity and race;
- a shift away from factory work has meant greater numbers in low-status service jobs, although some are in clerical positions (women) or skilled manual jobs (men);
- full-time, yearly employment seldom describes the work situation: most depend on seasonal, part-time, or high-turnover jobs, if employed at all;
- unemployment is commonly experienced, both as officially recognized and disguised in the situation of persons not yet in or currently out of the "labor force" who nevertheless wish to work, if they had the chance;

- many of the underemployed or unemployed are willing to receive job training or go back to school, but marking time (e.g. "hanging out") and such alternatives as military service, having a baby or doing odd jobs (the "hustle") remain typical;
- simply having a job is much more important than educational background as an explanation for the level of money earned;
- given the chance to work, education does make an economic difference, but only for those with a post-secondary technical or professional background;
- with some minor exceptions, language(s) spoken and birthplace do not influence employment as greatly as the disruptive consequences of migration, itself;
- family obligations and health conditions have a much greater influence on who works and how money is earned in a household, than the education, language, birthplace and migration of its members;
- if the number of earners in a household is held constant in a mathematical comparison, women with sole responsibility are as effective in supporting their families as those sharing the responsibility with men; and
- the monetary contributions of Puerto Rican youth are a significant factor in the economic well-being of the households in which they live.

As a general picture, we find people struggling to survive, despite overwhelming constraints and with a sense of futility about what, if anything, can be done to improve their economic situation.

This picture differs essentially from the condition of "new" immigrants legally admitted to the United States in recent times, people assigned by the same economic forces to a position of upward mobility. The educational preference policy for admission has enabled them to join the American labor force after acquiring job-related skills in their nations of origin. White flight from central-city areas has further provided a preferential chance for many to move into middle-class environments. Downward mobility may be initially experienced as new immigrants take the kind of jobs usually assigned to American blacks and Indians, Chicanos and Puerto Ricans. But increasing evidence shows that immigrants with a social appearance different from long-standing native and citizen minorities are encouraged by the prevailing economic order to move up to positions generally closed to the minorities by a deeply-rooted pattern of exclusion.

Regardless of one's policy perspective, it must be recognized also that most of the factors in "what can be done" are not subject to direct control by the Puerto Rican community. Such things as the decline of neighborhood economies, the flight of employers from central-city areas and discrimination are matters of general policy in the metropolitan areas where most Puerto Ricans live. General policy has favored a shift to post-industrial employment in sectors like banking, tourism, interpersonal services and retail sales. Where the "good" jobs are found, Puerto Ricans are not welcome, except by exception to policies favoring others. Therefore, major changes in metropolitan policies must be approached directly; that is, through the kind of advocacy efforts already discussed: empowerment, fixing the public school mess, and recasting the Puerto Rican image.

There are, moreover, many things that can be done by Puerto Rican organizations to enhance the economic opportunities of their members. For example, the National Puerto Rican Coalition could expand its programs to include a major effort to overcome job segregation. Proposals for legislation and lobbying could be directed to Congressional action in creating effective employment for minority youth. Inclusion of Puerto Ricans in these and existing programs must be sought, for whatever job experience and earnings are provided. Leadership development projects could seek to identify and empower Puerto Rican youth at levels relevant to the average person. Greater pressure could be placed on major commercial organizations profitting from Puerto Rican consumers, to allocate positions to Puerto Ricans.

The ultimate success of these solutions depends, however, on our sense of community. Most Puerto Ricans live close together in the barrios and places to which we have become attached and consider "home." These sources of identity resemble the "municipios of origin" in the migrant generation. To the extent that we could revitalize this community experience along more contemporary lines, the chances improve for positive results. However, the mode of organization must be adapted to our circumstances in the United States, and to the characteristics of our population.

If our sense of community were somehow revitalized, it would make sense to have community economic development plans to guide teamwork and cooperative efforts among Puerto Ricans at the local level. Here we are not necessarily talking about "enterprise zones" and other policies depending primarily on the metropolitan establishment. The development plans suggested combine external funding with self-reliance in such activities as:

- strengthening the economic development functions of existing community service agencies (job training, placement, counseling, problem-solving and the like);
- organizing networks, similar to municipio-of-origin, but based on residence, friendship, lifestyle preferences or household condition;
- using the networks and a small staff of specialists for communication and assistance to people in their economic problems; for example:
- enabling people to become fully self-employed, obtaining credit or whatever arrangement is needed to expand business or conventionalize the hustle;
- getting people together to start a group project, perhaps by acquiring possession or management of a neighborhood business;
- redirecting certain forms of underground economy (e.g. gangs could provide a ready-made work team for housing rehabilitation);
- helping to start new businesses critically needed by the community: day-care centers, real estate agencies specializing in converting low-cost housing to cooperative ownership, and family health clinics;
- centralizing an exchange system for the barter of services that currently happens on a haphazard basis, limited to friendships and acquaintances;
- seeking ways for community people to extend their business to other places, where disposable income is in greater supply;
- encouraging networking among Puerto Ricans in major employment places—

possibly the formation or strengthening of work associations that might assume certain labor union functions, where unions are absent or ineffective;

- enabling a community business leadership to gain some measure of power over local job opportunities, market research and investments from outside;
- identifying major businesses benefited by Puerto Rican consumers and establishing goals for employment in them.

In sum, what is proposed is a policy redirection that assumes capitalism as a given factor which cannot be currently eliminated in our particular circumstances. It builds on the experience of the Puerto Rican community, gives it control of economic development, and makes it the prime beneficiary of the results.

A comprehensive example regarding teenagers may help to clarify the approach suggested. Through the networks composed of Puerto Ricans, the chance for a group of youth to work temporarily is arranged at a major business either already having some Puerto Rican workers, or profiting from the community's patronage. The logic of "batch" employment is that it partly serves as a talent search for steady workers, and partly as a learning situation for people looking around for a career. With adequate preparation from school or a surrogate way of communicating how to succeed, chances are that the situational "chemistry" will lead to the hiring of some of the temporary workers, with provisions for skill advancement and on-the-job training. The other participants will likely gain the impression that they, too, can do it, in another, more appropriate work situation. All participants would take with them some evidence of credibility as workers who were employed, trusted and paid for their effort. The prospect is not as exciting as starting a Puerto Rican controlled business and some of the other ideas suggested. But it illustrates how a community could take an initiative and carry out an employment project, with the kind of empowerment proposed and a modest amount of resources.

Conclusion

Self-determination as a culturally distinct community with a sense of peoplehood is the basic principle underlying the four policy redirections suggested: community empowerment; fixing the public school mess; recasting the Puerto Rican image, and localized economic development plans. The social, political and economic context strongly influences what can be done. Thus, in the United States, self-determination ultimately requires some kind of compromise with the American system. Strategies successful in the case of Italians and Jews are worth considering in this regard. But for Puerto Ricans, a different kind of racism and discrimination urges us to not foresake our public recognition as a "minority" group. Therefore, elements of assimilation and the civil rights movement must be blended with pluralism in developing the most workable policy. In so doing, the empowerment solution moves from what we have learned in past experiences to a perspective in which a genuinely Puerto Rican agenda has first priority among alternative considerations.

As a final comment I wish to say that this presentation has been academic in tone, but not necessarily in content. Its mode of expression differs from that of many other people who must be heard if empowerment is to become reality. In particular, we need to listen to Puerto Rican youth and incorporate their viewpoints, needs and wants into whatever policy will guide us from facts to action. Not only are the policies about and for them, but they are our most valued resource for the future. If only we could help them seek power, the problem of resources may someday become secondary to living out one's life in pride of being Puerto Rican!

NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL

COMMISSION ON BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES AND EDUCATION

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COMMITTEE ON THE STATUS OF
BLACK AMERICANS

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September 25, 1985
85-054

Honorable George Miller
Chairman
Select Committee on Children,
Youth, and Family
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am pleased to respond to your request for information on our committee's study to assess the status of Black Americans. The proposal is enclosed.

Should you wish, at your convenience I would be glad to discuss the activities of the Committee on the Status of Black Americans.

Your interest is most sincerely appreciated.

Very truly yours,

Gerald D. Jaynes
Gerald D. Jaynes
Study Director

Enclosure

cc: Robin M. Williams, Jr.
Chairman
Committee on the Status of
Black Americans

David A. Goslin
Executive Director
Commission on Behavioral and
Social Sciences and Education

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National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council
Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education

THE STATUS OF BLACK AMERICANS

Summary

A major assessment of the status of blacks in the United States will be carried out under the auspices of the Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education of the National Academy of Sciences. The primary purpose of the study, which will be conducted by a committee of distinguished social scientists, statisticians, legal scholars, and other experts, is to marshall, assess, and synthesize existing evidence from many different sources on the changes that have occurred on the status of black Americans over the 40-year period since World War II. A three-year study is envisioned at an estimated total cost of $1,700,000.

Introduction

In his path-breaking study of race relations in the United States,[1] the noted Swedish economist and sociologist Gunnar Myrdal predicted that the Second World War, an ideological war fought in the name of democracy, would bring with it a "redefinition of the Negro's status in America." The ideology of the war years stimulated black protest against second-class citizenship for, like other Americans, blacks were moved and inspired by the slogans of democracy. Unlike most other Americans, blacks were painfully aware of the disparity between the ideal and the practice of democracy in the United States, and they sought to use the international crisis to further their demands for racial equity at home. As the Pittsburgh Courier, a paper written for a predominantly black readership, put it: "What an opportunity the crisis has been . . . to persuade, embarrass, compel and shame our government and our nation . . . into a more enlightened attitude toward a tenth of its people!"[2]

This resolution to force the country to live up to its promise was manifested in A. Philip Randolph's March on Washington Movement. In the face of almost universal discrimination against blacks in the armed forces and defense industries, organizations like the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) began to organize protest meetings. Randolph consolidated the protest sentiment and focused it on the seat of government. Arguing that only the power of the organized masses could effect change, Randolph suggested that 10,000 blacks march on Washington, D.C. under the banner: "We loyal Negro-American citizens demand the right to work and fight for our country." So great was the enthusiasm for the march among the mass of black people that organizers projected that 50,000 to 100,000 marchers would congregate in Washington on July 1, 1941. As a result of these plans, President Roosevelt established the President's Committee on Fair Employment Practices, and, with this victory in hand, Randolph cancelled the march.

The federal government continued to be concerned with the low morale of blacks during the War. The Office of Facts and Figures, later to become The Office of War Information, called a meeting of black leaders in March, 1942 to find out the reasons for widespread disaffection among blacks. The distance between what the black spokesmen wanted and what the government gave them in the 1940s was great; they asked for a reversal of segregationist policies and wanted the government to lead the nation by actively supporting integration. The federal response was halting and ambivalent. The Fair Employment Practices Committee, for example, had no enforcement powers. Yet the first steps were taken in these years to overturn the pattern of race relations established at the end of Reconstruction. During World War II, blacks were admitted for the first time into the Army Air Corps, the Marines, and naval grades above messman. The Fair Employment Practices Committee had some success in advancing the employment of blacks in defense industries and, perhaps more important, established a precedent suggesting that the right to nondiscriminatory employment might be regarded as a civil right.[3]

The pace of change increased during the Truman years. The election of 1948 marked the emergence of black political power in urban centers in the north and west; analysts attribute Truman's victory to the black vote in certain pivotal states, and although the Truman Administration was not able to get a civil rights act through Congress as the party platform had promised, a number of significant initiatives were taken. Of prime importance was Truman's directive ending segregation in the armed services. This change in policy meant that during the Korean War, millions of men and women of both races lived and fought together as equals; for the first time, white soldiers served under the leadership of black officers, particularly noncommissioned officers.

On the domestic front, federal activities in support of integration in the 1950s were less immediately effective, but of long range significance. Both Truman and Eisenhower ordered firms doing business with the federal government to adhere to nondiscriminatory employment practices, although the policy was not enforced effectively until the 1960s. A presidential commission appointed by Truman to study race relations in the United States issued a report that called for the full integration of black Americans into all aspects of the society. Although it took more than a decade for the federal government to back up a policy of integration with the necessary array of legislative and regulatory enforcement mechanisms, the report, and the establishment of a Civil Rights Commission in 1957, signaled a fundamental shift in national policy with regard to the status of blacks.

Meanwhile, a number of pressure groups representing the interests of blacks were effecting incremental change through the courts and through direct action techniques. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People battled in the courts against segregation, accumulating a series of judicial decisions that struck down restrictive covenants in housing, discrimination in publicly owned recreational facilities like swimming pools and parks, segregation in interstate transportation, and, with the Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education (1954), segregation in public education. The Congress on Racial Equality (CORE), founded in 1942, used nonviolent, direct-action techniques, particularly the sit-in, to combat discrimination in public accommodations in northern cities. The success of many of these efforts indicated a shifting of the attitudes of whites that also found legislative expression as more and more western and northern states during the 1950s passed laws prohibiting discrimination in employment, housing, and public accommodations. It was not until the 1960s, however, that the seeds planted in preceding decades came to fruition.

On June 11, 1963, President Kennedy announced in a televised address his intention to ask Congress to make a legislative commitment to the proposition that "race has no place in American life or law." The 1954 Supreme Court school decisions had restored the principle of equality to its central place in the Constitution. But local resistance, played out most recently in the streets of Birmingham, Alabama, had convinced Kennedy of the need to establish, by statute, federal rights and federal remedies that would bring to life the promise of the Constitution.

> "The old code of equity under which we live," he said, "commands for every wrong a remedy, but in too many parts of the country, wrongs are inflicted on Negro citizens and there are no remedies at law. Unless the Congress acts, their only remedy is in the street."

Kennedy pointed out to his listeners the moral violence done to the organizing principles of the nation--a nation that preaches freedom around the world--by continued toleration of second-class citizenship for the Negro. He called upon Congress to enact legislation giving all Americans the rights necessary to enjoy the fruits of citizenship--the right to receive equal service in hotels, theaters, restaurants, and stores; an equal chance to seek education and employment; the right to participate unhindered in the political life of the community. He also asked Congress to authorize the federal government to participate more fully in lawsuits designed to end segregation in public education.[4]

The Johnson Administration translated this program into law. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, supplemented by a much strengthened Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the Fair Housing Act of 1968, brought the power of the federal government to bear on the enforcement of individual rights.

It is a peculiarity of the American federal system that the police power resides in the states. The national government has no general authority over the administration of justice, maintenance of order, or promotion of the general security and welfare. It is also the case that, in the normal course of events, rights must be asserted by individuals; the central government cannot in general bring suit in the federal courts or otherwise protect the constitutional rights guaranteed to citizens.

In passing the Civil Rights Acts of the 1960s, Congress recognized that long-term official and systematic discrimination against black Americans had created special problems that could not be resolved by private citizens bringing suit in state courts. The Acts defined a set of specific circumstances under which federal courts, the Justice Department, or the executive agencies were empowered to intervene to protect the constitutional rights of classes of individuals or to influence a state's exercise of the police power. The statement of purpose preceding the 1964 Act illustrates the way in which federal power was marshalled to advance federal civil rights:

AN ACT

> To enforce the constitutional right to vote, to confer jurisdiction upon the district courts of the United States to provide injunctive relief against discrimination in public accommodations, to authorize the Attorney General to institute suits to protect constitutional rights in public facilities and public education, to extend the Commission on Civil Rights, to prevent discrimination in federally assisted programs, to establish a Commission on Equal Employment Opportunity, and for other purposes.

Administrative and judicial implementation of the several Civil Rights Acts over the last two decades has wrought significant changes in the structure of government, in the relationship between government and the private sector, and in the legal status of blacks. There have been dramatic shifts in racial attitudes, and in the day to day relations between the races. Whether the forces for change have resulted in an improved economic and educational standing for blacks is not as clear. Not since Gunnar Myrdal published An American Dilemma in 1944 has there been an attempt to paint a broad portrait of the life of blacks in American society. With the approach of the fortieth anniversary of the publication of that study, a serious, empirically-based stocktaking is in order.

The Proposed Study

Accordingly, a major assessment of the status of blacks in the United States is proposed. The proposed study will marshall, assess, and synthesize existing evidence from many different sources--social and economic indicators, the results of relevant social science research (of which there is a great deal), and the law--on the changes that have occurred since World War II. In addition to this essentially descriptive portrait based on social indicators, the study will explore the black experience in the context of the historical forces that have shaped relations between the races and influenced their respective economic and social destinies.

After careful consideration of matters of scope and coverage, the Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education recommended that the study focus solely on black Americans rather than including other groups defined by race, gender, national origin or age. This decision was based on the relative paucity of data available for other subpopulations and the sheer size of the undertaking even when the focus is limited to black/white comparisons.

The study will be organized around five subjects: education; economic status; political participation; health and demography; social and cultural pluralism and integration; and health. In each substantive area the study will:

- marshal descriptive data on the changing position of blacks in American society since 1940;
- draw from the wealth of existing research to describe the cultural context, including the increasingly complex framework of laws, policies, and institutions within which the observed changes have occurred;
- explore the consequences, anticipated and unanticipated, of public and private initiatives to ameliorate the position of blacks in America.

1. Education. It was on the question of equal access to public education that the federal government took the most important early steps toward establishing federal standards to which local law and custom would have to conform. Yet, though the Supreme Court declared segregated schools unconstitutional under the equal protection clause in 1954 (Brown v. Board of Education), little change was evident in the southern and border states a decade later. In the 1963-64 school year, only about 9.3 percent of black public school students were attending school together with whites. The figure was even lower (1.6 percent) for the Old South states; in Mississippi, not a single black child attended school with white students.

Under the authority of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the federal government became an active participant in school desegregation. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare was empowered to issue guidelines and timetables, and the Attorney General to bring suit against an offending school system or college. In the same month that HEW issued school desegregation guidelines (April, 1965), Congress passed the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, the first general federal school aid bill in history. This law was designed to provide funds to support enrichment programs for educationally deprived (defined as low-income) children of all races. It signaled the government's recognition that equal educational opportunity was not just a matter of the racial makeup of the classroom, but of improving the quality of the education provided to the disadvantaged child.

Federal policy has brought about a number of significant structural changes in public education, among them the dismantling of a dual system of public schools, the introduction of large-scale bussing to achieve racial balance in the schools (with a consequent weakening of the neighborhood school), and the infusion of federal monies for compensatory education programs. Federal desegregation and educational enrichment activities have also shaped current conceptions of equal educational opportunity as, indeed, they have directly or indirectly generated much of the data now available for study. Several large data sets exist which will enable the committee to describe changes that have occurred in the demography of school attendance and in educational outcomes as measured by number of years of schooling, number of graduates from high school, college, graduate and professional school, test scores, and other indicators of academic achievement. In addition, there is an abundance of non-quantitative research on the effects of a variety of educational and social programs that have been introduced by colleges and school systems as adjuncts to desegregation--such things as open-admissions, in-service training for teachers, culturally sensitive textbooks and curricula, compensatory education programs, special counseling programs, and student activities designed to ease the social integration of newcomers to a school. Drawing upon the large-scale data collections and a generation of research on racial integration, it should now be possible to draw conclusions about changes in the quality of education available to black Americans over the last forty years.

The salient questions with regard to school attendance patterns are: To what extent do black and white children learn in the same classrooms today and to what extent have various policies and demographic trends tended to preserve racially segregated schools? One can point to several large metropolitan areas in the South--Charlotte and St. Petersburg, for example--where public schools were integrated peacefully with little loss of white enrollment. Nevertheless, school integration became a divisive issue in many cities, North and South, in the 1960s and 1970s as parents opposed the reassignment of their children by federal courts. In some of these places a pattern of racial separation emerged which in some respects resembles the situation in the South prior to 1964. That is, in such cities as Detroit, Atlanta, and New Orleans over 80 percent of the public school students are black while white children in these metropolitan areas attend private schools or the largely white public schools found in the suburban ring.

Since 1967 the Office for Civil Rights and predecessor agencies have gathered data about the racial composition of the students and staff in individual public schools and school districts. An analysis of these data will allow us to determine, at both the national and local level, whether black children are increasingly going to the same schools as white students. In addition, several of the Census Bureau surveys indicate whether a student is enrolled in a public school, a parochial one, or another type of private school. These data may be used to estimate the racial composition of different types of schools and to ascertain the characteristics of families who elect to send their children to private schools.

An even more detailed picture of the current make up of the schools will be provided by a joint project of the National Center for Educational Statistics and the Census Bureau to retrieve the 1980 census data by school district. Census data will be collated with NCES school district data on pupils, teachers, facilities, finance, and curriculum.

Census data can also provide information about certain aspects of educational attainment, for example, whether blacks and whites enroll in similar courses or programs, and whether they complete about the same number of years of education. Evidence suggests that the racial gap in attainment is narrowing, but that it has not been eliminated. Blacks who finished their educational training just before the start of World War II completed about three and one-half fewer years of schooling on average than whites. Among those finishing school around 1980, the average racial difference was about three-tenths of a year.

The Bureau of the Census annually gathers data about educational attainment and, from time to time, also obtains information about courses of study. These sources permit documentation of similarities and differences in school attendance patterns by race. In particular, one can determine the pace at which racial differences declined and can describe persisting differences such as the continuing tendency for a higher proportion of whites than blacks to complete secondary school. Annual enrollment data provide information about grade retardation among the young and college or university enrollment among older students. These data relate a student's enrollment status to the characteristics of his or her family so that one can distinguish racial differences from socioeconomic ones. A similar distinction can be made in analyzing racial convergence in college attendance. During the 1970s, the college enrollment rates of blacks increased substantially more than those of whites. This may have been encouraged by a variety of governmental loan and benefit programs which made it easier for people from moderate income families to attend college. With Census Bureau data on the economic status of college students and their families, moreover, it will be possible to describe racial patterns by income levels.

The statistical portrait available from Census Bureau data can be supplemented by standardized test data, which provide a different sort of measure of educational achievement. Since Coleman's study, Equality of Educational Opportunity (1966) focused public and professional attention on educational outcomes, a variety of large surveys have tested elementary and secondary students to determine their mastery of various subjects. Especially important are the data from the National Assessment of Educational Progress conducted for the National Institute of Education since 1969. Since this program administers standardized tests to samples of students on a recurring basis, it is possible to monitor changes over time in the performance of black children as compared with white children. A recently reported analysis of the NAEP data showing a narrowing of the gap in performance between black and white students on tests of basic reading, writing, and math skills illustrates the potential contribution of this data source to our understanding of the educational status of black children.[5]

A second important source of information on educational attainment is offered by the National Longitudinal Survey of the High School Class of 1972 and its successor, High School and Beyond--the Class of 1980. The first of these surveys sampled 20,000 students, with oversampling of low SES schools and, therefore, of minorities. The followups continued until 1980 and provide a rich source of data on further education and employment.

There is an extensive body of scholarly research to draw upon in elaborating the picture presented by large-scale data. The accumulation of research findings should now make it possible to know in detail how the educational condition of black youngsters has changed over the forty-year period under study and to understand a good deal about how changes in attainment relate to educational policies and instructional programs that were designed to improve the quality of education received by black and disadvantaged students. In the search for explanatory principles, it might well be possible to identify the factors that have made some efforts at racial integration more successful than others; to draw conclusions about the relationships between the racial composition of the classroom and the quality of education; to analyze the interplay between housing patterns, economic disadvantage, and school performance; and in general to reflect on the process of trying to engineer change.

2. Economic Status. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 made it unlawful for employers to discriminate on the basis of race, sex, ethnic origin, or religion in the selection, promotion, remuneration, and general treatment of employees. The provisions of Title VII were extended to governmental units in 1972, and certain protections were made available to older employees and people with handicaps in separate legislation.

The 1964 Act created an agency to oversee implementation of its provisions and this agency, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, has played an extremely important role in federal policy formation over the years. It also gave the Attorney General authority to bring suit against private employers whose practices gave him cause to suspect systematic resistance to the law. The 1972 amendment gave the Commission the power to bring suits. Protection against discrimination by federal contractors is provided by Executive Order.

The impact of federal equal employment policy has been widespread. Few employers of any size are in a position to neglect to document their selection procedures in anticipation of the possibility of a compliance review or legal challenge. Thousands of investigations of complaints are conducted each year and the federal courts have litigated hundreds of employment discrimination cases, some of them involving sizeable awards of damages, since the Act was passed. Many a municipal police force and fire department is now selecting employees according to a court-ordered formula.

Tracing the impact of these changes on the economic power base of blacks is a delicate and complicated task. In assessing the economic status of blacks as it relates to employment, the proposed study will focus on three issues: the hiring and promotion of blacks in public and private employment and the armed forces; the occupational attainment of employed blacks; and unemployment and non-participation in the labor force. There is a sizeable research literature on the effects of affirmative action plans such as the Philadelphia Plan, as well as evaluations of the impact of job training programs. On the basis of this literature, by using data gathered by the implementing agencies (EEOC and the Office of Federal Contract Compliance) and by following the record of court-imposed hiring plans, the study will seek to establish currents of change that provide texture for the more general portrait of economic and social status afforded by census and social security administration data.

There are several different and apparently conflicting indicators of racial change in the area of employment. On the one hand, there has been a rapid expansion in the number of blacks employed as professionals, as managers or in the skilled crafts. Richard Freeman documents these trends in his book, Black Elite: The New Market for Highly Qualified Black Americans, which reports that college educated blacks compete quite successfully with similar whites. On the other hand, when the entire occupational distribution is examined, blacks are still concentrated in the least prestigious and lowest paying categories. The proportion of employed men holding white collar jobs was higher for whites on the eve of the Korean War than it was for blacks in 1980. In addition, there is an increasing population of black men who neither work nor look for work; that is, they are out of the labor force. In 1980, about one black man in ten aged 25 to 64 was in that status. Many commentators and essayists have suggested that this ten percent represents an underclass of men who lack marketable skills and depend on welfare or illegal activities to support themselves. The employment history of black women since the 1940s provides a strikingly different picture. In 1940, 70 percent of all employed women worked as domestics or farm laborers; by 1979, the proportion had dropped to about seven percent for black women and two percent for white women. At the same time, there was a dramatic increase in white collar employment; by 1979, 29 percent of black women held clerical jobs.

The analysis of racial differences in the field of employment will also focus upon the occupations of those who hold jobs, the rate of unemployment and the number and characteristics of those who are not in the labor force. Since the 1940s, the Bureau of the Census has conducted monthly surveys of employment which provide demographic and geographic information about all adults. For the employed, the monthly surveys disclose the nature of their work, something about their employer, their hours of work and their earnings. For the unemployed, data are presented about their last job, the duration of unemployment and the techniques used to search for a new job. Those who are out of the labor force are asked for an explanation, for example, going to school, illness, keeping house or not working for some other reason.

In addition to the Census Bureau data, which permit an analyst to monitor changes over time in employment opportunities for blacks, a number of other data sources provide longitudinal information for individuals. The Continuous Work History Sample of the Social Security Administration, a file of records for 1 percent of the individuals issued social security numbers each year for the period 1937-1977, includes data on year of birth, sex, race, wage and earnings data, and social security benefit status. This data is supplemented by a longitudinal file in which all the records associated with each employee in the sample during the time span of the file appear together. In addition to the information provided by administrative records, the Panel on the Study of Income Dynamics conducted by the University of Michigan's Institute for Social Research and the National Longitudinal Study carried out at Ohio State have tracked year to year changes in employment and earnings for national samples since the late 1960s. The National Longitudinal Survey recently expanded its sample of young people who are completing school and entering the labor force. These sources include fairly substantial numbers of blacks; they will allow comparison of the occupational careers of blacks and whites as they pass through the life cycle.

The Department of Labor has spent hundreds of millions of dollars on employment and training programs for the disadvantaged, and these programs have in turn given rise to numerous evaluations which will add important information to the employment history of blacks in the period.

Because a large proportion of the black community lives in a condition of relative poverty, it is important to look at the network of federal assistance programs that has grown up since the 1940s as well as the civil rights provisions intended to ensure that the programs are administered in a non-discriminatory fashion. These benefits are made available through over 400 programs totaling approximately $50 billion as of 1982 and administered by some 25 federal agencies. They include food stamps, medicare, medicaid, aid to families with dependent children, and unemployment insurance as well as funds for institutions serving the poor such as schools, hospitals, and vocational rehabilitation centers.

The significance of federal assistance programs, particularly for individual and family income, has increased enormously since the passage of the Civil Rights Act. For example, in 1981 there were over 22.4 million participants in the Food Stamp program receiving over $10.6 billion in benefits. In 1960, the program did not exist.

The monitoring activities of federal agencies under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 have produced a wealth of data on benefits and recipients in virtually all of the 400 program areas. These data are not easy to synthesize because the federal programs, with the exception of Food Stamps, vary extensively from state to state. Nevertheless, analysis would be possible in a few selected critical areas with reference to participation in benefit programs and proportional distribution of benefits. And some useful syntheses already exist, for example, the Aid to Families with Dependent Children Survey, which began in 1948 and was biennial from 1967 to 1979.

An important aspect of the economic status of black Americans which merits study is family composition and income. From the point of view of the general welfare, the crucial question is the net effect of changes in individual's opportunities since the 1940s on the well-being of black families. Most people live in family units, pooling income and sharing resources, and the well-being of children in particular is dependent on their family circumstance.

In 1947, the median income of black and other minority families was 51 percent that of white families. By the end of the 1960s, the ratio had increased to 63 percent. Even more striking gains were made in reductions in the number and proportion of black families in poverty. In 1959, the first year for which data are available, nearly half (48 percent) of all black families had incomes below the federally defined poverty line (then $2,973). By 1969 the percentage had fallen to 28 percent. But increases in black family income did not continue in the 1970s. By 1977, the black-white median family income ratio had fallen to 57 percent, while the poverty status of black families remained about the same.

PRIVILEGED INFORMATION

Clearly, an indicator such as the income of black families is a composite that reflects not only the earnings or other income of various family members but also the number of income recipients in each family. Poverty status or other measures of well-being that attempt to define need take into account the number of dependents as well. The post-war period has seen dramatic changes in family composition and labor force participation among both blacks and whites. More people, both young and old, live alone. Fertility among never married women has increased. Rates of separation and divorce have increased. More families are headed by single women. At the same time, the fertility of married women has decreased and more married women work in the labor force. Men's labor force participation rate has fallen. In 1978, only about one-third of all families with children consisted of a working father and a mother who stayed at home with the children. While the increase in families with multiple earners and the decrease in number of dependents per family act to raise family incomes, the growth in the proportion of families headed by single women tends to lower family incomes. The decline in median black family income in recent years is at least partially attributable to the growth in the proportion of black families maintained by women; over half of these families were poor in 1977.

The question of how much of the black-white differences in family well-being is the contribution of differences in family size and living arrangements and how much is the contribution of differences in labor force participation, earnings, and other income sources is still unanswered. The effects of changes in such transfer programs as food stamps, housing allowances, medicaid and medicare, and family assistance programs, particularly recent ones, on family well-being also merit attention. Differences in the use of these programs by different types of families have important implications for the well-being of family members which need to be studied further.

The availability of 10 years of data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics of the University of Michigan as well as comparable data for much of the period from the decennial censuses and current population surveys, supplemented by the 1967 Survey of Economic Opportunity, the 1976 Survey of Income and Education, the NORC National Longitudinal Survey, and other incidental surveys of transfer programs, provides sufficient opportunity to study these issues in some depth.

3. Political Participation. During the period of Reconstruction, southern freedmen obtained the right to vote and to hold office, rights not universally enjoyed by blacks in the north. But the era of black political activity was shortlived. Within 30 years of the passage of the 15th Amendment in 1870, virtually the entire black population of the South had been disenfranchised by a combination of legal manuevers and local intimidation. States passed residency requirements that tended to eliminate transient share croppers; these were bolstered with literacy laws, Grandfather clauses, and poll taxes, which worked to exclude the poor, whether black or white. The loss of the franchise coincided with the imposition of Jim Crow laws throughout the South in the 1890s so that the social separation and political subordination of black Americans was complete.

Founded in 1909, the NAACP fought in the courts against the disenfranchisement of the black population, but only among a small minority of mainly upper-class blacks in the cities did the tradition of voting and participation in civic affairs survive. On the basis of Ralph Bunche's exhaustive seven-volume study of Negro suffrage in the South (The Political Status of the Negro, unpublished manuscript, 1940), Gunnar Myrdal estimated in 1944 that fewer than 250,000 blacks--approximately five percent of the adult black population--had voted in the preceding five or six years. At the same time, however, black voting strength in the north was beginning to exert influence on national politics. This new-found power, together with the ideological climate of the war years, inspired a process of change that within a generation broke down the major legal barriers to political participation by black Americans and many of the cultural barriers as well.

There is a wealth of information documenting this change to be found in the records and publications of private organizations, in collections of statistics gathered by federal agencies like the Civil Rights Commission and the Census Bureau, and an abundant historical literature detailing the political developments that ultimately allowed the passage of the Voting Rights of 1965, which ushered in what C. Vann Woodward has called the Second Reconstruction. The proposed study will examine the role of private voter registration efforts by the NAACP, the Congress on Racial Equality (CORE), the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), and in the 1960s, the Voter Education Project of the Southern Regional Council (SRC). The NAACP and SRC files are a particularly rich source of data. On the basis of such publications as the annual National Roster of Black Elected Officials of the Joint Center for Political Studies, its recent report, *The Voting Rights Act and Black Electoral Participation* (1982), and reports of the Civil Rights Commission, the study will survey voting statistics over time and plot the rise of the political power of blacks in the number of black office holders and civil servants with policy-making positions. With the aid of census data, it will be possible to describe the population shifts that from the 1940s on gave blacks a power base in many urban centers, as well as the potential effects of more recent population shifts away from urban centers on the political power of blacks. And finally, the study will examine the influence of increased political participation. Possible areas of investigation are the provision of local services such as sidewalks and sewers in black neighborhoods; changes in party politics, for example, adoption of the McGovern rules in the Democratic Party, which require proportional representation; and + effects of black municipal leadership on the economic position of blacks (for example Eisinger's studies for the Institute for Research on Poverty comparing affirmative action data under black-run and white-run city administration and the Russell Sage Foundation survey of *Black Elected Officials* (1976)).

4. *Social and Cultural Pluralism and Integration*. The subordination and cultural isolation of black Americans was accomplished after the abolition of slavery by a series of laws and local ordinances, commonly called Jim Crow laws, which were passed throughout the South in the 1890s. The promise of social equality held out by the

Civil Rights Act of 1875 was as insubstantial as the determination of Southern whites was strong that the two races should be kept apart. Under the constitutional fiction of "separate but equal" treatment, Jim Crow laws mandated separation in schools, in public transportation, in hotels and restaurants, in theaters, movies, public parks, beaches, and in churches, courthouses, and other places where the public life of the community is carried on. In towns with particularly thoroughgoing systems of segregation, blacks were required to step off the sidewalk when whites approached.

Segregation was the institutional expression of the inferior status of blacks. Their social inequality was reinforced through an elaborate etiquette governing interpersonal relations between blacks and whites in the South. These social rituals, like the class etiquette of traditional European societies, functioned to preserve distance between the dominant and subordinate groups despite physical proximity. The forms of address, for example--"Mr." or "Mrs." for whites, first name or "boy" for blacks--were an overt reminder of the social hierarchy and of the subordinate position of blacks in that hierarchy.

Although the separation of the races was not as systematic, rigid, or thoroughgoing in the North, white attitudes toward blacks were ambivalent, and tended to become more negative as the migration of blacks from the rural South to Northern industrial centers progressed. In addition, residential patterns created a de facto segregation that greatly reinforced the cultural isolation of the migrants.

Changes brought about by federal policy, industrial and technological developments, and the civil rights movement during the last 40 years have fundamentally altered race relations in the United States. An important focus of this study will be the role of the federal government in overturning the legal separation of the races and in promoting the integration of blacks into the larger society. The integration of the armed forces is an interesting case in point. Beginning with President Truman's directive ending segregation in the armed forces, the pressure of federal policy gradually broke down internal barriers to the induction, placement, and advancement of blacks in all services and ranks. At the same time, federal policy had a measurable impact on the communities in which military bases were located, particularly in the South and Southwest, since restaurants, bars, theaters, hotels, and other business establishments that discriminated against black soldiers were declared off-limits to all military personnel. A number of important studies, including MacGregor's exhaustive research in military records documenting the process of integration of the armed forces at the policy level, can illuminate this part of the story of blacks in contemporary society.[6]

Another area of dramatic change in the character and tenor of race relations that can be related directly to federal policy was the integration of public facilities and public accommodations. By a series of legal actions in the federal courts, many of them brought by the NAACP, public facilities such as state universities, municipal transit systems, parks, swimming pools, and government buildings were haltingly but inexorably integrated. The integration of public accommodations--restaurants, theaters, stores, bars, hotels--was accomplished under the mandate of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Because these forms of social integration coincided with the growth of nationwide motel and hotel chains, fast food franchises, and shopping centers, local resistance was probably less persistent than it would have been in a more parochial economy. The effects of these changes on blacks and on whites have received a great deal of attention at the hands of sociologists, psychologists, economists, and historians. The committee will want to draw upon this literature in assessing the effects of ending legal segregation on the daily lives of blacks, on the relations between the races, and on racial attitudes of both groups, and in exploring the persistence of informal social segregation.

That significant changes have taken place in racial attitudes in the last 40 years is beyond dispute; the precise nature of these changes, their magnitude, and their implications for the future are less well understood. There exists, however, a large body of research and data on this subject, beginning at least with The American Dilemma itself and extending to more recent efforts by survey researchers to document in a more systematic fashion changes in racial attitudes. Samuel Stouffer's classic study, The American Soldier, published in 1949, includes data on black soldiers' attitudes toward the war, as well as their own status; similarly, the U.S. Office of Facts and Figures and the Office of War Information files contain the results of surveys of the attitudes of both blacks toward whites and whites toward blacks conducted during the early 1940s. Since that time a great many studies have explored the processes of attitude formation, the development of racial stereotypes, and the outcome of these processes through the use of a variety of research methods, ranging from experimentation in laboratory settings to anthropological field work to the analysis of quantitative data generated by public opinion polls. Two current projects deserve mention. The 1982 National Opinion Research Center General Social Survey includes a substantial sub-sample of blacks, who have been asked to respond to a number of questions relating to race; and the National Surveys of Black Americans, conducted by the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan, will soon be publishing both demographic and attitudinal data based on a national sample of adult blacks, the first survey to be based on the total national range of black Americans.

To date, no systematic effort has been made to pull together existing data and research findings regarding racial attitudes and racial differences in attitudes and aspirations from the many diverse sources available and, especially, to attempt to relate this evidence to data on actual changes in the status of blacks. It seems appropriate, therefore, that a working group of the proposed committee be charged with this task. In addition to assembling descriptive data on changes in racial attitudes during the last 40 years, an effort would be made to marshall evidence relating to the causes of observed changes and, insofar as the evidence permits, to explore the complex issue of how attitudes relate to actual behavior.

A pertinent area for the study of attitude and behavior is the question of where people live. Preliminary analysis of the General Social Survey mentioned above has led the NORC staff to conclude that record numbers of whites support racial integration and civil rights for blacks. It is reported that in 1983, 85% of whites are willing to vote for a black president. At the same time, an "all time high" of just 45% among whites would support prohibiting racial discrimination in selling homes.[7] This expression of only modest support for equal access to housing underlines the fact that residential segregation was and still remains one of the most thoroughgoing forms of separation of black Americans from the larger society. Not only did the federal government acquiesce in such devices as the restrictive covenant until the 1950s, certain federal policies actively promoted segregated housing patterns. For example, the Federal Housing Administration, a New Deal agency created after thousands of families lost their homes in the Depression, refused to guarantee mortgages on homes in white neighborhoods purchased by blacks. Likewise, the United States Housing Authority, which provided public housing for the homeless, placed blacks and whites in separate projects.

The federal government became actively involved in promoting fair housing practices with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, commonly referred to as the Fair Housing Act. Title VIII prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin in the sale or rental of most housing. Its provisions cover all facets of real estate, including mortgage lenders, real estate brokers, builders, sellers, apartment owners, and public housing. It prohibits such activities as blockbusting, steering blacks to black neighborhoods, redlining in allocating mortgage loans, as well as all discrimination in the terms or conditions of sale or lease of dwellings. The Department of Housing and Urban Development was empowered by the 1968 Act to investigate complaints and conciliate, but sole enforcement authority was vested in the Department of Justice.

The proposed study will describe federal and state efforts to alter residential segregation, and, on the basis of census data, will analyze housing patterns over the last four or five decades, taking into account the massive migration of southern blacks to northern cities since the 1920s, the process of suburbanization since the 1950s, and other long-term trends that have affected housing patterns.

The investigation of racial differences in the area of housing will address three topics. First, is the question of residential segregation. Is it increasingly the case that blacks and whites live in the same neighborhoods or is our society still moving toward racial polarization as the National Commission on Civil Disorders warned in 1968? Second, there are questions about the quality, the value, and the spaciousness of housing occupied by blacks and whites. Have racial differences on these indicators grown larger or smaller in recent decades? Third, there are questions concerning racial discrimination in the housing market. Are prospective black and white buyers and renters typically shown the same housing units or are blacks and whites steered into different neighborhoods or asked to satisfy different financial requirements?

Questions concerning neighborhood segregation are interesting for a variety of reasons. There are several studies which suggest that residential segregation limits opportunities for blacks and lowers their standards of living. That is, blacks may find themselves concentrated into central city ghettos at a time when cities are facing immense financial difficulties maintaining their schools, their police and fire forces, and their physical facilities. It also appears that employment opportunities are generally declining in central cities--where blacks are found--but increasing in the suburban ring where the population is overwhelmingly white.

There is a large body of research available on housing patterns. A variety of demographic investigators have analyzed census tract and city block statistics from the censuses since 1940 and ward data for earlier enumerations to assess the extent of black-white residential segregation. Data from the Census of 1980 concerning the racial composition of census tracts and city blocks are now available. They will allow an investigator to determine if racial segregation decreased in the 1970s, a decade which differs from earlier periods because of the Fair Housing Act. It will be important not only to assess changes in segregation but also to study the process and rate of neighborhood transition. In addition, several different sources of information are available to demonstrate changes over time in housing quality and tenure for blacks and whites. The decennial enumerations include a Census of Housing and, since 1973, the Bureau of the Census has conducted an Annual Housing Survey which asks a national sample an array of questions about their homes, how they pay for them, and about their neighborhoods. This source will be particularly valuable for determining if the racial gap in housing quality contracted in the 1970s.

5. Health and Demography. The panel on health status is charged with the responsibility of producing a general report analyzing the historical, current, and projected future conditions of blacks in America in the specific area of:

- population structure and geographic location
- fertility patterns
- health and mental health outcomes

In aggregate, the past four decades have seen an extraordinary growth in the health care sector and remarkable biomedical advances. These analyses will identify both absolute and black/white relative positions within the framework of the changing American health achievements of the past four decades in reducing the burden of avoidable illness, disability, and premature death. The definition of burden of illness includes societal costs such as loss of productivity and earnings as well as the personal costs in years of life lost and personal suffering.

The following major areas will be highlighted for data analysis and assessment:

1. A Demographic Profile on the black Population
2. Racial Differences in Mortality and Morbidity
3. Racial Differences in Access to Health Care
4. The Recruitment and Employment of Blacks in Health Fields
5. Black Families
6. The Health and Economic Status of Elderly Blacks

The concern for the health of black Americans is high on the national agenda and there are recent national studies that can provide a useful starting point and serve as additional resources for the work of the Panel on the Health Status of Black Americans. These include:

1. Task Force on Black and Minority Health initiated by the Secretary of Health and Human Services in February 1984, and being carried out across the component agencies of the U.S. Public Health Service.
2. Institute of Medicine Conferences and Studies
    a. Behavior, Health Risks, and Social Disadvantage
    b. Health in the Context of Civil Rights
    c. Preventing Low Birthweight

In general, excellent data exist for carrying out the work of the panel. There are rich resources of the National Center for Health Statistics that have been recorded giving separate black/white data. Many of these have been analyzed. There are valuable raw data on tapes that require analysis and further study. In addition, there are many excellent independent studies of health issues pertaining to blacks.

There are, however, some notable gaps in the published literature, resulting from variations in the scope of the analysis and the perspective applied to the data, or limitations of data-gathering procedures. In such cases, the panel will draw on unpublished data sources and commission special analyses of existing data sets, as appropriate.

Detailed Description of the Issues

A. A Demographic Profile on the Black Population

First, the panel will provide a demographic profile of the black population. This will include a description of recent trends in population growth, fertililty, mortality, and population distribution. Changes occurring among blacks will be contrasted to similar trends for the white and for the total population. Recent and future changes in the age composition of the blacks will be discussed and the increasing role which Caribbean immigration plays in the growth of the black population will be noted. Using a set of charts, graphs, and tables, the panel will provide the information which will be incorporated into the committee's final report and serve as background materials for the investigations of the four other panels.

The work of the health panel in describing demographic trends will be articulated with that of the economics and socio-cultural panels. We anticipate that the panel on the economic status of blacks will study recent trends in black migration in response to changing economic opportunities. Although the health panel will provide information about the concentration of blacks in central cities and their underrepresentation in the suburban ring, it will be the social and cultural panel which will describe the causes and consequences of racial residential segregation.

B. Racial Differences in Mortality and Morbidity

The second major aim of the health panel will be to precisely describe the profile of racial differences in mortality and morbidity. There is a continuing notable differential in life span among blacks and whites. According to life tables of the 1940s, this difference averages about eleven years. Gains have been made in the ensuing decades but the racial differences persist: about six years according to the life tables of the early 1980s. Some mortality rates, for example those of young adult men and those of infants, are much higher among blacks than whites. Indeed, the two to one ratio of infant mortality rates has persisted since the 1950s.

As a first step the health panel will thoroughly analyze racial differences in mortality by age and by cause. Efforts will be made to understand why racial differences have contracted at some ages but widened at others. The report of this panel will discuss and evaluate the possible impact of various medical procedures which may be used to lengthen the life span of blacks. For example, preventive interventions, use of medical high technology, advanced surgical procedures and other techniques. There are large racial differences in the frequency with which procedures such as heart by-pass surgery and cesarean sections are used. The panel will determine why there are such differences and their consequences for the health of blacks.

Racial differences in morbidity and other indicators of health or emotional well-being will also be investigated. On some measures such as the height and weight of children or teenagers, there are small and insignificant racial differences. On other indicators, blacks are clearly at a disadvantage since obesity is more common among adult black women and rates of hypertension are higher for blacks than whites beginning in the teen ages. Other measures which reflect health status such as work days lost because of illness or early withdrawal from the work force due to disability also indicate that blacks are at a racial disadvantage. An important aspect of the panel's work, therefore, will be to investigate racial differences in job-related health hazards.

Homicide, accidents, and suicide are major causes of mortality and morbidity among black youths and adults. Recently, the Center for Disease Control recognized violence as a major health problem. Violence will be included prominently in the studies of the panel on health.

This investigation of morbidity will not be confined to physical ailments. A series of studies with national and local samples demonstrate that blacks typically score much higher than whites on standardized tests measuring psychological depression. The panel will attempt to describe the psychological status of blacks as well as other indicators of emotional health.

C. Racial Differences in Access to Health Care

Studies of the social history of medicine suggest that blacks have often lagged far behind whites in obtaining the benefits of public health programs or medical services in general. This was attributable, in part, to their isolation in the rural South and to their poverty. Passage of the Social Security Act in 1935 was, without doubt, a benefit to blacks since it funded public health programs in many areas where they had not previously existed. Quite likely, the development of Medicare and Medicaid programs in the 1960s and their subsequent expansion also improved health conditions among blacks by providing services for many people who could not otherwise afford them. Despite this obvious progress, there still appear to be substantial differences in access to health care. For example, blacks and whites hardly differ in the frequency with which they visit doctors or medical facilities but blacks are much more likely than whites to obtain their care in emergency rooms. Although racial differences have declined in recent years, pregnant white women still visit physicians more often than pregnant black women and begin their prenatal care earlier in their pregnancies.

The health panel will describe current racial differences in the actual use of medical care in the United States and the implications these have for morbidity and mortality. Insofar as possible, the panel will investigate why differentials in the utilization of health care persist. Is this largely a question of cost or are there ecological factors which make medical care more accessible for some than for others. Racial differences in the use of medical procedures and in the use of diagnoses will also be discussed. The probable implications of changes in the financing of health care, especially changes in funding from the federal government, will be examined. There appears to be a pattern of reductions in the provision of health insurance coverage by employers and the consequences of this will be described.

Cost containment for health services is a major issue on the national agenda. It can be forseen that these efforts will have significant impacts on service delivery to blacks. The options, as they exist and can be projected, will be analyzed.

D. *The Recruitment and Employment of Blacks in Health Fields*

Blacks are quite well represented as employees in the health care industry. However, their distribution across occupational categories is unlike that of whites. An unusually large proportion of the manual and semi-skilled workers employed by hospitals and custodial institutions are blacks. At the professional ranks, blacks are greatly underrepresented. If there are trends toward significant reductions in hospital care, they will have a substantial effect upon employment opportunities for blacks.

The health panel intends to explore and then summarize findings with regard to several aspects of these issues. First, there will be a description of the representation of blacks among health care professionals. Trends across the past four decades in the proportion of blacks among those who became doctors, dentists, pharmicists, or nurses will be analyzed. How do the admission and recruitment programs used by training institutions facilitate or hinder the admission of blacks? How successful are the various efforts which were made to increase the number of black health care professionals?

Second, the committee will investigate the implications of the apparent underrepresentation of blacks in these occupations. Health surveys conducted by the National Center for Health Statistics find that older blacks have a much higher rate of dental problems than comparable whites. Blacks are quite poorly represented among the nation's dentists. Is there a link or are the dental problems of blacks attributable to other causes? In the *Bakke* decision, there are arguments that increasing the number of black doctors would, *ceteris paribus*, lead to better health care for blacks. What is known about this? Would an increase in the number of black health care professionals reduce racial differences in morbidity and mortality?

Third, this panel will describe the employment of blacks at all levels in the health care field. This industrial sector is now one of the largest and most rapidly growing components of the economy. Many blacks--and whites--begin their careers in jobs in medical institutions. To what extent are opportunities available to blacks on a nondiscriminatory basis? If there are basic changes in the financing of health care, will employment opportunities for blacks expand or contract? This work on employment in the health field will be closely linked to that of the panel which will describe the economic status of blacks.

E. Black Families

The panel on health is charged with responsibility for describing population structure and fertility patterns. The timing of childbearing, of course, has many important medical, social, and economic consequences. For these reasons, this panel has a deep interest in black families and will treat this topic as one of its six major concerns.

Black birth rates declined to a very low level in the 1980s. Indeed, were there no international immigration, the black population would now be approaching zero population growth. There is also evidence that racial differences in completed family size are disappearing since black women who were born around 1960 will bear an average of just over two children in their lifetimes compared to just under two for similar white women. However, there is an increasing racial divergence with regard to the timing of childbearing. Black women concentrate their fertility into the early years of their reproductive span while white women delay starting their families. At present, near-record high proportions of white women are childless when they reach age 30 but among blacks, the proportion childless at 30 is close to a record low.

There is also an increasing racial divergence in the marital status of mothers. Despite a decrease in the rate at which unmarried black women bear children, the proportion of births out-of-wedlock has increased because of the very rapid fall in marital fertility. The majority of black children now begin their lives with a mother who has no husband to help support the family or to provide child care.

In many important areas, gaps are beginning to be identified where new analyses are needed or critical reviews of existing data are required. Some of these are:

a. the history of changing black/white family forms in America
b. the analysis of family forms in relation to child socialization, maternal work patterns, and welfare payments
c. studies of single parenting in other western industrial nations which may shed light on the antecedents and the efficacy of a variety of societal remedies
d. the status of black males which is a neglected area of great importance for our understanding of family formation and dissolution

F. The Health and Economic Status of Elderly Blacks

One of the benefits of reductions in mortality is a sharp increase in the proportion of blacks who survive to retirement age. An important consequence of the decline in black fertility is a change in age structure such that the elderly become a larger share of the total population. As a result, there will be a rapid growth of elderly blacks in both absolute numbers and as a proportion of the total black population. Many of these individuals face numerous health problems and almost all of them are supported by transfer payments rather than their own earnings.

The health panel will assemble and analyze baseline information about the health and economic status of older blacks. They will, of course, be compared to whites. This study will describe who provides for the health needs of the elderly, how much care is provided relative to what is needed, and what would be the implications of changes in health care financing. This will be done in conjunction with an investigation of the income and assets of the elderly. A useful source of data will be the Census Bureau's new Survey of Income and Program Participation. This will not only give us information about insurance coverage and income but also includes an enumeration of an individual's financial assets. Preliminary work suggests that one of the major reasons why elderly black women are more frequently below the poverty line than similar whites is that older white women much more often report income from interest, rents, dividends, and annuities than do black women. Racial differences in marital status and in asset accumulation at younger ages apparently have a great impact upon the economic status of the elderly.

In summary, the health panel will provide a demographic profile of the black population, will describe racial trends and differences in mortality and morbidity, will analyze racial differences in access to health care, will describe the recruitment and employment of blacks in the health care industry, will describe and analyze the childbearing patterns and family structure of American blacks, and will assess the health and economic status of elderly blacks.

Data Sources

Throughout this nation's history, many social and economic statistics have been tabulated by race. Indeed, one of the most controversial topics the framers of the Constitution faced was how to count blacks in the first census for purposes of representation. This wealth of data means that an analyst can readily assemble substantial information about racial differences at various points in time. Lengthy monographs about the status of blacks appeared following the censuses of 1910, 1930, and 1960. Of course, one is not restricted to the decennial censuses because many national surveys of social and economic conditions have been conducted since the 1940s.

It is especially appropriate to undertake a study of the status of blacks in the United States at this time for three reasons. First, data from the Census of 1980 are now available which will permit scholars to describe the changing status of blacks in the 1970s and to determine whether the gains blacks made in the 1960s continued into the 1970s or were canceled out by the economic setbacks and inflation of that decade. The Census Bureau has already published a brief statistical overview of America's black population, 1970-1982.[8] And a more ambitious project is underway. A National Committee for Research on the 1980 Census, chaired by Charles F. Westoff, has been established to plan a series of monographs on major demographic aspects of American society. Volumes have been commissioned on black/white differences, ethnic and racial groups, living standards and the distribution of income, housing, and other pertinent topics. These Census monographs will make a vital contribution to the descriptive material available about the current status of black Americans.

Second, data on individuals from the censuses of 1940 and 1950 is just becoming publicly available. Until now an investigator who wished to describe racial differences for those years was restricted to published cross tabulations. It will soon be possible to create new tabulations or use statistical models based upon data for individuals, as the researchers at the Bureau of the Census and the University of Wisconsin complete their work with the 1940 and 1950 enumeration forms. This information will not, of course, provide the names and specific addresses of persons counted in those censuses. Rather it will be a tape file of data for persons providing some geographic detail but not enough to violate confidentiality. Similar individual level tape files now exist for the 1960 and 1970 censuses and will soon be available from the 1980 enumeration.

These data sources will give us a 40-year span for which we can study geographic changes and alterations in the social characteristics and economic status of black Americans. It will be particularly important to study the 1940s since blacks left the rural South and took industrial jobs in the north and west in great numbers during that decade. Additionally, it was the decade in which federal efforts were first directed toward equal employment opportunities through use of the Fair Employment Practices Commission.

Third, the civil rights activities of the early 1960s, the "War on Poverty" of the late 1960s, and the general expansion of governmental support for social and welfare program toward the end of the 1960s and into the 1970s, led to the development of several new national surveys and the expansion of others. For example, in 1967 there was a large survey entitled the Survey of Economic Opportunity that gathered information about the population living in poverty and about welfare levels. In 1976, a similar investigation, the Survey of Income and Education was conducted and obtained social and economic information from about 150,000 households. Other national data surveys were initiated during this period, incuding the Criminal Victimization Survey and the Annual Housing Survey. An investigation of racial integration of public schools was first carried out in 1967 and then repeated regularly through 1980. Following enactment of the voting rights acts of the early 1960s, the Census Bureau began to gather and tabulate information about who is registered and who actually votes in federal elections.

Many of the more important data sources for this study of racial differences were collected outside the federal government. We have already described the value of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics conducted at the University of Michigan and the National Longitudinal Study at Ohio State. Other information about the economic status of black Americans and the implications of various policies is provided by the evaluation studies of the income maintenance experiments which took place in Seattle, Denver, and other locations. The Joint Center for Political Studies, a Washington, D.C.-based research organization, has for years gathered data on black voting statistics and political participation and more recently has done work in the area of population redistribution and demographic trends. Throughout the 1970s, the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago asked national samples of both blacks and whites a wide array of attitudinal questions including their feelings about current racial issues.

Clearly quantitative data is far richer for the recent period than for the 1940s and 1950s. For example, little data was collected by race through the school systems before the Coleman study and the Civil Rights surveys. Furthermore, not all of the important questions will be illuminated by quantitative data. The success of the study will depend on a delicate balance between the analysis of aggregate data sets and more finely tuned historical and anthropological observation. Yet the empirical base is rich, if fragmented. It awaits only the sort of collaborative effort envisioned to bring together many discrete bodies of information into a far richer understanding of the quality of life of black Americans than now exists.

Plan for the Study

The proposed study would be conducted under the supervision of the Commission of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education of the National Research Council over a period of 3 years by a committee of approximately 20 distinguished scientists and other experts, chosen in accordance with established procedures of the National Academy of Sciences and appointed by the chairman of the National Research Council. Members of the committee would be drawn from all of the relevant social science disciplines, including economics, statistics, sociology, demography, political science, history, law, anthropology, geography, and social psychology. Particular care would be taken to ensure adequate representation of minorities on the committee; however, such individuals would be selected for their substantive expertise and not as formal representatives of civil rights or other interest groups. Major additional criteria for selection of members of the committee would be familiarity with existing data relevant to the status of blacks, expertise in the analysis and interpretation of complex quantitative and qualitative data, and an understanding of the institutional contexts within which social change occurs. The committee chairman would be chosen for his or her scientific expertise and demonstrated ability to organize and lead such a major study.

The committee would meet as a whole approximately 11 times during the 3-year period of the study and would establish four working groups or subcommittees corresponding to the major substantive areas described above. Each working group would be composed of several members of the committee, with the possible addition of consultants selected for their special expertise in its area. Working groups would be asked to identify, assemble, and analyze, with the assistance of staff, relevant data and research findings for incorporation into the committee's summary report and, in some cases, to prepare a more detailed report for publication as a separate volume. It is expected that each working group would meet approximately five times during the course of the study (see below).

Commissioned Papers/Special Analyses

Provision is made in the attached estimate of costs for the committee and its working groups to commission up to 10 papers and/or special analyses of existing data from individual experts or research organizations having access to major data sets. No major data collection efforts are envisioned; however, opportunities may arise during the course of the study to obtain at modest cost new data relevant to specific issues being addressed by the committee or its working groups.

In addition, at the request of the Ford Foundation, the study committee will commission up to ten individually authored papers focussing on the future status of black Americans. These papers, plus the committee's report, will provide the basis for a major national convocation to be held during the six-month period following completion of the study.

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Generalizations from Research in Second Language Acquisition and Bilingualism

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Opening Remarks:

I appear as an advocate, not of any particular instructional practice over another, but of good sound research to inform policy about bilingualism in the educational process of language minority children. I'd like to begin by distinguishing between two different kinds of research: *evaluation research* to look at the effectiveness of particular instructional approaches that have been adopted by different school districts (such as bilingual education versus English as a Second Language) on the one hand, and *basic research* to understand the psychological and linguistic processes involved in bilingualism on the other.

My personal opinion is that evaluation research on the effectiveness of programs -- the kinds of studies that have been referred to by Secretary Bennett in his speech yesterday -- are terribly difficult to conduct and bound to produce equivocal results. For one, any educator who has been involved in bilingual education knows that labels such as "bilingual education" or "English as a Second Language" are not mutually exclusive, and even if one were to succeed in labelling programs in this manner, that there are tremendous variations within each of these program types. Thus, it is unclear what these comparisons are a comparison of. Another problem is that whenever one conducts a research study comparing two school districts that use different instructional methods, the research methodology assumes that the districts did not self-select a method that is best for them -- researchers call this random assignment to condition. Unless this condition is met, the findings are difficult to interpret. There are no evaluation studies in which the program type has been prescribed to randomly selected sites, subsequent to which their effectiveness has been evaluated.

Rather than attempting to evaluate which type of program is more effective, I advocate the basic research approach, where we begin with what we know about the phenomenon of bilingualism at the individual psychological level of the child. Let's see what scientific data exists about bilingualism in children, and use this as a way of formulating guidelines about bilingual education policy. We get so caught up in the politics of what it means to allow a non-English language into a public institution, that it is all too easy to forget that we are dealing with individual children. Psychological research can tell us what is in fact happening in the development of these children. The following conclusions can be drawn from basic research, and provide support for the efficacy of the use of the native language in instruction even when the goal of the bilingual education is to prepare the student for participation in an English-speaking society.

Some general points about bilingualism:

o "bilingualism" is a catch-all word referring to all kinds of characteristics about individuals and about social groups, and this has led to confusion about policy on bilingualism; for example, classrooms labelled as "bilingual" does not mean that it contains children who are themselves bilingual;

o research on bilingualism has been conducted in different cultural settings, and research findings should only be cautiously generalized across those settings; for example, many misunderstandings have resulted from attempts to directly translate Canadian research to the United States setting. The social status of the group that is bilingual plays a large role in the outcomes.

Some specific conclusions:

(1) about the importance of a good foundation in language development for second language acquisition and for academic learning:

(a) second language acquisition is most successful when there is a strong foundation in the first language;

(b) children can become fluent in a second language without losing the first language; maintenance of the first language does not retard the development of the second language;

(2) about the relationship between language and academic learning:

(a) language is used not just for conversation and communication, but also for thinking and learning;

(b) conversational skills in a second language are learned earlier than the ability to use the language for academic learning;

(c) bilingualism in children --- in the sense of being able to use both languages in academic rather than conversational settings --- is associated with the development of the ability to think abstractly about language and to appreciate its form, as well as with the development of cognitive skills in general;

(d) academic skills learned in school transfer readily from one language to the other, so that skills taught in the native language in transitional bilingual programs do not have to be re-learned in English;

(3) about differences between people in the extent of second language acquisition:

(a) the ability to use language effectively for conversation does not imply an ability to use it well in academic tasks, nor does ability to use language in academic tasks imply good conversational skills; both skills need to be developed and evaluated;

(b) some of the differences between individuals in their ability to use language in conversations is due to attitude, motivation, and other personality factors;

(c) some of the differences between individuals in their ability to use language in academic learning is attributable to their aptitude and basic intelligence;

(4) about the difference between young children, older children, and adults:

(a) older children acquire the second language more quickly because they have a stronger base in the first language;

(b) adults are as capable as are children of acquiring a second language, with the possible exception of accent;

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FINAL REPORT

The Causal Relationship between the Development of Bilingualism, Cognitive Flexibility, and Social-Cognitive Skills in Hispanic Elementary School Children

December 31, 1984

NIE-G-81-0123

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SUMMARY

The project addressed the question of bilingualism and cognitive ability in bilingual children. The long tradition of research in this area has varied with respect to subject populations, methodology employed, and fundamental questions asked by social scientists. A comprehensive review of the early literature (culminating in an annotated bibliography) revealed that the early work was embedded in the nature/nurture controversy of intelligence that permeated American psychology at the turn of the century. Bilingualism as a test-taking factor came to be seen as a trait of the bilingual individual. More recent research with better-endowed middle class populations suggested that bilingualism might have positive effects on cognitive ability. Review of this research, however, suggested several limitations. Group comparisons of bilinguals and monolinguals are confounded with sociological factors that correlate with differential language use. Correlational studies also do not allow inferences about direction of causality. The focus on balanced bilinguals (those with

approximate equal levels of proficiency in both languages) also left unaccounted the cognitive performance of non-balanced bilinguals. Furthermore, studies were not conducted with appropriate blind procedures. The present empirical effort aimed at an investigation of the problem in the context of a transitional bilingual education program in the United States, where primarily non-balanced bilinguals are found.

Subjects were elementary school students (K-6) in the Bilingual Program in New Haven, Connecticut. Over the course of three years, a total of 342 subjects participated in the study. Subjects were tested in the fall and spring of each school year. Supplemental data on the home backgrounds of all Hispanic students in the New Haven schools were collected, in order to place the study sample of bilingual program students in the framework of the entire Hispanic population. Analyses revealed that bilingual program students were from a predictably select sector of the population, with greater orientation towards use of Spanish at home. In general, there appears to be a subtractive bilingual situation, with those individuals with increasing use of English showing lesser use of Spanish.

Measures for the study included the following. English and Spanish abilities were measured using respective versions of the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test, validated against independent measures of oral proficiency in each language on a subset of our sample. Metalinguistic ability for the younger cohorts (K-3) was assessed through their judgments of the grammatical acceptability of Spanish sentences. Metalinguistic ability in older children (Grades 4-6) was measured through a test requiring detection of ambiguous sentences. Nonverbal ability was measured using the Raven's Coloured Progressive Matrices and the spatial relations subtests of Thurstone's Primary Mental Abilities. In the younger cohorts, a measure of social perspective taking was adapted into Spanish

Data were analyzed primarily through correlational procedures English and Spanish abilities showed increasing correlation over time. The effect of bilingualism on the dependent measures was assessed through partial correlations (the correlation between English and the dependent measures, controlling for Spanish and for Age). The effect of verbal ability in Spanish was also assessed by its correlation with the dependent measures, controlling for English and Age. In both our cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses, there were statistically reliable effects of bilingualism on the dependent measures, although the magnitude of the effect and the statistical reliability varied over time and grade level. The most consistent relationship with bilingualism was found in the nonverbal measure of Raven's. Effects also appeared, although more sporadically, on metalinguistic awareness and the measure of social perspective-taking. Spanish showed its most consistent relationship with metalinguistic ability, which was expected since the measure consisted of Spanish sentences. The results in general support the position of a positive relationship between biligualism and cognitive ability even in non-balanced bilinguals. Cause-effect assessments were difficult to make, due to the high rate of mobility in this population. Furthermore, fluctuations in the correlations over time could be due to true changes in the relationship between the measures, or to changes in the reliability of the measures over time. The longitudinal aspect of the study provided solid support for the position of linguistic interdependence. Over time, there was an increasing correlation between English and Spanish, even when controlling for age.

The study suggested several directions for future efforts in this area. First, the results of this study are encouraging of a more theoretically-driven effort to understand what particular aspects of cognition are affected by bilingualism. Particularly intriguing is why effects of bilingualism might be found not just in the domain of metalinguistic awareness, but in nonverbal abilities as well. In fact, there were more consistent relationships found for the nonverbal than for the verbal measures. It would appear that this phenomenon demands explanation, either at the theoretical or methodological levels. Naturally, the theoretical problems raised here place the present research question solidly in the heart of traditional questions regarding the relationship of language and thought. Second, and related to the first point above, we should move from static accounts of individual cognitive and linguistic ability towards more process-oriented investigations, both at the individual cognitive and social-interactional levels. Third, the meaning of bilingualism to any given individual should be elucidated. In the case of our subjects, in the context of a bilingual program where emphasis is on the acquisition of English, development of English is practically synonymous with the ability to learn in the classroom context. Essentially, this point advocates a clearer articulation of the definition of the bilingual individual.

As a final suggestion, the individuals should be contextualized within a population of bilinguals, as this study began to do through tis population survey. We need a better understanding of the dynamic changes occurring in bilingual communities to better understand the subjects we designate as "bilingual." That is to say, the treatment, bilingualism, must be unpacked from both its individual and societal labels.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KIM COOK, M.S.W., EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, MUTUAL ASSISTANCE CONSORTIUM, ARLINGTON, VA

For the last ten years about 800,000 Indochinese refugees have been admitted into the U. S. Many more thousands are still suffering in refugee camps waiting for admission. Many are waiting in Viet Nam to be reunited with their families in America theough the Orderly Departure Program. The refugee community views the resettlement not as a program, but a personal investment. In spite of the fact that there are many governmental and federally funded programs to provide services for the refugees, it is the relative, the family and the refugee community that provide on-going moral and material support for the new comers. Because of the informal nature of this helping system, unfortunately, it is difficult to document the tremendous volume of self-help that the refugees have contributed to the resettlement efforts.

In a recent survey conducted, the Indochinese Refugee Action Center (IRAC) over 800 Mutual Assistance Associations were identified. These MAAs are self-help, community based organizations formed by former refugees to assist their fellos men to adjust to the new society. The services given by the MAAs range from cultural activities to employment and mental health services (see enclosed table).

It is widely recognized that ethnic communities are essential in the assimulation process of new immigrants in the new culture. Refugees self-help organizations have proven that their services are more culturally appropriate and therefore more effective, both in terms of monetary and human costs. With sufficient support and encouragement from policy makers, as well as program administrators at federal, state and local governments, the MAAs can certainly play a major role in the resettlement of refugees today and the development of a richer pluralistic society for America Tomorrow.

INDOCHINA RESOURCE ACTION CENTER
SURVEY OF MAAS
March 1985

RESPONSE RATE	73%
Responded	77
Did not respond	28

MAA OF WHICH ETHNIC GROUP?

Cambodian	10
Hmong/Highlander	25
Lowland Lao	4
Vietnamese	22
Ethnic Chinese	2
Refugee Consortia	11
Cuban Entrant	0
Ethiopian	1
Haitian Entrant	2

SERVICES PROVIDED

ESL/VESL	38
Job Placement	55
Vocational Training	22
Translation	60
Transportation	44
Orientation	56
Mental Health	27
Information & Referral	61
Housing	43
Business/Economic Development	26
Other	30

ETHNIC GROUPS SERVED

Cambodians	39
Hmong/Highlanders	39
Lowland Lao	47
Vietnamese	45
Ethnic Chinese	25
Cuban Entrants	1
Ethiopians	5
Haitian Entrants	2
Others	18